

**"PATRIOTISM" –  
A CONTRADICTION, A POSSIBILITY OR AN EMPIRICAL REALITY?**

Thomas Blank  
Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht  
Zur Bleiche 17  
48720 Rosendahl  
E-Mail: [BlankT@freenet.de](mailto:BlankT@freenet.de)

Peter Schmidt  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft  
Universität Giessen  
Karl Glöcknerstr. 21e  
35394 Giessen  
E-Mail: [Peter.Schmidt@sowi.uni-giessen.de](mailto:Peter.Schmidt@sowi.uni-giessen.de)

Bettina Westle  
Lehrstuhl für Kommunikations- und Politikwissenschaft  
WiSo-Fakultät  
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg  
Findelgasse 7-9  
90402 Nürnberg  
E-Mail: [Bettina.Westle@wiso.uni-erlangen.de](mailto:Bettina.Westle@wiso.uni-erlangen.de)

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**1. Introduction: "Patriotism" –  
a contradiction, a possibility or an empirical reality?**

Because of World War II the idea of the nation state and its ideology was severely injured. Nationalism was primarily seen as a negative phenomenon that should be restrained as far as possible. The formation of supranational units and processes of globalization on the one hand, processes of regionalization and federalisation on the other hand seemed to limit the relevance of the nation state from above and below (sandwich-model). This loss of relevance of the nation state as an institutionalized political structure seemed to be accompanied by a parallel loss of relevance in the cultural orientations of the citizens. Growing functional differentiation, pluralization of life-styles and individualization lead in the West to the assumption that the relevance and intensity of national identification, especially those of an ethnic type, will disappear as well. Thereby, the normative assumption that democratic states should and can be legitimized purely demotic (non-ethnic) increasingly gained ground. The historical, macro-sociological and theoretical research on nations and nationalism supported this view by formulating primarily dichotomous typologies as for example those ones between cultural and political nation, nation-state and state-nation, ethnic and demotic/civic nation, the first ones being incompatible, the second ones being not only compatible with democracy and peace, but even necessary for them (Meinecke 1908, Kohn 1945, Francis 1965, Lepsius 1986, Habermas 1991, Schieder 1991, Kellas 1991, Smith 1991, Greenfeld 1993, Miller 1995, Viroli 1995, Canovan 1996, Guibernau 1996, Keating 1996, Nairn 1997). The underlying idea of this perspective is that the observed historical link in the earlier genesis of nation-states between ethnic-national identity and democracy is to be interpreted as a contingent parallelity, but not as a systematic necessary connection (for descriptions of the historic nation-building see for example Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Schieder 1991, Greenfeld 1993, Hont 1994). However, there were no attempts to construct comparable typologies for the microlevel of research.

Meanwhile several countertendencies against the vanishing of the ethnic-national idea are to be observed. To mention just a few: Regional - territorial and/or ethnical - identities, articulate louder than before and claim for more autonomy. International migration has contributed to more ethnic heterogeneity in the Western countries and the direct confrontation between home-population and immigrants seems to lead to a rise of ethnic consciousness, in some cases also to violent outbreaks.

Whereas a European-wide immigration-policy is just in the beginning, some states begin to reformulate their traditional concepts of immigration-policy and naturalization-policy in the direction of a stronger closure, whereas others discuss more openness. Finally, whereas the socialist Eastern states were able to prevent the outbreak of ethnic-national tensions, after the collapse of the communist rule nationalist sentiments almost immediately revitalized. Thus, ethnic and national problems were not solved, but just suppressed throughout the communist rule; (concerning nationalism in Eastern Europe see for example Mommsen 1992, Brubaker 1996, Kupchan 1995, Weiss/Reinprecht 1998).

These countertendencies supported doubts about the prognoses of a vanishing relevance of ethnic-national identities and supported the hypothesis that a demotic national identity misses the affective power which is necessary for the integration of political communities (Mayer 1993, Richter 1994). Concerning the link between national identity and political attitudes, the development in Eastern Europe after the breakdown of the communist regime is interpreted as a process of late nation-building and national emancipation linked with transition to democracy. This has reaffirmed an earlier, alternative interpretation of a causal connection between ethnic-national consciousness and democracy. In this perspective, contrary to the dominant interpretation until then, ethnic-national identity is seen as a precondition for the genesis and as a necessarily corresponding characteristic for the stability of democracy (Mayer 1993, see also Rupnik 1990). On the other hand the ethnic-national tensions and violence in these processes soon again have challenged this interpretation. It seems as if those ethnic identities indeed had emancipatoric functions in the beginning of the democratic transitions, but that they also soon showed their Janus-Face (Westle 1999b). The questions concerning the links between collective identity, democracy and inter-ethnic relations therefore are controversial and still open.

In the theoretical and in the macro-sociological literature we now can observe a new trend of departing from the described and well-established dichotomous conceptualization of the national idea. Thus, for example, the distinction between the so called "bad nationalism" and "good patriotism" is challenged as non existent (Richter 1994) resp. "good patriotism" is called an oxymoron (Oevermann 1990, Burger 1994). Further it is suggested that the liberalism or anti-liberalism of nationalism is not linked to its ethnic or cultural versus its demotic or civic basis, but might depend upon the status mobility of the class articulating the nationalism (as marginalized or upwardly mobile) and/or might be a response to perceived threats from outside (Brown 1999).

Moreover, the dichotome typologies are criticized as failing to account for some actually existing types of national boundary construction and as indicating themselves an inadequate homogeneous and generic view on nations, national boundary construction and national identities, which needs to be disentangled by different organising principles as for example ancestry, race, culture and territory (Nieguth 1999).

