(Un)grounded language ideologies: A brief history of translanguaging theory

Jeff MacSwan and Kellie Rolstad
University of Maryland, USA

Abstract
Aims: The authors develop a contrast between grounded and ungrounded language ideologies, defining grounded ideologies as those which are anchored empirically and ungrounded ideologies as those which are not. This framework guides a description of the history of translanguaging theory from early translanguaging theory, grounded in empirical research on codeswitching and other scholarship on bilingualism, to late translanguaging theory, which changed under the influence of a postmodernist approach to language policy known as deconstructivism. The authors further discuss charges of “abyssal thinking” attributed to those who do not accept deconstructivism.

Approach: The approach is argumentative.

Data and Analysis: The authors draw on a wide range of previously published empirical work to support their conclusions.

Conclusions: The authors conclude that late translanguaging theory is at odds with empirical research and holds negative consequences for pluralist language ideologies and civil rights advocacy.

Originality: The article makes original contributions to language ideology, the history of translanguaging theory, and the relationship between language theory and language ideology.

Significance: The article makes a significant critical contribution to the literature on multilingual language theory by drawing attention to significant limitations of translanguaging theory as a resource for language ideology.

Keywords
Language ideologies, codeswitching, translanguaging, grounded language ideologies, ungrounded language ideologies, deconstructivism, plurilingualism, multilingual perspective on translanguaging

Corresponding author:
Jeff MacSwan, University of Maryland, 2311 Benjamin Building, College Park, MD 20742-5031, USA.
Email: macswan@umd.edu
Introduction
Language ideologies have dramatic consequences for multilingual children and communities. Classically, language ideologies make up the “beliefs, feelings, and conceptions about language structure and use which often index the political economic interests of individual speakers, ethnic and other interest groups, and nation-states” (Kroskity, 2010, p. 192). Fuller (2018) contrasts pluralist language ideologies with monoglossic and standard language ideologies, noting that pluralist ideologies celebrate linguistic diversity and multilingualism; by contrast, monoglossic ideologies discourage multilingualism, and standard language ideologies devalue the linguistic varieties of non-dominant groups.

The beliefs that underlie language ideologies can be true or false, a condition that has long motivated sociolinguistic inquiry on linguistic diversity, often with the intent of challenging negative (monoglossic, standard) ideologies. We explore the relationship between ideologies and empirical inquiry, emphasizing the importance of sound empirical scholarship in advocacy for pluralist language ideologies. We present criticisms of claims which neglect to anchor language ideology to empirical research, focusing our discussion on the historical shift in translanguaging theory from grounded to ungrounded language ideologies.

Ideology and empirical inquiry

Grounded language ideology
Gee (2015) noted that “all claims and beliefs are partly ‘ideological’” (p. 22); however,

we still must always ask ourselves whether our theories are based on a genuine attempt to understand the world and make it better or just on a desire for power, control, or status. When our beliefs are based on tacit theories (ones not much consciously considered) and/or non-primary theories (ones not based on a real search for evidence from diverse sources), then they become “ideological” in the worst sense if it turns out they are potentially harmful to others. (Gee, 2015, p. 22–23)

Everybody has theories, not just academics. Gee (2015) gives an example of perceptions of an utterance of African American English (AAE) like My puppy, he be followin’ me or My puppy followin’ me. A common mainstream reaction to AAE constructions like these follows from standard language ideology, which presumes that speakers do not know English “correctly,” and speak this way because they are ignorant; Gee calls this the “bad English” theory. However, linguistic theories about these constructions view them as a reflection of a language difference, not a deficit. Specifically, AAE has two forms of the imperfective (both equivalent to dominant or “standard” English My puppy is following me); one of these forms expresses limited durative aspect (My puppy followin’ me), and the other expresses extended durative aspect (My puppy be followin’ me). Both structures have been documented as productive rules of AAE, reflecting predictable patterns of use (Baugh, 1983; Labov, 1972).

Gee (2015) notes that what makes the linguist’s theory about AAE superior to the “bad English” theory is that the former “is based on a set of generalizations about which the linguist has been reasonably explicit” (p. 12). By contrast, “The claim advanced by people holding the bad English belief is often based on generalizations that people have not overtly considered and explicitly spelled out to themselves or others” (p. 12). Gee calls the linguist’s theory an overt theory and the “bad English” theory a tacit theory. Because the linguist’s theory is overt, it is spelled out in sufficient detail as to permit empirical evaluation. It makes predictions, and the predictions can be
shown to be true or false based on evidence. By contrast, the “bad English” theory is based on normative declarations about linguistic correctness, which are not, and cannot be, anchored in linguistic facts. Hence, the linguistic analysis provides an empirical basis for the claim that AAE is rule-governed, like dominant English, and not a haphazard reflection of ignorance of “correct” English. Gee’s discussion of overt (sometimes called explicit) theories reflects a long tradition in linguistic research. Unlike traditional (prescriptivist) grammar, which relies on tacit assumptions about structure and use, linguistic analysis is concerned with overt theories which aim to spell out every aspect of our linguistic knowledge in full detail. As Chomsky (1957) noted,

The search for rigorous formulation in linguistics has a much more serious motivation than mere concern for logical niceties or the desire to purify well-established methods of linguistic analysis. Precisely constructed models for linguistic structure can play an important role, both negative and positive, in the process of discovery itself. By pushing a precise but inadequate formulation to an unacceptable conclusion, we can often expose the exact source of this inadequacy and, consequently, gain a deeper understanding of the linguistic data. (p. 5)

Here, we call ideologies that are anchored in overt and falsifiable theories grounded ideologies, and those which are not so anchored, like the “bad English” theory, ungrounded ideologies.

Countless topics relevant to negative language ideologies have been studied by linguists and sociolinguists, with powerful consequences for linguistic social justice. For example, Franz Boas’ (1911) remarkable Handbook of American Indian Languages produced detailed descriptions of Chippewa/Ojibwa, Apache, Mohawk, and other Indigenous languages of North America, emphasizing their sophistication and complexity, a controversial perspective at that time (Beach, 2001). As Newmeyer (1986) noted, a commitment to linguistic social justice was in many respects integral to the development of linguistics as a new field in the United States, where the study of Indigenous languages of the American continent led to the clear conclusion that, like other languages of the world, they demonstrate rich and complex structure. The work of early sociolinguists, who began to focus on stigmatized language varieties, was especially disruptive to prevailing language ideologies in the academy:

As long as American structuralists confined their campaign to the languages of remote tribes, they did little to upset their colleagues in departments of modern and classical languages . . . But such was certainly not the case when they began crusading for the linguistic equality of all dialects of English and other literary languages, no matter how “substandard” they were regarded. This egalitarian view came in direct conflict with the long-seated tradition in the humanities that values a language variety in direct proportion to its literary output. (Newmeyer, 1986, p. 42)

Interest in the linguistic study of stigmatized language varieties, like AAE, gained momentum as the Civil Rights Movement took shape in the United States. Research on bilingual language mixing was undertaken in this same sociopolitical context, in which language and its relation to academic achievement and economic power dominated conversations about minoritized students, especially in the wake of the Chicano Movement (Benson, 2001; Riegelhaupt, 2000). Codeswitching researchers undertook to show that language mixing was rule-governed and a reflection of linguistic talent just as AAE scholars (e.g., Baugh, 1983; Labov et al., 1965, 1970; Smitherman, 1977; Wolfram, 1969) had shown that stigmatized language varieties spoken by African Americans were rule-governed and complex (Riegelhaupt, 2000).

