'I' Before 'E’ (especially after ‘C’) in Semantics: Church, Chomsky, & Constrained Composition
These are the power point slides for a recent talk stressing the
I-language/E-language distinction in the context of semantic
composition, logical vocabulary, and the lexical item 'most'.
Interrogatives, Instructions, and I-languages: an I-Semantics for Questions, coauthored with Terje Lohndal (Linguistic Analysis 37:459-510, 2011).
The basic idea is simple: an "instructionist" conception of meaning,
along lines developed in the paper above, can easily accommodate an
attractive internalist version of the old force/content distinction;
and there are interesting implications for the syntax/semantics of
relative clauses and "sentential" expressions. I never intended to have
views about--much less write a paper about--interrogatives. But my
co-author was persuasive.
Describing I-junction (to appear in a volume for a 2011 conference in Beijing, further details TBA).
The meaning of a noun phrase like ‘brown cow’, or ‘cow that ate grass’,
is somehow conjunctive. But conjunctive in what sense? Are the meanings
of other phrases—e.g, ‘ate quickly’, ‘ate grass’, and ‘at
noon’—similarly conjunctive? I suggest a possible answer, in the
context of a broader conception of natural language semantics.
Language and Conceptual Reanalysis (in Towards a Biolinguistic Understanding of Grammar: Essays on Interfaces,
edited by A. DiSciullo, in press John Benjamin). In the same vein as
the paper above, but longer, more detailed, and drawing some
connections to Frege's notion of fruitful definitions.
Minimal Semantic Instructions
(in the Oxford Handbook of
Linguistic Minimalism, edited by Cedric Boeckx, 2011).
This is an attempt work out, for a range of basic constructions, the
idea of meanings as "instructions to assemble conjunctive concepts."
This paper, mainly devoted to technical details and minimalist
reasoning, forms a pair with Concepts, Meanings, and
Truth: First Nature, Second
Nature, and Hard Work (listed below under Semantic Internalism). And with regard to the syntactic details, I draw on
the paper below.
Basic Operations, coauthored with
Norbert Hornstein (Catalan Journal of
Linguistics 8: 113-39, 2009).
This programmatic paper offers a minimalist conception of syntax and
semantics, with the broader aim of idenifying the fundamental
composition operations employed by the human faculty of language. With
regard to syntax, the leading idea is that the operation MERGE can and
should be decomposed into simpler operations of concatenation and
labeling; where the latter may reflect what is distinctive about human
language. With regard to semantics, the leading idea is that
concatenation is an instruction to conjoin monadic concepts, while
labels are vehicles for introducing thematic concepts in a constrained
way.
Systematicity via Monadicity (Croatian Journal of Philosophy
7:343-374, 2007)
This is the written version of a conference presentation in Dubrovnik
(Fall 2006). I argue that a "Conjunctivist" conception of
semantic composition, of the sort articulated in the paper below, helps
explain many otherwise puzzling features of natural
language. More speculatively, a Conjunctivist language faculty might
also help explain why human thought is as systematic as it is.
Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual Polyadicity
A newer discussion of material from the paper above, to appear in
the Oxford Handbook of
Compositionality, edited by Werning/Machery/Hinzen...
Quantification
and Second-Order Monadicity (Philosophical
Perspectives 17: 259-298, 2003).
The first part of this paper reviews some developments regarding the
apparent mismatch between the logical and grammatical forms of
quantificational constructions like 'Pat kicked every bottle'. I
suggest that (even given quantifier-raising) many current theories
still posit an undesirable mismatch. But all is well if we can treat determiners (words
like 'every', 'no', and 'most') as second-order monadic predicates without treating them as predicates
satisfied by ordered pairs of sets.
Drawing on George Boolos's construal of second-order quantification as
plural quantification, I argue that we can and should view determiners
as predicates satisfied (plurally) by ordered pairs each of which
associates an entity with a truth-value (t or f). The idea is 'every' is satisfied
by some pairs iff every one of them associates its entity with t. It turns out that this provides a
kind of explanation for the "conservativity" of determiners. And it
lets us say that concatenation signifies predicate-conjunction even in
phrases like 'every bottle' and 'no brown dog'.
Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity
without Synonymy
(in Chomsky and His Critics, edited [heroically] by Louise
Antony and
Norbert Hornstein, Blackwell 2003)
You may need to "Rotate View, Clockwise" to get the .pdf file to appear
properly.
This paper was written in 1998, and so may be past
its
use-by date. Updated versions of various bits of the paper appear
elsewhere; see note 1.
More Truth in Advertising: I'm not criticizing Chomsky; though I am
being critical, and Chomsky does figure prominently.