Curiously, trends in the micro-sociological research seem to be just opposite. Whereas former studies on national identity and nationalism tended just to distinguish between national consciousness and extreme nationalism along a continuum of intensiveness in national identification, this is rarely to be found in younger studies (Haller et al 1996). Instead, they increasingly aim at discovering qualitative different types of national identity, which mostly lean in one or the other form at the models of the ethnic versus the demotic nation. They primarily try to anchor these different types in the substantive content of the national self-image or the national pride and its correlates with respect to attitudes towards democracy, foreigners and other countries. To name just a few of these attempts: Staub's (1991) typology of blind versus constructive patriotism, Blank/Schmidt's (1993) distinction between ethnic nationalism versus democratic patriotism, Westle's (1994, 1999a) typology of traditional nationalism, democratic patriotism and postnationalism (and negative nationalism), Knudsen's (1997) distinction between national chauvinism and system legitimacy, or Hjerm's (1998) ideal types of national identity described as ethnic, civic, multiple and pluralist. On the one hand, these examples show the trend to empirically based and theoretically meaningful typization. On the other hand, especially because some of these examples are derived from identical countries, they also show much disagreement in the conceptualization of relevant types of modern collective identity as well as in its operationalization and moreover several problems in cross-national equivalence (see also Svallfors 1996, Smith/Jarrko 1998).

The main question of this paper therefore is, whether it is possible to identify a "positive" patriotism, which clearly can be distinguished from (excessive) nationalism (and national identification). This question will be asked in the following steps:

1. In how far can the concepts of national identification, nationalism and patriotism be distinguished from one another conceptually?
2. In how far do we find cross-national equivalent operationalizations of these three concepts, and in how far can these concepts empirically be distinguished from one another?

3. In how far are those operationalizations valid in cross-national perspective, using the criteria of relationships towards foreigners?
4. Is it possible to conceptualize a cross-national valid model of national identity with regard to the relationships between these concepts?

In the next section, the central theoretical concepts are defined and hypotheses formulated on the relationship between them. The third section describes the sample and the indicators used in the analysis. The results of statistical testing the postulated relationships on the basis of representative samples for Germany, Austria, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the United States follows in section four. The final section will summarise the results.

## **2. Conceptual background**

From a microsociological point of view the term "*national identity*" as used in the literature covers quite different aspects and facets of the individual's relationship towards its nation. Often it is used to describe a subjectively positive attitude towards one's nation (Tajfel/Turner 1986). However, to this day this concept lacks a distinct and uncontroversial definition. Still, the following aspects of national identity are mostly mentioned in the literature:

- a subjective conviction (knowledge) as to which nation one formally belongs to and/or to which one wants to formally belong to (national consciousness; Schweigler 1975; Tajfel 1982);
- a nation-related emotion; this can principally vary between a positive and a negative pole (Crocker/Luthanen 1990); positive national identity means an overall positive emotion towards the own nation, whereas an overall negative emotion towards one's nation can be called a "contra-identification" (Tajfel 1981) or "negative nationalism" (Zitelmann 1991, Westle 1999a).
- a high relevance of the national affiliation for the overall identity of the individual (Festinger 1954);
- subjective beliefs regarding the current aims and problems of the nation;
- subjective beliefs regarding opportunities and constraints for individual action, arising from national affiliation (Hechter 1987);
- a principal willingness to internalise the national culture (Festinger 1954);
- a community-ideology consisting of convictions about the ideal values, aims and character of the nation (Westle 1999a, 1999c).

This compilation makes it plain that "national identity" can be seen as a multi-dimensional system of beliefs toward one's nation (Eagly/Chaiken 1993). In the following, this rather diffuse form of a

positive bond with the nation and its qualitative content is called "national identity". In concrete, the term "national identity" will be used to cover *the intensity and the type* of the relationship towards the nation.

In contrast to this diffuse term we will use the term "*national identification*" to describe the *intensity* of feelings towards one's nation (*intensity of closeness*), regardless of the qualitative content of these feelings.<sup>1</sup> This "national identification" is seen as a relevant factor for the stability/durability of states in their specific political form and boundaries, though the necessary extent of identification for stability resp. the optimale extent for durability is far from clear (Easton 1975, Hirschman 1993, 1994). However, the collapse of the Weimar Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the separation of Tschechoslowakia and the breakdown of multinational systems like Russia show that subjective identification with the nation can lead to political instability, especially in the case of differences between political and national boundaries.

Whereas the national identification is seen as a question of intensity regardless of content, the main characteristics of "*nationalism*" and "*patriotism*" are seen as questions of *content or type* of national identity (though they also might exist in different intensities). Within the scientific literature, "nationalism" and "patriotism" are either differently defined or also regarded as multi-dimensional attitudinal syndromes.

Typically aspects of "*nationalism*" are described as follows:

- overemphasis of the national affiliation in the individual's self-concept (Adorno et al. 1950);
- inclination to define one's own group by criteria of descent, race or cultural affiliation (Evans 1952, Allport 1954, Francis 1965, Lepsius 1986, Westle 1994, 1999a, 1999c).
- inclination to regard one's own group as homogeneous (Blank 1997);
- idealisation of the nation and it's history (Adorno et al. 1950, Tajfel 1969, Kosterman/Feshbach 1989) and suppression of ambivalent attitudes towards the nation (Adorno et al. 1950, Rokeach 1960, Westle 1999a, 1999c);

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<sup>1</sup> However, there still is one difficulty in this definition, because the objective and the subjective belonging to a specific nation might differ. Thus, on the one hand, formally having citizenship of a nation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for identification with this nation, since it is principally possible to identify with a group one does not belong to (Tajfel 1982). Other conditions have to be met in order for identification with a nation to take place (Tajfel/Turner 1986).

- feeling of national superiority (Kosterman/Feshbach 1989, Westle 1994, 1999a);
- uncritical acceptance of national, state and political authorities (Adorno et al. 1950, Schatz/Staub 1997, Muelken 1999, Schatz et al. 1999, Westle 1994, 1999a);
- high relevance of socially derogating comparisons with groups not considered to be part of the nation (Schatz et al. 1999).

