Department of Economics
Advanced Topics in International Trade (econ 745)
Spring 2006
Course web page: www.wam.umd.edu/~Limão/econ745/econ745.html
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Instructor: Nuno Limão |
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Time and Location: Tu Th: 2-3:15 |
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4118F Tydings Hall, x57842 |
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4118C Tydings Hall |
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Off. hrs: Tu Th 11:00-12:00
or by appt. |
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This course has
two objectives. First, to analyze recent research on selected topics in trade
in order to identify dissertation topics. Second, to aid in your transition
from consumer to producer of research by critically presenting some of this
research yourself. In the first part of the course we analyze the theory and
evidence for alternative political economy models of trade policy and then
focus on the recent work on "pure" trade agreements and trade
agreements with non-trade objectives. The focus of the second part of the
course is mostly on empirical tests of trade theories and the effects of trade
on productivity, technological diffusion and growth. The final part addresses
the appropriate use of trade shocks as a source of identification to analyze
non-trade outcomes.
You
must have taken ECON 604 and either 622 or 624. I also highly recommend that you take ECON 742.
·
Presentations:
Each student is required to present at least twice during the semester (the
exact number will be 2 or three presentations depending on the number of
students enrolled). The presentations will last 20 minutes and should provide a
critical evaluation of the article chosen from the detailed reading list of
those denoted with “s*”.
·
Exercises:
There will be two empirical exercises. You will work in pairs for these.
·
Summary
papers: In order to benefit from the class all students must read the key
articles before class. Therefore I will require a 2 page summary of some of
those articles before each class. You need to do this 5 times during the
semester and you will be able to choose the topics from the articles marked
either “**” or “s*”.
·
Epilogue
presentations and reading list: The Epilogue aims to bring together various
parts of the syllabus and get you to think about their implications when using
trade shocks to study outcomes that are not immediately related to trade. Each
student must individually choose three papers that use trade related shocks
(e.g. world prices or trade volumes, policy or trade costs) to study any of the
following outcomes: wages, productivity, inequality, poverty or institutions
(e.g. labor standards, child labor, etc). At least one of the three papers must
be an example of a good use of a trade shock as an exogenous source of
identification and one a misuse. You will then pair up and choose two papers,
one of each, by April 11th. You will present and defend your choices
in the last classes. I can provide recent reviews if you need an initial guide.
·
The
final grade will be a weighted average of your presentations (30%),
summary papers (5%), exercises (20%), and final exam (45%). In exceptional
cases the final exam may be replaced with a paper on a topic related to the
class. This will be addressed on a
case-by-case basis and it is a privilege rather than a right.
Part I: Trade policy
1.1
The questions
1.2
Measuring trade policy
2.1
Theory
2.2
Evidence
3.1
The choice and use of inefficient redistribution policies
3.2
Anti-trade bias
4.1
Theory and practice of “pure” trade agreements
4.2
Theory and practice of trade agreements with non-trade objectives
4.3
Effects of Trade Agreements on Trade Policy: The Evidence
Part II: Trade
theory and evidence
1. Trade patterns, volume and composition
1.1
The questions
1.2
Comparative advantage models
1.3
Scale economies: evidence
1.4
Volume and composition of trade
2. Trade, productivity, technological diffusion and
growth
2.1
Theory
2.2
Cross-country evidence
2.3
Evidence on international knowledge/technology diffusion
2.4
Trade and productivity: Plant and firm level evidence
Epilogue
1. Trade shocks: uses and misuses as exogenous
variation for non-trade outcomes
1.1 Wages and productivity
1.2 Inequality and poverty
1.3 Institutions
The following books contain
background and supplemental material that may be useful. Some of them also
contain specific readings listed under each topic.
Bagwell,
Kyle and Robert Staiger. 2002. The
Economics of the World Trading System, MIT Press.
Feenstra, R.C. 2004. Advanced
International Trade, Theory and Evidence.
Grossman, Gene and E. Helpman. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
MIT Press.
Grossman,
G. and E. Helpman. 2001. Special Interest
Politics. MIT Press.
Grossman, Gene and K. Rogoff, eds. 1995. Handbook of International Economics, Vol
III, Elsevier.
Choi, K.E. and J. R. Harrigan. 2004. Handbook of International Trade, vol I.
Blackwell.
