

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

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Working Paper 27910  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w27910>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
1050 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
October 2020

We received helpful comments and questions from Ben Faber, Deborah Swenson, Daniel Xu, Eunhee Lee, Fernando Parro, George Alessandria, Jim Tybout, Jonathan Eaton, Meredith Crowley, Robert Staiger, Samuel Kortum, Shafaat Khan and various seminar and conference participants at Kobe, Stanford, Penn State, the AEA Meetings, Washington Area International Trade Symposium, International Trade Dynamics Workshop and NBER International Trade Policy and Institutions. Zhi Yu acknowledges support from the Public Computing Cloud Platform at Renmin University of China. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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NBER Working Paper No. 27910  
October 2020  
JEL No. F02,F1,F12,F13,F14,F61,O19,O24

### **ABSTRACT**

We examine the role of trade policy uncertainty in shaping the import decisions of firms. If the adoption of a new input requires a sunk cost investment, then the prospect of price increases in that input, e.g. due to trade barriers, reduces the adoption of that input (a substitution effect) and possibly other inputs (complementarity via lower profits). Thus trade policy uncertainty can affect a firm's entire input mix. We provide a new model of input price uncertainty that captures both effects and derive its empirical implications. We test these using an important episode that lowered input price uncertainty: China's accession to the WTO and the associated commitment to bind its import tariffs. We estimate large increases in imported inputs by firms from accession; the reduced uncertainty from commitment generates substitution effects larger than the reductions in applied tariffs in 2000-2006 and has significant profit effects.

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# 1 Introduction

We examine the role of policy uncertainty in shaping the input decisions of firms. If new inputs require a sunk cost investment, then firm decisions to adopt them depend on how uncertain their prices are. One such source of uncertainty is future policy, e.g. taxes on domestic or imported inputs, that affects the level and mix of inputs the firm adopts. We develop a theoretical model of this phenomenon and test its key implications using firm data on input usage and shocks to import taxes arising from China’s WTO accession.

We build on and contribute to ongoing research on various important issues. First, there is extensive research on global sourcing and the determinants of increased intermediate trade, but it has ignored the role of policy uncertainty. Intermediate inputs account for the bulk of world trade (Johnson and Noguera, 2012), and vertical specialization across countries is a prominent feature of the world economy (Hummels et al., 2001). Trade liberalization, in particular, has been shown to be a major contributor to the growth in vertical specialization (Hanson et al., 2005; Johnson and Noguera, 2017) with important implications for productivity and welfare (Amiti, and Konings, 2007; Goldberg et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2015).

Second, we contribute to the research on trade policy uncertainty (TPU) by moving its focus from exporting to global sourcing decisions. There is increasing evidence that reductions in TPU increase trade (Crowley et al., 2018; Feng et al., 2017; Handley, 2014; Handley and Limão, 2015; Pierce and Schott, 2016). In these papers, because of sunk costs, the response of export decisions to a foreign tariff reduction depends on firms’ beliefs about whether the policy change is permanent or reversible, and trade agreements play a role in shaping such beliefs.<sup>1</sup> As Antràs, et al. (2017) note, sourcing is a more complex problem than exporting in that it involves a portfolio of inputs with potential interactions between them.

We also contribute to the analysis of the role of international trade agreements. Existing theories emphasize the role of agreements in addressing terms-of-trade externalities (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; Grossman and Helpman, 1995), or allowing governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic actors (e.g. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998) or reducing TPU (Limão and Maggi, 2015). There is increasing evidence for the terms-of-trade role of agreements (Broda, Limão, Weinstein, 2008; Bagwell and Staiger, 2011) but less so on own commitment effects. Research on the effect of TPU provides support for the idea that a country’s exporters benefit from agreements that tie the foreign governments hands. We provide theory and

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<sup>1</sup>Handley and Limão (2017) show this has important price and welfare effects and extend this logic to entry and technology-upgrading decisions but not to global sourcing decisions. Uncertainty can also affect exports via inventory effects (Alessandria et al., 2019).

evidence that agreements provide a valuable commitment device to the importing country: by tying its own hands it spurs investment in the adoption of imported inputs. This suggests an important cost of ongoing trade tensions that erode the credibility of the WTO. It also points to a potential rationale for agreements on input trade.<sup>2</sup>

Our empirical application contributes to the large literature examining the impressive growth in Chinese firm exports, imports and productivity after its 2001 WTO entry. This work includes the effects of reductions in Chinese applied tariffs (Amiti et. al. 2018; Brandt, et. al., 2017; Feng et al., 2016; Yu, 2015) and reductions in U.S. TPU that Chinese exporters faced in the U.S. (Feng et al., 2017; Handley and Limão, 2017; Pierce and Schott, 2016). Both of these channels are potentially important for Chinese export outcomes.<sup>3</sup> Our contribution here is to go beyond the applied reductions in Chinese tariffs and also estimate and quantify the impact of its commitments not to reverse its liberalization on intermediate usage and adoption.

Finally, by identifying how policy uncertainty affects specific firm investments we also contribute to research showing that economic uncertainty leads firms to delay investments (Bloom et al., 2007) and that policy uncertainty (measured by news indices) helps predict aggregate output declines (cf. Baker et al., 2016).

In our model firms invest to adopt a range of intermediates used to produce a differentiated product under uncertainty in input prices driven by policy, e.g. taxes. Similarly to recent firm-based frameworks, greater input variety reduces the firms' marginal cost but each variety requires a cost to adopt (c.f. Halpern et al., 2015; Antràs, et al., 2017; Blaum et al., 2018). Unlike such frameworks, we model adoption costs as sunk, which implies the firm sourcing decision is a dynamic one and introduces a role for policy uncertainty.<sup>4</sup> We focus on shocks to relative prices between imported and domestic inputs arising from TPU, e.g. changes in the probability of tariff increases. The reduction in TPU in an input leads to an increase in its imports: a substitution effect. Moreover, this reduction in TPU also increases the usage of other inputs: due to a profit effect, which gives rise to input complementarity in our setting.

We use transactions-level trade data from 2000-2006 to examine how China's WTO tariff commitments affected its firm's imports of intermediates. After its economic reform and opening in the late 1970s, China applied to re-enter the GATT in 1986 and then its successor,

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<sup>2</sup>Such agreements may need to be deeper than the traditional ones focused on final goods as Antràs and Staiger (2012) show in a setting where imports of customized inputs generates bargaining externalities.

<sup>3</sup>Amiti, et. al. (2018) find that both lower Chinese input tariffs and US TPU contributed to the reduction in their export prices to the US.

<sup>4</sup>Gervais (2018) models and tests an alternative channel whereby more risk averse managers source from lower price volatility input suppliers.

the WTO, which it acceded in 2001. As we show in Figure 1 the average statutory import tariff was over 40% when it applied and around 10% by 2006. Most research on the WTO impact focuses on the tariff reductions after 2000, but this is only about one third of the import liberalization that occurs since 1992 (Lardy, 2002). The process since 1992 was driven by the “Socialist Market Economy” reforms and arguably as a condition for WTO accession (cf. Tang and Wei, 2009). A similar pattern holds for intermediate products, as we see since 1992. The outcome of this accession process was uncertain until 2001; and if China had not joined then it could have reversed some of the earlier liberalization.<sup>5</sup> This potential reversal hung over Chinese importers, just as the U.S. annual threat of removal of China’s MFN status hung over its exporters.

If WTO accession increased the cost of reversing China’s tariff reforms then our model predicts it should have increased imported input adoption. We first provide descriptive evidence that (i) 2/3 of that import growth is from new HS6 products, (ii) the fraction of importing firms increases, and (iii) there are sunk costs at the HS6 level. We then test the model predictions by constructing the required measure of tariff risk for imported inputs in each HS6, which is the difference between the historical mean tariff dating back to 1992 and its respective current rate.

The regression analysis, which controls for applied tariff changes and various fixed effects, shows that this tariff risk depressed Chinese firms’ imported intermediates prior to WTO entry, and that this effect is sharply reduced after WTO entry, consistent with increased commitment. These results are robust to alternative firm samples, risk measures, sources of TPU and explanations such as history dependence.

We find evidence consistent with several additional aspects of the model. First, the applied tariff trade elasticity increases substantially after WTO entry, suggesting that importers perceived them to be more permanent. Second, we identify both substitution and complementarity effects. Third, the estimates vary with initial firm productivity. Finally, post-accession, firms were more likely to adopt products that were previously subject to higher risk.

There are important quantitative implications from these estimates. The probability of reversal falls substantially—it is predicted to be less than 13 percent after accession. We estimate that WTO accession increased average firm imported inputs about 92 lp between 2000-2006. Over three quarters of this accession effect is due to improved commitment via both substitution and complementarity effects; the latter worked through an increase in

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<sup>5</sup>Several events contributed to this uncertainty including the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997 (who promoted the "Socialist Market" reforms), the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia and the 2001 midair collision of a U.S. spy plane and Chinese fighter jet.

average operating profits of 3 lp.

We provide the theory in section 2; the data and empirical strategy in section 3; the estimates, robustness and preliminary quantification in 4; and conclude in section 5. Derivation and estimation details are in the appendices.

## 2 Model

We consider a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms producing a differentiated final product from a primary factor (labor) and a continuum of intermediate inputs. Any firm present in the market in period  $t$  survives into  $t+1$  with probability  $\beta$ , which is the only discount factor for future profits. Firms enter and exit the market at a constant rate, such that their mass is constant.

In each period, the firm observes the prevailing input prices and makes three joint decisions: (a) how many varieties of each intermediate input to adopt; (b) how much to spend on each input, including labor; (c) the price of the final good. To keep the last two decisions simple, we assume functional forms such that expenditure shares and markups over marginal cost are constant.

Inputs are indexed by  $i \in [0, 1]$  and each  $i$  is available in a continuum of varieties on  $\mathbf{R}_+$ . For each firm  $f$  and input  $i$ , we partition varieties into three disjoint intervals depending on whether they require a sunk cost of adoption and are exposed to price risk. These intervals are shown in Figure 2. The first,  $[0, \bar{n}_i]$ , consists of **safe varieties**: those with no sunk cost and a fixed price normalized to one. The second,  $(\bar{n}_i, \bar{n}_i + \mu_{if}]$ , consists of **exposed varieties**: those with no sunk cost but a time-varying relative price,  $\tau_i^t$ , which follows a Markov process. The third,  $(\bar{n}_i + \mu_{if}, \infty)$ , consists of **risky varieties**: those with sunk cost  $K > 0$  and the same time-varying relative price as exposed varieties. The last interval is our primary focus, as the combination of sunk cost and price risk distort the firm's choice of which (if any) varieties from this type to adopt.<sup>6</sup> The parameter  $\mu_{if}$  governs the prevalence of this distortion, which we allow to be both firm- and input-specific. If  $\mu_{if} = 0$ , all variable price varieties are risky, whereas if  $\mu_{if}$  is large, risk becomes irrelevant.

In light of our empirical application to a setting of trade policy uncertainty, we label  $[0, \bar{n}_i]$  as domestic varieties and  $(\bar{n}_i, \infty)$  as imported varieties, of which  $(\bar{n}_i + \mu_{if}, \infty)$  are risky. We interpret  $\tau_i^t$  the tariff-inclusive relative price of imported varieties. Our objective is to capture large permanent regime shifts in a tractable way. We follow Handley and Limão

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<sup>6</sup>There is a fourth possible configuration of sunk costs and price uncertainty, namely, those varieties with a fixed price and  $K > 0$ . We rule this case out, as it contributes very little to our analysis of imports under policy uncertainty.

(2017) and model a three-state Markov process with an initial state tariff vector  $\tau^l$  and a constant probability  $\gamma$  that this policy changes the following period to a new vector  $\tau^s$  drawn with probability  $\varpi^s$ . We assume the following for tractability. First, there are only three states with tariffs ranked as follows  $\tau^h > \tau^l > \tau^g$ . Second, the extreme cases are absorbing (so there is only uncertainty in the initial intermediate state).

To simplify the presentation we first develop our results assuming  $\varpi^g = 0$  so there are effectively only two relevant cases and  $\gamma$  is the probability that the government increases protection. We then show that the results extend to allowing for a more favorable state,  $\varpi^g > 0$ , and  $\gamma$  is more easily interpreted as a measure of policy uncertainty. The equivalence between these two approaches is explained by the “bad news principle” (Bernanke, 1983): when firms can wait and see before making investments then only the expected severity of bad news matters.

## 2.1 Preferences, Technology and Current Profits

A firm is characterized by a productivity parameter  $\varphi_f$  drawn from a common distribution and a set of parameters  $\mu_{if}$  drawn for each input independently from a common distribution  $G(\mu)$ , both with non-negative support. For now we assume  $G(\mu)$  is absolutely continuous but relax this subsequently. The parameters are drawn on entry and remain constant for the life of the firm. In what follows, we consider the problem facing a generic firm and thus drop the firm subscript for notational convenience.

The firm faces a constant elasticity demand for its output given by,

$$q = Ep^{-\sigma} \tag{1}$$

where  $p$  is the endogenous consumer price,  $E > 0$  is an exogenous demand shifter and  $\sigma > 1$  the constant demand elasticity. This demand could be derived from a CES utility function, in which case  $E$  would contain the aggregate price index. Holding  $E$  constant, therefore, is equivalent to assuming that the final goods market is large relative to the mass of firms under consideration.

Production is Cobb-Douglas in labor and intermediate inputs, according to,

$$\ln y = \ln \varphi + (1 - \alpha) \ln l + \alpha \int_0^1 \ln(x_i) di \tag{2}$$

where  $l$  is labor input and  $x_i$  is the quantity of intermediate input  $i$ , and  $\alpha < 1$  is the cost share of intermediates. Each input is composed of a continuum of varieties aggregated with

constant elasticity of substitution  $\theta > 1$ :

$$x_i = \left[ \int_0^{n_i} x_i(\nu)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} d\nu \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \quad (3)$$

where  $n_i$  is the measure of varieties (extensive margin) chosen.

If the current relative price of imported varieties of input  $i$  is  $\tau_i$ , then a firm would have a current cost index for input  $i$  of  $z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$ , where

$$z_i(n_i, \tau_i) = \begin{cases} \bar{n}_i + (n_i - \bar{n}_i) \tau_i^{1-\theta} & \text{if } n_i > \bar{n}_i \\ n_i & \text{if } n_i \leq \bar{n}_i \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Since the unit cost index is decreasing in  $z_i$  the firm can lower it by expanding the extensive margin. Therefore at the very least the firm adopts all varieties that carry no sunk adoption cost, and hence we can confine our attention to  $n_i \geq \bar{n}_i + \mu_i$ .

Aggregating over all inputs and normalizing  $w = 1$ , the log unit cost of the final good is,

$$\ln c = \ln \tilde{\alpha} - \ln \varphi + \frac{\alpha}{1-\theta} \int_0^1 \ln(z_i) di \quad (5)$$

where  $\tilde{\alpha} \equiv \alpha^{-\alpha} (1-\alpha)^{\alpha-1}$ .

The profit-maximizing price of the final good is  $\hat{p} = \frac{\sigma}{(\sigma-1)}c$ . Thus, the one-period log operating profit of a firm can be written as,

$$\ln[\pi(z)] = \ln A + (\sigma-1) \ln \varphi + \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \int_0^1 \ln(z_i) di \quad (6)$$

where  $A \equiv E\sigma^{-\sigma}(\sigma-1)^{\sigma-1}(\tilde{\alpha})^{1-\sigma}$ .

The partial derivative of the profit function with respect to  $z_i$  is

$$\pi_{z_i}(z) = \pi(z) \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \frac{1}{z_i} > 0 \quad (7)$$

We show in the appendix that  $\pi(z)$  is strictly concave if  $\frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} < 1$ . This is satisfied if the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of the same input is greater than that between two different final goods, i.e.,  $\theta > \sigma$ , which we assume henceforth. Furthermore, differentiation of (7) yields  $\pi_{z_i z_j}(z) > 0$  for all  $i \neq j$ , and thus  $\pi(z)$  is supermodular.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>By itself, Cobb-Douglas technology would imply that inputs are neither gross complements nor gross substitutes. Thus the supermodularity property, which gives rise to input complementarity in our model, is driven by a profit effect alone. This is reflected in its dependence on the final demand elasticity.



## 2.2 Input Choice under Certainty

Before considering the problem with uncertainty, we solve the benchmark with certainty, i.e.,  $\gamma = 0$ , or equivalently,  $\tau_i^l = \tau_i^h = \tau_i$  for all  $i$ . The firm chooses each  $n_i$  to maximize the expected present value of profits net of adoption costs,

$$V(z) = \frac{\pi(z)}{1-\beta} - K \cdot \int_0^1 [n_i - (\bar{n}_i + \mu_i)] di \quad (8)$$

with  $n_i \geq \bar{n}_i + \mu_i$ .

The first-order condition compares the marginal operating profit from increasing  $z_i$  with the marginal cost of adding an imported variety with sunk cost  $K$ ,

$$\frac{\pi_{z_i}(z)}{(1-\beta)} \leq K \tau_i^{\theta-1} \quad (9)$$

with strict equality for an interior solution, i.e.,  $n_i > \bar{n}_i + \mu_i$ .<sup>8</sup>

Solving (9) for the optimal extensive margin of *imports*,  $n_i^* \equiv n_i - \bar{n}_i$ , gives  $n_i^* = \max\{\tilde{\mu}_i, \mu_i\}$ , where

$$\tilde{\mu}_i \equiv \kappa \pi - \rho_i \quad (10)$$

and  $\rho_i \equiv \bar{n}_i \tau_i^{\theta-1}$  and  $\kappa \equiv \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{(\theta-1)(1-\beta)K}$ . If the measure of exposed varieties  $\mu_i$  is sufficiently high, then the firm does not pay to adopt risky ones as well. Otherwise it does and in that case the extensive margin of imports is increasing in operating profit, decreasing in own input tariff and on sunk cost.