Prior to such work, codeswitching was poorly understood and highly stigmatized, even in the academy. For instance, Rabel-Heymann (1978) contrasted her own German-English bilingualism with the “morphologically and lexically garbled language many half-educated German immigrants
practice” (p. 222). Cummins (1979) similarly references Gonzalez (1977) as support for the view that codeswitching may be indicative of semilingualism:

Several investigators have drawn attention to the fact that some bilingual children who have been exposed to both languages in an unsystematic way prior to school, come to school with less than native-like command of the vocabulary and syntactic structures of both L1 and L2 . . . Gonzalez (1977) suggests that under these conditions children may switch codes because they do not know the label for a particular concept in the language they are speaking but have it readily available in the other language. (p. 238)

As noted, Cummins’ (1979) concern expressed here was common among academics in the 1970s; as codeswitching research continued to illuminate the nature of language mixing, presenting it in a positive light, views shifted accordingly in the academy, including for Cummins, who has noted that “no researcher in recent years . . . has disputed the legitimacy” of codeswitching as a valid bilingual language practice (Cummins, 2021, p. 32).

Commins and Miramontes (1989), Grosjean (1982), and Ramirez and Milk (1986) reported that codeswitching was widely believed to be a coping strategy that bilinguals engage in as a way of dealing with deficiencies in both languages. Guadalupe Valdés, too, observed that many teachers held the view that “children who code-switch really speak neither English nor Spanish” (Valdés-Fallis, 1978, p. 2). As with the “bad English” theory of AAE, this tacit theory—which we might call the semilingualism theory—was based on unexamined assumptions, related in this case to the nature of bilingualism.

The emergence of overt theories of codeswitching
Just as tacit theories about AAE motivated scholarly investigation into the structure of AAE, tacit theories about the nature of bilingual codeswitching similarly prompted a number of linguists to use empirical methods to develop overt theories about codeswitching. Gumperz and Hernández-Chávez (1969) observed systematic patterns of “linguistic constraints” (p. 6) on codeswitching, such that examples like He era regador (“he was an irrigator”) and que have chamaquitos (“who have boys”) are considered ill-formed by Spanish-English bilinguals, contrasting with well-formed codeswitches like Era regador at one time (“he was an irrigator at one time”). Aguirre (1976) studied bilinguals’ grammaticality judgments on codeswitching and found that bilingual Mexican Americans also considered expressions like ¿No te vas a poner tu jacket? (‘Aren’t you going to wear your jacket?’) and Tengo un magazine nuevo (“I have a new magazine”) to be well-formed.

By “ill-formed” or “ungrammatical,” linguists mean that speakers have a psychological intuition that an utterance is not allowed by their subconscious grammar. For instance, English speakers have the intuition that John saw pictures of himself on Facebook and John saw my pictures of him on Facebook are well-formed, but John saw my pictures of himself on Facebook contrasts as ill-formed. Intuitions about grammaticality are used to construct theories of grammar; in the case of bilingual codeswitching, these are theories of bilingual grammar.

In addition to restrictions on codeswitching at specific syntactic boundaries (e.g., He era regador), language switching is also constrained at morphological junctures. Bilinguals create new words through borrowing by phonologically integrating a word stem from one language into another, as in parqueando (“parking”) or lonchar (“to have lunch”), where the English-origin stems, too, are pronounced with Spanish phonology. But switching phonological systems from one language to another in the middle of a word is not well tolerated in codeswitching; so, words like run-eando ([rʌnéando], “running”), where the sound [ʌ] (available in English but not in Spanish) occurs with a Spanish affix, are judged to be ill-formed by bilinguals (Sankoff & Poplack, 1980).
These facts relate to a ban on word-internal codeswitching, first observed by Poplack (1980). The ban also appears to relate to word-like units, where linguistic processes have merged elements together, affecting words that are phonologically integrated with adjacent elements such as clitics. Typically serving as pronouns or articles, clitics are words which are phonologically merged with adjacent words, as in Spanish dáme lo (“give me it”), comprised of the imperative dá (“give”), the indirect object clitic me (“me”), and the direct object clitic lo (“it”). Note that orthography may not always reflect phonological merger, as in Spanish Yo la vi (“I saw her”), where the object pronoun la (“her”) is phonologically (and syntactically) merged with the verb vi (“saw”). Just as word-internal codeswitching is not well tolerated by bilinguals, codeswitching across instances of phonological merger like these is also illicit. This accounts for the strongly negative grammaticality judgment by Spanish-English bilinguals for codeswitches like Yo la saw (“I saw her”; Poplack, 1980), where a Spanish pronominal clitic is mixed with an English verb.

These observations suggest that bilinguals have discrete phonological systems (Bullock & Toribio, 2009; Grosjean & Miller, 1994; MacSwan & Colina, 2014). This finding may be further illustrated with a specific phonological process, namely, the contrast between Spanish and English with respect to lenition (or weakening) of /b, d, g/ between vowels. In Spanish, these sounds are usually realized as stops (involving obstruction of the airstream) when following another stop, a pause, or /l/ in the case of /d/ (e.g., cuándo [kwañdo] ‘when,’ tengo [tenɡo] ‘I have’), but are pronounced as continuants in intervocalic contexts (e.g., hada [aða] ‘fairy,’ haga [aŋa] ‘does’) (Lipski, 1994). English does not have this phonological rule.

These facts are very specific, and may therefore be used to empirically evaluate an overt theory. MacSwan and Colina (2014) assessed the theory that phonological systems are discretely represented for Spanish-English bilinguals using two specific tests. In one, they tested whether lenition of /b, d, g/ would occur intervocically in codeswitching contexts when situated between a Spanish vowel and an English vowel at word boundaries (e.g., Hablamos de mi ghost yesterday). The goal was to discover whether Spanish-English bilinguals (N = 5, adult simultaneous bilingual Arizonans) would allow a Spanish phonological process to modify English word structure (in the example, /g/ in ghost). A second experiment asked whether an English segment (e.g., /g/) could trigger a Spanish phonological process (/s/-voicing) to modify a Spanish word (e.g., mis ghosts). The results of a phonetic analysis showed that the bilingual participants switched seamlessly and effortlessly at language boundaries; participants applied the Spanish phonological processes exclusively to Spanish segments, even in a bilingual environment.