*"Patriotism"* forms a counter-concept to nationalism. Adorno et al. (1950) talk of "genuine" or "true" patriotism, which is defined as a combination of "love of the country" and "attachment to national values based on critical understanding". Schatz/Staub (1997; Staub 1997; Schatz et al. 1999) consider this form of national identity to be a kind of constructive patriotism in the sense of a critical loyalty. In order to more closely describe such a kind of patriotism, the scientific literature suggests the following, among other things:

- the national affiliation in the individual's self-concept is not overemphasised (Adorno et al. 1950; Staub 1997, Westle 1999a);
- the nation is not primarily defined in ethnic terms, but rests on a democratic definition (Francis 1965, Lepsius 1989, Westle 1994, 1999a, 1999c);
- at the center of the national self-definition are humanist and democratic values (Hirschman 1970, Lepsius 1989, Habermas 1990, Sternberger 1990, Staub 1997, Schatz/Staub 1997, Westle 1994, 1999, Blank et al. 1999); this includes a rejection of uncritical acceptance of national authorities (Adorno et al. 1950, Staub 1997);
- the support is refused (ideally: protest/voice), in case the nation's aims are not in accordance with the convictions of humanistic and/or democratic values (Hirschman 1970, Staub 1997; Schatz/Staub 1997, Blank et al. 1999, Westle 1999a);
- the nation is not idealised, but estimated on the basis of a critical conscience; critical conscience here refers to the formation of an opinion of the nation which is independent of elites within the group (Schatz/Staub 1997); critical loyalty means to support the nation's welfare, based on a universal humanistic value system (Staub 1997); this implies that negative nation-related emotions are accepted (Adorno et al. 1950);
- a reconstruction of group history allowing different views (Blank et al. 1999);
- temporal comparisons bear a high relevance (Albert 1977, Blank et al. 1999); in the case of patriotism it is more relevant to compare the status quo of the ingroup today with its prior

conditions of the ingroup history; in the case of nationalism this kind of comparison is not so important than social comparisons with outgroups.

This compilation demonstrates that nationalism and patriotism are conceptually two qualitatively different manifestations of national identity. However, both concepts share a positive attitude towards the own nation, that means, both are grounded on a positive national identification. Therefore our first two hypotheses are as follows:

*H. 1: The higher the positive national identification, the higher the degree of nationalism.*

*H. 2: The higher the positive national identification, the higher the degree of patriotism.*

And because of the assumed greater centrality of the national identification within a nationalistic than within a patriotic beliefs system we moreover expect:

*H 3.: The relationship between national identification and nationalism should be stronger than the one between national identification and patriotism.*

We agree with most of the conceptual descriptions of nationalism and patriotism, with only a few exceptions: Thus we take the view that the connection of nationalism and uncritical conformity on the one hand, and patriotism and a willingness to criticise on the other hand is only justified under certain conditions. That is to say, from a theoretical point of view, nationalism might be linked with criticism in case national reality and an aspired nationalistic conception of the nation diverge. This view of nationalism as a kind of limited support for the nation is therefore different from the often heard opinion, according to which nationalism principally is an uncritical support for the nation, independent of the national realities. On the other hand, patriotism is likely to be linked with uncritical conformity, if national reality and an aspired concept of the nation are identical.

With regard to desired national realities, aims and developmental trends, we think of clear differences between nationalism and patriotism. For example, whereas nationalism strives for idealising the group's history, patriotism backs its constructive-critical analysis. They should also differ in their conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is to be structured. Nationalism rather supports authoritarian-totalitarian structures, whereas patriotism is conceptually rather linked with the support of democratic principles.

According to social identity theory (Tajfeld/Turner) there is no "we", no collective identity, without demarcation from "others". Transferred to the questions of national identity this means that attitudes

towards others should be seen as a component of the national identity itself. However, according to an opposite perspective of attitude theory (Eagly/Chaiken 1993) attitudes towards others than the own nation can conceptually be distinguished from the national identity itself, a distinction, which is based on the exchange of the attitude object. We take this latter view and define the "others" or "outgroups" as those ones which are not regarded as nation members. This includes the formal non-members, and also nation members which are subjectively categorised as non-members.

A second controversial question in this context is, whether the demarcation from others necessarily carries the component of devaluation of the outgroups. This is, what social identity theory suggests, assuming that only this devaluation can bring about a positive self-image of the ingroup. Though at first sight this might seem plausible, we think that there are other possibilities to reach a positive collective self-esteem than through devaluation of others – in case this is not possible, the construct of patriotism indeed would be unrealistic. Thus, we assume that a central difference between nationalism and patriotism are their consequences in coping with others. Nationalism emphasizes feelings of national superiority and idealisation. The other side of this coin however is, that these feelings of superiority are quite sensible for being threatened by outgroups, because they are not realistic, but based on idealisation. For example, in a nationalistic perspective, outgroups can threaten cultural or religious homogeneity by bringing other cultures, value preferences or religious beliefs into the nation. Outgroups try to participate on the national economic power and so on. The main consequence of those feelings of being threatened is the devaluation of outgroups. Therefore we postulate:

*H. 4: The stronger the degree of nationalism, the stronger the feeling that foreigners are threatening.*

Concerning patriotism, relationships to feelings of threat have not been sufficiently conceptualised so far. As a consequence, there has been no systematic empirical analysis. Empirical findings indicate that there is no significant correlation between patriotism and the denigration of foreigners (Schatz/Staub 1997). These findings, however, are based on operationalizations measuring the rejection of foreigners only indirectly by means of an internationalism scale (Kosterman/Feshbach 1989). We go a step further, assuming that our concept of patriotism has the potential to support tolerance towards outgroups (Adorno et al. 1950, Allport 1954). This proposition is backed by various arguments. First of all, a patriotism of this kind is based on a humanist moral concept (Staub

1994). Secondly, it is associated with support for democratic principles, because these favour intra-societal diversity in cultural and religious categories. Thirdly, patriotism includes a personality concept which is marked by the rejection of shaping individual social relationships on the basis of stereotypes on the one hand, and by emphasising individuality and emotionality on the other hand: "The genuine patriot, it would appear, can appreciate the values and ways of other nations, and can be permissive toward much that he cannot personally accept for himself. He is free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and imperialistic striving for power" (Adorno et al. 1950: 107f.). Reasoned by this it can be assumed, that patriotism is connected with only weak or no feelings of threat and therefore with only a small or no tendency of exclusionism.