Using this we solve for import expenditure for each input. Given CES at the variety level, the share of imports in total spending on input  $i$  is,

$$s_i^* = \frac{n_i^*}{\rho_i + n_i^*} \quad (11)$$

Domestic plus import expenditure on  $i$  is  $\alpha(\sigma-1)\pi$ , which follows from the Cobb-Douglas input technology (see appendix). Thus import spending is,

$$m_i^* = \alpha(\sigma-1)\pi \frac{n_i^*}{\rho_i + n_i^*}, \quad (12)$$

which increases with operating profit and declines with own tariff, via  $\rho_i$ . Using the optimal  $n_i^*$ , this expression becomes,

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<sup>8</sup>We abstract from sunk costs to start producing or importing. They are not necessary or sufficient to generate the impact of product specific risk on imports that we subsequently find. However, such costs could be incorporated in the theory.

$$m_i^* = \alpha (\sigma - 1) \begin{cases} \frac{\tilde{\mu}_i}{\kappa} & \text{if } \tilde{\mu}_i \geq \mu_i \\ \frac{\mu_i}{\rho_i + \mu_i} \pi & \text{if } \tilde{\mu}_i < \mu_i \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

To determine operating profit, we substitute (10) into (4) yielding,  $z_i = \tau_i^{1-\theta} \cdot \max(\kappa\pi, \rho_i + \mu)$  and use this in (6) to obtain

$$\ln \pi = \Theta \left[ \ln (A\varphi^{\sigma-1}) + \frac{\alpha (\sigma - 1)}{\theta - 1} \int_0^1 \left( \ln (\tau_i^{1-\theta}) + G(\tilde{\mu}_i) \ln (\kappa) + \int_{\tilde{\mu}_i}^{\infty} \ln (\rho_i + \mu) dG \right) di \right], \quad (14)$$

where  $\Theta \equiv \left[ 1 - \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \int_0^1 G(\tilde{\mu}_i) di \right]^{-1} > 1$  is a multiplier, reflecting the fact that the exogenous profit shifters in brackets induce changes in imported input intensity, which further affect profits. This multiplier is an increasing function of the average probability of sunk-cost variety adoption across all inputs,  $G(\tilde{\mu}_i)$ , which itself depends on  $\pi$ ; hence (14) is an implicit profit function.

We obtain comparative statics for operating profit by totally differentiating (14) (holding  $A$  and  $\kappa$  fixed) and using Leibniz's integral rule to obtain,

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln \pi = \Theta & \left[ (\sigma - 1) d \ln \varphi + \frac{\alpha (\sigma - 1)}{\theta - 1} \int_0^1 \delta_i (d \ln \bar{n}_i) di \right] \\ & - \alpha (\sigma - 1) \Theta \int_0^1 (1 - \delta_i) (d \ln \tau_i) di \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where  $\delta_i \equiv \int_{\tilde{\mu}_i}^{\infty} \frac{\rho_i}{\rho_i + \mu} dG < 1$  and  $\frac{\rho_i}{\rho_i + \mu_i}$  measures the domestic spending share for inputs where risky varieties are not adopted ( $\mu_i > \tilde{\mu}_i$ ). Thus, operating profit is increasing in productivity and the aggregate number of available domestic varieties and decreasing in the aggregate tariff. The tariff elasticity on the second line captures how they lower profit proportionally to their share of intermediate inputs in total cost  $\alpha(1 - \delta_i)$ , the elasticity of profit with respect to cost  $\sigma - 1$ , and the multiplier effect  $\Theta$ .

### 2.3 Input Choice under Uncertainty

We now introduce uncertainty. The vector of relative import prices for all  $i$  is  $\tau^l$  in the initial period and there is a constant probability  $\gamma$  of it increasing to  $\tau^h \geq \tau^l$  in the following period and remaining there indefinitely. Uncertainty is therefore characterized by how likely the current regime is to change,  $\gamma$  common across all inputs, and if so by how much in each  $i$ ; to distinguish between these we refer to  $\tau_i^h / \tau_i^l$  as policy risk (e.g. tariff risk).

The present discounted value of a firm starting at  $\tau^l$  is defined recursively by,

$$\Pi [z(n, \tau^l)] = \pi [z(n, \tau^l)] + \beta(1 - \gamma) \Pi [z(n, \tau^l)] + \beta\gamma \frac{\pi [z(n, \tau^h)]}{1 - \beta} \quad (16)$$

where  $\beta(1 - \gamma)$  and  $\beta\gamma$  are the joint probabilities that the firm survives and then faces the low-tariff and high-tariff states, respectively, in the next period. Note that if the firm adopts  $n$  varieties under  $\tau^l$  then it optimally continues to use them under  $\tau^h$ . After tariffs increase the firm does not gain from decreasing  $n$  because any adoption costs were already sunk, and it would not wish to increase  $n$  because of the supermodularity of  $\pi$ .

To simplify notation, let  $z^s = z(n, \tau^s)$  for  $s = l, h$ . After solving (16), total profits can be written as,

$$V(z^l, z^h) = \frac{\pi(z^l)}{(1 - \beta)} U(z^l, z^h) - K \cdot \int_0^1 (n_i^* - \mu_i) di \quad (17)$$

where we define an uncertainty factor,  $U(z^l, z^h) \equiv \frac{1+u[\pi(z^h)/\pi(z^l)]}{(1+u)} < 1$ , and  $u \equiv \frac{\beta\gamma}{(1-\beta)}$ —the expected duration in the high state. So  $U$  scales down discounted profits at current input prices due to the probability they will increase, alternatively: it is the ratio of discounted profits under uncertainty relative to certainty. The firm wishes to maximize (16) subject to  $n_i^* \geq \mu_i$ .

Again the first-order condition compares the marginal operating profit from expanding the extensive margin with the marginal cost of adding an imported variety, yielding:

$$\frac{\pi_{z_i}^l \cdot (\tau_i^l)^{1-\theta} + u\pi_{z_i}^h \cdot (\tau_i^h)^{1-\theta}}{(1+u)(1-\beta)} \leq K \quad (18)$$

with strict equality for  $n_i > \bar{n}_i^*$ . Solving (18) for the optimal extensive margin of imports gives,  $n_i^{*u} = \max\{\tilde{\mu}_i^u, \mu_i\}$ , where

$$\tilde{\mu}_i^u \equiv (1 - \psi_i) \kappa \pi(z^l) U - \psi_i (\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l) - \rho_i^l \quad (19)$$

and  $\psi_i \in [0, \frac{1}{2}]$ . In the limit case where  $\gamma = 0$  or  $\tau^l = \tau^h$  we have  $\psi_i = 0$  and  $U = 1$  so this reduces to the condition under certainty in (10).<sup>9</sup> Similarly to the certainty condition if  $\mu_i$  is sufficiently high, then the firm does not pay to adopt risky ones as well. Otherwise, it adopts risky varieties and their number increases in operating profit and decreases with the current tariff, as was the case under certainty. Under uncertainty three additional elements

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<sup>9</sup>In particular,  $\psi_i = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - \frac{u}{1+u} \frac{4\kappa\pi(z^h)(\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)}{[\kappa\pi(z^l)U + (\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)]^2} \right]^{1/2}$ , which is zero when  $\rho_i^h = \rho_i^l$  or  $u = 0$  and can be no larger than  $1/2$ , which occurs when the square root term is zero.

affect imported varieties in the interior case. First, profits are reduced by  $U$ , which reflects the probability of moving to the high-tariff state. Second, the gap  $\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l$  enters negatively, even though the high tariff does not currently apply. Third, the elements of the expression are weighted by  $\psi_i$ , which reflects the uncertainty specific to input  $i$ . This weight is equal to zero under certainty and up to one half otherwise.

These three additional elements suggest that the firm is more conservative about expanding its extensive margin under uncertainty than if it faces a certain  $\tau^l$ , which we establish in the following lemma.

**Lemma 1:** *The optimal extensive margin of imported varieties,  $n_i^*$ , is (weakly) lower under uncertainty than under certainty for all  $i$ , as is the probability of the firm adopting risky imports,  $G(\tilde{\mu}_i)$ , and the operating profit in the low-tariff state,  $\pi(z^l)$ .*

Proof in Appendix.

We build on this lemma to prove the result for import values below. So it is useful to provide some intuition. Since the cost of expanding the extensive margin is sunk, the firm chooses that margin in the low-tariff state taking into account it will keep it in an eventual high cost state as well. Thus, it will generally choose an extensive margin under uncertainty that differs from its optimal choice under certainty:  $n_i^{*u}$  is lower than  $n_i^*$  under  $\tau^l$  and higher than  $n_i^*$  under  $\tau^h$ .

The distortion of the extensive margin under uncertainty has implications for the firm's import expenditure in the low-tariff state as well. Import expenditure on input  $i$  is given by,

$$m_i^{*u} = \alpha (\sigma - 1) \pi(z^l) \frac{n_i^{*u}}{\rho_i + n_i^{*u}} \quad (20)$$

Using the optimal  $n_i^{*u}$ , this expression becomes,

$$m_i^{*u} = \alpha (\sigma - 1) \begin{cases} \left( \frac{\tilde{\mu}_i^u}{\kappa} \right) \frac{\pi(z^l)}{(1-\psi_i)\kappa\pi(z^l)U - \psi_i(\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)} & \text{if } \tilde{\mu}_i^u \geq \mu_i \\ \frac{\mu_i}{\rho_i^l + \mu_i} \pi(z^l) & \text{if } \tilde{\mu}_i^u < \mu_i \end{cases} \quad (21)$$

The effect of uncertainty on import value follows from Lemma 1 above.

**Proposition 1:** *For each input  $i$ , each firm's import expenditure is (weakly) lower under uncertainty than under certainty.*

Proof in Appendix.

For inputs where risky varieties are not adopted the import spending function in (20) is the same as (13), except that the value of operating profits is generally lower under uncertainty. When risky inputs are adopted,  $\tilde{\mu}_i^u \geq \mu_i$ , imports are also lower due to both

the substitution and profit effect.<sup>10</sup>

## 2.4 Three State Extension

Thus far we assumed that after a policy change the only possible state is the one with higher tariffs,  $h$ . We now argue that the possibility of a more favorable state does not affect our results and provides an option value of waiting interpretation. The equivalence between these two approaches is explained by the “bad news principle” (Bernanke, 1983): when firms can wait and see before making investments then only the expected severity of bad news matters. Thus, the effect of trade policy uncertainty on input decisions is not driven by the expected value of future  $\tau$  *per se* but only by the expected value of the less favorable state.

We demonstrate this principle applies to our multi-dimensional decision problem in Appendix A.6. Specifically, we show the first order condition is still given by (18) but  $u' = u(1 - \varpi) < u$  where  $1 - \varpi$  is the probability of the worst state  $h$  conditional on a policy change. Here we make two observations. First, this extension does not affect the estimation, only the interpretation of the variable we construct, which becomes a measure of tail risk. Second, this extension allows us to identify two distinct impacts of changes in  $\gamma$ : a long-run mean effect and a pure risk effect. We are interested in the combined impact of changes in the uncertainty parameter,  $\gamma$ , and the tail risk measure we compute is sufficient to capture it.<sup>11</sup>

## 2.5 Approximation

In this section, we take a step towards estimation. We re-introduce  $f$  subscripts to clarify the level of variation of alternative variables. As the draws of  $\mu_{if}$  are unobservable (to the econometrician), we characterize the expected value of  $\ln(m_i^u)$  over the distribution  $G(\mu)$ . Moreover, as this expression is non-linear, it is useful to work with a first-order Taylor approximation of  $E_\mu \ln(m_i^u)$  around a specific point  $(\tau_0, \bar{n}_0, \varphi_0)$  for all  $f, i$  and tariff state, where  $E_\mu$  denotes the expectation over the distribution of  $\mu$ . This allows us to estimate the approximate effects of deviations from this point in all three dimensions. The approximation of  $E_\mu \ln(m_i^u)$  (derived in the appendix) is,

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<sup>10</sup>The distorted adoption of risky inputs is partially offset by higher intensive margin in the low tariff state and lower otherwise.

<sup>11</sup>As Handley and Limão (2015) show if a given initial policy  $\tau^l$  is at its long-run mean then any increases in  $\gamma$  imply a mean-preserving spread of that policy, i.e. a pure risk effect. If  $\tau^l$  is below that long-run mean then higher  $\gamma$  increases it, otherwise it decreases it.

$$\begin{aligned}
E_\mu \ln(m_{if}^{*u}) &\approx \Phi + \Phi_f + \Phi_i - (\theta - 1) \left[ (\delta_0 + \xi_0) \ln\left(\frac{\tau_i^l}{\tau_0}\right) + (1 - \tilde{s}_0^*) \xi_0 \frac{u}{1+u} \ln\left(\frac{\tau_i^h}{\tau_i^l}\right) \right] \\
&\quad - \alpha(\sigma - 1) \Theta_0 (1 - \delta_0) (1 + \xi_0) \left( \int_0^1 \ln\left(\frac{\tau_i^l}{\tau_0}\right) di \right) \\
&\quad - \alpha(\sigma - 1) [\Theta_0 (1 - \delta_0) (1 + \xi_0) - E_\mu(s_0^*)] \left( \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 \ln\left(\frac{\tau_i^h}{\tau_i^l}\right) di \right) \quad (22)
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\tilde{s}_0^*$  is the import share of a firm that adopts risky imports (i.e.,  $n_i^{*u} > \mu$ ) and  $\xi_0 \equiv \rho_0 G(\tilde{\mu}_0)/\tilde{\mu}_0$ .

The first three terms are a constant  $\Phi^m$ , a firm effect  $\Phi_f^m$ , and an input effect  $\Phi_i^m$ .<sup>12</sup> The remaining terms on the top line capture the substitution effects of the current tariff  $\tau_i^l$  and tariff risk,  $\ln(\tau_i^h/\tau_i^l)$ , which enter negatively. The second and third line capture the profit effects of the average tariff and average tariff risk, respectively. They too enter negatively.<sup>13</sup> This is because the tariff on each input negatively affects profits, thus indirectly lowering imported input use across all inputs. This effect depends on the profit elasticity with respect to average tariffs,  $\alpha(\sigma - 1)\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0)$ , as in equation (15).

All of the tariff and TPU effects in (22) depend on  $\xi_0$ , which is proportional to the probability that the firm adopts sunk-cost varieties,  $G(\tilde{\mu}_0)$ . Consider what would happen if the firm were so unproductive as to have  $G(\tilde{\mu}_0) = 0$  (this would occur if  $\varphi_0$  were so low that  $\tilde{\mu}_0 = \kappa\pi_0 - \rho_0 < 0$ ). In that case, the only imported varieties would be riskless (i.e., no sunk cost). As such varieties would be imported regardless of tariffs, the extensive margin of each input would be invariant to tariffs and to tariff risk. The value of imports of such varieties will continue to be affected by tariffs (via the intensive margin) but not by tariff risk.<sup>14</sup> Thus, for the case of a low productivity firm for which  $G(\tilde{\mu}_0) = 0$ , equation (22) becomes,

$$\begin{aligned}
E_\mu \ln(m_{if}^{*u}) &\approx \Phi + \Phi_f + \Phi_i - (\theta - 1) \delta_0 \ln\left(\frac{\tau_i^l}{\tau_0}\right) \\
&\quad - \alpha(\sigma - 1) (1 - \delta_0) \left( \int_0^1 \ln\left(\frac{\tau_j^l}{\tau_0}\right) dj \right). \quad (23)
\end{aligned}$$

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<sup>12</sup>Specifically,  $\Phi^m + \Phi_f^m + \Phi_i^m = E_\mu \ln m_0^* + (1 + \xi_0) \delta_0 \Theta \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \int_0^1 \ln\left(\frac{\bar{n}_i}{\bar{n}_0}\right) di + (1 + \xi_0) \Theta (\sigma - 1) \ln\left(\frac{\varphi}{\varphi_0}\right) - (\xi_0 + \delta_0) \ln\left(\frac{\bar{n}_i}{\bar{n}_0}\right)$ .

<sup>13</sup>It is not obvious, but  $\Theta(1 - \delta_0)(1 + \xi_0) - E(s_0^*) \geq 0$ . This follows from  $E(s_0^*) = 1 - \delta_0 - G(1 - \tilde{s}_0^*)$ , which implies  $(\Theta(1 + \xi_0) - 1)(1 - \delta_0) + G(1 - \tilde{s}_0^*) \geq 0$ , as  $\Theta \geq 1$ .

<sup>14</sup>While the tariff and TPU elasticities are zero for sufficiently low productivity, they need not be monotonically increasing in  $\varphi_0$  for  $G(\tilde{\mu}_0) > 0$ . While  $\tilde{\mu}_0$  increases with productivity, the derivative of  $\xi_0$  with respect to  $\tilde{\mu}_0$  depends on the shape of  $G$ .

In this case, imports are affected by current tariffs but not TPU and in fact imports are the same for this firm as under certainty. This is because TPU only distorts choices of risky varieties and the low productivity firm does not adopt any.

In addition to the value of imports at the firm level, we wish to estimate the impacts of tariff risk on current operating profits; which has the following approximation:

$$E_\mu \ln \pi(z^l) \approx \Phi^\pi + \Phi_f^\pi + \Phi_i^\pi - \alpha(\sigma - 1)\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0) \left( \int_0^1 \ln \tau_i^l di \right) - \alpha(\sigma - 1) [\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0) - E_\mu(s_0^*)] \frac{u}{1 + u} \left( \int_0^1 \ln \left( \frac{\tau_i^h}{\tau_i^l} \right) di \right). \quad (24)$$

The elasticities of average tariffs and tariff risk are smaller than in (22) due to absence of  $1 + \xi_0 > 1$ .<sup>15</sup>

### 3 Estimation Approach and Data

We describe the econometric specifications implied by the model for firm-specific input import values. We then describe the data and provide descriptive statistics.

#### 3.1 Approach

We use variation in applied tariffs,  $\tau_i^l$ , and risk,  $\tau_i^h/\tau_i^l$ , across inputs for each firm. We allow these variables to have different elasticities before and after WTO accession to capture any change in the probability of tariff increases and test if the resulting effects are consistent with the model. We describe the steps and identification assumptions necessary to obtain our baseline estimation equations that focus on the own tariff or substitution effects and control for profit effects by using firm-time fixed effects. Subsequently, we provide the conditions to identify the profit effects.

