Interdicting
A spat of recent naval incidents caught my attention, as a former sailor, and I made note to circle back and mention them when I had time. The Kang Nam was a small and marginal cargo ship that sailed from from North Korea early this summer, supposedly containing a shipment weapons or ammunition bound for Burma (Myanmar if you insist) Whither the Kang Nam, North Korea's suspect cargo ship? | csmonitor.com. It is unclear how this determination was made, but once it was, the ship was set upon and tracked continually. The outcome was an apparent success. After being shadowed by U S ships as it sailed slowly down the Chinese coast, very publicly thanks to the U S Navy, it eventually turned around and sailed back to North Korea
US Navy well-versed in interdicting suspect cargo ships | csmonitor.com. A very different incident was the disappearance of the Russian ship Arctic Star. That was the first mystery. Speculation ran from smuggling, illicit arms trading, piracy, or simple theft
BBC NEWS | Special Reports | 'Ransom threat hit hijack ship'. After a week or so the lost was found, or perhaps was never really lost. Russian naval forces effected a self interdiction quietly in mid-ocean and escorted the ship back to Russia. Then began the second period of mystery. The Russian maritime expert who first raised alarm, flees county saying he has received strong threats
BBC NEWS | Europe | Russia ship mystery editor flees. Speculation now turns on involvement by Russian oligarchs and or sectors of Russian Government. There are hints of involvement of by Israeli special operations the scenario here is that the ship contained advanced weapons of some sort perhaps anti-aircraft missile systems bound for Syria or Iran that had not been formally cleared by the Russian Government . At least the world's navies can locate and track ships at sea, when they want to. Using Naval resources to accomplish anti-terror / anti proliferation goals turns on three abilities (1) Human resources: Training and teams. Certainly at the most specific level - physical interdiction and vessel searching. (2) Material resources: ships in (the right) place. This depends greatly on cooperation regimes with other services and other nations. As well the ability to quickly enter into operational Intel networks with these regimes, aspects of these networks are evolving along lines not dissimilar to social networks (and social networking software types) familiar to ordinary experience. (3) A legal mandate.
The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Means to an End for the Operational Commander
Traditional definitions of Ocean Surveillance aims, more broadly Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), involves knowing where US and Allied trade assets (merchant shipping) that need protecting are. Where what would harm them is also. Keeping the sea lanes open. At the moment this has been made easier as half the world's merchant fleet is riding empty at anchor in the Malacca straits off of Singapore
Revealed: The ghost fleet of the recession | Mail Online. The Increasing commitment to Anti- terror, proliferation and even piracy missions is an added tasking
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism: Background and Issues for
Congress: RS22373.pdf. A primary interest here for me at least is seeing what the new administration's inclinations on this topic are, particularly as the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review is underway which will set the tone for the next few years. At the moment it seems the Navy will continue to be a primary tool of Non-proliferation efforts.
The PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) dates from May 2003 originating with John Bolton under[deputy] secretary of state at the time was/is a State Department program. John Bolton is something of a prat. commonly given to over the top dyspeptic rhetoric unbecoming someone at his supposed level. President Bush era aggressiveness and unilateralism are woven in the very fabric of the NSCWMD (National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction out of which the PSI grew The proliferation security initiative as a new paradigm for peace and security. There are a number of useful general assessments of the PSI and its history written towards the end of the last administration
The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full | Arms Control Association. One from an Australian perspective seemed especially succinct: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): An Assessment of its Strengths & Weaknesses The PSI is primarily as an activity, an agreement towards potential bilateral cooperation with only a 3 page statement of principle governing it. It was designed to fill in the gaps between existing international non proliferation frameworks and to especially close down transfers of mass destruction weapons to non-State actors. This received strong affirmation in the form of Security Council resolution 1540 in 2004. Beyond this framework, there are only a fairly light rounds of operational and command center exercises to flesh the intent out. The desire of the core members of the program has always been to move against both weapons and their delivery systems. Against acquisition of precursor materials even those acknowledge as having dual (civilian and military) use. Against networks of materials trade, and weapon design expertise and information. All for the purpose of making this trade more costly and more difficult. I haven't read it, but this book treats the subject at length:
Combating weapons of mass destruction : the future of international nonproliferation policy [WorldCat.org]
There are acknowledged knocks against the initiative. Mostly involving its thin legal grounding. Also difficulty assessing its efficacy amid secrecy surrounding the initiatives activities, and claims that some acknowledged successes were the product of multi-faceted efforts. Lastly its extensiveness. That the PSI will only be effective if a certain and sizable set of nations participate in its activities. It started with only 10 nations in 2003, by mid 2007 73 nations were involved in one fashion or another many in the periphery
Origin, Developments and Prospects for the Proliferation Security Initiative : JFD_2006_PSA_Yamazaki.pdf.