How these empirical observations inform the organization of bilingual grammar can be illuminated through a closer look at how language-specific differences like these are represented in phonological theory. Phonologists capture language variation like this in terms of differences in the rankings associated with phonological rules, which are called constraints in current phonological theory (de Lucy, 2012; Prince & Smolensky, 1993). As with classical phonological rules (Chomsky & Halle, 1968), each constraint modifies sound structure in a specific way; a series of ordered constraints stands in a “feeding order” such that each successive constraint creates a context for the application of the next one. Language-specific differences are represented by distinct constraint dominance hierarchies, each capturing a different constraint ranking. Since language-specific phonologies differ with respect to the ranked order of constraints, it follows that bilinguals will have discrete phonological systems, each with a distinct ranked order of constraints. If competing orders for sets of constraints were combined as one, the distinct rankings would not be preserved, and the phonological processes would not generate phonetic forms as expected. More concretely, if two phonological constraints, A and B, were ranked such that A > B and B > A in a unitary (single) phonological system, the contradiction would result in a ranking paradox, as A would have no priority relative to B or vice versa. To avoid the paradox, the human language
faculty organically organizes two discrete systems, one corresponding to the phonological output of each language.

This study, focused on bilingual phonology, is but one of a multitude of highly detailed and rigorous codeswitching studies that lead to the conclusion that bilingual codeswitching is rule-governed and systematic and that bilinguals have integrated linguistic systems which they exquisitely manage in dynamic social contexts. An integrated system means that some components of a bilingual’s grammatical knowledge are shared across the languages they know (as a “unitary” system), and others are discrete, capturing those aspects of our linguistic knowledge that represent language-specific elements, as depicted in Figure 1 (MacSwan, 2017). Encapsulating language-specific components of a bilingual’s grammar (such as the phonological differences just discussed) prevents the rules of one language from modifying structures in the other language in ways that are not supported by the linguistic data.

Since the early 1970s, empirical research conducted on codeswitching has grounded ideological arguments to repudiate deficit views of language mixing. As Lipski (2014) recalled,

> Seeking to dispel popular notions that equate code-switching with confusion, “alingualism,” imperfect acquisition, and just plain laziness, linguists have since the early 1970s devoted considerable effort to demonstrating grammatical and pragmatic conditions favoring or constraining code-switching. Bilingual code-switching so analyzed is not regarded . . . as a deficiency or anomaly. (p. 24)

Rampton (2007) similarly remarked,

> . . . research on code-switching has waged a war on deficit models of bilingualism and on pejorative views of syncretic language use by insisting on the integrity of language mixing and by examining it for its grammatical systematicity and pragmatic coherence. (p. 306)

The celebration of codeswitching research as strong empirical support for pluralist language ideologies was similarly evident in Ofelia García’s (2009) excellent *Bilingual Education in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective*, in which she re-introduced Williams’ (1994) coinage *translanguaging*, which she defined as “multiple discursive practices in which bilinguals engage in order to make sense of their bilingual worlds” (García, 2009, p. 45, emphasis in original). García noted, “Translanguaging therefore goes beyond what has been termed code-switching . . ., although it includes it, as well as other kinds of bilingual language use and bilingual contact” (p. 45). García (2009) leaned on codeswitching scholarship to make the important point that codeswitching provides evidence of linguistic talent, not deficit:

> Code-switching often occurs spontaneously among bilingual speakers in communication with others who share their languages. Far from being a sign of inadequacy or sloppy language usage or lack of knowledge,
it has been shown that code-switching is a sophisticated linguistic skill and a characteristic of speech of fluent bilinguals. (Garcia, 2009, p. 50)

García et al. (2015) similarly observed,

In both developmental maintenance programmes and transitional bilingual education programmes, Latino educators had used a bilingual vernacular which included linguistic borrowings as well as “code-switching” (Jacobson, 1983). Although many language scholars have argued that these everyday language practices of bilinguals are normative and intelligent expressions of bilingualism (MacSwan, 2000[a]; Poplack, 1980; Zentella, 1997), these practices have been racialized and stigmatized (Martínez, 2010; Rosa, 2010), and rendered as “corrupted” language, as “Spanglish.” (p. 205)

However, this perspective, which drew on empirically grounded research on bilingualism to inform language ideology, would soon shift under the influence of Pennycook’s (2006) postmodern approach to language policy, a matter we turn to next.

**Ungrounded language ideology**

Linguists have long understood (named) languages to be social constructs, epiphenomenal of individual (and varied) language speakers who share a speech community (e.g., Bloch, 1948; Bloomfield, 1926; Chomsky, 1986). For Pennycook (2006), however, “named languages” were more specifically colonial inventions, and hence vestiges of colonialism itself. “A postmodern (or postcolonial) approach to language policy . . . suggests we no longer need to maintain the pernicious myth that languages exist,” conjectured Pennycook (2006, p. 67). Logically, if languages do not exist, then neither do “many of the treasured icons of liberal-linguistic thought . . . such as language rights, mother tongues, multilingualism or code-switching” (Makoni & Pennycook, 2007, p. 22).

Pennycook’s view that discrete languages do not exist is often called deconstructivism, a reference to Derrida’s (1967) postmodernist theory of deconstruction, which is skeptical of scientific inquiry and the Enlightenment. (See MacSwan, 2022b, for discussion.) Deconstructivism is predicated on the historical emergence of “named languages” and their ties to colonial expansion. However, while named languages certainly may correspond to colonial powers, they are very often an expression of defiance of colonial power, part of an effort to decolonize. Nicholas and McCarty (2022) make this important point in relation to Indigenous language revitalization work, focused specifically on the Hopi language. They show that “naming in the Indigenous [Hopi] language is central to (re)claiming collective linguistic and epistemic memory. . .” Indeed, “Names and naming—myaamia, Hopilavai, Kanienké:ha—are vitally important connectors to distinct lands/waters, people, and home place” (p. 242). Cook (2022) similarly observes in this connection that languages specifically associated with nations represent a minority, with 193 countries in the United Nations collectively speaking more than seven thousand languages. Moreover, as Cook notes, several languages of the world—such as Yenish, Kurdish and Swahili—have no clear political homeland at all. The same could be said of numerous stigmatized language varieties, including Chicano English, African American English, Indian English, and much more. Naming these varieties is an act of defiance and independence, and an assertion of identity for stigmatized and often racialized communities. These named language varieties are not colonial artifacts but are rather expressions of rebellion against colonizers.