Helpman, Elhanan and Paul Krugman, Trade Policy and Market Structure, MIT 1989.
Hoekman,
B. and M. Kostecki. 2001. The political
economy of the world trading system : from GATT to WTO, 2nd ed,
Leamer, Edward. 1984. Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence, MIT.
Notes for the detailed reading list below
“*” Denotes a required reading. Summary papers
can cover these.
“S*” Denotes a required reading of an article
that I expect a student to present. Summary papers can cover these.
“ r ” Denotes a review. Some
are important enough and so required, they are marked as “*r”.
“ b ” Denotes background
material generally for the trade policy section.
References that are not
preceded by any of the marks above denote other interesting papers in the
topic.
The underscored titles
indicate online availability (for some of these you must access from the
campus).
Part I: Trade
policy
1.1 The questions
r Rodrik, D. 1995. "Political Economy of Trade Policy"
in Handbook v.III 1457-94.
r Staiger, R. 1995. "International Rules and Institutions
for Trade Policy" in Handbook v.III
1495-1551.
r Trebilcock, M.J. and Robert
Howse. 1999. The regulation of international trade, 2nd ed. Routledge. Chs. 15
and 16.
1.2 Measuring trade policy
*Anderson, J. and J.P. Neary. 2005. Chs 2, 4.
(chs. 12, 13 recommended)
Kee, H.L., A. Nicita
and M. Olarreaga. 2004. “Estimating
Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Indices,”cepr dp 4669.
Pritchett, L. 1996.
"Measuring Outward
Orientation in LDCs: Can it be Done?" Journal of Development Economics, 49(2), 307-335.
bWTO
country trade policy reviews
2.1 Theory
*r
Helpman, E. 1997. “Politics and Trade
Policy,” in D.M. Kreps and K.F. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and
Econometrics: Theory and Applications (
*r Rodrik, D. 1995. "Political Economy of Trade Policy"
in Handbook v.III 1457-94
2.1.1
Demand,
supply and median voter models of protection.
Hillman, A. L.
1982. "Declining
Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives." American Economic Review 72(5):
1180-1187.
Mayer, W. 1984. "Endogenous
Tariff Formation." American
Economic Review 74(5): 970-985.
2.1.2
Political
contributions and electoral models of protection
*Grossman, G. and E.
Helpman. 1994. “Protection
for Sale." American Economic
Review, 84: 833-850.
*Mitra, D. 1999. "Endogenous
lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long- run model of trade policy
determination." American
Economic Review 89(5): 1116-1134.
Grossman,
G. and E. Helpman.
2004. “A Protectionist Bias in
Majoritarian Politics.” NBER WP 11014.
Grossman, G. and E.
Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics.
MIT Press. Chs. 7,8,10.
2.2 Evidence
*Bandyopadhyay, Usree and Gawande, Kishore. 2000. “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the
Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection.” Review of Economics and Statistics
82(1), 139-52.
s*Goldberg, P. K. and G. Maggi. 1999. "Protection
for sale: An empirical investigation." American Economic Review 89(5): 1135-1155.
s*Trefler, D. 1993. "Trade
Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection - an Econometric Study
of United-States Import Policy." Journal
of Political Economy 101(1): 138-160.
r Gawande, K. and P.
Krishna. Forthcoming. "The Political Economy of
Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches" Handbook of International
Trade.
Baldwin, R. The
Political Economy of
Dutt, P. and D. Mitra. 2002. "Endogenous
trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation." Journal of International Economics 58,
107-133.
Lee, J. and P. Swagel.
1997. "Trade
Barriers and trade flows across countries and industries." The Review of Economics and Statistics,
372-82.
Scheve, K. F. and M. J. Slaughter. 2001. "What
determines individual trade-policy preferences?" Journal of International Economics 54(2): 267-292.
*r Rodrik, D. 1995. "Political Economy of Trade Policy"
in Handbook v.III 1457-94
3.1 The choice and use of inefficient redistribution policies
3.1.1 Asymmetric and
imperfect information
*Coate, S. and S. Morris. "On
the Form of Transfers to Special Interests." Journal of Political Economy, 1995, 103(6), 1210-35.
*Falvey, R. E., Lloyd, P. J. 1991 “Uncertainty
and the Choice of Protective Instrument.”
Feenstra, R.C. and T.R. Lewis .1991.