Legal objections to use of force in international waters extend from a firm and fixed principle that the flag a vessel sails under constitutes it as sovereign territory of that nation. There is the possibility allowed in theory that this might happen in redress of a past injury. Injury a non transferrable or non diffusible concept, that is it cannot extend to others to form a negative common good
Interdicting Vessels to Enforce the Common Interest.
Largely these Legal objections are answered by they suffer from impracticality. The law at the International level for all its resemblance to statue law or aged common law is more a balance of actions. For those nations inclined to look on the world as an organized or tuned affair, it becomes a matter of passive deterrence vs. preemption of threats. This turns on notion that catastrophic lethality cannot be contained in notion of equivalency to conventional categories of injury the law supposes. As in the case of Guilfoyle's [above] continual referral to nations in a fishing dispute seizing each others boats and catches as a suitable paradigm for injury. Commensurate action in nuclear non proliferation is interruption of their trade. Reading through the various summaries and their description of the legal difficulties it seemed that some nations may be telling the core nations of the PSI that they wished that the Initiatives activities were more clearly tied to traditional notions of risk assessment. Balancing the level of probability of occurrence against the severity of loss. At least as it pertains to the lengthy lists of banned commodities and the U S's zeal for interdicting them. There is also the sense that the cost of overly isolating target nations ought be added to the assessments. However most accept there is a near certain likelihood that non state actors would use weapons of mass destruction if the international community did not work to make it exceptionably difficult. There is also an increasing acknowledgment that existing models and assumptions of nuclear deterrence would fray and break down once the number of nations possessing nuclear weaponry rises to a dozen or more nations. The nine nations that currently have atomic weapons have set off more than two thousand nuclear detonations since they were developed Nuclear weapons testing - Wikipedia, Informal policy statements around PSI make it clear the initiative is aimed at particular nations such as North Korea, Syria and Iran. This promotes buy-in by some nations who take this as an assurance that this initiative will not interfere with their own arms trade. Others will see in this a double standard absenting nations the United States favors including ones they disfavor, and see behind it all a U S hegemony. For those inclined to caution and taking the very long view. Pushing such a way of proceeding into de-facto international law; consider that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. There may come a time in the not-that-distant future where others seek to stop U S shipping from what they deem inappropriate technology or weapons transfer.
North Korea's recent apparently successful test of nuclear device so alarmed the international community that the U N security council passed a further resolution forbidding them to traffic in weapons technology and called on all U N members to search vessels, with consent, anytime it is reasonably believed, such forbidden cargo is aboard a vessel
India Detains North Korea Ship, Citing U.N. Resolution - NYTimes.com. There are some indications that recent North Korean maritime activity show possible signs of a probing for weakness in the PSI's capabilities.
Non-proliferation and anti-mass destruction weapons trade is a process and PSI is a part of that process the idea is to provide redundant blocks to spread of dangerous weapons. The PSI needs to grow in membership, become normalized and partially institutionalized. For funding and training purposes and for effective international cooperation. So that its process: leveraging existing national authorities for extra border coercive police action attains the status of recognized international principle rather than an activity that is a cipher (the U S is not yet a signatory to UNCLOS). The UN can hamper nuclear arms trade through Security Council resolutions. Further acquisition of nuclear weapons is de-legitimized by these means. This paves the way for blocking arms trade by nations that continue to develop nuclear weapons regardless -- by international agreements authorizing searches and seizure of any vessel carrying on such sanctioned trade. Ultimately the success of the PSI and acceptance of its aims by a critical mass of nations will be the degree to which it is guided by the principle of the eventual decommissioning of all nuclear weapon arsenals by all nations. It is here that I suspect I diverge from Mr. Bolton's vision most, who will give up mass destruction last of all.
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