The idea, as the subtitle suggests, is that there are analytic
truths--even if the notion of synonymy is suspect. The trick involves
(can you guess?) combining, in the right way, a neo-Davidsonian event
semantics with a Minimalist syntax. Blatant Advertising: get hold of
the entire book if only for Chomsky's replies; for anyone interested
Chomsky's conception of meaning (and his semantic internalism), see especially
his replies to Egan, Rey, Ludlow, Horwich, and Pietroski.
Function
and Concatenation (in Logical Form, edited by G.
Preyer
and G. Peters, OUP 2002).
Explores the idea that concatenating natural language expressions
corresponds to predicate-conjunction, as opposed to
function-application. The proposal is developed in more detail in Events
and Semantic Architecture (OUP 2005). But the paper gives
the main idea, in the context of questions about how natural language
syntax is related to Logical Form.
Interpreting
Concatenation and Concatenates (Philosophical
Issues 16:221-45, 2006).
This paper presents a slightly modified version of the compositional
semantics proposed in Events and Semantic Architecture.
Some readers may find this shorter version, which ignores issues about
vagueness and causal
constructions, easier to digest. The emphasis is on the treatments of
plurality and quantification, and I assume at least some familiarity
with more standard approaches. Space constraints caused the final
document to be considerably shorter
than drafts with homophonous titles. The paper above (Systematicity via Monadicity) is a kind of
companion piece,
showing how to locate the proposed conception of semantic
composition in the context of more general attempts to simplify
(or "minimize") theories of linguistic competence, with the aim of
isolating the distinctively human aspects of the human language
faculty. There are
points of contact with recent suggestions by Elizabeth Spelke and her
colleagues; see also the BBS
paper by Peter Carruthers, my colleague in philosophy at Maryland.
To Be a Value of a Plural Variable, You
Don't Have to Be Plural (You Just Have to Be)
This is something between a handout and a paper. It focusses on an
idea, acquired from George Boolos, discussed in the papers immediately
above and below. For purposes of giving a compositional semantic theory
for a natural
language, we can and should allow for genuinely plural variables; where
a genuinely plural variable is one that has more than one value
relative to each assignment of values to variables.
Induction
and Comparison (Maryland
Working Papers in Linguistics, 15: 157-90, 2006)
This speculative paper is an attempt to say why Frege's Theorem
might bear, in interesting ways, on several issues in linguistics.
Does
Every Sentence Like This Exhibit A Scope Ambiguity? coauthored with
Norbert Hornstein
(in Belief and Meaning, edited by W. Hinzen and H. Rott,
Hansel-Hohenhausen 2002)
The answer is 'no'. Instances of 'every F likes some G' may not, after
all, be examples of scope ambiguity.
Figuring out whether a given expression with multiple quantifiers is
semantically ambiguous is hard
On
Explaining That (Journal of Philosophy 97: 665-62, 2000)
How can a speaker can explain that P without explaining the fact that
P, or explain the fact that P without explaining that P, even when it
is true (and so a fact) that P? Or in formal mode: what is the semantic
contribution of 'explain' such that 'She explained that P' can be true,
while 'She explained the fact that P' is false (or vice versa),
even when 'P' is true? The proposed answer is that 'explained' is a
semantically monadic predicate, satisfied by events of explaining. But
'the fact that P' (a determiner phrase) and 'that P' (a complementizer
phrase) get associated with different thematic roles, corresponding to
the distinction between a thing explained and the content of a speech
act.
The
Undeflated Domain of Semantics (Sats: The Nordic Journal
of
Philosophy 1: 161-76, 2000).
A reply to Horwich-style "deflationary" conceptions of meaning,
focussing on the importance of "negative" semantic facts.
An edited version of this paper appears in Reading
Philosophy of Language, edited by Jennifer Hornsby and Guy
Longworth.
Event Variables and Framing Effects
These are the power point slides for a recent talk at a conference organized by the graduate student PHLING group at Maryland.
Concepts, Meanings, and Truth: First Nature,
Second
Nature, and Hard Work (Mind and Language 25: 247-78, 2010).
The idea is that lexical expressions of a human I-language let children
use available concepts to introduce formally distinct "I-concepts,"
which can then be combined via operations invoked by phrasal
syntax. So while "prelexical" concepts may not exhibit the kind of
systematicity required for truth, I-concepts do. But various empirical
considerations suggest that I-concepts are massively monadic, and
that the relevant "I-operations" are fundamentally conjunctive. This, I
claim, makes it implausible that I-concepts are true of
language-independent things. Meanings can be viewed as instructions to
assemble concepts that make it possible for humans to have
truth-evaluable thoughts. But forming such concepts requires
independent cognitive work, not just a language with a compositional
semantics. This paper, which abstracts from the technical details,
forms a pair with Minimal Semantic Instructions
(listed above under Compositional Semantics).
Meaning
Before Truth (Contextualism in Philosophy,
edited by G.
Preyer
and G. Peters, OUP 2005).