However, Otheguy et al. (2015) sought to establish a point of contrast with Pennycook’s (2006) view:

Because we recognize the importance of the scholarly, political, and sociolinguistic distinction between monolinguals and bilinguals, we are not simply abandoning the distinction or scuttling the concepts of language and bilingualism, as Pennycook (2010), and Makoni and Pennycook (2007) have urged. (p. 293)

Rather, for Otheguy et al. (2015), deconstructivism applied only to individual bilingualism. As Garcia and colleagues (2021) assert, those who see bilingualism as cognitively real reify the presumption of discrete languages that arose from colonialism and nation-building efforts, as well as give credence to the imaginary line imposed by colonial logics, enabling the continued identification of racialized bilinguals’ language practices as fundamentally deficient when compared to those of dominant monolingual language users. (Garcia et al., 2021, p. 215)

Other than appealing to its negative consequences for language policy, García et al. (2021) do not offer a rationale for limiting the conclusion of Pennycook’s argument to individual bilingualism alone (exempting societal bilingualism). Pennycook’s argument was that languages, as social artifacts, were named by colonists to manipulate and control oppressed people, and that these “named languages” should therefore be abandoned altogether. However, because many languages are named in the interest of decolonization, of rebellion and independence, one sees that Pennycook’s premise is false in some cases and that languages and language varieties have been named by both the oppressed and the oppressor. As social constructs, named languages are emergent properties of the individual languages people speak, and refer to communities of interlocutors whose individual languages are sufficiently alike to permit communication. García and colleagues maintain that social languages exist, and bilingualism as a social phenomenon exists, but individual bilingualism does not. They reject individual bilingualism because it reifies “the presumption of discrete languages that arose from colonialism” (García et al., 2021, p. 215), but they themselves engage in the presumption of discrete languages by affirming the “distinction between monolinguals and bilinguals” at the societal level (Otheguy et al., 2015, p. 293). Although Pennycook’s conclusion, like his premise, is mistaken, he is consistent in his disdain for constructs like multilingualism at both the societal and individual levels, while García and colleagues are not. However, as we will show later, rejecting bilingualism as a construct, even limited to the individual level, has dramatically negative consequences for civil rights advocacy.

García and colleagues drew on Pennycook’s approach to question “the ontological status of language” and “the very idea of multilingualism” (García et al., 2017, p. 5, 8), and, as such, to reject codeswitching as “a theoretical endorsement of the idea that what the bilingual manipulates, however masterfully, are two separate linguistic systems” (Otheguy et al., 2015, p. 282). Instead, they see bilingual grammar as “disaggregated in the sense that features are separable and not integrated into linguistic systems” (García & Otheguy, 2014, p. 645). They erroneously attribute a “dual competence” perspective to codeswitching scholars rather than the integrated view depicted in Figure 1. As a natural extension of these positions, they further reject the concepts of second language (acquisition), home language, and heritage language, along with any term that suggests internalized representation of more than one language (e.g., Wei, 2022; Wei & García, 2022).

García and colleagues published four essays critical of codeswitching research (García et al., 2021; García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015, 2018), which garnered some very critical reactions. For example, Stephen May charged that Garcia and colleagues’ presentations reflect “a high degree of historical amnesia, or at least historical ellipsis . . .,” seen “clearly in the progression
of translanguaging as a new academic paradigm, for example, via its increasing dichotomization of . . . translanguaging and codeswitching” (May, 2022a, p. 345). Peter Auer, a leading codeswitching scholar whose research is foundational to current approaches to the study of codeswitching as language use (e.g., Auer, 1984, 1995) was even more candid: “The construction of translanguaging as a counter-notion to codeswitching is based on a gross misrepresentation of research on bilingualism and codeswitching as it has accumulated since the 1970s” (Auer, 2022, p 147). MacSwan (2017, 2022a) and Bhatt and Bolonyai (2022) make similar critical assessments.

The concerns raised about García and colleagues’ criticism of codeswitching research (García et al., 2021; García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015, 2018) relate to its tacit nature—that is, their critique lacks the specificity ordinarily expected in disciplinary linguistic research. For example, García and colleagues’ essays include no literature review documenting the characteristics of codeswitching scholarship which form the basis of their concerns, and no description of specific codeswitching theories, even though the literature is quite extensive (see MacSwan, 2020b, 2021, for review). While it is not uncommon for a publication to provide an inadequate literature review, it is very unusual for a critical discussion of a topic to lack substantive engagement of even a single relevant scholarly work, as in García and colleagues’ essays. A literature review could have informed readers about specific details of prior research relevant to their concerns, and would have allowed them to present detailed discussions of falsifiable proposals presented by codeswitching scholars, which could have then been empirically challenged. Much more significantly, because the literature review acknowledging and engaging prior relevant research is omitted, García and colleagues’ essays give their readers the impression that such research does not exist.

In addition, while steeped in vague metaphorical language about “linguistic features,” García and colleagues’ essays include no actual detailed linguistic theories which make verifiable empirical predictions. Presenting their work as an overt theory with predictive capabilities would have given them the opportunity to offer evidence showing its advantages over existing theories of bilingual grammar which have emerged from codeswitching research.

Especially troubling, García and colleagues offer no relevant empirical evidence in any of their critical essays about codeswitching. Presenting empirical evidence would have allowed them to demonstrate that existing theories of bilingual grammar and codeswitching make false predictions (if that were true). Such evidence could have also shown how their own overt and falsifiable theories of language structure, had they been presented, might demonstrate better accounts of the evidence than existing theories do.

For example, if a bilingual’s linguistic knowledge is fully “disaggregated,” why do Spanish-English bilinguals soften /b, d, g/ between vowels in the case of Spanish words but not in the case of English words? Why is there a restriction on crosslinguistic morphological affixation, such that language-specific phonological systems correspond to language-specific morphological affixation? Why is there a restriction on using an English subject pronoun with a Spanish verb, or a Spanish object clitic pronoun with an English verb?

These are challenging research questions, extensively explored in the literature, which any theory of bilingual grammar must be able to address. To the extent a theory does not or cannot address such questions, it is a tacit theory, similar to the “bad English” theory and the semilingualism theory in this regard, even if it purports to be committed to progressive language ideologies.

**The “manifesto”**

The “historical amnesia” (May, 2022a) and “gross misrepresentation” (Auer, 2022) of codeswitching scholarship evident in García and colleagues’ first critical discussions (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015, 2018) are intensified in their more recent essay, dubbed “a manifesto”
by its authors (García et al., 2021). The “manifesto” suggests that codeswitching research has primarily been the enterprise of White scholars whose characterization of bilingual codeswitching patterns has long been repelled by scholars of color, whose concerns are dismissed or ignored by White scholars; these White scholars are said to be guilty of “abyssal thinking” (de Sousa Santos, 2007) because the actual views of racialized people are invisible to them (cast into an abyss). Specifically, the “manifesto” authors claim:

... many scholars of bilingualism have long insisted—benignly in their eyes—that this behavior is rule-governed (MacSwan, 2017; Poplack, 1980). However, very early on, racialized bilingual scholars argued that the proposed orderliness and constraints on codeswitching, well-meaning as they were, did not correspond to their observations of practices in the community. For example, ... Pedro Pedraza et al. (1980) argued that ... they did not find such constraints. (p. 214)

One sees from a careful look at the discourse of the text a contrast set up between “many scholars of bilingualism” (exemplified by White scholars, Poplack and MacSwan) on the one hand, and “racialized bilingual scholars” on the other hand, suggesting that White scholars did not accept the views of racialized scholars like Pedro Pedraza regarding codeswitching constraints. Although the alleged objections of racialized scholars are characterized as prevalent, only one example is offered — Pedraza et al. (1980). The contrast in the text further suggests that codeswitching research is the undertaking of White scholars rather than racialized scholars, and that the “proposed orderliness and constraints on codeswitching” (suggesting structured integration, illustrated in Figure 1) are not actually empirically attested. These three claims serve as premises for the “manifesto” authors’ conclusion that codeswitching scholars are guilty of “abyssal thinking,” understood as deficit ideology.