*H. 5: The stronger the degree of patriotism, the smaller the perception to be threatened by foreigners.*

In the framework of attitude and action theory such feelings of threat can result in a behavioural disposition to exclude outgroups from the nation by certain rules and conditions. In this sense it is a conceptual difference to feel threatened by foreigners and to behave towards them by defining rules for exclusion. Therefore exclusionism can be regarded as a direct consequence of feeling threatened or an indirect consequence of nationalism.

*H. 6: The stronger the feeling that foreigners are threatening, the stronger the tendency to exclude of foreigners.*

Summarising, these hypotheses postulate that identification with one's nation does not directly lead to rejection and exclusion of foreigners. It is rather an indirect causal influence, which should be moderated by the content of national identity, that is enforced by nationalism, but reduced by patriotism. National identification is not per se negative, nor does it necessarily lead to the rejection of foreigners.

We will test the above hypotheses in an integrated model. Additionally we will use age, sex and the level of formal education as independent variables to explain the degree of national identification.

Age seems to be relevant as an indicator for different generational experiences with the history, the political and social developments of one's nation. Age may moderate the degree of national identification based on the lifetime experience with the nation. With age also connected are

different value preferences as it is often discussed. And age may be an indicator for the possibilities and realisation of international experiences. By changes in possibilities of travel on the technical, economical and political level younger people may have more experiences with other countries and therefore may have not such a strong relationship to their own nation than older people.

*H. 7a: The higher the age the more intensive the national identification.*

*H. 7b: The higher the age in long established democracies, the stronger the patriotism.*

*H. 7c: The higher the age in non-democracies, the stronger the nationalism.*

Gender could be thought of as an predictor of national identity as well. So far men usually show more interest in politics than woman do, this might include questions of national identity as well and thus lead to a stronger national identification. With respect to the type of national identity woman should show – at least within longer enduring democracies – less preferences for nationalism, since its ideology clearly restricts the freedom of woman. However, with respect to patriotism, we do not have an idea of possible effects of sex resp. gender (except for those effects which are linked to the level of education).

*H. 8a: To be a man promotes national identification.*

*H. 8b: The role of women in established democracies hinders from nationalism.*

Formal education firstly may be connected with socialization into the existing political culture and thereby promote the identification with one's nation, the development of patriotism in a democratic system or of nationalism in an authoritarian system. .Yet, secondly, from the prespective of the social identity approach a higher formal education enables the individual to be more effective in reaching personal goals successfully. Therefore higher educated people do not need the identification with the nation as much as low educated people do in order to optimize their self-esteem. Furthermore higher education mostly is followed by more ressources which also allow mor individuality among higher educated people. this leads to alternative hypotheses, as follows:


*H. 9a: The higher the formal level of education, the stronger the national identification.*

*H. 9b: The higher the formal level of education, the lower the national identification.*

*H. 9c: :The higher the formal level of education, the higher the probability of nationalism in authoritarian systems, of patriotism in democratic systems.*



Figure 1: Determinants of threat and ethnic exclusionism



Determinants of Threat and Ethnic Exclusionism  
(Circles represent summscores.)

In the following, these hypotheses will be tested empirically with data from different countries.

these hypotheses

### 3. Data base and measurement instruments

The data used in the following stem from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995. Its main topic were questions of national identity, and it was conducted in 23 countries. For our purpose we selected Austria, Germany-East and Germany-West, Great Britain, Italy, the United States and Russia.<sup>2</sup> With respect to questions of national identity these countries should cover a relatively wide range of variability, but not be so different that comparisons seem a priori impossible. The main characteristics which might have effects on national identity in these countries are:

<sup>2</sup> We excluded respondents, who are younger than 18 years or show missing values concerning their age; the remaining total number of respondents is shown in table 1.

firstly, their role in the recent history; thus Germany, Austria and partly Italy belong to those countries with a fascist period and were losers of the second world war, whereas the USA, Great Britain and Russia were the winners. In the literature it is assumed that winners of war may have a more intensive national identification, whereas losers national identity might be injured (Rose 1985, Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 1987);

secondly, the form of coping with the past, with the guilt of nazi-time; whereas in West-Germany a long public debate on the guilt and public responsibility of the ordinary Germans for the atrocities during the time from 1933 to 1945 took place, East-German political authorities declared East-Germany as an antifascist state and did not initiate a debate about the Germans guilt for the war; in Austria for a long time a self-stereotype of being a victim of Hitler-Germany was cultivated; (with respect to Italy's fascist period nearly nothing about the later form of coping with this time is known to us); we assume that these different forms of coping with the past might have consequences for the national identity; thus coping with a negative past closely linked to excessive nationalism should reduce intensive national feelings, especially of the ethnic type;

thirdly, the selected countries differ with respect to their history concerning their political regime; whereas the USA and Great Britain have a long democratic tradition, in West-Germany and Italy democracy was (re-) installed just after the Second World War, and East-Germany and Russia just passed from a long period of socialism/communism towards democracy. Certainly the concept of patriotism is not purely linked to a specific type of political regime, but shows clearly some facets which are typically for a non-authoritative, democratic political order – therefore it is doubtful, whether we at all can expect this kind of patriotic identity in countries without or with a very new democratic regime.

