Autonomous regions
In the past few weeks and not without coincidence at a time when a new administration is slowly taking form in Pakistan, the U S is stepping up its war on the Taliban insurgency
6 Reported Dead in U.S. Afghan Strike. They do this incorporating the risks of increased use of airpower
U.S. Officials Describe Afghan Airstrike - NYTimes.com. They do this at the risk of cross border raids across the somewhat fanciful notion of a Afghan-Pakistan border US-Led Forces Accused in Pakistan Attack. . They, we, I should say, do this to stem a situation in Afghanistan which increasing is picking up an unstable wobble as events go around
Is Afghanistan a Narco-State? - NYTimes.com. And there are indications we do it with increasing urgency in suppression of a re-coalescing al Qaeda
al Qaeda Repeats Threat to Danes. The only thing which is clear enough not to draw dispute is that the heart of this fight is in the trans-borderland area of Pakistan. Mostly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas U.S. Analyst Depicts Al Qaeda as Secure in Pakistan and More Potent Than Last Year - NYTimes.com.
Questions are being raised on the interest and engagement of the Pakistan government in this fight. Using an old phrase the flaming datum laid against Pakistan include the Afghan Government's insistence (quietly seconded by U S intelligence of the ISI's (Pakistan's intelligence and national security bureau) involvement in the recent bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul
India and Afghanistan Are Wary Of New Tensions With Pakistan. In addition to the more mundane safety, protection and outright assistance given to the various insurgencies by Pakistan security forces. Some are becoming increasingly suspicious given the increased confidence of the Taliban
The Globe and Mail: Taliban learning how to win key propaganda battles that there may be a standing relation between the taliban and parts of the Pakistani government
AFP: India warns Pakistan over terror 61 years after partition.
The Taliban is the product developed by Pakistan's security forces, sold to various generals and politicians as a strategic counterbalance to India. In a similar manner it could be argued that Al Qaeda is the by-product. As the more virulent and particular forms of the extreme fundamentalist Islamic movements grow among the idle travelers and disaffected along the edges of more straightforward and nationalist movements in this war. Pakistan's security forces are walking along a narrow ledge in attempt to aid potentially useful violent groups and dissuade ones that would throw over Pakistan's secular government as much as Afghanistan's.
All this gently begs a question. What does a guerilla force need to be effective? What I suppose could be termed Corps Competencies. What is the source of efficacy in small wars? How much depends on outside help? The basics sufficient to fight an occupying ground or police force are simply volunteers, small arms, and a body of proven doctrine. The later is largely open source after the last half century
People's war, People's Army; the Viet Cong insurrection manual for underdeveloped countries. Nguyen Giap Vo [WorldCat.org]. Particularly though we are looking at a guerilla force differentiated against a modern networked terrorist-guerilla force like Hamas or Hezbollah as much as the near mythic al Qeada. Beyond the basics this type of force needs advanced weapons. Ideally anti-armor, anti-aircraft, night vision equipment, and sniper rifles, plastic explosives. Additionally it needs protocols for securing, encrypting, communication, and securing its leadership. Advanced tactics for coordinated attacks against an opponent with clear C3 advantages. At the least it needs developed tactics for using improvised weapons: Among these the car bomb (poor mans cruise missile), suicide bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (old artillery shells for the main part), and Explosively Formed Penetrators. The last of these deceptively primitive in reality sophisticated and devastating
Explosively formed penetrator - Wikipedia. At the very least the internet with only nominal care aides such a force as an unlimited networked source of information and with some further care a limited avenue of communication.
An imperfect but still useful metaphor for looking at this is to see in this a retail and wholesale warfare. Retail: cash transaction warfare. You buy your guns, your pick-up trucks with 50 cal. machine guns welded onto a pipe in the back. Your capital investment completed, jihadist or warlord, you're in business. Wholesale is indicative of a more thorough if obscured and possibly dysfunctional relationship. The resources of a state are made available. The effectiveness of a terrorist force is in correlation to its current or former sponsorship by state level institutions. A professional military, or clandestine service bureau. A general staff for doctrine, commissioned and noncommissioned officers to transmit careers worth of professional experience and technical know how. Time space and expertise needed to train enthusiasts into a coherent military force. An exterior civil society capable of supplying engineering, and advanced materials. I acknowledge the caveat of the crucible of war. If you are winning a small war you will gain critical experience as a resource and become less dependent on exterior powers, if you're not winning you are losing such resources and become more dependent. All of this is to say that I have always been dubious of the ability of so-called non state or sub state entities, a franchise terrorism notwithstanding the ferocity of the ideology, to pose a grave and existential threat to world order. Generally in small wars against extremism seeking to win local opinion, combating that should be about engaging the ideology as much as the gun. In territory occupying revolutionary or irredentist ambition, it is worthwhile to identify the enabling patron, who will exist, and turn some attention in that direction. After I had written or a least worked out the bulk of this piece the New York Times saw fit to publish a lengthy and detailed article on this very subject (as have others as this subject increasingly surfaces into news cycles)
Right at the Edge - Special Report - NYTimes.com. This was distressingly timed on their part but an excellent article.
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