However, all three claims are overtly false. First, Pedraza et al. (1980) made no such statements about codeswitching patterns. Pedraza et al. (1980) were concerned with whether codeswitching may have a deleterious effect on the Spanish or English of New York Puerto Ricans. Pedraza et al. (1980) did not dispute contemporaneous codeswitching research as the “manifesto” reports, but rather favorably cited it, including references to Pfaff (1975), Timm (1975), Lance (1975), Gumperz (1976), Valdés-Fallis (1976), Wentz (1977), Poplack (1980) and Sankoff and Poplack (1980). Pedraza and colleagues reported that the “linguistic analysis of code-switching recorded in the natural setting has shown that claims of language debasement are unfounded” (p. 93). They did not at any point indicate that reported codeswitching patterns were inconsistent with their data, as the “manifesto” says. (To view the scanned full text of Pedraza et al., 1980, visit go.umd.edu/3VUmDRA.)

Furthermore, codeswitching research has been carried out for nearly 50 years as a collaboration between racialized bilingual scholars and White scholars, many of whom are also bilingual. Research on African American English, which found structure and orderliness in AAE, has similarly been served by a productive collaboration between White scholars like Walt Wolfram, Guy Bailey, and Ralph Fasold and racialized scholars like Geneva Smitherman, John Baugh, and John Rickford, among others. Racialized bilingual scholars who have participated in codeswitching research over the course of many years include Shoji Azuma, Shoba Bandi-Rao, Abdelâli Bentahila, Rakesh Bhatt, Brian Chan, Sonia Colina, Rosario Gingrás, Kay González-Vilbazo, Eduardo Hernández-Chávez, Almeida Jacqueline Toribio, Luis López, Shahrazd Mahootian, Miwa Nishimura, Ira Pandit, Adalberto Aguirre, Hedi M. Belazi, Avavind K. Joshi, Liliana Sánchez, Guadalupe Valdés (Valdés-Fallis), and Ana Celia Zentella, among many others.

Finally, the “manifesto” authors’ claim that the “proposed orderliness and constraints on codeswitching” are unattested is absurd. It has been abundantly documented over the course of 50 years
that codeswitching exhibits restrictions on language mixing across all structural domains, including syntax (see MacSwan, 2014), morphology (see Stefanich et al., 2019), and phonology (see Bullock & Toribio, 2009; MacSwan & Colina, 2014). While grammaticality judgments are known to exhibit individual variation and gradience among monolingual and bilingual speakers (Schütze, 1996; Sorace, 1996), empirical research specifically focused on bilinguals has shown that grammaticality judgments on codeswitching are statistically stable (Grabowski, 2011; Stadthagen-González et al., 2018), even in the presence of negative attitudes toward codeswitching (Badiola et al., 2018). The stability of codeswitching patterns is similarly evident in bilingual corpus data (MacSwan & McAlister, 2010).

The “manifesto” lays bare the purely ideological basis of García and colleagues’ views about the cognitive representation of bilingualism. First incorporated into the translanguaging literature in García and Otheguy (2014) and Otheguy et al. (2015), the deconstructivist thesis assailed empirical research on bilingualism with inaccurate and general descriptions of existing scholarship on bilingualism in lieu of the usual substantive literature review expected in any scholarly publication; it presented no empirical evidence, and offered only vague metaphors about the nature of bilingual grammar, intended to serve “as not only a theory of bilingual education and bilingualism, but more generally also as a theory of language” (Otheguy et al., 2015, p. 284). Because these conjectures were not made overt, the deconstructivist proposal in García and Otheguy (2014) and Otheguy et al. (2015) was a tacit theory, just as it was in its original form in Pennycook (2006), and therefore far too vague to subject to empirical tests. The “manifesto” (García et al., 2021) reiterates much of the same, but now further distorts the published record by making overtly false claims rather than merely reflecting the familiar “historical amnesia” (May, 2022a) of their prior work. Even worse, these statements are made in the interest of characterizing codeswitching scholars as “abyssal thinkers” who are said to dismissively patronize racialized bilinguals.

**Ideology and advocacy**

Recall Gee’s (2015) discussion of the basis for evaluating competing language ideologies. Specifically, in considering what makes the linguist’s theory about AAE superior to the “bad English” theory, Gee noted: “One important difference between them is that the linguist’s theory is based on a set of generalizations about which the linguist has been reasonably explicit” (p. 12). By contrast, “The claim advanced by people holding the bad English belief is often based on generalizations that people have not overtly considered and explicitly spelled out to themselves or others” (p. 12). Although late translanguaging theory, infused with Pennycook’s postmodernist deconstructivist thesis, aims to advance the same pluralist language ideologies that codeswitching scholars have promoted, it does so without an empirical anchor—in fact, it makes assertions about the nature of bilingualism that are empirically known to be false. Although deconstructivism promotes different language ideologies from those which underlie “the bad English” theory of AAE or the semilingualism theory of bilingualism, it is similarly ungrounded, serving as ideology alone.