The world is not an ideal one – and this surely is true concerning the available measurement instruments (table 1). In the following we will shortly comment our measurement-instruments and the distributions. However, the latter are not at the center of our interest as is the case with respect to the question of relations between the concepts.

With respect to the concept of *national identification*, that is the intensity of subjective affiliation to one's nation, well known survey questions for example ask how proud one is to be a member of a specific nation or how close one feels to one's country. Whereas the question concerning the general national pride causes severe problems of crossnational equivalence (Westle

1999a), the topic of closeness to one's country, which was asked in the ISSP, on first sight does not show such problems, although the missing values in Great Britain are somewhat high compared to the other countries. In sum, we find the most intensive national identification in Austria, followed by Italy, whereas Russia and the USA range in the middle and both parts of Germany show clearly less intensive affiliations, as was expected. Against our expectations however is the unusual low identification with the nation in Great Britain, which should show clearly higher values because of its history as winner of the war.

*Nationalism* as well as *patriotism* will be constructed as indices on the basis of a question concerning pride in specific national achievements. Principally this question is highly problematic as an indicator for nationalism and/or patriotism, mainly because it does not refer to relatively stable values and convictions of the respondents, but to an ever changeable reality, and because concrete achievement-objects may be non-existent in some, but existent in other countries. Thus, for instance, pride in national sports might vary from day to day according to the country's international successes or failures – so how can we interpret answers to this type of question as indicators for a deeper lying type of national identity? The decision to use the stimuli "achievements in sports", "armed forces" and "history" as indicators for nationalism and the stimuli "the way democracy works" as "social security system" as indicators for patriotism thus mainly rests on the observation that these objects represent the respective concepts quite well in the West-German context. Thus, German respondents who show pride in sports, German history, and/or the army tend to more authoritarianism, a more positive evaluation of the idea of national socialism, more hostile attitudes towards strangers, rejection of a multicultural society and more negative evaluations of supranational bodies than those respondents articulating pride in the way democracy works and in the social security system (Mohler/Götze 1992, Blank/Schmidt 1994, Westle 1994, 1999a,c). The question thus arises, whether these results and interpretations are transferable to the other countries. Doubts in the cross-national equivalence are fast at hand. For example: Not all the countries have a history that is comparable dark to the one of Germany – so why should pride in history represent a nationalistic attitude in those countries? Russia, for example, nearly does not have democracy and a social security system – so how could we expect pride in them? And does missing pride in democracy show its irrelevance for the respondent as an object of national identity, a rejection of democracy or – just in contrast – high aspirations towards democracy and low satisfaction with its realization? In

sum, there are more open questions than answers concerning the indicators for nationalism and patriotism.

When we look at the distributions, we find the lowest values and noticeably high missing values for the items of nationalism in West Germany, assumingly as a consequence of coping with the nazi-past. Striking low values for patriotism and high missing values are to be observed as was expected in Russia, which confirms our doubt about the adequacy of these instruments in the Russian case. Relatively low pride in the way democracy works and in the

Table 1: Question-wordings and distributions of central concepts

item/index	question-wording/score	Austria			Germany-E			Germany-W			Great Britain			Italy			USA			Russia		
total n		978			608			1269			1056			1094			1363			1585		
		mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %
IDENT	How close do you feel to (country)? 1=not at all 4=very close	3.47	.68	1,4	3.07	.72	6,3	3.01	.72	7,2	2.86	.88	10,5	3.26	.78	0,2	3.13	.80	4,4	3.18	.86	4,2
NAT meanindex	How proud are you in each of the following? 1=not at all 4=very proud	2.98	.63	19,8	2.39	.69	25,5	2.31	.72	24,7	3.22	.63	13,8	2.91	.53	10,0	3.32	.57	11,2	2.87	.70	18,6
proudspo	country's achievements in sports	3.31	.76	5,4	3.06	.82	8,6	2.72	.87	11,0	2.94	.82	8,0	3.16	.68	3,4	3.23	.74	7,6	3.06	.86	9,9
proudarmy	country's armed forces	2.41	.95	14,1	2.00	.86	19,6	2.04	.90	17,2	3.32	.79	7,9	2.29	.93	6,4	3.37	.72	5,8	2.27	1.04	10,8
proudhis	country's history	3.20	.79	7,9	2.13	.93	9,4	2.12	.92	10,6	3.36	.76	6,4	3.27	.69	2,6	3.33	.79	5,8	3.19	.90	10,1
PAT meanindex	How proud are you in each of the following? 1=not at all 4=very proud	3.04	.67	8,2	2.29	.67	9,2	2.84	.70	9,2	2.60	.67	14,1	1.97	.70	3,7	2.81	.65	8,8	1.60	.62	16,8
prouddem	the way democracy works in country	2.88	.80	5,3	2.29	.75	6,3	2.78	.79	7,4	2.77	.77	10,3	1.96	.84	1,0	3.09	.73	6,6	1.80	.84	15,0
proudsoc	country's social security system	3.19	.80	4,2	2.29	.83	6,1	2.88	.86	5,1	2.39	.87	8,0	1.99	.82	3,1	2.52	.87	5,1	1.42	.67	5,7