The relative price of the imported intermediate in the initial period in the theory is  $\tau_i^l$ , which we assume varies only due to trade barriers. In the data, the true relative price,  $\tau_{it}^l$ , varies over time even in the low tariff state and has determinants beyond tariffs. Therefore we rely on a parsimonious empirical model where its key determinant is the applied import tariff factor in category  $i$  at time  $t$  denoted by  $\bar{\tau}_{it} \geq 1$  and control for other determinants as follows

$$\ln \tau_{it}^l = \ln \bar{\tau}_{it} + a_t^\tau + e_{it}^\tau, \quad (25)$$

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<sup>15</sup>This is because average tariffs and average tariff risk affect imports in two ways, as can be seen in (20): first by affecting  $\pi(z^l)U$ , which affects the extensive margin, and second by affecting  $\pi(z^l)$ , which affects the intensive margin. Equation (24) involves only the second of these effects.

where the time effect,  $a_i^\tau$ , controls for aggregate shocks, e.g. to exchange rates, and  $e_{it}^\tau$  is i.i.d. random noise.

The relevant threat barrier driving firm decisions depends on their belief of the protection level to which the Chinese government may revert. We do not observe this belief directly but both we and those firms do observe historical tariffs,  $\tau_i^h$ . So we model true firm beliefs,  $\ln \tau_{it}^h$ , as a weighted average of the observable  $\ln \tau_i^h$  and an average tariff equivalent  $\ln \tau$ , common across products and unobservable to us. Thus we have

$$\ln \tau_{it}^h = h \ln \tau_i^h + (1 - h) \ln \tau + e_{it}^h, \quad (26)$$

where the weight  $h \in [0, 1]$  is reflected in the estimation coefficients and  $e_{it}^h$  is an idiosyncratic shock with mean zero and orthogonal to  $\tau_i^h$  and  $\tau_{it}^l$ .<sup>16</sup>

Allowing the applied tariffs to vary over time in the approximation (22) and using the empirical models in (25) and (26), we derive the specification for import values as

$$\ln m_{ift} = \beta_{\tau t} \ln \bar{\tau}_{it} + \beta_{ht} \ln \frac{\tau_i^h}{\bar{\tau}_{it}} + \mathbf{a}_{f,t,I} + e_{ift}. \quad (27)$$

The current ad valorem tariff factor  $\bar{\tau}_{it}$  and the threat tariff  $\tau_i^h$  are observed. The error term  $e_{ift}$  includes idiosyncratic firm-product-time shocks (including errors from approximation and the empirical models of relative price and beliefs). Initially we do not include the aggregate policy effects on a firm explicitly but fully account for them using a set of firm-time effects,  $\mathbf{a}_{ft}$ . In order to identify those aggregate effects we subsequently include only firm and time effects,  $\mathbf{a}_f$  and  $\mathbf{a}_t$ , respectively.<sup>17</sup>

The coefficients on applied tariffs,  $\beta_{\tau t}$  are predicted to be negative. Moreover, both these and  $\beta_{ht}$  are potentially time-varying through  $\gamma_t$ . If TPU is present, i.e.  $\gamma_t > 0$ , and importers place weight on our measure of the threat tariff  $h > 0$ , then the theory predicts that  $\beta_{ht} < 0$ .

We model WTO accession using an indicator variable for the post-period, i.e.  $\mathbf{1}_{wto}(t > 2001)$ , to test whether there is an uncertainty shock  $\Delta\gamma = \gamma_{wto} - \gamma_{pre} \neq 0$ . This approach yields the baseline specification

$$\ln m_{ift} = (\beta_{\tau,pre} + \Delta\beta_\tau \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto}) \ln \bar{\tau}_{it} + (\beta_{h,pre} + \Delta\beta_h \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto}) \ln \frac{\tau_i^h}{\bar{\tau}_{it}} + \mathbf{a}_{f,t,I} + e_{ift}. \quad (28)$$

As noted above, in the pre-WTO period  $\beta_{h,pre} < 0$  when  $\gamma_{pre} > 0$  and  $h > 0$ ; and applied

<sup>16</sup>Broda et al (2008) show the tariffs measured by  $\tau_i^h$  are increasing in Chinese import market power so an alternative interpretation is that firms believed that the government is more likely to exploit import market power if a WTO accession does not materialize.

<sup>17</sup>We control for potential variation in domestic varieties, captured in  $\Phi_i$  approximation terms, via industry effects  $\mathbf{a}_I$  at different levels of aggregation  $I$ , described in the estimation and robustness.



tariffs have a negative effect,  $\beta_{\tau,pre} < 0$ . The theory predicts that if there is a reduction in uncertainty then  $\Delta\beta_h = \beta_{h,wto} - \beta_{h,pre} > 0$  when  $h > 0$ . The theory also predicts an increase in the responsiveness to applied tariffs estimated by  $\Delta\beta_\tau = \beta_{\tau,wto} - \beta_{\tau,pre} < 0$  for beliefs with  $h < 1$ , i.e. if firms place some weight on threats other than the historical mean  $\tau_i^h$  (shown below).

The structural interpretation is

$$\beta_{ht} = -(\theta - 1)(1 - \tilde{s}_0^*)\xi_0 \frac{u_t}{1 + u_t} h \quad (29)$$

$$\beta_{\tau,t} = -\left[ (\theta - 1)(\delta_0 + \xi_0) + \frac{1 - h}{h}\beta_{ht} \right]. \quad (30)$$

Using these interpretations we calculate the percentage change in TPU upon accession

$$\Delta \left( \frac{u}{1 + u} \right) / \left( \frac{u_{pre}}{1 + u_{pre}} \right) = \Delta\beta_{ht} / \beta_{hpre}. \quad (31)$$

Note that if  $h < 1$  then  $\beta_{\tau,t}$  also changes over time with uncertainty, specifically,  $\Delta\beta_\tau = -\frac{1-h}{h}\Delta\beta_{ht}$ .<sup>18</sup> So we can infer the belief parameter  $h$ , using

$$h = \frac{\Delta\beta_h}{\Delta\beta_h - \Delta\beta_\tau}. \quad (32)$$

We can test if it is within the relevant range  $h \in [0, 1]$ , whether it is similar across alternative specifications and how relevant alternative threat measures are for beliefs.

## 3.2 Data

We combine Chinese trade data from 2000-2006 with product specific tariffs from before and after WTO accession.

### 3.2.1 Firm Imports

We use Chinese transaction-level trade data for the years 2000 to 2006, which is collected by China's General Administration of Customs. The data records information on each transaction including the Chinese firm's name, code, contact information, ownership; the product code (at 8-digit); the country of the counterpart (source of import or destination of export); year and month; value; and trade type (ordinary or processing). We use imports

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<sup>18</sup>To see why note that if  $h = 1$  then conditional on the risk measure  $\frac{\tau_i^h}{\bar{\tau}_i}$ , the applied tariff elasticity is constant and given by  $-(\theta - 1)(\delta_0 + \xi_0)$ : its value under certainty. If  $h < 1$  this elasticity is attenuated by the fraction of the uncertainty effect that is not controlled,  $\frac{1-h}{h}\beta_{ht}$ .

and concord the product codes to be in the 1996 version of the Harmonized System 6-digit product classification (known as HS6) using the official UN concordances. We identify intermediate products using the UN’s Broad Economic Categories.

We focus on ordinary imports and exclude processing trade. Ordinary imports refer to non-processing imports and are subject to Chinese import tariffs and thus are a closer fit to our model and policy data. Processing trade imports on the other hand receive tariff exemptions and may be affected by other policies and incentives that we can’t control for and may be correlated with the policy uncertainty we measure, hence we exclude those imports.<sup>19</sup>

Our analysis focuses on firm import values, which is the best available variable that directly maps to the theory. However, we also explore the mechanism of the model by using indicators for whether a firm adopted a specific HS6 and examining how it changes.

### 3.2.2 Tariffs

The tariff data are from the World Bank’s WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) database. We use Chinese MFN statutory tariffs from 1992 (the starting year of Chinese tariffs in WITS) to 2006 (the ending year of our trade data).<sup>20</sup> We use the historical tariffs before 2000 to construct Chinese tariff risk measures, which will be proportional to the log difference between current tariffs and a potential worst case scenario captured by the mean tariff from 1992-1999. As with the trade data, we concord the product codes to 1996 revision of the HS classification.

## 3.3 Descriptive Evidence

### 3.3.1 Policy

We measure the tariff risk faced by Chinese firms using  $\ln(\tau_i^h/\bar{\tau}_{it})$ . In the baseline we use the simple log average of the tariff factor between 1992-1999 in  $i$  for  $\ln \tau_i^h$  and the applied tariff in  $t$  for  $\bar{\tau}_{it}$ . In the pre-WTO years tariff risk has a mean of 0.07 for intermediate products

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<sup>19</sup>The two most important types of processing trade are: (1) processing with imports (PWI) and (2) processing with assembly (PWA). PWI is when Chinese firms import intermediate inputs from foreign firms, use them to produce final products, and then sell the final products to foreign firms (typically different from the foreign firms that export intermediate inputs to them); both the import and export prices are set based on the negotiations between transaction parties. PWA is when Chinese firms get intermediate inputs directly from foreign firms for free, assemble them to produce final products, and then return them back to the same foreign firms for sale; foreign firms pay Chinese firms a certain processing fee.

<sup>20</sup>We use the data in WITS sourced from the UN TRAINS database as our primary tariff measure, but these data are missing 1995 and 2002. The 2002 tariff schedules are in the WTO Integrated Database (IDB), but no schedules are available for 1995.

and a standard deviation of 0.05, so it exhibits considerable variation (see Table 1). There is also considerable variation within the typical sector (defined by the UN’s aggregation of HS6 codes into 21 sections, as shown in Table A3). This will allow us to control for unobservable heterogeneity across sectors. The applied tariff factor,  $\ln \bar{\tau}_{it}$ , is around 0.12 for intermediates in our firm sample before accession and 0.075 after. The coefficient of variation is between 0.4 and 0.5 across periods and variation is present in several sectors as seen in Table A2.<sup>21</sup>

### 3.3.2 Aggregate and Intermediate Imports

The growth in Chinese imports is substantial from 2000 to 2006 and intermediate goods are an important component of it.

Chinese imports increased from 225 billion USD in 2000 to 788 billion USD in 2006. Ordinary imports (OI) increased from 133 to 469 billion, mostly after accession as we see in Figure 3. While the share of OI is roughly constant, around 60%, its composition shifted towards intermediates—the focus of our theory. Figure 3 shows the intermediate share of OI increased from an average of 66% in 2000-2001 to 70% in 2005-2006. This also implied an increase in the OI intermediates share of total imports. In contrast, the share of processing trade remained around 40%.

There are also changes in the composition of importing firms away from state-owned enterprises and trade intermediaries (Table A1).<sup>22</sup> These may reflect an increase in the incentive to import by private manufacturing firms consistent with the model. However, they also reflect the continued opening of trade rights to non-SOEs and small-to-medium sized manufacturing firms. We will show the baseline results are robust to excluding SOEs and using subsets of firms that already imported pre-accession so the effects are not driven by changes in trade rights.

### 3.3.3 Firm Import Adoption and Persistence

A substantial fraction of the aggregate intermediate growth is driven by new input adoption. To provide a lower bound we can define a continuing input,  $i \in c$ , between  $t$  and  $T$  as an HS6 product the firm imports in both periods and decompose its intermediate import expenditure

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<sup>21</sup>After the WTO accession our risk measure increases because the measured threat is assumed to be unchanged but the applied tariff falls.

<sup>22</sup>We identify trade intermediaries from their Chinese names using a method similar to that used in Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei (2010). If a firm name contains Chinese characters equivalent to “export”, “import”, “trade”, etc., then it is classified as a trade intermediary.

midpoint growth between these and all other products.

$$\frac{\Delta m}{\bar{m}} = \left[ (1 - s_c) \cdot \frac{\Delta m_{i \notin c}}{\bar{m}_{i \notin c}} \right] + s_c \cdot \frac{\Delta m_{i \in c}}{\bar{m}_{i \in c}}, \quad (33)$$

New HS6
Continuing HS6

where the denominators reflect averages over the periods, e.g.  $\bar{m} = (m_t + m_T) / 2$ , and thus allow computing growth if there is entry or exit.

Doing so for 2000-2005 and further decomposing it into continuing firms and others we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} 1.01 &= \left( \frac{[0.28 \cdot 0.75]}{\text{New HS6: continuing firms}} + 0.72 \cdot 0.77 \right) \cdot 0.6 + \frac{[1.37] \cdot 0.4}{\text{New HS6: other}} \\ &= \frac{0.67}{\text{New HS6 Growth: all}} + 0.33, \end{aligned} \quad (34)$$

The aggregate midpoint growth of 101 percent reflects the values in table A1 between 2000-2005. The term in () in the first line is the import growth of continuing firms: 21 percent new HS6 and 55 for continuing HS6. All of the 137 percent growth by other firms captures new adoption (at some point between 2001-2005). Weighting the 21 and 137 percent by the firms' respective shares yields 67 percent, so at least two thirds of aggregate growth is accounted for by new HS6-firm pairs. This is a lower bound since varieties in the model are defined more finely so they also contribute to part of the 55 percent growth in continuer firms's existing HS6 (e.g. imports from new countries and/or firms in an HS6).

Table A4 summarizes information on the probability of importing, the distribution of imported HS6 by firms and their change over time. In 2000 about 11% of all manufacturing firms imported at least one intermediate HS6. About 14% of these imported a single intermediate HS6, which suggests that sunk (or fixed) costs are variety or at the very least product specific, otherwise if they covered all imports then firms would adopt all available HS6 (relevant for its production) after incurring it. Our estimation approach relies on the remaining fraction of firms, those with more than one HS6 in order to explore variation in risk across HS6 within firms. The number of importing firms nearly doubles by 2005 and the fraction of importers of intermediates in manufacturing rises to 13%. There is growth in all bins with the largest at the bottom of the distribution, 10 or fewer, which further supports the role of new adoption.<sup>23</sup>

In Table A5 we provide additional summary statistics aggregating the years into pre or post periods and contrasting the full sample with continuing firms. The table contains information for the full sample and the manufacturing subsample and we discuss the latter

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<sup>23</sup>The product distribution of importers in 2006 is similar to 2005.

for comparability with the rest of this section. In the pre-period the mean number of intermediate HS6 per importing manufacturing firm was 13—much higher than the median of 4 (panel I). The coefficient of variation of 1.8 shows considerable heterogeneity in input usage across firms—as the model would predict.<sup>24</sup> The mean of adopted HS6 is similar in the pre and post-period in panel I since there is more adoption growth at the lower end of the distribution in this sample that includes both continuing and other firms (as seen in Table A4). The composition effect is driven by new firms, which tend to adopt fewer varieties.<sup>25</sup> In panel II we see that for continuing importers in 2000-2005 the mean, median and maximum grow. The mean growth in HS6 used in 2000-2005 for continuers is 8.6 lp.

The small fraction of importing firms confirms the existence of some adoption costs. If these were simply fixed costs then there would be no input hysteresis and so any input used at  $t$  would depend only on current firm and input conditions. Alternatively, and as the model assumes, if costs are sunk then prior input usage should predict current usage *even after controlling for all firm and input current conditions*. To test if there is evidence for such sunk costs we run the following linear probability model

$$1(m_{ift} > 0) = \beta^{sunk} 1(m_{ift-1} > 0) + \mathbf{a}_{ft} + \mathbf{a}_{i,t} + e_{ift}, \quad (35)$$

where  $\mathbf{a}_{ft} + \mathbf{a}_{i,t}$  represent firm and product effects interacted with time. In Table A6 we see  $\beta^{sunk}$  is around 0.15 and significant at the 1 percent level with minor variations depending on the sample (all and manufacturing firm subsample) and set of fixed effects (sector or HS6 or their interactions with time). This further supports the existence of some firm-variety sunk costs.

## 4 Estimation

We first provide the baseline regression results for import values and robustness. We follow with evidence on the mechanism of the model that explores firm heterogeneity and adoption. We conclude with a quantification using the econometric estimates to assess the relative importance of applied tariffs versus commitment on imported inputs due to accession.

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<sup>24</sup>This heterogeneity can also be due to time-invariant sectoral variation, which we control for in the regressions. We will also see there is variation in adoption even within firms in the same industry and consistently with the model it varies by initial productivity.

<sup>25</sup>We can verify this by computing the average number of varieties for continuing importers in 2000-2005 relative to the overall sample, which is higher by 1.4 times in 2000 and 1.54 in 2005.

## 4.1 Baseline: Imported Intermediate Values

We now provide regression evidence for the role of TPU in firm-level imports. We focus on ordinary import values of intermediates, which are best suited to test the model. In the robustness section we provide estimates for alternative samples.

The estimates in Table 2 apply the baseline model in (28) to firm-level import values. In columns 1 and 2, we include only the applied tariff and post-WTO accession interaction; we control for sector and alternative firm fixed effects. The tariff elasticity is negative as expected and it increases in magnitude in the post-WTO period. In columns 3 and 4 we add tariff risk and see that it reduces the value of imported intermediates pre-WTO, a key prediction of the model and this is partially reversed post-WTO, as shown in the positive and significant differential effects. Magnitudes are nearly the same for both sets of fixed effects: firm (column 1 and 3) and firm-time (2 and 4), where the latter controls for the profit effect on the composite bundle of all the firm inputs.<sup>26</sup>

While we did not restrict the parameters of the estimation, we obtain estimates of two structural parameters in the relevant range. Specifically, in column 4 we obtain the proportionate change in  $u/(1+u)$  of  $-0.51$ ; and  $h = 0.49$ , so importers believed the historical average captured half the threat.

## 4.2 Robustness

We check the robustness of the baseline with respect to alternative firm and product samples and risk measures. We also test if alternative hypotheses regarding other sources of TPU and history dependence affect the results.