"Distributing the gains from Trade with incomplete information." Economics and Politics, 3, 21-40.
3.1.2
Lobby competition and free-riding
s*Rodrik, D. 1986. “Tariffs, Subsidies, and Welfare with
Endogenous Policy." Journal of
International Economics 21 285–96.
Dixit, A.; Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. "Common
Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making." Journal
of Political Economy, 1997, 105(4), 752-69.
3.1.3
Other
*Drazen,
A. and N. Limão. 2003. “Government Gains
from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies,”
CEPR DP no. 4007.
3.2 Anti-trade bias
*Limão, N. and A. Panagariya.
2005. "Inequality and Endogenous
Trade Policy Outcomes" mimeo UMD.
*Tovar-Rodriguez, P. 2004. “The Effects of Loss
Aversion on Trade Policy and the Anti-Trade Bias Puzzle.” mimeo.
Fernandez,
R. and D. Rodrik. 1991. “Resistance to Reform: Status-Quo Bias in the
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty." American Economic Review 81:1146–55.
Levy,
Philip. 1999. "Lobbying and International Cooperation in Tariff
Setting." Journal of
International Economics, 47, 345–370.
* r
Staiger, R. W. 1995. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade
Policy" in Handbook V. 3 1495-1551.
4.1 Theory and practice of “pure” trade agreements
4.1.1
The
structure and history of the GATT/WTO
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2002..
b Hoekman, B. and M. Kostecki, Chs.1,2.
b
b WTO, WTO Agreements
on CD-ROM: The Legal Texts and Schedules: Services, 2002,
4.1.2 The motivations
for trade agreements
Terms-of-trade
*Bagwell, K. and
R. W. Staiger. 1999. "An
economic theory of GATT." American
Economic Review 89(1): 215-248.
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2002.
s*Grossman,
G. M. and E. Helpman. 1995. "Trade
Wars and Trade Talks." Journal
of Political Economy 103(4): 675-708.
Gros, D. 1987. "A Note on the Optimal Tariff, Retaliation
and the Welfare Loss from Tariff Wars in a Framework with Intra-industry Trade",
Journal of International Economics, 23 (3/4): 357-67
Johnson, H. 1954. "Optimum
Tariffs and Retaliation.'' Review of
Economic Studies, 21: 142-53.
Krugman, Paul. 1997. "What
Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?"
Journal of Economic Literature 35(1):113-20.
Pure political externalities
Ethier, J.W. 2002. "Political
Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World." PIER
Working Paper 02-030.
Commitment
*Maggi, G. and A. Rodriguez-Clare.1998. "The
Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures" Journal of Political Economy,
106(3):574-601.
Staiger, R. W. and G. Tabellini. 1987. "Discretionary
Trade-Policy and Excessive Protection." American Economic Review 77(5): 823-837.
Staiger, R. and Guido Tabellini. 1999. “Do
GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?” Economics and Politics, 11(2), 109-44.
4.1.3 Can countries influence
their TOT?
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2002. ch. 11.
Testing
the optimal tariff theory
*Broda, C, N. Limão and D. Weinstein. 2006.
"Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence.
" mimeo.
Effects of tariff changes on prices
*Chang, W. and Winters,
L. A. 2002. "How
Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of Mercosur."
American Economic Review, 92(4),
889-904.
Kreinin, M. E. 1961.
"Effect
of Tariff Changes on the Prices and Volume of Imports." American Economic Review, 51(3),
310-24.
Pass-through/imperfect
competition evidence
s*Feenstra, R. C. 1989."Symmetric Pass-through of
Tariffs and Exchange-Rates under Imperfect Competition - an
Empirical-Test." Journal of
International Economics, 27(1-2), 25-45.
r
Feenstra, R.C. 1995 "Estimating the effects of
trade policy." in Handbook V.3, ch 30, 1553-95 (NBER WP 5051)
r Goldberg, P. K. and M. Knetter. 1997. "Goods
Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?" Journal of Economic Literature,
35(3), 1243-72.
Knetter, M. M. 1993.
"International
Comparisons of Pricing-to-Market Behavior." American Economic Review, 83(3),
473-86.
a.
4.1.4
Reciprocity and MFN as the pillars of the WTO: theory and evidence
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2000. "Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT.'' mimeo. (original version
1999 NBER WP7071).
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger. 2002. Chs 4,5
*Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger. 1999. "An
economic theory of GATT." American
Economic Review 89(1): 215-248.