item/index	question-wording/score	Austria			Germany-E			Germany-W			Great Britain			Italy			USA			Russia		
total n		978			608			1269			1056			1094			1363			1585		
		mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %	mean	std. dev.	miss. %
THREAT meanindex	There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in (country). How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1=friendly 5=unfriendly	3.07	.89	17,3	3.20	.80	23,0	2.86	.80	21,4	3.01	.76	12,0	3.28	.86	6,5	2.91	.77	11,9	3.42	.79	34,1
goodecon	immigrants are generally good for country's economy (rec)	2.81	1.06	8,0	3.14	1.02	9,0	2.90	.97	12,5	3.26	.85	7,9	3.56	1.07	3,4	2.99	.97	8,5	3.46	1.12	22,7
newideas	immigrants make more open to new ideas and culture (rec)	2.76	1.17	10,0	2.58	1.04	13,3	2.37	.97	9,1	2.60	.93	6,4	3.01	1.18	2,5	2.45	.96	7,2	3.18	1.22	24,3
crimerates	immigrants increase crime rates	3.68	1.22	4,2	3.79	1.06	7,9	3.43	1.16	8,6	2.87	1.05	5,9	3.64	1.20	1,0	2.97	1.07	7,4	3.69	1.23	15,9
takejobs	immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in (country)	3.03	1.25	4,8	3.38	1.20	7,1	2.73	1.13	7,3	3.35	1.10	4,0	2.88	1.26	1,0	3.28	1.11	6,3	3.37	1.28	15,8
CITIZENSHIP meanindex	Some people say the following things are important for being truly (countrymen). Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? 1=not at all 4=very important	3.32	.69	3,6	3.04	.76	5,9	2.94	.74	5,9	3.28	.70	6,1	3.25	.63	1,2	3.23	.74	4,3	3.19	.72	5,7
born	to have been born in /country/	3.10	.99	2,4	2.78	1.06	2,0	2.59	1.06	2,8	3.22	.93	3,1	3.18	.87	0,8	2.97	1.05	3,1	3.03	.98	3,5
time	to have lived in /country/ for most of one's life	3.26	.88	1,9	2.96	.92	5,1	2.81	.95	4,3	3.12	.89	5,2	3.25	.78	0,5	3.11	.95	3,2	3.21	.86	3,5
language	to be able to speak /country's/ language	3.59	.66	0,8	3.38	.75	2,6	3.42	.74	2,6	3.49	.80	3,3	3.30	.79	0,2	3.62	.67	2,0	3.32	.91	3,7
EXCL. IMMI	Do you think the number of immigrants to /country/ nowadays should be increased/reduced 1=increased 5=reduced	3.81	.93	5,9	4.34	.87	9,5	4.22	.91	10,6	4.05	.96	6,7	4.15	.90	4,7	3.87	1.04	16,5	3.72	.97	34,1
EXCL. REFUG	How much do you agree or disagree that refugees who have suffered political repression in their country should be allowed to stay in (country)? 1=allowed 5=not allowed	2.09	1.11	5,3	1.96	.88	6,9	2.04	1.02	6,5	2.82	1.10	6,8	2.85	1.27	4,8	2.74	1.10	11,2	2.70	1.24	23,8

social security system also are to be found in Great Britain, East-Germany and Italy. Knowing about the reduction of welfare spendings in these countries and about the long enduring Italian dissatisfaction with its unstable governments and corrupt authorities it seems unlikely that these instruments can catch patriotism in these countries in a sufficient way.

The operationalization of *feelings of threat* caused by immigrants seems less problematic in all those countries which really have immigration, however it is hardly applicable to Russia. Concerning the other countries no direct relationship between the amount of immigration and attitudes towards immigrants exists. The Italians, East-Germans, Austrians and Britains show somewhat more fears and/or less positive recognitions of immigrants than the Americans and the West-Germans.

Similar problems occur to the items concerning the *policies towards immigrants and refugees*. Both show extremely high missing values in Russia, but seem to work in the other countries. In contrast to that, the three items which thematize *criteria for truly being a member of the respective nationality* do not show any conspicuous missings hinting at non-attitudes or problems with the questions. Moreover they might catch more deeply rooted convictions. However, their conceptually understanding is not undebatable. Thus, all three items formulate hurdles against citizenship, but "born in country" may be interpreted in ethnic terms, whereas "able to speak country's language" may be understood as a condition for democratic participation, and "have lived for most of one's life in the country" may evoke associations with the political question of immigration- and naturalization policies. In any case, again as with the concepts before, we do not find identical rankorders of the countries along all the items thought to represent one and the same concept, but differing rankorders. This also hints to suboptimal measuring.

Age is measured in years (18 and higher), education is measured in years spent in school and gender refers to men (1) and women (2).

#### **4. Empirical results**

For the empirical test of our hypotheses developed in section 2 we have specified for each dependent variable one regression equation. Therefore we came up with seven equations for each of the seven countries:

- (Ia) Citizenship = Threat + Pat.Pride + Nat.Pride + Ident + Age + Sex + Edu  
 (Ib) Excl.Immigr = Threat + Pat.Pride + Nat.Pride + Ident + Age + Sex + Edu  
 (Ic) Excl.Refug = Threat + Pat.Pride + Nat.Pride + Ident + Age + Sex + Edu  
 (II) Threat = Pat.Pride + Nat.Pride + Ident + Age + Sex + Edu  
 (III) Pat.Pride = Ident + Age + Sex + Edu  
 (IV) Nat.Pride = Ident + Age + Sex + Edu  
 (V) Ident = Age + Sex + Edu

Each equation was analyzed for each country using stepwise regression analyses. All results are presented in the following table 2.

