Intelligence Bill
I've been following intelligence reform legislation since the
911 commission hearings and the release of their report. [They
are a dot org now 9/11 Public Discourse Project.]
Which I admit I only read the executive summary of. Around page 16 of
that summary they move into recommendations. This includes such 'what
to do' speculation as plan and act comprehensively. An admonishment to share information between agencies. This would entail transcending boundries;
that is, engage in domestic spying or at least equate certain criminal
like activities, money movement and such, with national security, and
moving militarily against it. They follow this with some specific
"How to do It" suggestions which fall into the bureau reorganization
catagory. A National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) to sit
across foreign domestic divide. To unify the intelligence community
with a National Intelligence director (NID). To also unify participants
knowledge with a network-based information system, strengthen the FBI
and first responder agencies (homeland security). Last perhaps most
important to unify congressional oversight to gain consistency.
I was able to follow that, so I expected the legislation to
make sense also. Instead at times it seemed relentlessy murky. Two
issues partly surfaced during the debates. On the use of
spy satellites, access to intelligence resources as it was phrased the
Pentagon indicated it would be a deal breaker if it didn't have
exclusive rights when it wanted them. Frankly any veto on these
devices will lead to high tech naval gazing by one side or
another. One article relates that the Pakistani nuclear weapon test was
missed because the Pentagon was using national resources for mundane
monitoring of its Iraqi no-fly zones, What spy reforms mean | csmonitor.com. After the bill was finished disagreement surfaced on a new and still secret generation of satellites New York Times > New Spy Plan Said to Involve Satellite System
which may have colored that debate. Another issue sprang from a
recommendation to standardize drivers licenses. So that they would
essentially form a national Identification card, even to the point of
being a tacit internal passport. The States Rights Crowd are uniquely
quiescent on this - states rights was always more subject matter than
principle. This particular provision is being especially
championed by those looking to screw down immigration laws. Not to
prevent border crossing, but to keep it where it is, and ever much more
so. Illegal: the people; desperate, dependent, and willing to work for
a wage of their employer's choosing.
The version we received at armed forces air intelligence
training center (AFAITC) when I went through there. We ran through the
organizational models of most of the big intelligence apparatus's. Your
various bureau twelves and such. The Director of Central
intelligence was described and labeled as having two hats DcI, the
primary advisor to the President, and dCI(a) head of the Central
Intelligence Agency. The CIA began life as a compromise the National
Security Act of 1947 founded it basically to keep intelligence from
falling wholly to the twin black holes of the State and Defense
Departments. It had five charges going out: advise the National
Security Council, recommend coordinating policy for intelligence
correlate and evaluate intelligence and ensure its dissemination
throughout the community, carry out activities of existing agencies
requiring centralized resources, and other duties as required. In
practice it came down to analysis, counterintelligence and
interventions (political and paramilitary). The way it was described
and the way I worked within it over next four years in Naval
Intelligence it seemed fairly workable. We were looking for the formal
order of battle, the enemy fleet. Looking at its system
capabilities. Trying to uncover its informal or current
arrangement - the whereabouts of their deployment. We were aiming for
the sort of specificity a 5'' gun could use. We took that last upon
ourselves. DIA (Defense intelligence agency) created in 1961 with in
the Secretary of defenses office to centralize portions of the
activities of the service branch offices we relied upon for technical
analysis of weapon systems. Other national offices to provide
that raw information to DIA, and to investigate the fortitude with
which these weapons were held. Also I'm almost positive the CPO going
over this lesson indicated there was a real board or committee this
Dir. Central Intelligence ruled as roost over. The National foreign
Intelligence board under which the National Intelligence Estimates were
wrought.
After 40 years of bureaucracy, adding of units: NSA SRO
etc. the DCI has been pushed down by turf wars into his home
agency. For the sake of a correction - the cure is to add a layer of
bureacracy? Now we have the DNI (Dir. of National Intelligence) &
his agency the NCTC. If bureaucracy. could be undone as easily as done
This might be a viable idea. When I worked at the Kinko's Copy store we
had three or four assistant. managers - which was excessive for a
operation like ours, but we were the first Kinko's in the DC area. When
the expansion came they all left and became branch managers. If
the expansion had been postponed we would have had asst. managers
pushing green buttons indefinitely. If the expansion had been called
off they would have been fired. Whipping up a policy or program Tsar
can be an effective approach when the established means are not
providing. If you grow a new tooth; though, its usually best if an old
comes out. Coordination, Cooperation, and information sharing is what
the past failures revealed wasn't happening. Having both a DCI and a
DNI ain't exactly going to help that. The Post reported yesterday that
the President was considering having the new guy give him his daily
briefings New Director Might Prepare Bush's Daily Intelligence Brief (washingtonpost.com).
That might show the Dir. of the CIA his place in things. It does
nothing for overall organizational logic - other than reveal there is
none. Reuters had a article out the other day which noted that no
other national intelligence operation is this centralized U.S. Alone Among Allies in Centralizing Spy PowersInternational News Article | Reuters.com and no other nation is considering following our suit.
The DNI or whoever is going to fulfill the role of
chairman of the 15 agency Intelligence community board needs to be
independent actor in the political arena with a measure of internal
budgetary and process discretion. The auspices under which this
intelligence reorganization has been launched and it has the presidents signature now seem to shade towards
seeing this office a branded creature of the executive branch and its
policies. With weak and divided congressional oversight, but
removing no ones committee chair out from under them. For myself -- I'm not planning any vacations to Pearl Harbor
11:28:16 PM  ;;
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