### 4.2.1 Firm sample

The firm information in the trade transactions data does not allow us to perfectly distinguish between importers that are manufacturing firms, the closest to our model, and importers that are primarily engaged in wholesale or retail activity. To test if our results are robust to this issue, we restricted our trade transactions sample to those that can be matched to firms in the Chinese manufacturing census. Table 3 reports the baseline for all intermediate goods trade in column 1. This can be compared to column 3, the manufacturing firm subsample. We continue to find a negative uncertainty effect in the pre-WTO period that is partially reversed following accession. The tariff elasticity also increases after accession, as in our baseline. The sign and significance patterns are the same in the manufacturing subsample

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<sup>26</sup>The model predicts a positive profit effect on variety adoption, which could otherwise bias our coefficients on applied tariffs and uncertainty. We estimate it below.

and the differences in coefficient magnitudes relative to the baseline are not large enough to generate quantitatively different conclusions; the implied uncertainty reduction is  $-0.51$  in both.

#### 4.2.2 Composition and trading rights effects

One possible explanation for the change in tariff elasticity post-WTO is composition of firm imports and/or new rules that allowed more firms to import. In the model we assume the input elasticity  $\theta$  is common across all  $i$ , but if newly adopted inputs, or entering firms, had systematically higher elasticity then it would be reflected in higher post-WTO estimates. To test this we re-estimate using a panel that includes only firm-HS6 cells with positive imports in at least one year in the pre and post-WTO period. Doing so yields very similar coefficients as seen by comparing the estimates in column 2 of Table 3 to those in column 1. The fact that the result holds even if we restrict the sample to firm-HS6 that already imported in the pre-WTO period also indicates that the baseline estimates are not driven by new firms acquiring trade rights post-WTO accession.

#### 4.2.3 State ownership

Next we check if there is heterogeneity in our results depend on whether a firm is a State Owned Enterprise (SOE). In Table 4 we re-estimate the baseline for the SOE subsample (column 2), which account for about one quarter of observations in the baseline, and the non-SOE (column 4). The qualitative results are present in both samples and they reflect similar proportionate changes in  $u$ .

#### 4.2.4 Correlated shocks and alternative sources of TPU

We have focused on TPU related to imported inputs, but existing theories and evidence for TPU point to investments by firms to increase their *exports*. We consider two variations of these existing export theories and ask if they can explain our findings of increased imports. We first consider the “home export TPU” mechanism: more secure access to foreign markets leads home firms to expand, and therefore adopt more inputs including imported ones. If the input adoption is common across all HS6 then they are captured by the firm-time effects and do not affect our results; the same will be true if they are uncorrelated with changes in foreign market TPU. However, our results could be affected if there is a positive correlation between import and export shocks at the product level, e.g. if firm export and

import bundles are concentrated in similar HS6.<sup>27</sup> If this were the driving force for our findings then they should hold for exporting firms but not for firms that never export. We test this by dividing the sample into “Never Exporters”, “Always Exporters”, and “New Exporters” and running our baseline specification on these sub-samples in Table 5. For all three samples, we find negative uncertainty effects in the pre-WTO period that are partially and significantly reversed following accession. The implied change in  $u$  and  $h$  are identical.<sup>28</sup> So, this alternative source of TPU does not drive our import results.

The second variation is the “foreign export TPU” mechanism: more secure access to the home market leads foreign firms to increase varieties to it and be directly reflected as the higher home firm imports. A distinguishing feature of this export mechanism is that the foreign firm decision depends on the aggregate demand in the home market, whereas our import mechanism implies that even if a variety is available some home firms will adopt and others will not. If we had transaction-level data on all foreign firms exporting to China then we could fully control for this export mechanism. However, this data does not exist and so we consider alternative econometric approaches that try to maintain the available foreign variety bundles as constant as possible before and after accession so any import adoption reflects variation of importing firm behavior.

Here we define country-varieties as exporter-HS6 pairs. We exclude imports of new country-varieties by using only imports from  $ci$  pairs that were continuously exported to China in all periods. Doing so leaves the baseline coefficients largely unchanged as shown in Table 6 column 2 relative to column 1. We can apply a stricter criteria that excludes any  $ci$  unless they are continuously sold to a specific production sector. This allows for the possibility that each of the over 400 production sectors classified in China source different varieties within any given  $ci$ . Doing so reduces the sample in column 4 to about one third of the relevant manufacturing sample in column 3 but does not change the estimated coefficients. In a subsequent section we control for *all* foreign export-TPU by including HS6-time effects and exploring firm productivity heterogeneity to identify the remaining import TPU effects.

#### 4.2.5 Alternative risk measure

We examine how our results depend on the measurement of the threat tariff in Table 7. As an alternative to using the historical mean tariff by product for 1992-1999 (column 1), we

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<sup>27</sup>For example, WTO accession reduced TPU in the US and thus increased China’s exports to that market. If the Chinese uncertainty measure across products is correlated with the one in the U.S. then our results may overstate the impact of the import mechanism.

<sup>28</sup>Specifically,  $u$  is -0.45 for always and -0.42 for never;  $h$  is 0.45 and 0.36 respectively. The absolute value of the elasticities are smaller for never exporters. This may be due to different composition of inputs or lower productivity. We examine variation regarding the latter in the mechanism section.



use the historical maximum tariff (column 2), which is typically close to the 1992 value. The results are qualitatively similar but the magnitudes are slightly different: smaller for the maximum threat tariff. This difference in magnitude is partly because the mean and standard deviation for the alternative variable are roughly twice of their respective values for the baseline measure. The effects in column 2 remain smaller even after adjusting for standard deviation shocks, which might suggest the historical maximum was less salient than the average measure incorporating liberalization in the late 1990s. We can verify this directly by noting that in column 2 the implied probability of reversal to the maximum is  $h = 0.26$ , about half the value of the probability of reversal to the mean measure in the baseline.<sup>29</sup>

#### 4.2.6 History dependence

Our main focus is on the change in the effects of tariffs after the WTO accession, which does not reflect any unobserved effects of a product that are constant over time. To interpret and quantify the pre-WTO effects as well we test robustness to alternative hypotheses. One such hypothesis is that firms face sunk costs but no uncertainty; if that were the case then tariffs set at  $T$  affect the input technology firms adopt in that period and as long as the technology does not depreciate or is replaced. This is plausible for shorter periods but unlikely in our setting. For example, the historical maximum reflects tariffs around 1992 so the technology would have had to survive until 2000-2001 to explain what we find in Table 7. Many of the firms in our sample were not created until much later. The baseline results reflect the mean tariffs between 1992-1999 and thus the explanation seems a priori more plausible. Under this alternative, the relevant historical average should only reflect periods while the firm was alive, so the 1992-1999 average should have smaller explanatory power for firms created in the later periods. To test this we restrict the sample of manufacturing firms to those created after 1997 and re-run the specification in Table 3 column 3 (available on request). This restriction reduces the sample by more than half but leaves the coefficients largely unchanged in terms of magnitudes and standard errors. This identical response from younger firms indicates they place similar weight on tariffs they did not actually face and supports our uncertainty interpretation of the measure.

### 4.3 Mechanism Evidence

We now provide evidence on the mechanisms of the model, specifically on intermediates vs. consumption goods, productivity heterogeneity, complementarity and adoption effects.

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<sup>29</sup>Thus importers placed a lower probability on a reversal to the 1992 tariffs, which reflect the regime prior to the “Socialist Market Economy” reforms as indicated in Figure 1.

### 4.3.1 Intermediates vs. Consumption Goods

Thus far we focused on the subset of HS6 that match the UN BEC intermediate classification. If we find the same quantitative effect for final consumption goods then it is harder to distinguish our mechanism from others, such as the export TPU. A simple way to test this is provided in Table 8 where we run the baseline on the sample of final consumption goods. For the sample including all firms (column 2) we find effects that are qualitatively similar to those for intermediates (replicated in column 1) but with considerably smaller elasticities. This may reflect the “export TPU” channel previously documented by other authors. Importantly, for the subsample that is most relevant for the theory—the manufacturing firms—we find no statistically significant evidence for the uncertainty channel in consumption goods (column 4). This provides additional evidence that the baseline results for inputs capture a mechanism distinct from the standard export TPU in the literature.<sup>30</sup>

### 4.3.2 Productivity Heterogeneity

We now examine how the import elasticities depend on initial firm productivity.

Our baseline approach used an approximation around a given firm productivity and product characteristics so firm heterogeneity was controlled via firm fixed effects. According to the theory, the risk elasticity of imports is proportional to  $(1 - \tilde{s}) \xi$ . If a firm is sufficiently unproductive so as not to adopt any risky imported inputs, this elasticity is zero. Thus, its import equation in (23) reflects no uncertainty impact. When a firm is sufficiently productive to adopt some intermediates then its risk elasticity relative to a more productive firm is ambiguous and depends on the properties of the exposed variety distribution  $G$ . Given this we ask if there is any significant difference in the uncertainty coefficients between high and low productivity. If there is then we explore it and ask if it is robust to controlling for the foreign export-TPU mechanism.

We use the matched manufacturing data to compute productivity for each firm present in the pre-WTO period. Productivity is measured as real output per worker to maximize the number of observations. Firms are classified as high productivity if in the pre-WTO period they are above their industry’s median and low otherwise. Column 1 of Table 9 confirms the baseline predictions hold for high productivity firms. This is also the case when we run the baseline for this subsample of low productivity in column 2. In column 3 we pool these

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<sup>30</sup>Interestingly, we find some uncertainty effects for capital goods in both samples (available on request). Their magnitudes are closer to the intermediates but the estimates are much less precise. There are two possible reasons. First, the intermediate classification is subject to error, for example it may be too narrow and misclassify some HS6 as capital goods. Second, the basic insight of the model can be adapted for capital goods that must be periodically replaced.

subsamples and report the estimated coefficients for low on the left and the differential for high relative to low on the right. We find that the accession had a larger impact for high productivity firms reflected in the differential coefficients for risk and applied tariffs in the post period.

Column 4 offers further robustness of the results relative to foreign export TPU. Here we find that the magnitude and significance of high productivity differentials are robust to including HS6-time effects (so we can only identify the differential between high and low). This robustness indicates that the differentials are driven by input TPU and not by foreign export TPU, since the HS6-time effects control for *any* change in the availability of foreign input varieties in China.

### 4.3.3 Profit and Input Complementarity Effects

Thus far we focused on own substitution effects: larger imports of an input  $i$  if it has lower relative price and risk. We now examine if there are complementarities across inputs, i.e. if reductions in the cost or risk in inputs  $j \neq i$  increase imports of  $i$ .

To do so we augment the baseline estimation equation in (28) as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \ln m_{ift} = & (\beta_{\tau,pre} + \Delta\beta_{\tau} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto}) \ln \bar{\tau}_{it} + (\beta_{h,pre} + \Delta\beta_h \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto}) \ln \frac{\tau_i^h}{\bar{\tau}_{it}} + \mathbf{a}_{f,t,I} + e_{ift} \quad (36) \\ & + \Delta\bar{\beta}_{\tau} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto} \int_f \ln \bar{\tau}_{it} + \Delta\bar{\beta}_h \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto} \int_f \ln (\tau_i^h / \bar{\tau}_{it}). \end{aligned}$$

The two new terms are in the second line. To apply the approximation in (22) we need to compute a simple log average over relevant inputs, denoted by  $\int_f \ln (\tau_j^h / \tau_j^l)$  for risk and defined as the average over the  $j$  inputs used by the CIC-4 industry  $F$  to which  $f$  belongs. This avoids the endogeneity of computing averages over only the adopted set of each firm. This measure and the applied tariff analog have no product variation and so are firm specific, which implies that we can't identify their baseline effect separately from the firm effect,  $\mathbf{a}_f$ , but we can still identify the differential post-WTO effect if we restrict the firm effect to be fixed over time, as we now will.

The sign predictions are the same as those for the respective substitution effects if  $\gamma$  falls:  $\Delta\bar{\beta}_h > 0$  (if  $h > 0$ ) and  $\Delta\bar{\beta}_{\tau} < 0$  (if  $h < 1$ ).<sup>31</sup> In Table 10 we implement this

<sup>31</sup>Similarly, we can obtain structural predictions from (22) and the empirical models in (25) and (26). For example,

$$\Delta\bar{\beta}_h = \alpha(\sigma - 1) [\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0)(1 + \xi_0) - E(s_0^*)] h \left( -\Delta \frac{u_t}{1 + u_t} \right)$$

for the manufacturing sample. The first column replicates the baseline only including the substitution effects for comparison. The second column adds new variables. The substitution effects are unchanged and we find evidence for the complementarity impacts: the reduction in uncertainty in other inputs increased imports of  $i$ ,  $\Delta\bar{\beta}_h > 0$ . Moreover, the magnitude of the elasticity of  $i$ 's tariffs with respect to other inputs increased. The results are robust to a subsample of firms that import before and after the accession (column 3).

The last two columns split the sample into high and low productivity and as predicted we find larger profit effects for high, partially because the profit multiplier,  $\Theta$ , increases with productivity.

#### 4.3.4 Probability of Adoption

The baseline model assumes there are always some riskless imported varieties in a category  $i$ , and thus there are positive imports within each  $i$  with probability one. While this is likely to hold at a high enough level of aggregation, at the HS6 level we do observe zeros. One interpretation is that the desired import level is so low that it falls below the recorded level, or is done through third parties. Alternatively, these may be true zeros and we have to augment the model as described below. Variation at this level may capture large differences in incentives to adopt because of TPU and thus may be informative about the mechanism of the model but testing this empirically also requires care to ensure the zeros are not simply because an HS6 is outside the potential adoption set for firms in a given sector.

As a preliminary step, we ask whether the prevalence of zeros seems important a priori in the data. At an aggregate level almost all imports in this period occur in HS6 products China imported before and after accession (about 99% in 2005-2000) and they account for all of the growth. This aggregate masks churning at the firm level, but about three quarters of imports and import growth by continuing firms also occurs in HS6 products they already imported before WTO accession, as noted in the descriptive evidence section.<sup>32</sup> Even these firm aggregates mask potentially interesting heterogeneity across firms. In particular, they reflect an import weighted average of continuing firm-HS6 observations that should be more representative of the larger firms that have already adopted most potential inputs, as the model would predict. The evidence suggests this is the case and that smaller firms have a lower share of trade in continuing HS6 products.<sup>33</sup> Thus it may be instructive to examine

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<sup>32</sup>Specifically, we construct a panel of continuing importing firms between 2000-2005; these account for 60% of total intermediate imports (averaged between those two years); we compute the imports in continuing firm-HS-6 pairs and find that it accounts for almost three quarters of their total imports and also a similar share of their import growth between 2000-2005.

<sup>33</sup>Specifically, we compute the average continuing share,  $\sum_{i \in cont} (m_{i,f,post} + m_{i,f,pre}) / \sum_i (m_{i,f,post} + m_{i,f,pre})$ , which has a simple average across firms of 0.39, considerably smaller than the import weighted average

HS6 adoption to study the mechanism of the model.

Our theoretical model of Section 2 did not allow for zero imports of an input, because the firm always imports at least  $\mu_{if}$  (the measure of the riskless foreign varieties), which is positive with probability 1. To allow for zero imports, therefore, we must require the distribution of  $\mu$  to have a mass point at zero:  $G(0) > 0$ . The probability of observing a firm with *positive* imports in this subset is,

$$\Pr(n_{if}^{*u} > 0 | \mu_{if} = 0) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tilde{\mu}_{if}^u > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \tilde{\mu}_{if}^u \leq 0 \end{cases}, \quad (37)$$

where the latent variable  $\tilde{\mu}_{if}^u$  is given by (19). We showed that it is increasing in the firm's expected profits and decreasing in the own current tariff and TPU. In the appendix, we approximate it around  $\tilde{\mu}_{if} = 0$ —the point of adoption indifference under certainty—and it yields,

$$\tilde{\mu}_{if}^u \approx \Phi^n + \Phi_f^n + \Phi_i^n - (\theta - 1) \left[ \ln \tau_i^l + \frac{u}{1+u} \ln \left( \frac{\tau_i^h}{\tau_i^l} \right) \right] \quad (38)$$

where the profit effect is subsumed in the firm fixed effect,  $\Phi_f^n$ .

### *New input adoption*

If we observed the subset of risky products for each firm then we could specify a probability model over  $fi$  in any given year using indicators  $\mathbf{1}(m_{ift} > 0)$ . We would have similar sign predictions to those derived in (28), e.g. higher probability of adoption post accession for  $i$  with higher initial risk,  $\Delta\beta_h^y > 0$ . However, without directly observing that subset we require an alternative approach; we focus on the adoption of new inputs described below.

According to the model if a firm  $f$  does not use an input  $i$  even though it is used by others then this is a risky variety for  $f$ . Using this insight the following adoption variable over the set of products a firm did not import pre-WTO includes only risky varieties.

$$adopt\_post_{if} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } m_{if,post} > m_{if,pre} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } m_{if,post} = m_{if,pre} = 0 \end{cases} \quad \text{and } i \in \mathcal{I}_{f \in F}$$

We use the subset of inputs  $i \in \mathcal{I}_{f \in F}$ , which are the potential products relevant for the production sector,  $F$ , that firm  $f$  belongs to.<sup>34</sup> In order to avoid timing issues and maximize

of 0.72. Similarly, the simple mean of the share of growth by continuous firm-products is lower than the weighted average.

<sup>34</sup>Specifically, we construct the subset of all  $i$  ever imported by any firm in  $F$  in the sample period, i.e.  $i \in \mathcal{I}_{f \in F}$  if  $\max_{t, f' \in F} \{1(m_{if't} > 0)\} = 1$ .

the sample size in terms of firms we define the import variables over any pre and any post period and thus there is no time dimension in this variable.

The relevant set of potential inputs differs across sector. The fraction of new adoptions in the sample is seemingly low, 1.8%, but that reflects in part the large number of potential *if* pairs in the sample, almost 30 million.

