Lexicalizing and Combining
This is one version of a (power point) talk I was giving last year. I've had a number of requests for the slides. Here is a draft of the paper.
The Meaning of 'Most': semantics, numerosity, and
psychology, coauthored with: Jeff Lidz, Tim Hunter, and Justin Halberda
(forthcoming, in Mind and Language).
The title is descriptive. We offer experimental evidence in support of
a certain view about how the meaning of the English determiner 'most'
is related to various psychological capacities potentially relevant to
human capacities for counting and quantifying. This is the first
installment of a large and ongoing project. I hope to be posting more
about this in the near future.
Systematicity via Monadicity (Croatian Journal of Philosophy
7:343-374, 2007)
This is the written version of a conference presentation in Dubrovnik
(Fall 2006). I argue that a "Conjunctivist" conception of
semantic composition, of the sort articulated in the paper below, helps
explain many otherwise puzzling features of natural
language. More speculatively, a Conjunctivist language faculty might
also help explain why human thought is as systematic as it is.
Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual Polyadicity
A newer discussion of material from the paper above, to appear in the Oxford Handbook of Compositionality.
This replaces an earlier version of the paper.
Induction
and Comparison (Maryland
Working Papers in Linguistics, 15: 157-90, 2006)
This speculative paper is an attempt to say why Frege's Theorem
might bear, in interesting ways, on several issues in linguistics.
Interpreting
Concatenation and Concatenates (Philosophical
Issues 16:221-45, 2006).
This paper presents a slightly modified version of the compositional
semantics proposed in Events and Semantic Architecture.
Some readers may find this shorter version, which ignores issues about
vagueness and causal
constructions, easier to digest. The emphasis is on the treatments of
plurality and quantification, and I assume at least some familiarity
with more standard approaches. Space constraints caused the final
document to be considerably shorter
than drafts with homophonous titles. The paper above (Systematicity via Monadicity) is a kind of
companion piece,
showing how to locate the proposed conception of semantic
composition in the context of more general attempts to simplify
(or "minimize") theories of linguistic competence, with the aim of
isolating the distinctively human aspects of the human language
faculty. There are
points of contact with recent suggestions by Elizabeth Spelke and her
colleagues; see also the BBS
paper by Peter Carruthers, my colleague in philosophy at Maryland.
To Be a Value of a Plural Variable, You
Don't Have to Be Plural (You Just Have to Be)
This is something between a handout and a paper. It focusses on an
idea, acquired from George Boolos, discussed in the papers immediately
above and below. For purposes of giving a compositional semantic theory
for a natural
language, we can and should allow for genuinely plural variables; where
a genuinely plural variable is one that has more than one value
relative to each assignment of values to variables.
Quantification
and Second-Order Monadicity (Philosophical
Perspectives 17: 259-298, 2003).
The first part of this paper reviews some developments regarding the
apparent mismatch between the logical and grammatical forms of
quantificational constructions like 'Pat kicked every bottle'. I
suggest that (even given quantifier-raising) many current theories
still posit an undesirable mismatch. But all is well if we can treat determiners (words
like 'every', 'no', and 'most') as second-order monadic predicates without treating them as predicates
satisfied by ordered pairs of sets.
Drawing on George Boolos's construal of second-order quantification as
plural quantification, I argue that we can and should view determiners
as predicates satisfied (plurally) by ordered pairs each of which
associates an entity with a truth-value (t or f). The idea is 'every' is satisfied
by some pairs iff every one of them associates its entity with t. It turns out that this provides a
kind of explanation for the "conservativity" of determiners. And it
lets us say that concatenation signifies predicate-conjunction even in
phrases like 'every bottle' and 'no brown dog'.
Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity
without Synonymy
(in Chomsky and His Critics, edited [heroically] by Louise
Antony and
Norbert Hornstein, Blackwell 2003)
You may need to "Rotate View, Clockwise" to get the .pdf file to appear
properly.
This paper was written in 1998, and so may be past
its
use-by date. Updated versions of various bits of the paper appear
elsewhere; see note 1.
More Truth in Advertising: I'm not criticizing Chomsky; though I am
being critical, and Chomsky does figure prominently.
The idea, as the subtitle suggests, is that there are analytic
truths--even if the notion of synonymy is suspect. The trick involves
(can you guess?) combining, in the right way, a neo-Davidsonian event
semantics with a Minimalist syntax. Blatant Advertising: get hold of
the entire book if only for Chomsky's replies; for anyone interested
Chomsky's conception of meaning (and his semantic internalism), see especially
his replies to Egan, Rey, Ludlow, Horwich, and Pietroski.
Function
and Concatenation (in Logical Form, edited by G.
Preyer
and G. Peters, OUP 2002).