Table: 2 Standardized partialized regression coefficients

independent variable	dependent variable	Austria	GE	GW	Italy	GB	USA	Russia
Threat→	Exclusion Refugees	.45	.42	.46	.34	.48	.42	.26
Nat.Pride→		n.s.	n.s.	.10	n.s.	.13	n.s.	n.s.
Pat.Pride→		-.09	n.s.	n.s.	-.08	-.12	n.s.	n.s.
Edu→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.15	n.s.	n.s.	-.07
Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	-.08	.10	-.06	n.s.	n.s.
Threat→	Exclusion Immigrants	.63	.59	.54	.58	.57	.52	.43
Nat.Ident.→		n.s.	n.s.	.10	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Nat.Pride→		n.s.	n.s.	.15	n.s.	.17	n.s.	n.s.
Pat.Pride→		n.s.	n.s.	-.08	n.s.	-.11	n.s.	n.s.
Age→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.10	.09	n.s.
Edu.→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.07	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	.05	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07
Threat→	Exclusion by Citizenship	.27	.19	.22	.14	.34	.34	.14
Nat.Ident.→		.17	.10	.18	.12	.08	n.s.	.13
Nat.Pride→		.28	.30	.24	.15	.15	.23	n.s.
Pat.Pride→		n.s.	.12	n.s.	n.s.	.09	.10	n.s.
Age→		.10	.17	.13	.13	.20	n.s.	.13
Edu.→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.10	n.s.	-.10	n.s.
Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07	n.s.
Nat.Ident.→	Threat	n.s.	.11	.11	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Nat.Pride→		.29	.35	.43	.11	.23	.16	.13
Pat.Pride→		-.26	-.16	-.28	-.23	-.18	-.18	-.11
Age→		.10	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.11	n.s.	.09
Edu.→		n.s.	n.s.	-.10	-.28	-.09	-.25	n.s.
Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.10	n.s.	n.s.
Nat. Ident.→	Pat.Pride	.26	.25	.32	.14	.30	.16	n.s.
Age→		n.s.	.12	n.s.	n.s.	-.11	.32	-.07
Edu.→		n.s.	n.s.	.07	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	-.06	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Nat.Ident.→	Nat.Pride	.29	.38	.37	.22	.28	.29	.16
Age→		.23	n.s.	.20	-.07	n.s.	.12	n.s.
Edu.→		-.08	-.09	n.s.	-.17	-.08	-.12	-.06
Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.08	.08
Age→	Nat.Ident.	.19	.29	.29	.14	.34	.26	.12
Edu.→		n.s.	n.s.	-.09	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Sex→		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06	-.09	-.08	n.s.
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As expected in *hypothesis 1* national identification has a positive and moderate effect on nationalistic pride in all seven countries. The strongest effect can be found in East Germany (.38), whereas the weakest effect can be found in Russia (.16). That these differences in strength of relationship are significant can be assumed but is not tested here on the statistical level. These differences can be reasoned by different realities of the collective goods used to measure nationalistic pride and therefore the possibilities to be proud on them in the countries under consideration here. Or these differences are based in substantial differences in national identity varying between the countries.

Also as postulated in *hypothesis 2* there is a positive and significant relationship between national identification and patriotic pride. Here the strongest relationship can be found for West Germany (.32) whereas this effect for Russia is not significant. But again these are only descriptive differences which are not tested on their statistical significance. For an explanation of these differences the same arguments as listed for nationalistic pride have to be taken into account. But this kind of analysis does not allow to decide precisely which of these arguments is true.

By *hypothesis 3* we assumed that the relationship between national identification and national pride should be stronger than the relationship between national identification and patriotic pride. Except for Great Britain this is confirmed for all countries. In Great Britain national identification is on the descriptive level some more stronger related to nationalistic than to patriotic pride. On the level of absolute differences between both regression coefficients the countries can be grouped by more higher or more lower differences. Russia, East Germany and USA form the group with rather high differences whereas in Austria, West Germany and Great Britain the differences are rather low. Italy rank between these two groups. However, here we can not decide whether the relationship between identification and nationalism is stronger because of conceptual and theoretical reasons or because of using the term "to be proud of" in measuring the specific content of national identity.

As theoretically predicted in *hypotheses 4 and 5*, nationalistic and patriotic pride have significant, but opposite effects on the feeling, foreigners are threatening. This means that nationalism goes along with feelings of threat, whereas patriotism does not. The really interesting phenomenon seems to be the strength of the relationships between nationalistic pride and threat in Austria, West and East Germany. These countries show the strongest effects compared with all other countries regarded in our analysis. This means that a nationalistic attitude in Austria and Germany is especially strong linked to xenophobic and hostile attitudes towards foreigners may be as a heritage of antisemitism.

Furthermore, except for Italy and USA, the link between nationalistic pride and threat is stronger than the one between patriotic pride and threat. This is close to our assumption that nationalism is somewhat stronger related to social inter group comparisons whereas this kind of social comparison is not so relevant for patriotism. Finally, in the consistently opposite links of nationalistic and of patriotic pride to feelings of threat we see an important argument, that our operationalization of nationalism and patriotism using the pride items shows some validity, though of many theoretical doubts.

Now we want refer to the three aspects of exclusion, the index for exclusion from citizenship, the exclusion of immigrants and the exclusion of refugees. In all seven countries these three tendencies to exclude others are mainly explained by perceived threat, which is close to *hypothesis 6*. The only structural difference seems to be that this relationship is consistently stronger for the exclusion of immigrants. This makes sense because both the measurement of threat and the measurement of exclusion refers to the same attitude objekt: immigrants.

Beside these results with regard to our hypotheses there are some other significant effects. Holding threat constant, consistent and significant effects on exclusion from citizenship can be found with respect to nationalistic pride and national identification. The higher the nationalistic pride and the higher the identification with one's country, the higher is the tendency to exclude on the dimension of citizenship. Moreover the strength of this relationship is systematically stronger for nationalistic pride compared with national identification. This means that additionally to our hypotheses that threat seems not to be the only determinant of exclusion from citizenship but also nationalism and patriotism are predictors of this exclusion tendency.

From a theoretical point of view this seems to be plausible. As discussed above the concepts of nationalism and patriotism are related to different community ideologies. Obviously in case of nationalism citizenship is defined through criteria which are very closed to ethnic aspects. Because of the stronger link between national identification with nationalism than with patriotism this is also reflected in the effects of national identification on exclusion from citizenship. In opposite to this patriotism has only very small effects on exclusion from citizenship in East Germany, Great Britain and USA and no significant effects in the other countries. This makes sense, because patriotism certainly also has a community ideology, but this one differs in many aspect from the nationalistic

community ideology. For the patriotic community ideology to be born in the country or to have lived there for a long time is not so important, but it may be seen as necessary to speak the same language in order to be able to fulfill patriotic duties.