To interpret the estimated coefficients we can start with a linear probability model using  $\mathbf{1}(m_{ift} > 0)$  following (28), which would yield coefficients  $\beta_\tau^y$  and  $\beta_h^y$  with the same qualitative predictions described for import values. Now note that around no initial adoption  $adopt\_post_{if} = \mathbf{1}(m_{if,post}) - \mathbf{1}(m_{if,pre})$  and using the changes over time operator,  $\Delta$ , we obtain

$$adopt\_post_{if} = \Delta\beta_h^y \ln \frac{\tau_i^h}{\bar{\tau}_{ipre}} - (\beta_{\tau,pre}^y - \beta_{h,post}^y) \ln \bar{\tau}_{ipre} + (\beta_{\tau,post}^y - \beta_{h,post}^y) \ln \bar{\tau}_{ipost} + \Delta\mathbf{a}_{f,t} + \Delta e_{ift}. \quad (39)$$

The differencing implies we need only control for firm and time effects and the coefficient on pre-risk is the differential impact  $\Delta\beta_h^y > 0$ . If uncertainty was eliminated post accession then the coefficient on the initial tariff would simply be  $-\beta_{\tau,pre}^y > 0$ : higher adoption of products with initially higher tariffs, and the model predicts that is also the case even if uncertainty is not fully eliminated since  $\beta_{\tau,pre}^y < \beta_{h,post}^y$ . Finally, conditional on pre-tariffs, the higher tariffs are in the post period the lower the probability of new adoption since  $\beta_{\tau,post}^y < \beta_{h,post}^y$ .

The estimates in column 1 of Table 11 are consistent with all three predictions. The elasticity of new adoption with respect to tariff risk after a reduction in uncertainty is 4.7 at the mean. This implies that WTO accession increased the probability of new adoption for products with the mean tariff risk (0.07 in the data) relative to those without by about 33%.

A final exercise splits the sample into high and low productivity. According to the theory, firms on the margin of adoption of an HS6 should have an adoption elasticity which is independent of firm productivity, unlike the elasticities of values within an already-adopted HS6 which we examined in previous sections.<sup>35</sup> To construct productivity we lose about one third of the sample but still find a similar impact of uncertainty relative to the sample in column 1 (the tariff estimates are now too imprecise to identify). The uncertainty effect is present in both high and low productivity samples. Their point estimates differ but this merely reflects the fact that high productivity are more than twice as likely to adopt on average in the data. Thus the elasticities with respect to tariff risk at the mean are similar

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<sup>35</sup>The identification is from firms on the margin of adoption, so  $\tilde{\mu}_{if} \approx 0$  and in the appendix we show that the risk elasticity of adoption around this point is  $-(\theta - 1) \frac{u_t}{1+u_t}$ , which is independent of firm productivity.

for high and low as predicted.

## 4.4 Quantification

We explore the estimates and model structure to do the following: (1) extract information about the probability of reversal,  $\gamma$ ; (2) quantify how accession increased imported input values via substitution and complementarity and the impact this had on operating profits.

### 4.4.1 WTO Commitment Effect on Probability of Reform Reversal

The key uncertainty measure for firm investment is the expected duration in a worst case state. This is given by  $u = \frac{\beta\gamma}{1-\beta}$ , where  $\beta$  here is the firm discount factor (not an estimation coefficient) and  $\gamma$  is the transition probability to the worst state, where tariff reforms are reversed and protection increases. Using the relationship in (31) we used the estimates to quantify the percent reduction in a related uncertainty measure,  $u/(1+u)$ , of  $-0.5$  for the manufacturing sample we use for the import quantification exercises (Table 10, column 3). However, it is also interesting to examine what we learn about the underlying probability  $\gamma$  by using a reasonable value of  $\beta$ , e.g. 0.85. Doing so we can obtain a percent change in  $u$ , which is the same as that of  $\Delta\gamma/\gamma^{pre}$ , for any given  $\gamma^{pre}$ .<sup>36</sup>

We plot the  $\gamma$  post-WTO relative to its pre value in Figure 4. If there was no commitment effect then the probability would remain on the 45 degree line, the shaded area below it shows the percentage point reduction for any  $\gamma^{pre}$  using the import estimates. We find the post-WTO reversal probability is at most 0.13 (any  $\gamma^{pre} \leq 1$ ) and its percent reduction is at least 63% (if  $\gamma^{pre} \geq 0.13$ ).<sup>37</sup>

### 4.4.2 WTO Effects on Imported Inputs

We use the structural interpretation of the estimated parameters to quantify and decompose the effects of accession. We isolate the import growth from changing applied tariffs,  $\Delta \ln \tau_i$ , and the probability of reversal reflected in  $u$ , holding all else fixed. For any firm-product this is given by the difference of expression (22) between pre and post values, where the only change in parameters is due to changes in  $u$ . We define  $m_{if,t} \equiv m_{if}(u_t, \tau_t)$ , so it corresponds

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<sup>36</sup>To guide this choice we note that  $\beta = (1-d)/(1+r)$  where  $d$  is the constant death rate of firms and  $r$  the real rate at which it discounts future profits. A  $\beta = 0.85$  is consistent with alternative reasonable combinations of these parameters; e.g.  $d = 0.125$  (similar to what other authors) and  $r = 0.026$  (the median Chinese real interest rate). We would obtain a slightly higher value, 0.88, if we used  $d = 0.10$  (the median of the fraction of firms that exit in China in 2000-2006).

<sup>37</sup>Handley and Limão (2017) estimate that Chinese exporters believed that the US would revert to column 2 tariffs with a probability of 0.13, so, assuming China would reverse its own tariffs in retaliation, this places a lower bound on  $\gamma^{pre}$ .

to the data for  $t = pre$  and to a counterfactual when only  $u$  and  $\tau$  change to new values for  $t = wto$ . In appendix B.2 we show this growth in imports predicted by the model is given by the following function of the econometric parameters defined in section 3:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E_\mu \ln \frac{m_{if,wto}}{m_{if,pre}} &= \underbrace{\left[ \overbrace{(\Delta\beta_h/h) \cdot r_{i,pre}}^{\text{Substitution}} + \overbrace{(\Delta\bar{\beta}_h/h) \cdot \int_f r_{i,pre}}^{\text{Complementarity}} \right]}_{\text{Commitment}} \\
 &\quad + \underbrace{\left[ (\beta_{\tau,wto} - \beta_{h,wto}) \cdot \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i + (\bar{\beta}_{\tau,wto} - \bar{\beta}_{h,wto}) \cdot \int_f \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i \right]}_{\text{Applied Tariff Change}}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{40}$$

The expression applies to any continuing input  $i$  by a firm  $f$  that uses a constant set of input categories with average policies  $\int_f x_i$ . The terms in brackets capture the commitment and applied tariff change effects—each is decomposed into the respective substitution and complementarity components. The commitment effect depends on overall risk arising from the historical mean and the unobserved component  $\tau$ , i.e.  $r_{i,pre} \equiv h \ln \tau_i^h + (1-h) \ln \tau - \ln \bar{\tau}_{i,pre}$ .

We first assess the relative importance of each effect for an input  $i$  with risk equal to the firm average and equal to the tariff reduction, i.e.  $r_{i,pre} = \int_f r_{i,pre} = -\Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i$ . We present these at the bottom of Table 10 and here focus on column 3.<sup>38</sup> The substitution commitment effect is 6.2; it is stronger than complementarity (4.9) and over twice as large as tariff substitution.<sup>39</sup> We are unable to identify the tariff elasticity level for the complementarity effect. But according to the model that effect is positive when tariffs fall. Thus the share of the commitment effect for this input as a share of all policy effects is up to 80%.

#### 4.4.3 Average growth

The growth varies across inputs with different policies and across firms with different input sets via the complementarity effects. The average effect for any firms using a common set of

<sup>38</sup>We focus on these because they use only observations where the HS6 categories in a CIC industry are used before and after—holding constant the set of inputs available to firms in the industry used to compute  $\int_f x_i$ . The results are broadly similar if we use the unrestricted sample in column 2. The  $h$  for substitution is 0.48 and obtained using (32); a similar formula yields 0.44 for the  $h$  in the complementarity effects.

<sup>39</sup>This ranking holds for all specifications in Table 10. Note that the estimated reduction in the probability of increasing a tariff by 1 lp increases imports by more than an actual reduction in the tariff by 1 lp. This reflects the residual uncertainty post accession, which still attenuates the tariff impact. The counterfactual tariff elasticity in the absence of uncertainty is  $\beta_{\tau,wto}|_{u_{wto}=0} \equiv \beta_\tau + \beta_h(1-h)/h = -8.8$ .



inputs is

$$E_{\mu,i} \ln \frac{m_{if,wto}}{m_{if,pre}} = [(\Delta\beta_h/h) + (\Delta\bar{\beta}_h/h)] \cdot \int_f r_{i,pre} \quad (41)$$

$$+ [(\beta_{\tau,wto} - \beta_{h,wto}) + (\bar{\beta}_{\tau,wto} - \bar{\beta}_{h,wto})] \cdot \int_f \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i.$$

Table 12 evaluates these assuming an average input mix where  $\int_f \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i = -5.0$  lp and  $\int_f r_{i,pre} = 7.1$  lp; the first is the tariff change in 2000-2006 averaged over all HS6 traded in both years and the second is the average of  $\ln \tau_i^h / \bar{\tau}_{i,pre}$  across the same  $i$ .<sup>40</sup> The first column uses the parameters from Table 10, column 3 described above. The average commitment effect is 79 lp with 35 lp arising from complementarity effects; the applied tariff effect is at least 13 lp (from substitution).

We also find significantly larger commitment effects of accession for high productivity firms, 83 lp, than low productivity, 66 lp (column 3).

#### 4.4.4 Aggregate growth

What do these result imply for aggregate input import growth? Denote the aggregate pre-accession imports as  $m_{pre} \equiv \sum_{if} m_{if,pre}$  and the counterfactual post accession values when only  $(u, \tau)$  change as  $m_{wto} \equiv \sum_{if} m_{if,pre} \cdot (m_{if,wto}/m_{if,pre})$ . Hence the aggregate counterfactual growth rate is  $\frac{m_{wto}}{m_{pre}} - 1 = \sum_{if} \frac{m_{if,pre}}{m_{pre}} \cdot \left( \frac{m_{if,wto}}{m_{if,pre}} - 1 \right)$ : the initial import weighted average of firm-product input rates. There is considerable variation in risk (and tariffs) across inputs and their mix across firms so the aggregate and average growth can differ substantially. To examine this we approximate aggregate growth with the following weighted average of the predicted growth rates in (40)

$$\ln \frac{m_{wto}}{m_{pre}} \approx \sum_{if} \frac{m_{if,pre}}{m_{pre}} \cdot E_{\mu} \ln \frac{m_{if,wto}}{m_{if,pre}}.$$

We evaluate it with the parameters in Table 10 but now using import weighted policies for each sample. In Table 12 we show the weighted tariff change in 2000-2006 is  $\sum_{if} \frac{m_{if,pre}}{m_{pre}} \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i = -5.9$  lp (for the specification in column 3 of Table 10), slightly larger than the simple average. The weighted historical risk is considerably lower,  $\sum_{if} \frac{m_{if,pre}}{m_{pre}} \ln \frac{\tau_i^h}{\bar{\tau}_{i,pre}} = 4.4$  lp, which is consistent with the model's prediction that pre-accession firms imported less of any  $i$  with high initial risk. The aggregate effect from commitment is thus lower than its average but

<sup>40</sup>Since around the approximation point all inputs have similar shares we can factor out  $\int_f x_i$ , which represents a simple average across inputs the firm uses for each  $x_i$ . The value used for average risk implicitly assumes that  $\ln \tau = E \ln \tau_i^h$  so the overall mean of the risk is simply  $\int_f r_{i,pre} = E_i \ln (\tau_i^h / \tau_{i,pre})$ . Since we recover  $h$  we can consider higher or lower  $\ln \tau$ , but this is the most neutral assumption.

still at least 49 lp.<sup>41</sup>

In sum, the more conservative estimates imply that the policy effects of accession increased aggregate input imports of continuers by at least 65 lp with up to three quarters due to commitment. As a reference, the observed aggregate growth in this sample for continuers was 73 lp.

#### 4.4.5 Current Profit Effects

We showed that lower tariffs and tariff risk contributed significantly to Chinese firm intermediate import growth following WTO accession. This input expansion increases the firm's current operating profits. We can use the approximation in (24), to derive the following commitment effect on those profits

$$E_{\mu f} \ln \frac{\pi_f(u_{wto}, \tau_{pre})}{\pi_f(u_{pre}, \tau_{pre})} = \chi \cdot (\Delta \bar{\beta}_h / h) \cdot \bar{r}_{pre}, \quad (42)$$

where  $\bar{r}_{i,pre}$  is the average over the sample and we can show  $\chi \leq 1$ .<sup>42</sup> It follows that the 35 log points found for the complementarity effect on imports in the previous subsection is also an upper bound for the impact on current operating profits.

We also provide a direct estimate of the profit effect based on (24). Specifically we use

$$\ln \pi_{ft} = \mathbf{a}_{f,t,I} + \Delta \bar{\beta}_\tau^\pi \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto} \int_f \ln \bar{\tau}_{it} + \Delta \bar{\beta}_h^\pi \cdot \mathbf{1}_{wto} \int_f \ln (\tau_i^h / \tau_i^l) + e_{ift}, \quad (43)$$

where profits are measured at the firm level by sales net of cost of goods sold. The RHS includes only the aggregate policy variables computed as in Table 10. In Table 13 column 1 we confirm the predictions from uncertainty reduction:  $\Delta \bar{\beta}_\tau^\pi < 0 < \Delta \bar{\beta}_h^\pi$ . Moreover, we can compute the commitment effect in (42) directly as  $(\Delta \bar{\beta}_h^\pi / h) \cdot \bar{r}_{pre} = 3$  lp. The effect is 4.6 lp for profits per worker (column 2).

<sup>41</sup>This assumes  $\ln \tau = 4.4$  so weighted risk equals the weighted historical measure. Alternatively, if we keep  $\ln \tau = 7.1$ , the value used in the average, the weighted risk is about 5.8 and the aggregate commitment effect is 64 lp.

<sup>42</sup>To obtain (42) we use (24) and difference it with respect to  $u_t$ :

$$E_{\mu f} \ln \frac{\pi_f(u_{wto}, \tau_{i,pre})}{\pi_f(u_{pre}, \tau_{i,pre})} = \underbrace{-\alpha(\sigma - 1) [\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0) - E(s_0^*)] \Delta \left( \frac{u_t}{1 + u_t} \right)}_{\equiv \Delta \bar{\beta}_h^\pi / h} \times \underbrace{E_f \int_f d \ln \left( \frac{\tau_i^h}{\tau_i^l} \right)}_{\equiv \bar{r}_{pre}}.$$

Using the import equation complementarity coefficient and  $\chi \equiv \frac{\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0) - E(s_0^*)}{\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0)(1 + \xi_0) - E(s_0^*)}$  we have  $\Delta \bar{\beta}_h^\pi / h = \chi \cdot (\Delta \bar{\beta}_h^m / h)$  where  $\chi \leq 1$  since  $\xi_0 \geq 1$ .

## 5 Conclusion

We provide a new model of input price uncertainty that captures both substitution and complementarity effects and derive its empirical implications. We test these using an important episode that lowered input price uncertainty but the insights apply to other settings.

Commitments to trade liberalization and trade agreements induce firms to make investments in new trade relationships and upgrades. Most research has focused on improved market access for exporters through reduced policy uncertainty in trade agreements. Our approach builds on and extends this research to imports when the future path of import tariffs is uncertain and there are sunk costs of adoption. We show that reductions in trade policy uncertainty that lock-in applied tariffs can increase adoption of imported varieties.

We estimate the model using Chinese firm-level data before and after China's accession to the WTO. Our estimates show that accession reduced uncertainty and that WTO commitments for China's own import tariffs explain a considerable portion of the large increase in intermediate imports from 2000-2006 both through substitution and profit effects. We also show that imports are more responsive to continued tariff reductions after accession because importers believed a reversion to historically higher tariffs was less likely.

An important caveat is that WTO accession reduced TPU, but it did not eliminate it. The recent trade war between the US and China, Brexit, and other trade tensions are likely to reduce some of the credibility of WTO commitments and existing trade agreements. Such credibility takes time to rebuild. According to our model and findings, the recent trade tensions could continue to depress imported inputs even if recent increases in tariffs are reversed.

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## A Appendix

### A.1 Result: $\alpha \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right) < 1$ implies that $\pi(z)$ is strictly concave.

**Proof:** The second derivatives and cross-partials of  $\pi(z)$  can be written as  $\pi_{z_i z_i}(z) = ab_i^2 \left[ 1 - \left( \alpha_i \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right)^{-1} \right]$  and  $\pi_{z_i z_j}(z) = ab_i b_j$ , respectively, where  $a = \pi(z) \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right)^2$  and  $b_i = \frac{\alpha_i}{z_i}$ . Let  $\mathbf{b}$  denote an  $N \times 1$  column vector whose elements are  $b_i$ , and let  $\mathbf{A}$  denote an  $N \times N$  diagonal matrix with  $-b_i^2 \left( \alpha_i \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right)^{-1}$  on the diagonal. Thus, the Hessian of  $\pi$  can be written as  $\mathbf{H} = a [\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{b}\mathbf{b}^T]$ . Letting  $\mathbf{H}_k$  denote the  $k$ th order leading principal submatrix of  $\mathbf{H}$ , we can likewise write  $\mathbf{H}_k = a [\mathbf{A}_k + \mathbf{b}_k \mathbf{b}_k^T]$  for  $k = 1, 2, \dots, N$ . The  $k$ th leading principal minor is,

$$|\mathbf{H}_k| = a [1 + \mathbf{b}_k^T \mathbf{A}_k^{-1} \mathbf{b}_k] |\mathbf{A}_k| = a \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^k \alpha_i \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right) \right] \prod_{i=1}^k \left[ -b_i^2 \left( \alpha_i \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right)^{-1} \right]$$

where the first equality follows from the matrix determinant lemma. The concavity holds if  $\mathbf{H}$  is negative definite, which requires that  $|\mathbf{H}_k| < 0$  for  $k$  odd and  $|\mathbf{H}_k| > 0$  for  $k$  even, and a sufficient condition for this is  $1 - \sum_{i=1}^k \alpha_i \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right) > 0$  for all  $k$ , or  $\alpha \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right) < 1$ . QED

### A.2 Derivation of $z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i = \alpha (\sigma - 1) \pi$

The firm minimizes lagrangian  $\int_0^1 z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i + l + \lambda \left( \ln y - \ln \varphi - (1 - \alpha) \ln l - \alpha \int_0^1 \ln x_i di \right)$ . First-order conditions are:  $z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i = \alpha \lambda y$  and  $l = (1 - \alpha) \lambda y$ . Integrating and adding the FOCs gives:  $\int_0^1 z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i + l = \lambda y$  or  $\lambda = \left( \int_0^1 z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i + l \right) / y = c$ . Thus,  $z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i = \alpha y c$ . Replacing  $y$  with demand (1) and using  $p = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c$ , we have  $z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i = \alpha E \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c \right)^{-\sigma} c$ . Whereas operating profit is:  $\pi = (p - c) y = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c - c \right) E \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c \right)^{-\sigma} = \frac{1}{\sigma-1} E \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c \right)^{-\sigma} c$ . Substitution yields,  $z_i^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} x_i = \alpha (\sigma - 1) \pi$ .