Explores the idea that concatenating natural language expressions
corresponds to predicate-conjunction, as opposed to
function-application. The proposal is developed in more detail in Events
and Semantic Architecture (OUP 2005). But the paper gives
the main idea, in the context of questions about how natural language
syntax is related to Logical Form.
Does
Every Sentence Like This Exhibit A Scope Ambiguity? coauthored with
Norbert Hornstein
(in Belief and Meaning, edited by W. Hinzen and H. Rott,
Hansel-Hohenhausen 2002)
The answer is 'no'. Instances of 'every F likes some G' may not, after
all, be examples of scope ambiguity.
Figuring out whether a given expression with multiple quantifiers is
semantically ambiguous is hard
The
Undeflated Domain of Semantics (Sats: The Nordic Journal
of
Philosophy 1: 161-76, 2000).
A reply to Horwich-style "deflationary" conceptions of meaning,
focussing on the importance of "negative" semantic facts.
An edited version of this paper appears in Reading
Philosophy of Language, edited by Jennifer Hornsby and Guy
Longworth.
On
Explaining That (Journal of Philosophy 97: 665-62, 2000)
How can a speaker can explain that P without explaining the fact that
P, or explain the fact that P without explaining that P, even when it
is true (and so a fact) that P? Or in formal mode: what is the semantic
contribution of 'explain' such that 'She explained that P' can be true,
while 'She explained the fact that P' is false (or vice versa),
even when 'P' is true? The proposed answer is that 'explained' is a
semantically monadic predicate, satisfied by events of explaining. But
'the fact that P' (a determiner phrase) and 'that P' (a complementizer
phrase) get associated with different thematic roles, corresponding to
the distinction between a thing explained and the content of a speech
act.
Meaning
Before Truth (Contextualism in Philosophy,
edited by G.
Preyer
and G. Peters, OUP 2005).
This paper extends the line of thought
in "The Character of Natural Language Semantics." A running theme is
that Chomsky offers a conception of semantics that
lets us preserve what is right about truth-conditional semantics--and
this has less to do with truth than the usual rhetoric suggests--while
also preserving late-Wittgensteinian/Austinian insights about the
relation between truth, meaning, and context. There are three main
sections: one about the relevance of negative facts (and nativism) for
semantics, and why this tells against both "deflationary" conceptions
of meaning and Quine-Davidson "interpretability" conceptions; one that
reviews some familiar reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that names
denote things in the environment; and one that concedes externalism
about truth, while noting that externalism about linguistic meaning
does not follow. The paper ends with a brief tour of some alternatives,
and some familiar reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that predicates
are satisfied by things in the environment. A handout elaborates this line of thought (in a
handouty way).
Nature,
Nurture, and Universal Grammar coauthored with Stephen Crain (Linguistics
and Philosophy 24: 139-86, 2001).
Discusses the logic of "poverty of stimulus" arguments and some
specific empirical premises, concerning both adults and children, in
reply to recent empiricist conceptions of language acquisition--with
particular focus on Cowie's
book What's Within.
Why
Language Acquisition is a Snap coauthored with Stephen Crain (Linguistic
Review, 19: 163-83, 2002).
Presents additional empirical arguments for universal grammar in reply
to a target article by Pullum and Scholz. The main arguments concerns a
cluster of semantic phenomenon concerning downward entailment, negative
polarity, and the "pragmatic" implicature associated with disjunctive
claims.
Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory coauthored with Stephen Crain and
Andrea Gualmini
(In The Innate Mind: structure and
contents, edited by S. Laurence, P. Carruthers, and S. Stich,
175-197, Oxford University Press, 2005).
Yes, still arguing for innate constraints on linguistic meanings. Here,
we discuss in more detail some of the individual phenomena addressed in
other papers.
And we're not replying to anyone in particular.
Innate Ideas coauthored with Stephen Crain, in The Cambridge
Companion
to Chomsky (edited by
James McGilvray, 164-180, Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). You may need to
"Rotate View, Clockwise" to get the .pdf file to appear
properly.
A more general discussion of innateness and universal grammar, in the
context of Chomsky's version of rationalism.
Some of the examples
mentioned here
are discussed in more detail in the other papers.
The Language Faculty coauthored with Stephen Crain, to appear in The Handbook for Philosophy of Cognitive Science (edited by E.Margolis, S. Laurence, and S. Stich). An essay on the language faculty, in keeping with the papers above, but also discussing some new material.
Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency (Mind 107: 73-111, 1998)
Experiencing the Facts: critical notice of John McDowell's Mind and World (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 613-36, 1996)
A Defense of Derangement (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24: 95-118, 1994)
Prima
Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory (Ethics
103: 489-515, 1993)
Intentionality and Teleological Error (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 267-82, 1992)