Let us now turn to the independent variables. Identification with one's country is - as expected in *hypothesis 7a* - consistently and significantly increasing with higher age in all seven countries. Education shows only in West Germany a small reducing effect on the intensity of the national identification. Therefore our hypothesis 9a is disproved, hypothesis 9b is also disproved except for West Germany.

Gender has only small significant effects in Italy, Great Britain and the United States. Whereas in Italy men have a stronger national identification, in Great Britain and USA women identify more with their nation. So there is no empirical support for *hypothesis 8a*.

Age, gender and education influence the degree of nationalism and patriotism. In Austria, West Germany and United States we find that nationalistic pride increases significantly with age. The opposite relationship can be found in Italy, although it is much smaller. In East Germany, Great Britain and Russia there is no significant relation. The effect of education on nationalistic pride is small, but consistently negative. Higher education seems to reduce nationalism, regardless of the political system, but does not consistently lead to more patriotism, except for West Germany. Thus, *hypothesis 9c* is not confirmed.

Also, gender has no effect on nationalistic pride with the exception of the United States and Russia. In both countries men are more nationalistic than women. Therefore *hypothesis 8b* is not confirmed.

Increasing age is linked with higher patriotism in East Germany and the United States, but with lower patriotism in Great Britain and Russia. In the remaining countries there is no significant relationship between age and patriotism. So finally, hypotheses 7b and 7c are not confirmed.

Summarizing these results we have shown that our key hypotheses on the relationship between national identification, nationalism, patriotism, feelings of threat and exclusionism hold on a general level in all countries taken into account here. Furthermore there exist some differences between countries only in strength of relationships. Whether this is a consequence of the problematical operationalization of nationalism and patriotism as discussed above or is it reasoned by

specific national social and political conditions can not be decided here on an significant level.  
Therefore this remains still open for speculations.

## 5. Summary and outlook

This paper deals with two important questions concerning national identity. The first one is whether it is theoretical possible to distinguish precisely between identification with one's nation in the sense of affective attachment on the one hand and nationalism and patriotism as different types of its content at the other hand. Therefore we suggest clear definitions of these three concepts. In our view nationalism is characterized through idealisation of the nation and feelings of national superiority. In contrast, patriotism is described as support of the nation based on humanistic values.

The second question is, whether it is possible to distinguish these three concepts empirically, which requires in advance valid operationalizations. To represent the affective attachment to one's nation we used a question about the feeling of closeness to one's country. To distinguish empirical between nationalism and patriotism we used an operationalization which is based on a question about pride in different national goods. Reasons for this operationalization were that a similar operationalization proved as valid for the West- and East-German context in earlier studies and that this question now is available in cross-national comparison. However, we also formulated some severe principal doubts about the adequacy of this question to catch nationalistic and patriotic beliefs-systems and moreover some doubt about the cross-national equivalence of these operationalizations.

Therefore we decided to test the cross-national validity of these concepts resp. there operationalizations not primarily with internal procedures, but by external validation. Attitudes toward foreigners were taken into account as criteria to test the external validity of our operationalization of nationalism and patriotism. We postulated that nationalism should result in a strong feeling of being threatened by foreigners and therefore favor national exclusionism. In contrast, patriotism should reduce feelings of threat and therefore not result in exclusionism. This model of national identity was tested empirically for seven countries based on data of the ISSP (Austria, East and West Germany, Italy, Great Britain, USA and Russia).

The first important result of our analyses is, that it is possible to distinguish national identification, nationalism and patriotism theoretically. It is also possible to distinguish between these three concepts empirically.

National identification was shown to be the more general concept, that is the affective support of the nation seems to be a precondition of nationalism as well as of patriotism. Nationalism and patriotism themselves also can empirically be distinguished by using indicators of pride in selected collective goods. On the one hand, those operationalizations are far from being optimal – because they bear the substantial problems of whether the selected goods are existent in all countries at all, whether they are realized in a way that makes positive evaluations as pride possible and because some of them may change quite fast. Russia was on example, were these problems showed obviously in the distributions.

But, on the other hand, in spite of these problems, we found systematic relationships between the constructs of nationalism and patriotism on the basis of these operationalizations on the one hand and attitudes toward outgroups on the other hand in all countries under study. Nationalism is linked with feelings of being threatened by foreigners and those feelings of threat result in exclusionism. In opposite to this patriotism is not linked with feelings of being threatened.

Furthermore, as a by-product, we analyzed effects of sex/gender, age and education on national identity. Summarizing these results only age has a cross-national systematic effect on identification. Older people tend to identify more with their nation than younger people, which may be a life-cycle or a generational effect. All our other hypotheses – especially those ones about a link between socialisation in a democratic or non-democratic system and nationalism versus patriotism could not be confirmed – may be as a result of being too diffuse and undifferentiated.

The main problem of our study lies in the operationalization of nationalism and patriotism and could not be solved by using the ISSP dataset. Nationalism and patriotism as theoretical concepts have a lot of subdimensions which are relevant for an adequate understanding of these concepts. The operationalization using pride in specific collective goods is something like a proxy for better operationalizations. But it does not cover theoretical relevant aspects of nationalism and patriotism, as for example divergent definitions of a prototypical nation, different preferences for political structures, different self-definitions as political actors and so on – in short it catches the divergent community ideologies just on a small edge. For a valid operationalization of both concepts more complex operationalizations are necessary. Nevertheless our results show that it is possible to

identify something like a "positive" patriotism beside the traditional nationalism even using unsatisfactory indicators. Thus it seems worthwhile to work on better survey questions for this topic.

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