### A.3 Derivation of equation (19)

Equation (18) can be written as,

$$\frac{\kappa \pi^l}{1+u} + \frac{u \kappa \pi^h}{1+u} \frac{\rho_i^l + n_i^*}{\rho_i^l + n_i^* + (\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)} \leq \rho_i^l + n_i^*$$

which is quadratic in  $\rho_i^l + (n_i - \bar{n}_i)$ . Simplifying gives,

$$a + b \frac{x}{x+c} = x$$

where  $x = \rho_i^l + n_i^*$ ,  $a = \frac{\kappa\pi(z^l)}{1+u}$ ,  $b = \frac{u\kappa\pi(z^h)}{1+u}$ ,  $c = \rho_i^h - \rho_i^l$ .

We can rule out the negative root (as  $n_i^{*u}$  is constrained to be non-negative), leaving

$$x = a + b - (a + b + c) \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{4bc}{(a+b+c)^2}}}{2}$$

Let  $\psi_i = \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{4bc}{(a+b+c)^2}}}{2} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{u}{1+u} \frac{4\kappa\pi(z^h)(\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)}{(\kappa\pi(z^l)U + \rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)^2} \right)^{1/2}$ , then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_i^l + n_i^* &= \kappa\pi(z^l)U - (\kappa\pi(z^l)U + \rho_i^h - \rho_i^l) \psi_i \\ n_i^* &= \kappa\pi(z^l)U (1 - \psi_i) - \psi_i (\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l) - \rho_i^l \end{aligned}$$

## A.4 Proof of Lemma 1

Differentiating (17) with respect to  $n_j^{*u}$  gives,

$$V_{n_i^{*u} n_j^{*u}} = \frac{\pi_{z_i z_j}(z^l) (\tau_i^l)^{1-\theta} (\tau_j^l)^{1-\theta} + u \pi_{z_i z_j}(z^h) (\tau_i^h)^{1-\theta} (\tau_j^h)^{1-\theta}}{(1+u)(1-\beta)} > 0$$

Thus,  $V$  has strictly increasing differences in  $(n_i^{*u}, n_j^{*u})$  for  $i, j \in \{1, \dots, N\}$  such that  $i \neq j$ . Differentiating (17) with respect to  $\tau_j^h$  for  $i \neq j$  gives,

$$V_{n_i^{*u} \tau_j^h} = (1-\theta) u (\tau_j^h)^{-\theta} \frac{\pi_{z_i z_j}(z^h) (\tau_i^h)^{1-\theta} n_j^{*u}}{(1+u)(1-\beta)} \leq 0$$

Thus,  $V$  has (weakly) decreasing differences in  $(n_i^{*u}, \tau_j^h)$  for  $i \neq j$ . Differentiating (17) with respect to  $\tau_i^h$  gives

$$V_{n_i^{*u} \tau_i^h} = (1-\theta) u (\tau_i^h)^{-\theta} \frac{\pi_{z_i z_i}(z^h) (\tau_i^h)^{1-\theta} n_i^{*u} + \pi_{z_i}(z^h)}{(1+u)(1-\beta)}.$$

Noting that  $\pi_{z_i z_i}(z) = \pi_{z_i}(z) \frac{1}{z_i} (\alpha_i \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} - 1)$ , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} V_{n_i^{*u} \tau_i^h} &= \frac{(1-\theta) u}{(1+u)(1-\beta)} (\tau_i^h)^{-\theta} \pi_{z_i}(z^h) \frac{1}{z_i^h} \left[ \left( \alpha_i \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} - 1 \right) (\tau_i^h)^{1-\theta} n_i^{*u} + z_i^h \right] \\ &= \frac{(1-\theta) u}{(1+u)(1-\beta)} (\tau_i^h)^{-\theta} \pi_{z_i}(z^h) \frac{1}{z_i^h} \left[ \left( \alpha_i \frac{\sigma-1}{\theta-1} \right) (\tau_i^h)^{1-\theta} n_i^{*u} + \bar{n}_i \right] < 0 \end{aligned}$$

Thus,  $V$  has strictly decreasing differences in  $(n_i^{*u}, \tau_i^h)$  for  $i$ . Standard results from monotone comparative statics (e.g., see Van Zandt (2002), Theorem 5) imply that any high-tariff vectors  $\tau^h$  and  $\tau^l$  such that  $\tau^h > \tau^l$ , we have  $n_i^{*u}(\tau^h) \leq n_i^{*u}(\tau^l)$  for all  $i$ . As certainty is just the special case where  $\tau^h = \tau^l$ , and  $\tau^h > \tau^l$  by definition, the result is immediate.

Having established that  $n_i^{*u} < n_i^{*c}$  (where  $n^{*c}$  is the optimal  $n^*$  under certainty), it follows that  $\tilde{\mu}_i^u < \tilde{\mu}_i^c$ . As  $G(\tilde{\mu}_i^u)$  is increasing, we have  $G(\tilde{\mu}_i^u) < G(\tilde{\mu}_i^c)$ .

Finally, we establish that for a given productivity, operating profit under certainty is greater than the expected value of operating profit under uncertainty. Note that for any  $n^*$  it must be that  $\pi(n^*, \tau^l) \geq \pi(n^*, \tau^h)$ , and thus, evaluated at  $n^{*u}$ , we have,

$$\pi(n^{*u}, \tau^l) \geq \frac{1}{1+u} \pi(n^{*u}, \tau^l) + \frac{u}{1+u} \pi(n^{*u}, \tau^h)$$

A sufficient condition is therefore,  $\pi(n^{*c}, \tau^l) \geq \pi(n^{*u}, \tau^l)$ , where  $n^{*c}$  is the optimal  $n^*$  under certainty. As  $n^{*c}$  maximizes (8), it must be that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\pi(n^{*c}, \tau^l)}{1-\beta} - \int_0^1 K n_i^{*c} di &\geq \frac{\pi(n^{*u}, \tau^l)}{1-\beta} - \int_0^1 K n_i^{*u} di \\ \frac{\pi(n^{*c}, \tau^l)}{1-\beta} - \frac{\pi(n^{*u}, \tau^l)}{1-\beta} &\geq \int_0^1 K (n_i^{*c} - n_i^{*u}) di \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the sufficient condition holds if and if  $\int_0^1 K (n_i^{*c} - n_i^{*u}) di \geq 0$ , which must be true given  $n_i^{*u} < n_i^{*c}$ . QED.

## A.5 Proof of Proposition 1

Taking the ratio of (20) to (12) gives

$$m_i^{*u}/m_i^{*c} = \frac{\pi^u(z^l)}{\pi^c(z)} \cdot \left( \frac{n_i^{*u}}{\bar{n}_i + n_i^{*u} (\tau_i^l)^{1-\theta}} / \frac{n_i^{*c}}{\bar{n}_i + n_i^{*c} (\tau_i^l)^{1-\theta}} \right)$$

Lemma 1 established that  $n_i^{*u} \geq n_i^{*c}$  and the proof showed that,  $\pi^u(z^l) \leq \pi^c(z^l)$ . Thus,  $m_i^{*u}/m_i^{*c} \leq 1$ . QED.

## A.6 Three State Model

Our model includes only downside risk (i.e., a positive probability of transitioning to a less favorable state than the current one). In many irreversible investment problems, this focus is without loss of generality, because of the “bad news principle” (Bernanke, 1983): when firms can wait and see before making investments then only the expected severity of bad news matters. Here we confirm the applicability of this principle to our setting.

Consider an alternative model with three states: the current state  $l$ , and two absorbing states,  $h$  and  $g$ , where  $\tau^h > \tau^l > \tau^g$ . Let  $\gamma$  denote the probability of switching from the current state, and let  $\varpi$  denote the probability of  $g$  conditional on switching.

For any absorbing state  $s$  and “legacy” vector of imported varieties  $n^*$ , the optimal vector



of imported varieties is:

$$\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^s | n^*) = \max \{ \tilde{\mu}_i(\tau^s), n_i^* \}$$

where

$$\tilde{\mu}(\tau^s) = \arg \max_{n_i^{*'}} \left[ \frac{\pi(n_i^{*'}, \tau^s)}{1 - \beta} - K \cdot \int_0^1 n_i^{*'} di \right]$$

Following the proof of lemma 1, the maximand above has strictly increasing differences in  $(n_i^{*'}, n_j^{*'})$  for all  $i \neq j$  and strictly decreasing differences in  $(n^{*'}, \tau)$  which implies that  $\tilde{\mu}(\tau^g) > \tilde{\mu}(\tau^l) > \tilde{\mu}(\tau^h)$ .

As in the main text, we denote the choice under uncertainty as  $n_i^{*u} = \max \{ \tilde{\mu}_i^u, \mu_i \}$ , where  $\tilde{\mu}^u$  is the unconstrained optimum of the full problem, beginning in state  $l$ . Note that in this problem,  $n^{*u}$  is the common legacy vector for states  $g$  and  $h$ . It follows that if  $\tilde{\mu}^u \in [\tilde{\mu}(\tau^h), \tilde{\mu}(\tau^l)]$ , then

$$\tilde{\mu}(\tau^g) > \tilde{\mu}^u \geq \tilde{\mu}(\tau^h)$$

and thus,  $\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^h | n_i^{*u}) = n_i^{*u}$  and  $\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^g | n_i^{*u}) = \max \{ \tilde{\mu}_i(\tau^g), \mu_i \}$ . Critically,  $\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^g | n_i^{*u})$  does not depend on  $\tilde{\mu}^u$ ; rather, it is only a function of the exogenous component of  $n_i^{*u}$ , namely,  $\mu_i$ . This implies that a marginal change  $\tilde{\mu}^u$  (the endogenous component of  $n_i^{*u}$ ) will not affect either  $\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^g | n_i^{*u})$  or the continuation payoff in state  $g$  (so the latter can be treated as exogenous in the full problem, and it drops out of the first-order condition, as we show below).

To formally show these points we first define the present discounted value of profits gross of initial sunk costs in state  $l$  recursively by,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(n^*, \tau^l) &= \pi(n^*, \tau^l) + \beta(1 - \gamma)\Pi(n^*, \tau^l) \\ &\quad + \beta\gamma \left[ (1 - \varpi)\hat{V}(\tau^h | n^*) + \varpi\hat{V}(\tau^g | n^*) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where for the extreme absorbing states  $s = g, h$  we have

$$\hat{V}(\tau^s | n^*) = \max_{n_i^{*'}} \left[ \frac{\pi(n_i^{*'}, \tau^s)}{1 - \beta} - K \cdot \int_0^1 (n_i^{*'} - n_i^*) \mathbf{1}_{[n_i^{*'} > n_i^*]} di \right]. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

The indicator function  $\mathbf{1}_{[n_i^{*'} > n_i^*]}$  is unity if varieties are added beyond those from state  $l$  and zero otherwise.

Solving (A.1) and subtracting the initial sunk costs yields the firm's initial state objective function—it maximizes:

$$\begin{aligned} V(n^*, \tau^l) &= \frac{1}{(1 + u)} \frac{\pi(n^*, \tau^l)}{(1 - \beta)} - K \cdot \int_0^1 (n_i^* - \mu_i) di \\ &\quad + \frac{u}{(1 + u)} \left[ (1 - \varpi)\hat{V}(\tau^h | n^*) + \varpi\hat{V}(\tau^g | n^*) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

subject to  $n_i^* \geq \mu_i$ . Note that  $\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^h | n_i^{*u}) = n_i^{*u}$  and  $\hat{n}_i^* (\tau^g | n_i^{*u}) = \max \{ \tilde{\mu}_i(\tau^g), \mu_i \}$  implies,

$$\begin{aligned}
V(n^*, \tau^l) &= \frac{1}{(1+u)} \frac{\pi(n^*, \tau^l)}{(1-\beta)} - K \cdot \int_0^1 (n_i^* - \mu_i) di + \frac{u(1-\varpi)}{(1+u)} \frac{\pi(n^*, \tau^h)}{(1-\beta)} \\
&+ \frac{u\varpi}{(1+u)} \left[ \frac{\pi(\max\{\tilde{\mu}(\tau^g), \mu\}, \tau^s)}{1-\beta} - K \cdot \int_0^1 (\max\{\tilde{\mu}_i(\tau^g), \mu_i\} - n_i^*) di \right] \quad (\text{A.4})
\end{aligned}$$

The first-order condition for  $n_i^* > \mu_i$  is thus

$$0 = \frac{1}{(1+u)} \frac{\pi_{n_i^*}^l}{(1-\beta)} - K + \frac{u(1-\varpi)}{(1+u)} \frac{\pi_{n_i^*}^h}{(1-\beta)} + \frac{u\varpi}{(1+u)} K$$

Letting  $u' = u(1-\varpi)$ , the first-order condition becomes

$$K = \frac{1}{(1+u')} \frac{\pi_{n_i^*}^l}{(1-\beta)} + \frac{u'}{(1+u')} \frac{\pi_{n_i^*}^h}{(1-\beta)}$$

which is the same first-order condition as in the two-state model in the main text with  $u' < u$  if  $\varpi > 0$  since the probability of the worst case scenario is lower. Moreover, the solution to this problem is such that  $\tilde{\mu}^u \in [\tilde{\mu}(\tau^h), \tilde{\mu}(\tau^l)]$ . Hence the addition of a third state more favorable than the current state has no effect on our results, it simply changes the interpretation as described in the text.

## A.7 Derivation of Approximations

We wish to approximate  $E_\mu \ln(m_i^{*u})$  and  $E_\mu \ln(\pi^l)$  around  $(\tau_0, \bar{n}_0, \varphi_0)$ . We start with

$$E_\mu \ln(m_i^{*u}) = \ln \alpha (\sigma - 1) + \ln \pi^l + G(\tilde{\mu}_i) \ln \left( \frac{\tilde{\mu}_i}{\rho_i^l + \tilde{\mu}_i} \right) + \int_{\tilde{\mu}_i}^\infty \ln \left( \frac{\mu}{\rho_i^l + \mu} \right) d\mu$$

and  $\tilde{\mu}_i^u = (1 - \psi_i) \kappa \pi^l U - \psi_i (\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l) - \rho_i^l$ . Differentiating gives,

$$dE_\mu \ln(m_i^{*u}) = d \ln(\pi^l) + G(\tilde{\mu}_0) (1 - \tilde{s}_0^*) (d \ln(\tilde{\mu}_i) - d \ln \rho_i^l) - \delta_0 d \ln \rho_i^l$$

and differentiating  $\tilde{\mu}_i^u$  gives,

$$d \ln(\tilde{\mu}_i^u) = \left( \frac{\alpha \kappa \pi_0}{\alpha \kappa \pi_0 - \rho_0} \right) d \ln(\pi^l U) - d \psi_i \left( \frac{\alpha \kappa \pi_0}{\alpha \kappa \pi_0 - \rho_0} \right) - d \ln \rho_i^l \left( \frac{\rho_0}{\alpha \kappa \pi_0 - \rho_0} \right)$$

Recall that,

$$\psi_i = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{u}{1+u} \frac{4\kappa\pi^h (\rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)}{(\kappa\pi^l U + \rho_i^h - \rho_i^l)^2} \right)^{1/2}$$

And thus  $d\psi_i$  evaluated at  $(\tau_0, \bar{n}_0, \varphi_0)$  is

$$d\psi_i = \frac{u}{1+u} \frac{\rho_0}{\alpha\kappa\pi_0} d\ln\left(\frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l}\right)$$

Using  $d\psi_i$  and  $\tilde{s}_0^* = \frac{\alpha\kappa\pi_0 - \rho_0}{\alpha\kappa\pi_0}$  in  $d\ln(\tilde{\mu}_i^u)$  produces,

$$d\ln(\tilde{\mu}_i) = \frac{1}{\tilde{s}_0^*} d\ln(\pi^l U) - \frac{1 - \tilde{s}_0^*}{\tilde{s}_0^*} \left[ d\ln\rho_i^l + \frac{u}{1+u} \left( d\ln\frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l} \right) \right] \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Using (A.5) and simplifying gives the approximation,

$$E_\mu \ln(m_i^{*u}) \approx E_\mu \ln(m_0^{*u}) + \ln\left(\frac{\pi^l}{\pi_0}\right) + \xi_0 \ln\left(\frac{\pi^l U}{\pi_0}\right) - (\xi_0 + \delta_0) \ln\left(\frac{\rho_i^l}{\rho_0}\right) - \xi_0 (1 - \tilde{s}_0^*) \frac{u}{1+u} \ln\left(\frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l}\right) \quad (\text{A.6})$$

If we were only interested in the effects of own current tariff and own TPU, then (A.6) would suffice. However, to obtain effects of aggregate tariffs and TPU, we need to unpack  $\ln(\pi^l)$  and  $\ln(\pi^l U)$ . Taking derivatives gives,

$$d\ln(\pi^l) = d\ln(\varphi^{\sigma-1}) + \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \int_0^1 dE_\mu \ln z_i^l di \quad (\text{A.7})$$

$$d\ln(\pi^l U) = d\ln(\varphi^{\sigma-1}) + \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \left\{ \frac{1}{1+u} \int_0^1 dE_\mu \ln z_i^l di + \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 dE_\mu \ln z_i^h di \right\} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

from which we get,

$$d\ln(U) = \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 (dE_\mu \ln z_i^h - dE_\mu \ln z_i^l) di$$