The empirical grounding of ideology is an important part of critical engagement and advocacy. The empirical component is important not only as a tool for informing policymakers but also for raising critical consciousness among the oppressed. As Fuller (2018) noted, “even those disadvantaged by hegemonic ideologies accept them as immutable facts” (p. 119). For Freire (1985), science and empirical inquiry are critical components of social justice:

Those who use cultural action as a strategy for maintaining their domination over the people have no choice but to indoctrinate the people in a mythified version of reality. In doing so, the right subordinates
science and technology to its own ideology, using them to disseminate information and prescriptions in its
effort to adjust the people to the reality the “communications” media define as proper. By contrast, for
those who undertake cultural action for freedom, science is the indispensable instrument for denouncing
the mythos created by the right, and philosophy is the matrix of the proclamation of a new reality. Science
and philosophy together provide the principles of action for conscientization. (p. 86)

Freire’s approach to critical pedagogy can and should be distinguished from the postmodernist/
poststructuralist approach underlying deconstructivism. Whereas Freireans maintain a commit-
ment to the Enlightenment, poststructuralism and postmodernism actively engaged in epistemo-
logical skepticism, resulting in the emergence of “the relativist turn” in the social sciences by the
1980s, privileging perspective over discovery (Susen, 2015). Postmodernists developed a political
critique founded on epistemological doubt by positioning all knowledge as subjective and perspec-
tival, thus seeking to undermine political elites who cloak themselves in “objectivity.” However, as
Peter McLaren, a leading critical theorist, wrote with Ramin Farahmandpur, these methods failed
to develop an actionable agenda for social justice:

Postmodern theory has made significant contributions to the education field by examining how schools
participate in producing and reproducing asymmetrical relations of power, and how discourses, systems of
intelligibility, and representational practices continue to support gender inequality, racism, and class
advantage. For the most part, however, postmodernism has failed to develop alternative democratic social
models. This is partly due to its failure to mount a sophisticated and coherent opposition politics against
economic exploitation, political oppression, and cultural hegemony. In its celebration of the aleatory
freplay of signification, postmodernism exhibits a profound cynicism—if not sustained intellectual
contempt—towards what it regards as the Eurocentric Enlightenment project of human progress, equality,

Empirical inquiry into the nature of bilingualism serves the interests of advocacy and creates a firm
foundation upon which to build meaningful progressive social policy. Relying on ideology alone
creates vulnerabilities, leaving pluralist language ideologies defenseless.

However, the “manifesto” suggests that those who deny deconstructivism are ipso facto
deficit thinkers: “These [multilingual, non-deconstructivist] approaches reify the presumption of
discrete languages that arose from colonialism,” and hence enable “the continued identifica-
tion of racialized bilinguals’ language practices as fundamentally deficient” (García et al.,
2021, p. 215).

It is worth reflecting for a moment on the vastness of the universe of people who reject decon-
structivism and are therefore “abyssal” or deficit thinkers according to the “manifesto.” First and
foremost, it includes the legions of people in the world who have not read or do not accept
Pennycook’s or the “manifesto” authors’ point of view, many of whom are very effective political
activists, advocates, and partners, and may themselves be racialized bilinguals. Second, it includes
many who have contributed in powerful ways to the advancement of pluralist language ideologies,
including work by some of the authors of the “manifesto,” carried out before Pennycook’s post-
modern approach to language policy influenced their thinking.

Consider, for example, García (2009), who made persuasive arguments in her pre-deconstruc-
tivist work against semilingualism, a construct embedded in Cummins’ (1979) theoretical framework,
defined as “the unequal performance of bilingual children in their two languages when
compared to monolingual children” (García, 2009, p. 56). She urged that the construct be aban-
donated, while wholeheartedly accepting and promoting codeswitching and other empirical research
on bilingualism. Edelsky et al. (1983) criticized semilingualism as “a confused grab-bag of
prescriptive and descriptive components” (p. 2). Martin-Jones and Romaine (1986) similarly
criticized Cummins’ (1979) ideas, noting that “the type of literacy-related skills described by Cummins are, in fact, quite culture-specific: that is, they are specific to the cultural setting of the school” (p. 30). MacSwan (2000b) reviewed reputed empirical evidence for semilingualism from studies of language variation, linguistic structure, school performance, and language loss, and concluded that all of it is either spurious or irrelevant; he showed that semilingualism is indistinguishable from classical prescriptivism, and urged that it be abandoned on empirical, theoretical, and moral grounds. Reflecting on Cummins’ (1979) related distinction between Basic Interpersonal Communications Skills (BICS) and Cognitive Academic Language Proficiency (CALP), Wiley’s (2005) and Wiley and Rolstad’s (2014) critiques traced the distinction to “the Great Divide” between literate and non-literate societies, and illuminated the purely ideological basis of dichotomous views of language proficiency. Other strong and effective critiques of semilingualism and related constructs include Commins and Miramontes (1989), Edelsky (2006), Hakuta and D’Andrea (1992), MacSwan and Rolstad (2003, 2010), MacSwan et al. (2017), Paulston (1983), Petrovic and Olmstead (2001), and Valadez et al. (2002), among many more. Similarly, in relation to “academic language,” Martínez and Mejía (2020) analyzed the “everyday language of Latina/o/x students” to showcase the complex language practices which overlap with those framed as academic. Other critiques of academic language as an expression of standard language ideology include Valdés (2004), Leeman (2005), Rolstad (2014), Flores and Rosa (2015), Rosa (2016), and MacSwan (2020a). This important body of critical work, none of which has a deconstructivist orientation, can hardly be described as promoting deficit thinking. Indeed, it is explicitly designed to repel deficit perspectives on bilingualism.

Similarly, in critical work on bilingual language assessment, we showed that Spanish language tests, frequently used in schools to assess children’s Spanish home language as “non-” or “limited,” lack validity (MacSwan & Rolstad, 2006). Specifically, we found that while the Language Assessment Scales-Oral (LAS-O) Español and the Idea Proficiency Test I-Oral (IPT) Spanish identified 74% and 90% (respectively) of Spanish-speaking children as limited speakers of Spanish (their first language), a coded natural language sample found participants (N = 145) to have typical native Spanish language proficiency. MacSwan et al. (2002) and MacSwan and Mahoney (2008) similarly challenged the common “non-non” label which ascribed semilingualism to many children, and Rolstad and MacSwan (2024) present related criticisms of language assessments developed under the No Child Left Behind Act (2002) as the new assessments may relate to the surge in numbers of so-called Long Term English Learners. Rosa (2016) and Flores and Rosa (2015) favorably reference this strand of our research in building a case for pluralist language ideologies. This work—again, in no way related to deconstructivism—persuasively repudiated institutionalized mechanisms used to label bilingual children as linguistically deficient, and contributed to ending the widespread practice of assessing children’s oral first language ability in school (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017).

As a final example, consider the extensive body of research evaluating bilingual education in program comparison studies, which in fact depends on an understanding of bilingualism as both socially significant and cognitively real. For example, Rolstad et al. (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of program effectiveness research on emergent bilingual learners. The study found that bilingual education is consistently superior to all-English approaches, and that developmental bilingual education programs are superior to transitional bilingual education programs. Rolstad and colleagues concluded that bilingual education programs are effective in promoting academic achievement, and that their development should be encouraged.

The individual studies making up the research corpus of the meta-analysis relied on assessments of children’s language and academic achievement in English, in Spanish, and in both. The meta-analysis found a positive effect for bilingual education of .23 standard deviations, but a
much stronger positive effect for studies with outcome measures in the native language, at .86 standard deviations. If we accepted that individual bilingualism does not exist, then we could not meaningfully conceptualize any study which seeks to evaluate program effectiveness around the development of language and academic content knowledge in two languages for individual students. Indeed, one sees that any empirical research which conceptualizes children as individually multilingual is incongruous under deconstructivism, severely hampering applied linguists and educational researchers seeking to engage in advocacy-related research. Hence, this important work, which advances pluralist language ideologies, not only has no conceptual dependence on deconstructivism, but in fact deconstructivism effectively renders it meaningless.