*Limão, N. Forthcoming.
“Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade
Liberalization: Evidence for the
Shirono, K. (2004) “Are WTO Tariff Negotiations Reciprocal? An Analysis of
Tariff Liberalization,” mimeo,
Finger, M., Reincke, U. and Adriana Castro. 1999. "Market
Access Bargaining in the Uruguay Round: Rigid or Relaxed Reciprocity?"
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
2258.
Horn, H and Petros Mavroidis. 2000. "Economic
and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause." European Journal of Political Economy, 17(2),
233-279.
b Bhagwati,
J. 2002. Going Alone, The case for
relaxed reciprocity in freeing trade. MIT Press. Introduction.
b Hoekman
and Kostecki, ch. 4.
4.1.5
Dispute
settlement and enforcement of trade commitments and rules
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger.
2002. Ch 6.
s*Bown, C.P. 2004. “On
the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” REStat, 86(3).
*Dixit, A. 1987. "Strategic aspects of trade
policy'' in Advances in Economic Theory,
T. Bewley (ed.), Cambridge University Press; 329-62.
*Limão N. and Kamal
Saggi. 2006. “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the
Enforcement of International Trade Agreements.” Mimeo.
Maggi, G. 1999. "The
role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation."
American Economic Review 89(1): 190-214.
Ethier, W. 2001.
"Punishments
and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements." mimeo.
b Petersman,
E. 1997. The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement,
Kluwer Law International Ltd.
b World
Trade Organization. 1999b. "Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO
Disputes.'' <http://www.wto.org>.
b WTO, Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical
Index.
4.1 Theory and practice of trade agreements with non-trade objectives
s*Copeland, B. R. 1990. "Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable
and Non-negotiable Trade Barriers.'' Canadian Journal of Economics 23(1); 84-108.
Hoekman, B. 1989. "Determining
the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations.''
International Organization 43 (4); 693-714.
Sebenius, J. K. 1983., "Negotiation
arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties.'' International
Organization, 37 (2); 281-316.
b Charnovitz,
S. 1998. "Linking Topics in Treaties.'' Journal of International Economic
Law, 329, 329-343.
4.1.1
The
expanding scope of the WTO: Environment and labor
*Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger. 2001. "Domestic
Policies, National Sovereignty and International Economic Institutions.'' The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 2, 519-62.
*Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger.
2002. Ch 8.
*Limão, N. 2005. “Trade
policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce
more cooperative outcomes?” Journal
of International Economics, 67(1), 175-199.
Barret, S. 1994. “Strategic
Environmental Policy and International Trade.'' Journal of Public Economics, 54(3); 325-38.
b
b Trebilcock,
M.J. and Robert Howse. 1999 The
regulation of international trade, 2nd ed. Routledge. Chs 15,16.
b World
Trade Organization. 1999. "Trade and
Environment.''
4.1.2
Preferential
trade agreements with non-trade objectives
*Limão, N. 2005. “Are
Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for
Multilateral Liberalization?” mimeo (earlier WP).
*Perroni, C. and J. Whalley. 1994. "The New Regionalism: Trade
Liberalization or Insurance?'' NBER WP 4626.
Fernandez, R. and Portes, J. 1998 "Returns to
Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade
Agreements.'' World Bank Economic Review,
12(2); 197-220.
Schiff, M. and A. Winters. 1997. "Regional
Integration as Diplomacy.'' World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
no.1801, World Bank,
4.2 Effects of Trade Agreements on Trade Policy: The Evidence
4.3.1 Preferential
Trade Agreements and Multilateral Liberalization
*Limão, N.
Forthcoming.
“Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade
Liberalization: Evidence for the
*Limão, N. 2005. “Are
Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for
Multilateral Liberalization?” mimeo (earlier WP).
*Karacaovali, B. and Limão, N. “The Clash of
Liberalizations: Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization in the
European Union.” World Bank working paper no. 3493, 2005.
Foroutan, F. 1998. “Does Membership in a
Regional Preferential Trade Arrangement Make a Country More or Less
Protectionist?” The World Economy 21(3): 305-36.
r Limão, N. Forthcoming “Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization:
Evidence and Open Questions,” World Trade
Review.
r Winters,
A. 1999. “Regionalism vs. multilateralism,” in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir
and T. Venables, (eds.), Market Integration,
Regionalism and the Global Economy, CEPR,
b
Bhagwati, J.,
b.