For  $s = l, h$ , we have

$$dE_\mu \ln z_i^s = d\ln(\bar{n}_i) + \left[ \frac{\tilde{\mu}_i}{\rho_i^s + \tilde{\mu}_i} (d\ln\tilde{\mu}_i - d\ln\rho_i^s) G(\tilde{\mu}_i) - \left( \int_{\ln\tilde{\mu}_i}^\infty \frac{\mu}{\rho_i^s + \mu} g(\mu) d\mu \right) d\ln\rho_i^s \right]$$

which valuated at  $(\tau_0, \bar{n}_0, \varphi_0)$  becomes

$$dE_\mu \ln z_i^s = d\ln(\bar{n}_i) + \tilde{s}_0^* G(\tilde{\mu}_0) (d\ln\tilde{\mu}_i) - E_\mu(s_0^*) (d\ln\rho_i^s) \quad (\text{A.9})$$

where  $E_\mu(s_0^*) = (1 - \delta_0) - (1 - \tilde{s}_0^*) G(\tilde{\mu}_0)$ . Hence, we can already obtain an approximation for  $\ln(U)$ :

$$\ln(U) \approx -\frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \frac{u}{1+u} E_\mu(s_0^*) \int_0^1 \ln\left(\frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l}\right) di \quad (\text{A.10})$$

Integrating (A.9) over  $i$  and taking the weighted average over the two possible states gives,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1+u} \int_0^1 dE_\mu \ln z_i^l di + \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 dE_\mu \ln z_i^h di &= d \ln (\bar{n}_i) + \tilde{s}_0^* G(\tilde{\mu}_0) \int_0^1 d \ln \tilde{\mu}_i di \\ &\quad - E_\mu (s_0^*) \left( \int_0^1 d \ln \rho_i^l di + \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 d \ln \left( \frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l} \right) di \right) \end{aligned}$$

Substituting this expression into (A.8) gives,

$$d \ln (\pi^l U) = d \ln (\varphi^{\sigma-1}) + \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \left\{ \int_0^1 d \ln (\bar{n}_i) di + \tilde{s}_0^* G(\tilde{\mu}_0) \int_0^1 d \ln \tilde{\mu}_i di \right\} \quad (\text{A.11})$$

$$- \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} E_\mu (s_0^*) \left( \int_0^1 d \ln \rho_i^l di + \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 d \ln \left( \frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l} \right) di \right) \quad (\text{A.12})$$

Integration of (A.5) over all  $i$ , gives,

$$\int_0^1 d \ln \tilde{\mu}_i di = \frac{1}{\tilde{s}_0^*} d \ln (\pi^l U) - \frac{1 - \tilde{s}_0^*}{\tilde{s}_0^*} \left[ \int_0^1 d \ln \rho_i^l di + \frac{u}{1+u} \left( \int_0^1 d \ln \left( \frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l} \right) di \right) \right]$$

Substituting this expression into (A.11) allows us to approximate  $\ln (\pi^l U)$  as:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \left( \frac{\pi^l U}{\pi_0} \right) &\approx \Theta \left[ (\sigma-1) \ln \left( \frac{\varphi}{\varphi_0} \right) + \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} \int_0^1 \ln \left( \frac{\bar{n}_i}{\bar{n}_0} \right) di \right] \\ &\quad - \Theta \frac{\alpha(\sigma-1)}{\theta-1} (1 - \delta_0) \left( \int_0^1 \ln \left( \frac{\rho_i^l}{\rho_0} \right) di + \frac{u}{1+u} \int_0^1 \ln \left( \frac{\rho_i^h}{\rho_i^l} \right) di \right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.13})$$

Using (A.13) and (A.10) in  $\ln \left( \frac{\pi^l}{\pi_0} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{\pi^l U}{\pi_0} \right) - \ln (U)$ , gives the approximation for  $\ln (\pi^l)$  in the main text, and using using (A.13) and (A.10) in (A.6) produces equation (22) in the main text.

## B Data and Estimation Appendix

### B.1 Data sources and definitions of main variables

- *Tariff* ( $\ln \tau_{it}$ ) Log of 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rate in the HS6 product  $i$  in each year  $t$ , 2000-2006. HS6 codes are concorded to the 1996 version. Source: TRAINS via WITS except when missing (2002 for which we use WTO data).
- *Tariff Risk* ( $\ln \tau_{ih} - \ln \tau_{it}$ ) where  $\tau_{it}$  is 1 plus the Chinese average MFN tariff rate in the HS6 product  $i$  and  $\tau_{ih}$  is the threat tariff factor: the historical mean in each  $i$  product in 1992-1999 (baseline) or the maximum of  $i$  in 1992-199 (robustness).
- *Imports*: log of Chinese ordinary (non-processing) import value in a firm-HS6-year. Source: Chinese Customs.
- *Import Indicator* ( $1(m_{ift} > 0)$ ): Chinese ordinary (non-processing) import dummy equal to 1 if a firm imports an intermediate HS6 and 0 otherwise in each year, 2000-2006. Used to construct adoption variable. Source: Chinese Customs.
- *Post Indicator* ( $1_{wto}$ ): Post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise.
- *SOEs*: State-owned enterprises. Source: Chinese Customs.
- *Manufacturing Firms*: Firm in Chinese Census with CIC industrial codes from 13-43 matched to customs data using their names, zip codes and telephone numbers. Source: Chinese Customs and production data from the Chinese Bureau of Statistics.
- *Cic4*: 4-digit Chinese industry classification. Source: Chinese firm level production data from the Chinese Bureau of Statistics.
- *Section*: UN defined "sections", which are coherent groups of HS-2 industries, as described in <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/HS>. Source: United Nations.
- *Intermediates*: Product categories based on UN BEC classification. Source: UN BEC classification.

### B.2 Derivation of quantification equation (40)

Start with (22) and define the structural parameters for each variable as  $b_\tau \equiv -(\theta - 1)(\delta_0 + \xi_0)$ ;  $b_h \equiv -(\theta - 1)(1 - \tilde{s}_0^*)\xi_0 \frac{u}{1+u}$ ;  $\bar{b}_\tau \equiv -\alpha(\sigma - 1)\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0)(1 + \xi_0)$ ;  $\bar{b}_h \equiv -\alpha(\sigma - 1)[\Theta_0(1 - \delta_0)(1 + \xi_0) - E_\mu(s_0^*)] \frac{u_i}{1+u_i}$

$$E_\mu \ln(m_{if,t}^{*u}) \approx \Phi + \Phi_f + \Phi_i + b_\tau \ln \frac{\tau_{i,t}^l}{\tau_0} + b_h \ln \frac{\tau_{i,t}^h}{\tau_i^l} + \bar{b}_\tau \int_f \ln \frac{\tau_{i,t}^l}{\tau_0} + \bar{b}_h \int_f \ln \frac{\tau_{i,t}^h}{\tau_i^l},$$

where we allow for firms in different industries to have different technologies and thus average policies, as reflected in  $\int_f$ . Around the approximation point the only time-varying coefficient is  $\bar{b}_h$ , via  $u_t$ . All other including the fixed effect terms are constant and thus the difference over a given  $if$  between post and pre is

$$\begin{aligned}
E_\mu \ln \frac{m_{if}^{*u}(u_{wto}, \tau_{i,wto}^l)}{m_{if}^{*u}(u_{pre}, \tau_{i,pre}^l)} &= b_\tau \ln \frac{\tau_{i,wto}^l}{\tau_0} - b_\tau \ln \frac{\tau_{i,pre}^l}{\tau_0} + b_h^{wto} \ln \frac{\tau_{i,wto}^h}{\tau_{i,wto}^l} - b_h^{pre} \ln \frac{\tau_{i,pre}^h}{\tau_{i,pre}^l} + \Delta \Pi_{f,t} \\
&= (b_{h,wto} - b_{h,pre}) \cdot r_{i,pre} + (b_\tau - b_{h,wto}) \cdot \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i + \Delta \Pi_f \\
&= (\Delta \beta_h / h) \cdot r_{i,pre} + (\beta_{\tau,wto} - \beta_{h,wto}) \cdot \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i \\
&\quad + (\Delta \bar{\beta}_h / h) \cdot \int_f r_{i,pre} + (\bar{\beta}_{\tau,wto} - \bar{\beta}_{h,wto}) \cdot \int_f \Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i
\end{aligned}$$

where in the first line  $\Pi_{f,t} \equiv \bar{b}_\tau \int_f \ln \left( \frac{\tau_{i,t}^l}{\tau_0} \right) + \bar{b}_h \int_f \ln \left( \frac{\tau_{i,t}^h}{\tau_{i,t}^l} \right)$  and  $\Delta \Pi_f$  the difference over time. The second line uses the relative price definition and  $\Delta \ln \bar{\tau}_i = \ln (\tau_{i,wto}^l / \tau_{i,pre}^l)$  as well as the constant threat level over time,  $\ln \tau_{i,t}^h = h \ln \tau_i^h + (1-h) \ln \tau$ , and defined risk  $r_{i,pre} \equiv \ln \tau_{i,t}^h - \ln \bar{\tau}_{i,pre}$ , and simplifies. The last line applies the same steps to the uses the definitions of the terms in  $\Delta \Pi_f$  after noting that in this approximation the set of inputs  $i$  is constant.

**Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables in Main Regressions**

	N	Mean	SD
<b>I. Firm-product Intermediate Imports All (Tables 2, 3, 6, 7)</b>			
Imports (ln)	4,466,183	7.764	2.950
Tariff Risk-Pre	909,120	0.071	0.048
Tariff Risk-Post	3,557,063	0.119	0.067
Tariff-Pre	909,120	0.121	0.050
Tariff-Post	3,557,063	0.075	0.040
Tariff Risk-Pre(max)	909,120	0.167	0.106
Tariff Risk-Post(max)	3,557,063	0.216	0.121
<b>II. Firm-product Intermediate Imports Manufacturing (Table 10)</b>			
Imports (ln)	1,690,405	7.58	2.8
Tariff Risk-Pre	319,666	0.071	0.048
Tariff Risk-Post	1,370,739	0.118	0.066
Tariff-Pre	319,666	0.118	0.046
Tariff-Post	1,370,739	0.075	0.038
Mean Tariff Risk-Post	1,370,739	0.115	0.018
Mean Tariff-Post	1,370,739	0.079	0.008
Imports (ln) High productivity	703,181	7.809	2.811
Imports (ln) Low productivity	207,467	7.305	2.744
<b>III. Firm-product New Imported Intermediate Adoption (Table 11)</b>			
New Adoption	29,379,409	0.018	0.132
New Adoption High Productivity	9,843,580	0.024	0.152
New Adoption Low Productivity	9,480,391	0.011	0.106
Tariff Risk-Pre	29,379,409	0.073	0.051
Tariff-Pre	29,379,409	0.127	0.057
Tariff-Post	29,379,409	0.082	0.041

Notes: Imports are (ln) of \$US of each intermediate HS6 good imported by individual firms in a given year. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Tariff Risk (max) replaces the mean with the max in a given HS6 in 1992-1999. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. High productivity defined as firms with real output/worker above the respective CIC industry median in the pre-WTO period, low otherwise.

**Table 2. Intermediates Import Value**  
Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

	1	2	3	4
Tariff Risk			-8.029*** [0.543]	-7.844*** [0.538]
Tariff Risk×Post			3.983*** [0.592]	3.985*** [0.593]
Tariffs	-6.074*** [0.473]	-5.941*** [0.475]	-3.308*** [0.519]	-3.182*** [0.508]
Tariffs×Post	-1.986*** [0.581]	-1.943*** [0.591]	-4.233*** [0.620]	-4.194*** [0.613]
Fixed Effects	f+t+s	ft+s	f+t+s	ft+s
N	4,551,009	4,466,183	4,551,009	4,466,183
R <sup>2</sup>	0.286	0.329	0.293	0.335

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year).



**Table 3. Intermediates Import Value - Robustness to Firm and Product Sample**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

<i>Firm sample</i>	All			
	Any		Pre and Post	
	1	2	3	4
Tariff Risk	-7.844*** [0.538]	-8.010*** [0.651]	-5.640*** [0.527]	-5.894*** [0.645]
Tariff Risk×Post	3.985*** [0.593]	3.358*** [0.727]	2.893*** [0.598]	2.932*** [0.732]
Tariffs	-3.182*** [0.508]	-3.433*** [0.657]	-2.103*** [0.522]	-1.650** [0.655]
Tariffs×Post	-4.194*** [0.613]	-3.596*** [0.790]	-3.631*** [0.642]	-3.324*** [0.793]
Fixed Effects	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s
N	4,466,183	1,178,469	1,665,714	537,922
R <sup>2</sup>	0.335	0.333	0.286	0.301

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year). Pre and post period indicates that the f-HS6 pair was imported in at least one year pre and one post accession. Manufacturing firm subsample: those matched to production census.

**Table 4. Intermediates Import Value - SOE and non-SOE Firm Samples**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

	State Owned		Non-State Owned	
	1	2	3	4
Tariff Risk	-11.92*** [0.711]	-11.52*** [0.695]	-5.777*** [0.483]	-5.610*** [0.484]
Tariff Risk×Post	5.312*** [0.750]	5.201*** [0.735]	2.738*** [0.541]	2.716*** [0.551]
Tariffs	-4.836*** [0.671]	-4.719*** [0.656]	-2.020*** [0.463]	-1.767*** [0.454]
Tariffs×Post	-5.792*** [0.791]	-5.685*** [0.776]	-4.058*** [0.575]	-4.160*** [0.572]
Fixed Effects	f+t+s	ft+s	f+t+s	ft+s
N	1,171,481	1,160,895	3,379,426	3,305,288
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.29	0.305	0.348

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Subsamples defined based on the firm ownership information in Chinese customs data. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year).

**Table 5. Intermediates Import Value - Variation by Firm Export Status**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

	Never Exporters		Always Exporters		New Exporters	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Tariff Risk	-5.569*** [0.528]	-5.237*** [0.523]	-8.255*** [0.548]	-8.112*** [0.549]	-7.187*** [0.624]	-6.870*** [0.589]
Tariff Risk×Post	2.443*** [0.609]	2.209*** [0.607]	3.629*** [0.588]	3.647*** [0.598]	3.750*** [0.692]	3.611*** [0.667]
Tariffs	-1.639*** [0.473]	-1.451*** [0.465]	-3.550*** [0.536]	-3.399*** [0.528]	-2.668*** [0.568]	-2.171*** [0.543]
Tariffs×Post	-3.943*** [0.622]	-3.860*** [0.625]	-4.420*** [0.636]	-4.481*** [0.630]	-4.319*** [0.712]	-4.722*** [0.693]
Fixed Effects	f+t+s	ft+s	f+t+s	ft+s	f+t+s	ft+s
N	485,104	462,189	1,612,633	1,602,324	295,458	290,141
R <sup>2</sup>	0.481	0.513	0.228	0.27	0.287	0.342

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Subsamples defined based on firm export status from 2000-2006: never, always, and new exporters (in post-WTO). Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year).

**Table 6. Intermediates Import Value - Robustness to Export TPU**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

<i>Firm sample</i>	All		Manufacturing	
<i>Input sample</i>	All	Continuing Exporter country- HS6	All	Continuing Exporter country- HS6-manuf. sector
	1	2	3	4
Tariff Risk	-7.844*** [0.538]	-7.766*** [0.562]	-5.640*** [0.527]	-5.795*** [0.794]
Tariff Risk×Post	3.985*** [0.593]	3.889*** [0.619]	2.893*** [0.598]	3.179*** [0.888]
Tariffs	-3.182*** [0.508]	-3.225*** [0.536]	-2.103*** [0.522]	-2.148*** [0.804]
Tariffs×Post	-4.194*** [0.613]	-4.117*** [0.647]	-3.631*** [0.642]	-3.890*** [0.982]
Fixed Effects	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s
N	4,466,183	4,223,751	1,665,714	548,024
R <sup>2</sup>	0.335	0.335	0.286	0.355

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year). "Continuing Exporter country-HS6" includes exporter country-HS6 pairs with positive imports in all sample years. "Continuing Exporter country-HS - manuf. sector" includes exporter country-HS6 pairs with positive imports in all sample years for firm's CIC industry. Manufacturing firm subsample: those matched to production census.

**Table 7. Intermediates Import Value - Robustness to Alternative Risk Measure**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)		
Tariff Threat	Baseline Historical Avg	Alternative Measure Historical Max
	1	2
Tariff Risk	-7.844*** [0.538]	-3.760*** [0.237]
Tariff Risk×Post	3.985*** [0.593]	1.108*** [0.269]
Tariffs	-3.182*** [0.508]	-2.946*** [0.510]
Tariffs×Post	-4.194*** [0.613]	-3.180*** [0.614]
Fixed Effects	ft+s	ft+s
N	4,466,183	4,466,183
R <sup>2</sup>	0.335	0.338

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured in column 2 as  $\ln(\tau_{\max}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\max}$  is (1 plus) Chinese maximum MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year).

**Table 8. Import Value - Intermediates vs. Consumption Goods**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

<i>Firm sample</i>	All		Manufacturing		
	<i>BEC classification</i>	Intermediate	Consumption	Intermediate	Consumption
	1	2	3	4	
Tariff Risk	-7.844*** [0.538]	-1.400*** [0.519]	-5.640*** [0.527]	0.137 [0.951]	
Tariff Risk×Post	3.985*** [0.593]	1.909*** [0.530]	2.893*** [0.598]	1.271 [0.975]	
Tariffs	-3.182*** [0.508]	-1.005** [0.415]	-2.103*** [0.522]	-0.782 [0.744]	
Tariffs×Post	-4.194*** [0.613]	-2.457*** [0.468]	-3.631*** [0.642]	-2.137*** [0.805]	
Fixed Effects	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s	
N	4,466,183	738,919	1,665,714	149,668	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.335	0.425	0.286	0.443	

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year). Manufacturing firm subsample: those matched to production census.