Additional potential examples seem endless. As with sociolinguistic research on stigmatized language varieties and codeswitching conducted since the 1970s (Lipski, 2014; Riegelhaupt, 2000; Smitherman, 1977), these powerful efforts to undermine monoglossic and standard language ideologies are in no case conceptually dependent on deconstructivism, and in many instances they are directly at odds with it. These studies ground pluralist language ideologies by anchoring them in empirical research. Far from supporting the labeling of “racialized bilinguals’ language practices as fundamentally deficient” (García et al., 2021, p. 215), this work draws on rigorous empirical research to support pluralist language ideologies.

Protecting bilingual children’s civil rights

Pennycook understood well that language rights were collateral damage of deconstructivism. By abandoning “the pernicious myth that languages exist” (Pennycook, 2006, p. 67), he observed that we will also lose the concepts of language rights, mother tongue, multilingualism, and codeswitching (Makoni & Pennycook, 2007; Pennycook, 2006). Accordingly, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (2017) noted that scholars “working in the area of language policy with postmodernist leanings have challenged even the basic concept ‘language,’ whereas in national and international law the concept is self-evident and problem-free” (p. 10-11). The challenge this presents for advocacy is obvious: “In legal documents on language rights, these rights cannot be attached to non-existing entities” (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 2017, pp. 10-11). These well-understood implications of deconstructivism cannot be overcome simply by limiting its scope to individuals rather than society, as García and colleagues suggest. One sees this clearly around legal mandates to protect the civil rights of multilingual learners in US schools.

In Lau v. Nichols (1974), the Supreme Court unanimously found that a “disparate impact” occurred when a San Francisco school district failed to provide for the special challenges facing school-age English language learners, as “students who do not know English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.” The Court found that the policy violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and required the school district to provide students with “appropriate relief.” Schools in the United States have responded differently to this requirement, but all have a legal obligation to address the language learning needs of children who do not speak English.

In the context of second language acquisition, deconstructivism implies that a second language learner’s linguistic knowledge is “always and at every stage complete” (García & Otheguy, 2020, p. 28), with each learner speaking an individual language or idiolect (Otheguy et al., 2015). From a deconstructivist perspective, second language learning (growth) has no meaning; there is no way to distinguish a child who knows, say, only a few words of English from one who has grown up bilingual in English and another language, as each person is conceptualized under deconstructivism as speaking independent and complete idiolects. Reference to an external target language such as “English” to assess the child’s progress is incongruous. If children cannot be described
individually as bilingual, or as developing second language proficiency over time, then their access to meaningful educational participation under Lau cannot be protected. If they can be described as bilingual, the implication is that deconstructivism is not correct.

In addition to the need to identify children who need language support under Lau, teachers must engage in efforts to teach children English while using their home language as a resource for content knowledge development (Baker & Wright, 2021). Teachers therefore appropriately engage in intentional efforts to teach children English in bilingual and dual language education programs. However, if a learner’s individual language or idiolect is “always and at every stage complete” (García & Otheguy, 2020, p. 28), and if the learner’s bilingual proficiency does not “correspond” to language communities like “English speakers” and “Spanish speakers” (Otheguy et al., 2018), then why should teachers make an effort to teach English? Under deconstructivism, second language corrective feedback, however mediated (Razfar, 2010), would be inappropriate, as any such feedback would suggest that there may be a next “stage” of development for the learner, as well as make reference to an external community of “English speakers.”

The benchmark for reclassification under deconstructivism is also incongruous. Children are generally reclassified as English proficient and admitted into a regular educational program once they have learned English well enough to understand school subject matter instruction in English (Rolstad, 2017). Research has shown that attenuated classification as an English learner may have negative consequences, especially impacting high school graduation rates (Callahan et al., 2010; Johnson, 2019). Reclassification results from growth in English language proficiency, but what meaning can be ascribed to language learning if a child’s second language proficiency is “always and at every stage complete” (García & Otheguy, 2020, p. 28), as deconstructivists insist? And if their progress in learning English as a second language cannot be evaluated because it is “complete” and only reflects their idiolect, then multilingual learners’ civil rights cannot be protected, and their access to reclassification cannot be made available.

Indeed, if we take deconstructivism seriously, it quickly becomes impossible to speak coherently about bilingual students at all. García and colleagues disparage codeswitching and any related concept, including the distinction between first and second language acquisition, because, they argue, such constructs “reify the presumption of discrete languages that arose from colonialism” (García et al., 2021, p. 215). Yet these scholars actively use the term “emergent bilingual learner” (Garcia et al., 2008), which clearly denotes individual bilingualism every bit as much as codeswitching does. A vast array of articles published in applied linguistics and language education over the course of the last several years desperately attempts to navigate this maze of contradictions, continuing to speak of second language education, bilingual students, and dual language education even when endorsing a deconstructivist brand of translanguaging.

**Summing up**

Tacit theories are characterized by vagueness; vague theories generally do not make predictions that can be empirically assessed. For example, the “bad English” theory discussed by Gee (2015) relies on the assertion that AAE expressions like My puppy followin’ me reflect “bad English” because they are imagined to deviate in a haphazard way from the language of the educated classes. By contrast, the linguist’s view relies on systematic analysis of AAE expressions like this and demonstrates how the imperfective aspect is formed in AAE; data can be collected to show that this form is productive, and regularly expresses an imperfective meaning, just as dominant varieties regularly express with constructions like My puppy is following me. Linguistic analyses of AAE patterns are overt because they are reasonably explicit and predictive. As such, they can be used to
anchor pluralist language ideologies in an effective and persuasive way, whereas the “bad English” theory has no empirical foundation. Ideologies which cannot be empirically anchored are ungrounded, and those which are empirically anchored are grounded.

Codeswitching research, like contemporaneous research on AAE, empirically demonstrated that language mixing is structured and rule-governed. This important research countered a common belief that codeswitching reflected semilingualism. Patterns of codeswitching across a vast array of language pairs have been studied in explicit detail over the past several decades, resulting in increasingly sophisticated theories about the cognitive representation of bilingual grammar. These theories converge on a view of bilingual grammar as an integrated system, with shared and discrete components. Grosjean’s (1985, 2010) holistic view of bilingualism drew on codeswitching research to make the important point that a bilingual should be appreciated as a unique language learner rather than the sum of two monolinguals. Because codeswitching research is overt and fully explicit, it makes falsifiable predictions that can be empirically evaluated. As such, it effectively grounds pluralist language ideologies, as Grosjean’s work illustrates.

