Desperate straits
At the beginning of the month there was a transit through the Straits of Hormuz by some Navy vessels, that became briefly newsworthy. The problem laid bare was speed boats plus armored cruisers plus maybe bombs equals trouble. I use the archaic term armored cruisers because they're not particularly armored, and it may encourage a more detached thinking. Two of the ships involved were the USS Port Royal (CG 73) a
Ticonderoga class cruiser - Wikipedia and the USS Hopper (DDG 70) an
Arleigh Burke class destroyer - Wikipedia. For the Iranians, just simple speedboats often called Boghammers, although formally this refers to models of industrial speedboats built by Boghammar Marin AB, a Swedish firm. In the video the Navy provided, the maneuvers of the Iranian boats if not hostile are certainly aggressive and indicative of operational rehearsal of maneuvers to intercept US Navy vessels and gauge their reactions and counter moves President Calls Action of Iranian Boats 'Provocative' - washingtonpost.com. While incidents of this nature seem to be uncommon occurrences, they are happening. A suicide attack (like what befell the USS Cole) may not be most likely scenario given that these are moderately complex maneuvers. Suicide bombings seem to be generally carried out by non-professional grade combatants. In the realm of near suicide missions (more acceptable to the military mind) there is the possibility of a massive waterborne explosively-formed-penetrator deployed against US vessels perhaps in concert with medium sized mines. These Boghammers do pose a threat to the US Navy Iran's Small Boats Are a Big Problem - New York Times. More interesting was once the Navy released their account, The Iranians came forward with one of their own. In common they had only their mutual intransparent natures. This led some to question whether this tale of the tapes depicted one incident, different points of the incident or even from different incidents altogether. This disconnect added an extra layer of mystery and sinister suspicion to the incident. The threatening voice on the tape central to the incident [I am coming towards you now, you will explode after a few minutes...] is rather obviously from a different source than the Iranian officers of the intercepting boats. This would have been as apparent to those on the ships transiting and to those responsible for putting that video release together latter, as it is to those receiving it as news commodity now. More so even. The Navy would have had additional means besides for ascertaining intrusion on the TBS circuit. In the ten days prior to this incident I twice had referrer hits to Atomized here on the the terms Meakoning or MIJI (the more inclusive military acronym: Meakoning, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference). These practices are hardly unknown. They are textbook Soviet military doctrine. In addition latter news stories reported this waterway, in fact, has a twenty year history of perverse or deliberate radio intrusion. Going under the handle "the
Filipino Monkey" by tradition. (Navy Times via both TPM and War and Piece) It seems odd that the Navy would proffer the narrative they did without disclosing this. The Navy's handling of this incident failed as PR, if that was what was intended. Further in this seeming clumsy reaction to the Iranian boats raised questions about the Navy's operational awareness.
Fred Kaplans article in Slate contained an interesting quote
And yet, as Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, told the Boston Globe's Bryan Bender and Farah Stockman on Monday, the U.S. commanders have no systematic way to halt a conflict if it begins to spiral. "I do not have a direct link with my counterpart in the Iranian Navy," he said. "I do not have a way to communicate directly with the Iranian Navy or [Revolutionary] Guard."
How to prevent war with Iran. - By Fred Kaplan - Slate Magazine. It strikes me that this is something that Admiral Fallon CENTCOM, the theater commander, should put together. To provide a protocol for communicating with various levels of the Iranian command and control apparatus so immediate tactical misunderstandings do not lead to a major shooting war. A minor thought here concerning the recent NIE on Iran (representing the intelligence communities professional estimate based on all available empirical evidence) that the President went to theatric lengths to distance himself from on his last mideast tour.
Iran NIE Reopens Intelligence Debate. The message here: facts follow policy; the bureaucracy is treasonous and disloyal unless they fall in line. This needs to be considered carefully. It is the American people who are ultimately in charge and will ask where were the professionals and where their counsel? When it comes time to examine the smoking ruin this next round of imperial adventureism. At the time of Pakistan's President Musharraf's initial declaration of Martial Law last year Admiral Fallon was in Pakistan. The announcement came apparently as the Admiral was heading back to his plane. It was getting a hit in Atomized's referrer logs on the text string "Admiral Fallon is a joke" that day that sent me to Google News to find out what the Admiral was up to. No available evidence suggests; however, that the Admiral's sensibilities compare unfavorably with this administration's foreio-milit policy. Recently there was a news item that a small team of senior administration officials, McDonnell and Hayden (unsure which gets top big-top billing), undertook a pilgrimage to Islamabad earlier this month to get things sorted, and left a day later without public words, or anything to show
Pakistan Rebuffs Secret U.S. Plea for C.I.A. Buildup - New York Times. By the end of the month I read that Admiral Fallon was back in Pakistan quietly working on the same tasks
Admiral: Pakistan OKs Bigger U.S. Role .
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