This paper extends the line of thought
in "The Character of Natural Language Semantics." A running theme is
that Chomsky offers a conception of semantics that
lets us preserve what is right about truth-conditional semantics--and
this has less to do with truth than the usual rhetoric suggests--while
also preserving late-Wittgensteinian/Austinian insights about the
relation between truth, meaning, and context. There are three main
sections: one about the relevance of negative facts (and nativism) for
semantics, and why this tells against both "deflationary" conceptions
of meaning and Quine-Davidson "interpretability" conceptions; one that
reviews some familiar reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that names
denote things in the environment; and one that concedes externalism
about truth, while noting that externalism about linguistic meaning
does not follow. The paper ends with a brief tour of some alternatives,
and some familiar reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that predicates
are satisfied by things in the environment. A handout elaborates this line of thought (in a
handouty way).
The Meaning of 'Most': semantics, numerosity, and
psychology, coauthored with: Jeff Lidz, Justin
Halberda, and Tim Hunter
(Mind and Language, 24:554-85,
2009).
The title is descriptive. We offer experimental evidence in support of
a certain view about how the meaning of the English determiner 'most'
is related to various psychological capacities potentially relevant to
human capacities for counting and quantifying. In this first
installment of an ongoing project, we offer experimental evidence
that adult speakers of English do indeed understand sentences like
'Most of the dots are blue' in terms of cardinality comparison (as
opposed to, say, one-to-one correspondence). We also make some
tentative suggestions about how the meaning of 'most' is related to
potential verification procedures and the "analog magnitude system"
that humans share with other animals.
Interface Transparency and the
Psychosemantics of most,
coauthored with: Jeff Lidz, Justin
Halberda, and Tim Hunter
(Natural Language
Semantics, in press, 2011). This paper extends the initial results obtained in
the paper above. Here, we offer experimental evidence that adult
speakers of English understand sentences like 'Most of the dots are
blue' in a quite specific way that involves representing the
cardinality of the blue dots, the cardinality of the dots, and subtracting the former from the
latter--as opposed to, say, representing the cardinalities of the blue
dots and the nonblue dots (as such). We also argue that this finding,
together with independent studies of the visual system, provides some
empirical support for a more general view about how meaningful
expressions generated by the language faculty interface with other
cognitive systems.
MORE PAPERS LIKE THESE, CO-AUTHORED WITH: Justin
Halberda, Tim Hunter, Jeff Lidz, and Darko Odic
(LINKS SOON, or contact me)
Seeing What You Mean, Mostly
Poverty of the Stimulus Revisited co-authored with Robert Berwick, Beracah Yankama, and Noam ChomskyThe
Language Faculty coauthored with Stephen Crain, in The
Handbook for Philosophy of Cognitive Science
(edited by E.Margolis, S. Laurence, and S. Stich, OUP 2011). An essay on the
language faculty, in keeping with the papers below, but also discussing
some new material.
Think of the Children (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86:657-669, 2009). This was a critical notice of Michael Devitt's book, Ignorance of Language. Michael's reply, which you might want to look at, appeared in the same issue.
Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory coauthored with Stephen Crain and
Andrea Gualmini
(In The Innate Mind: structure and
contents, edited by S. Laurence, P. Carruthers, and S. Stich,
175-197, Oxford University Press, 2005).
Yes, still arguing for innate constraints on linguistic meanings. Here,
we discuss in more detail some of the individual phenomena addressed in
other papers.
And we're not replying to anyone in particular.
Innate Ideas coauthored with Stephen Crain, in The Cambridge
Companion
to Chomsky (edited by
James McGilvray, 164-180, Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). You may need to
"Rotate View, Clockwise" to get the .pdf file to appear
properly.
A more general discussion of innateness and universal grammar, in the
context of Chomsky's version of rationalism.
Some of the examples
mentioned here
are discussed in more detail in the other papers.
Why
Language Acquisition is a Snap coauthored with Stephen Crain (Linguistic
Review, 19: 163-83, 2002).
Presents additional empirical arguments for universal grammar in reply
to a target article by Pullum and Scholz. The main arguments concerns a
cluster of semantic phenomenon concerning downward entailment, negative
polarity, and the "pragmatic" implicature associated with disjunctive
claims.
Nature,
Nurture, and Universal Grammar coauthored with Stephen Crain (Linguistics
and Philosophy 24: 139-86, 2001).
Discusses the logic of "poverty of stimulus" arguments and some
specific empirical premises, concerning both adults and children, in
reply to recent empiricist conceptions of language acquisition--with
particular focus on Cowie's
book What's Within.
Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency (Mind 107: 73-111, 1998)
Experiencing the Facts: critical notice of John McDowell's Mind and World (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 613-36, 1996)
Fregean Innocence (Mind and Language 11: 338-70, 1996)
A Defense of Derangement (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24: 95-118, 1994)
Prima
Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory (Ethics
103: 489-515, 1993)
Intentionality and Teleological Error (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 267-82, 1992)