Early translanguaging theory (García, 2009), too, affirmed the significance of empirical research on bilingualism, including codeswitching, as evidence of linguistic talent, noting that “code-switching is a sophisticated linguistic skill and a characteristic of speech of fluent bilinguals” (García, 2009, p. 50). However, under the influence of Pennycook’s (2006) postmodern approach to language policy, translanguaging was infused with deconstructivism, which stipulates that “we no longer need to maintain the pernicious myth that languages exist” (Pennycook, 2006, p. 67), dispatching with “many of the treasured icons of liberal-linguistic thought” such as language rights, mother tongues, multilingualism, and codeswitching (Makoni & Pennycook, 2007, p. 22). Pennycook’s conclusion was predicated on the premise that “named languages” are colonial artifacts; however, language naming is at least as often an act of decolonization, of defiance of colonial authority, as one sees in the naming of Indigenous languages and minoritized language varieties like AAE and Chicano English (Cook, 2022; Nicolas & McCarty, 2022).

Otheguy et al. (2015) use of Pennycook’s postmodern approach to language policy, focused more narrowly on deconstructivism, positioned itself as “a perspective from linguistics.” However, García and colleagues’ (García et al., 2021; García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015, 2018) essays criticizing codeswitching research present no overt linguistic theory, no relevant empirical evidence, and no literature review of research on codeswitching or bilingual grammar. These limitations have been described by others as “historical amnesia” or “ellipsis” (May, 2022a, p. 345), and as “a gross misrepresentation of research on bilingualism and codeswitching as it has accumulated since the 1970s” (Auer, 2022, p. 147). The flaws in García and colleagues’ first essays on codeswitching (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015, 2018) are amplified in the recent “manifesto” (García et al., 2021), in which we see very specific erroneous claims put forward in the furtherance of purely ideological conclusions.

The path forward

Translanguaging is one of a number of recent terms introduced in the language education literature to denote the active use of the full range of children’s linguistic repertoires in teaching and learning. While translanguaging is without a doubt the most widely used, other terms include polylanguaging and polylingual languaging (Jørgensen, 2008; Jørgensen et al., 2011), metrolingualism (Otsuji & Pennycook, 2011), translingual practice (Canagarajah, 2013), and multilanguaging (Nguyen, 2012). (See Lewis et al., 2012, for further discussion.)
Largely as a result of its late deconstructivist turn, however, a number of scholars have increasingly voiced criticisms and concern about translanguaging (e.g., Auer, 2022; Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2022; Block, 2018; Cook, 2022; Cummins, 2017, 2021; Edwards, 2012; Faltis, 2020, 2022; Gee, 2022; Genesee, 2022; Gort, 2020; Grin, 2018; Henderson & Sayer, 2020; Huang & Chalmers, 2023; Jaspers, 2018; King & Bigelow, 2020; Kubota, 2016; MacSwan, 2017, 2022a, 2022b; Marks et al., 2022; Martinez & Martinez, 2020; May, 2022a, 2022b; Mendoza, 2023; Nicholas & McCarty, 2022; Prilutskaya, 2021; Sah & Li, 2022; Sah & Kubota, 2022; Tigert et al., 2019; Wiley, 2022). Some of these efforts have advocated a return to the non-deconstructivist roots of early translanguaging, promoting a multilingual perspective (MacSwan, 2017, 2022c). However, translanguaging, which has taken on an air of orthodoxy (May, 2022a) in applied linguistics and language education, may now be immutably associated with deconstructivism, making a return to its earlier meaning difficult to achieve with adequate clarity.

Mendoza (2023) reminds us that plurilingualism, an alternative concept now deeply embedded in official European language policy (Council of Europe, 2018), provides an alternative way of thinking about dynamic language use that is unencumbered by deconstructivism. Piccardo et al. (2017) trace the term to Italian origins (plurilinguismo; Di Mauro, 1977) from which it spread to French (plurilinguisme; Coste & Hébrard, 1991) before being used in English, now with “a growing number of publications, mainly coming from the non-Anglophone world (e.g., Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Central Europe, and South America)” (Piccardo et al., 2017, p. 2). Like translanguaging, plurilingualism was coined by academics to describe the everyday language use of multilingual individuals and families and is used conceptually to promote multilingual teaching and learning. Plurilingualism specifically refers to “an integrated competence with resources from different named languages—yet interaction-wise, people can orient to language(s) as distinct or as an undifferentiated whole” (Mendoza, 2023, p. 14). As Vallejo and Dooly (2020) note, “For researchers on plurilingualism, . . . concepts such as code-switching or code-mixing (Auer, 1984, 1998, 1999) . . . remain useful emic categories in the analysis of plurilingual practices . . .” (p. 8). Translanguaging contrasts with plurilingualism in this way specifically: “From a translanguaging perspective, given that there are no boundaries between ‘named’ languages (at least as psycholinguistic entities) it can be understood that a bilingual speaker’s language competence is ‘always and at every stage complete’ (see García & Otheguy, 2020), as opposed to the widespread definition of plurilingual competence as emergent, situated and in constant evolution and change . . .” (Vallejo and Dooly, 2020, p. 8).

As such, plurilingualism is consistent with empirical and theoretically overt research on bilingualism, while translanguaging, in its deconstructivist form, is not. Plurilingualism (or plurilanguaging) is thus conceptually similar to early translanguaging theory (Garcia, 2009) and multilingual perspectives on translanguaging (MacSwan, 2017, 2022c), but has the potential advantage of greater clarity than these due to its distinctive name. We urge colleagues to consider contributing to research on theoretical and pedagogical plurilingualism and plurilanguaging as a means to evade the inherent pitfalls and conceptual shortcomings of late translanguaging theory.

Acknowledgements
The authors thank Huseyin Uysal and Pramod Sah for the invitation to participate in this special issue project and for their guidance as guest editors throughout the process. They are grateful, too, to Katharine Glanbock and to the three anonymous reviewers who provided thoughtful comments on a prior draft of this paper.

Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Jeff MacSwan  https://orcid.org/0009-0007-6406-4109

Notes
1. For additional examples, see MacSwan (2021) and chapter contributions to MacSwan (2014), and references cited there.
2. See May (2022b) for an exploration of how related work in superdiversity contributed to the development of deconstructivism.
3. William Labov similarly did groundbreaking research on AAE (Labov, 1970, 1972). We omit Labov here because, while he is a racialized scholar, he is not racialized as African American.

References


Author biographies

Jeff MacSwan is Professor of Applied Linguistics at the University of Maryland. His research focuses on the linguistic study of bilingualism and its implications for the education of multilingual students. He is a Fellow of the American Educational Research Association, and recently edited Multilingual Perspectives on Translanguaging (Multilingual Matters, 2022).

Kellie Rolstad is Associate Professor of Education at the University of Maryland. Her research interests include the language of schooling, language variation and dialects in school, and second language teaching and learning. Her work has appeared in the Bilingual Research Journal, Bilingual Review and Teachers College Record, among others.