**Table 9. Intermediates Import Value - High vs. Low Initial Productivity**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln); Sample: pre and post HS6-firm

<i>Firm productivity sample</i>	High	Low	Pooled		
	All	All	Low	High-Low Diff.	High-Low Diff.
<i>Coefficient</i>	1	2	3		4
Tariff Risk	-5.946*** [0.666]	-6.061*** [0.705]	-6.005*** [0.682]	0.0275 [0.397]	-0.189 [0.367]
Tariff Risk×Post	3.216*** [0.757]	2.405*** [0.789]	2.270*** [0.769]	0.995** [0.452]	0.820** [0.417]
Tariffs	-1.680** [0.692]	-1.088 [0.677]	-1.353** [0.665]	-0.26 [0.427]	-0.352 [0.386]
Tariffs×Post	-3.889*** [0.846]	-2.634*** [0.823]	-2.499*** [0.803]	-1.439*** [0.537]	-0.869* [0.488]
Fixed Effects	ft+s	ft+s	ft+s		ft+hs6t
N	337,276	142,090	479,366		476,697
R <sup>2</sup>	0.263	0.358	0.295		0.415

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year), hs6t denotes hs6 by year. All observations are for firm-HS6 pairs imported in at least one year pre and one post accession. Manufacturing firms matched to production census: Productivity measured by real output/worker in pre WTO period; High subsample if above median productivity of all firms within the same CIC industry, low otherwise.

**Table 10. Intermediates Import Value - Profit Effects**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Imports (ln)

<i>Firm productivity sample</i>	All		All	High	Low
	Any		Pre and post	Pre and post	Pre and post
	1	2	3	4	5
Tariff Risk	-5.826*** [0.528]	-5.856*** [0.531]	-5.947*** [0.572]	-5.969*** [0.602]	-5.973*** [0.642]
Tariff Risk×Post	2.964*** [0.586]	3.006*** [0.593]	2.981*** [0.642]	3.090*** [0.676]	2.510*** [0.711]
Tariffs	-2.405*** [0.528]	-2.425*** [0.530]	-2.445*** [0.599]	-2.480*** [0.634]	-1.993*** [0.660]
Tariffs×Post	-3.467*** [0.641]	-3.455*** [0.645]	-3.193*** [0.722]	-3.478*** [0.765]	-2.471*** [0.781]
Mean Tariff Risk×Post		2.043*** [0.317]	2.183*** [0.741]	2.325*** [0.697]	1.922* [1.123]
Mean Tariffs(ln)×Post		-1.523** [0.635]	-2.757* [1.564]	-2.878* [1.645]	-2.363* [1.381]
Fixed Effects	f+t+s	f+t+s	f+t+s	f+t+s	f+t+s
N	1,690,405	1,690,405	975,421	703,181	207,467
R <sup>2</sup>	0.246	0.246	0.234	0.208	0.311
<b>Accession effects if 1 lp risk and 1lp tariff reduction for all inputs</b>					
Commitment Substitution	6.42	6.46	<b>6.17</b>	6.56	4.98
Commitment Complementarity		3.56	<b>4.93</b>	5.20	4.28
Tariff Substitution	3.00	3.03	<b>2.67</b>	3.08	1.00

Notes: Dependent variable imports (ln) are Chinese import values defined at the firm-hs6-year level. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year). Manufacturing firm subsample: those matched to production census. Mean Tariff Risk/tariff: average Tariff Risk/tariff of all products imported by any firm in the CIC that the firm produces in. Pre and post requires the imported inputs used in a given CIC to have been imported in at least one period before and one after. Productivity measured by real output/worker in pre WTO period; High subsample if above median productivity of all firms within the same CIC industry, low otherwise. Computation of the accession effects based on the regression coefficients described in quantification section. The values of h used to compute commitment effects are obtained as described in the text.



**Table 11. New Imported Intermediate Adoption**  
 Dependent Variable = 1 if firm-HS6 import =0 pre and >0 in post

<i>Firm sample</i>	All manufacturing	Productivity sample (pre Y/L)	High pre Y/L	Low pre Y/L
	1	2	3	4
Pre Tariff Risk	0.0727*** [0.0188]	0.0641*** [0.0174]	0.0826*** [0.0229]	0.0449*** [0.0120]
Pre Tariffs	0.0176* [0.0093]	-0.0119 [0.0178]	-0.0201 [0.0236]	-0.0034 [0.0119]
Post Tariffs	-0.0513** [0.0221]	-0.00809 [0.0202]	-0.00587 [0.0268]	-0.0106 [0.0138]
Fixed Effects	f+s	f+s	f+s	f+s
N	29,379,406	19,323,970	9,843,579	9,480,391
R <sup>2</sup>	0.078	0.078	0.087	0.055

Notes: Dependent Variable=1 if firm-HS6 import =0 pre and import>0 in post for subsample of products any firm in the same CIC as f imported in at least one year. Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level. Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in current year. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section. Manufacturing firm subsample: those matched to production census. Productivity subsamples: those firms with census data that allow computing real output per worker (Y/L).

**Table 12. Quantification of Accession Effects on Imported Intermediate Growth (lp)**

<i>Firm productivity sample</i>	All	High	Low
<b>Average Effect</b>	<b>92</b>	99	71
Commitment	79	83	66
Tariffs	13	15	5.0
<b>Aggregate Effect</b>	<b>65</b>	70	42
Commitment	49	52	37
Tariffs	16	18	4.9
<i>Weighted Risk 2000 (lp)</i>	<i>4.4</i>	<i>4.4</i>	<i>4.0</i>
<i>Weighted Tariff Change 2006-2000 (lp)</i>	<i>-5.9</i>	<i>-6.0</i>	<i>-4.9</i>

Notes: Computation of the accession effects based on the regression coefficients in Table 10 columns 3-5 as described in quantification section. Commitment includes substitution and complementarity effects. The average uses 7.1 lp for risk and -5 lp for tariff change for all specifications. Weighted risk uses firm-input import share in 2000 to weight pre accession risk in the respective sample. A similar weight is used for tariff changes. These are used to compute the aggregate effects. Productivity measured by real output/worker in pre WTO period; High subsample if above median productivity of all firms within the same CIC industry, low otherwise.

**Table 13. Firm Profit Effects from Intermediates**

<i>Dependent variable (ln):</i>	1	2
	Profits	Profits/Worker
Mean Tariff Risk×Post	0.174** [0.0781]	0.286*** [0.0640]
Mean Tariffs×Post	-0.334* [0.183]	-0.487*** [0.153]
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>f+t+s</b>	<b>f+t+s</b>
N	158,422	158,422
R <sup>2</sup>	0.866	0.814

Notes: Dependent variables in ln are Profits=sales-cost of goods sold, Profit/worker. Mean variables are defined as described in Table 8. Post is a post-WTO dummy that is equal to 1 for years since 2002, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year).

**Table A1. Dynamics of Chinese Imports, 2000-2006**

<i>Type of Imports Decomposition</i>	Ordinary + Processing	Ordinary (OI)							
	All	All		By good: Intermediates		By ownership: State-Owned		By trading type: Intermediaries	
		Value	Value	Share of OI +Processing	Value	Share of OI	Value	Share of OI	Value
	2000	225	133	59%	90	68%	72	54%	43
2001	266	164	62%	105	64%	89	54%	52	32%
2002	273	159	58%	102	64%	83	52%	49	31%
2003	413	250	61%	164	66%	119	48%	72	29%
2004	561	339	60%	230	68%	149	44%	93	27%
2005	660	386	58%	272	70%	168	44%	100	26%
2006	788	469	60%	329	70%	193	41%	111	24%

Notes: Values in billions US \$. Source Chinese Customs. Intermediates classified using the UN BEC classification. Firms are classified as intermediaries similarly to Ahn et al, 2010: if the name contains characters equivalent to "export", "import", "trade". The omitted categories in OI are (i) capital and final good (by good column); (ii) non-SOEs (by ownership column); (iii) non-intermediaries (by trading type column).

**Table A2. Intermediates Tariffs in 2000 and 2006 by Section — Summary Statistics**

Section	Import Share (2006)	Mean		Median		SD		C.V.		Min		Max		Obs.
		2000	2006	2000	2006	2000	2006	2000	2006	2000	2006	2000	2006	
1 Animals	0.001	0.14	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.06	0.63	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.41	0.18	38
2 Vegetables	0.027	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.72	0.95	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.50	114
3 Fats & Oils	0.012	0.21	0.12	0.18	0.10	0.08	0.04	0.36	0.37	0.08	0.05	0.34	0.22	37
4 Prepared Foodstuffs	0.006	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.10	0.78	0.80	0.04	0.03	0.50	0.45	52
5 Minerals	0.308	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.60	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.08	146
6 Chemicals	0.126	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.42	0.48	0.02	0.00	0.41	0.24	707
7 Plastics, Rubber & Articles	0.065	0.14	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.26	0.36	0.03	0.01	0.34	0.22	184
8 Hides, Leather, & Articles	0.004	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.06	0.04	0.41	0.38	0.05	0.05	0.26	0.18	51
9 Wood, Straw & Articles	0.015	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.51	0.89	0.01	0.00	0.18	0.15	70
10 Pulp, Paper & Articles	0.024	0.13	0.05	0.14	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.57	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.07	120
11 Textiles & Articles	0.010	0.18	0.08	0.18	0.10	0.06	0.03	0.34	0.33	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.17	500
12 Footwear, Headgear, other	0.001	0.20	0.17	0.22	0.18	0.04	0.03	0.22	0.18	0.14	0.13	0.26	0.22	10
13 Stone, Plaster, Cement, other	0.005	0.16	0.12	0.15	0.11	0.06	0.05	0.38	0.40	0.08	0.00	0.37	0.25	133
14 Precious stones, Metals, Jewellery,...	0.004	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.05	1.41	1.39	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.19	29
15 Base Metals & Articles	0.104	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.46	0.55	0.01	0.00	0.26	0.26	491
16 Machinery; Elec. Equip.; Electronics	0.244	0.11	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.46	0.69	0.01	0.00	0.34	0.30	273
17 Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels	0.033	0.19	0.08	0.22	0.09	0.12	0.06	0.65	0.67	0.02	0.00	0.53	0.26	43
18 Optical, Medical & other instruments	0.009	0.14	0.10	0.17	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.33	0.54	0.03	0.00	0.20	0.18	76
19 Arms and Ammunition	0.000	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.12	4
20 Miscellaneous Manufactures	0.002	0.20	0.14	0.20	0.18	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.47	0.10	0.00	0.22	0.22	34

Notes: Tariffs (ln) are 1 plus the Chinese statutory MFN tariff rates at the hs6-year level for UN BEC intermediates. Data sources described in Appendix B1.

**Table A3. Initial Tariff Risk and Import Growth 2000-2006 (Δln) by Section — Summary Statistics**

Section	Import Share (2006)	Mean		Median		SD		C.V.		Min		Max		Obs.
		Imports	Risk	Imports	Risk	Imports	Risk	Imports	Risk	Imports	Risk	Imports	Risk	
1 Animals	0.001	0.39	0.09	0.56	0.08	2.66	0.05	6.86	0.61	-5.90	0.00	6.84	0.19	38
2 Vegetables	0.027	1.17	0.08	1.11	0.07	2.46	0.06	2.11	0.80	-7.93	0.00	7.83	0.20	114
3 Fats & Oils	0.012	0.90	0.05	0.79	0.04	2.18	0.03	2.42	0.68	-2.05	0.01	6.54	0.13	37
4 Prepared Foodstuffs	0.006	0.52	0.07	1.16	0.06	2.52	0.03	4.83	0.50	-9.37	0.01	5.67	0.19	52
5 Minerals	0.308	1.69	0.07	1.41	0.06	2.13	0.05	1.26	0.77	-4.04	0.00	8.34	0.20	146
6 Chemicals	0.126	1.13	0.05	1.16	0.04	1.49	0.03	1.32	0.66	-5.15	0.00	8.66	0.31	707
7 Plastics, Rubber & Articles	0.065	1.32	0.06	1.41	0.05	1.26	0.03	0.96	0.48	-2.81	0.01	6.43	0.15	184
8 Hides, Leather, & Articles	0.004	1.85	0.10	1.62	0.10	1.65	0.05	0.89	0.57	-2.12	0.03	5.73	0.22	51
9 Wood, Straw & Articles	0.015	0.24	0.05	0.45	0.04	1.78	0.03	7.31	0.63	-2.91	0.00	6.19	0.12	70
10 Pulp, Paper & Articles	0.024	0.50	0.05	0.68	0.05	1.36	0.04	2.75	0.80	-3.13	0.00	4.92	0.19	120
11 Textiles & Articles	0.010	1.56	0.13	1.42	0.13	1.75	0.06	1.12	0.42	-3.34	0.00	8.90	0.24	500
12 Footwear, Headgear, other	0.001	2.12	0.22	2.50	0.22	1.59	0.04	0.75	0.18	-0.45	0.16	4.20	0.27	10
13 Stone, Plaster, Cement, other	0.005	0.93	0.09	1.07	0.08	1.26	0.04	1.35	0.48	-3.34	0.01	3.26	0.20	133
14 Precious stones, Metals, Jewellery,...	0.004	2.15	0.04	2.07	0.02	2.33	0.04	1.08	1.14	-3.27	0.00	9.73	0.12	29
15 Base Metals & Articles	0.104	1.53	0.05	1.44	0.03	1.72	0.05	1.12	1.01	-4.39	0.00	9.34	0.17	491
16 Machinery; Elec. Equip.; Electronics	0.244	0.98	0.05	1.20	0.04	1.34	0.04	1.36	0.81	-6.67	0.00	6.05	0.22	273
17 Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels	0.033	1.35	0.05	1.86	0.03	1.63	0.04	1.21	0.82	-3.88	0.00	3.86	0.13	43
18 Optical, Medical & other instruments	0.009	1.08	0.08	1.34	0.09	1.71	0.06	1.58	0.69	-5.62	0.00	3.81	0.21	76
19 Arms and Ammunition	0.000	0.78	0.18	0.30	0.17	7.40	0.01	9.45	0.05	-6.01	0.17	8.66	0.19	4
20 Miscellaneous Manufactures	0.002	0.93	0.15	0.97	0.17	0.94	0.05	1.01	0.33	-1.76	0.06	2.81	0.24	34

Notes: Initial Tariff Risk is measured as  $\ln(\tau_{\text{mean}}/\tau_t)$ , where  $\tau_{\text{mean}}$  is (1 plus) Chinese average MFN tariff rate during the pre-WTO period 1992-1999, and  $\tau_t$  is (1 plus) Chinese MFN tariff rate in 2000. UN BEC intermediates. Imports are in log changes. Data sources described in Appendix B1.

**Table A4. Manufacturing Firms Imported Intermediate Input Distribution (HS6)**

		2000		2005	
		Firm #	Fraction Manuf. Firms (%)	Firm #	Fraction Manuf. Firms (%)
	1	2,428	1.56	5,717	2.21
Intermediate	2-10	6,630	4.26	14,429	5.58
Input	11-100	7,726	4.97	12,720	4.92
Range	101+	264	0.17	471	0.18
	<i>Any</i>	<i>17,063</i>	<i>11.0</i>	<i>33,337</i>	<i>12.9</i>

Notes: Source authors matching of Chinese Customs and Manufacturing Census data. Intermediates classified using the UN BEC classification. The total number of manufacturing firms in the denominator is 155,497 and 258,403 in 2000 and 2005.

**Table A5. Firms' Imported Intermediate (HS-6) Statistics: Pre and Post; All and Continuing Firms**

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	N
<b>I. All Importing Manufacturing Firms</b>						
Pre	12.9	4	23.7	1	380	24,960
Post	12.8	4	22.4	1	453	107,591
<b>II. Importing Manufacturing Firms in 2000 and 2005</b>						
Pre	17.9	7	28.6	1	380	14,011
Post	19.5	8	27.9	1	453	41,670
<b>III. All Importing Firms</b>						
Pre	11.7	3	26.3	1	887	79,913
Post	11.0	3	24.2	1	973	332,498
<b>IV. Importing Firms in 2000 and 2005</b>						
Pre	18.3	7	34.2	1	887	33,230
Post	20.1	7	36.9	1	973	80,297

Notes: Source Chinese Customs for panels III, IV and match with Manufacturing Census data for remaining. Intermediates classified using the UN BEC classification. Years are 2000 and 2001 for pre and 2002-2006 for post.




**Table A6. Firm Intermediate Import Decision - Persistence**

Dependent Variable = Firm-HS6 Import Indicator

<i>Firm sample</i>	All				Manufacturing			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Lagged Import Indicator	0.130*** [0.00176]	0.118*** [0.00148]	0.130*** [0.00175]	0.116*** [0.00148]	0.176*** [0.00194]	0.160*** [0.00159]	0.176*** [0.00193]	0.158*** [0.00160]
Fixed Effects	ft+s	ft+hs6	ft+st	ft+hs6-t	ft+s	ft+hs6	ft+st	ft+hs6-t
N	15,887,012	15,886,999	15,887,012	15,886,997	6,548,287	6,548,273	6,548,287	6,547,967
R <sup>2</sup>	0.3	0.308	0.3	0.311	0.243	0.254	0.243	0.259


Notes: Dependent variable =1 if f-HS6 >0 at t, 0 otherwise for subsample of products f imported in at least one year. Standard errors clustered at the hs6-year level in parenthesis, with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. For fixed effects, f denotes firm, s denotes section, and t denotes time (year). Manufacturing firm subsample: those matched to production census.

**Figure 1. China's Average Statutory Import Tariffs (1985-2006)**




Notes. Simple average of MFN statutory rates over all products or intermediates (as defined by UN's Broad Economic Categories). Sources: Authors' calculations using UN TRAINS and WTO data for 1992-2006 (1995 interpolated); Lardy (2002, p. 34) for 1985, '88, '91, '92 (remaining interpolated). The Communist Party Congress discussed the Socialist Market Economy in 10/1992 and it became part of the Chinese constitution in 1993.

**Figure 2. Varieties of Inputs**




**Figure 3. Chinese Ordinary Imports and Intermediate Share**



Notes. Authors' calculations from Chinese Customs data. Ordinary imports (OI) identified by transaction identifiers; intermediate share uses UN BEC classification.

**Figure 4. WTO Reduction in Uncertainty vs. Status Quo (Dashed)**



Notes. Authors' calculations from baseline estimates assuming discount factor  $\beta = 0.85$ . See the text for further description.