4.3.1
GATT-WTO and Multilateral Liberalization
*Rose, A. K. 2004. “Do
WTO Members have a More Liberal Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics,
63(2), 209-35.
b Ianchovichina
E. and Will Martin.
2001. “Trade Liberalization in China's Accession to the
World Trade Organization” World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2623
Part II: Trade theory and evidence
1.1 The questions
*Leamer, E. 1997. "The Interplay of Theory and
Data in the Study of International Trade." in Nerlove, Marc ed. Issues in Contemporary Economics,
*r Helpman,
E. 1998. "Explaining the Structure of Foreign
Trade: Where do We Stand?" Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 134 (4) pp.
573-89 .
Davis D. and D. Weinstein . 2002. “What Role for Empirics
in International Trade?." In Ronald Findlay, Lars Jonung, Mats
Lundahl, eds., Bertil Ohlin: A Centennial Celebration, 1899-1999,
1.2 Comparative Advantage models
*Leamer, E. 1984. Sources
of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence.
1.2.1 Tests of the HOV
theory
*Davis D. and D. Weinstein. 2001. "An
Account of Global Factor Trade." American
Economic Review, 91(5), 1423-53.
*Davis, D., Weinstein, D., Bradford, S., and Shimpo,
K. 1997. “Using
International and Japanese Regional Data to Determine When the Factor Abundance
Theory of Trade Works." American
Economic Review, 87(3),421-46.
s*Trefler
D. 1995. “The Case of the Missing Trade and Other HOV Mysteries." American Economic Review, 85, 1029-47.
Bowen, H., Leamer, and L. Sveikauskas. 1987. “Multicountry,
Multifactor Tests of the Factor Abundance Theory." American Economic Review, 77(5),
791-809.
Harrigan, J. 1997.
“Technology,
Factor Supplies, and International Specialization: Estimating the Neoclassical
Model." American Economic Review,
87 (4), 475-94.
c.a.
1.2.2 Determinants of the location of production
*Bernstein J. and D. Weinstein. 2002. "Do
Factor Endowments Determine the Location of Production? Evidence from National
and International Data." Journal
of International Economics, 56 (1), 55-76.
*Venables, A. and Nuno Limão. 2002. "Geographical
Disadvantage: a Hecksher-Ohlin-Von-Thunen Model of International Specialisation." Journal of International Economics,
58, 239-63.
S*Harrigan,
J. 1995. "Factor
Endowments and the International Location of Production: Econometric Evidence
from the OECD” Journal of
International Economics, 39 (1-2), 123-41.
Hummels, David; Ishii, Jun; Yi, Kei-Mu.
2001. “The
Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade." Journal of International Economics,
54(1), 75-96.
Overman, H. Stephen Redding and Anthony Venables.
2004. "The economic geography of trade,
production, and income: a survey of empirics." In Handbook of International Trade. (Working paper).
1.3 Scale economies’ models: evidence
*Antweiler W and Daniel Trefler. 2002. "Increasing
returns and all that: A view from trade." American Economic Review 92 (1): 93-119.
*Davis, D. and D. Weinstein. 2003 “Market
Access, Economic Geography, and Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Perspective”
Journal of International Economics, 59:1,
1-23.
r Overman,
H. Stephen Redding and Anthony Venables. 2001. "The economic geography of
trade, production, and income: a survey of empirics." Mimeo.
Davis and Weinstein. 2001. “Market Size, Linkages, and
Productivity: A Study of Japanese Regions." NBER WP 8518.
Hanson, G. 1998. "Market Potential, Increasing Returns,
and Geographic Concentration." NBER WP 6429.
1.4 Volume and composition of trade
1.4.1
Gravity
equation
*Deardorff, A. 1998.
“Determinants of Bilateral
Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical World,” in J. Frankel ed., The
Regionalization of the World Economy,
*Hummels, David, and James Levinsohn. 1995. “Monopolistic
Competition and International Trade: Reconsidering the Evidence." QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 110,
799-836.
r Harrigan, J. 2001. "Specialization and the Volume of
Trade: Do the Data Obey the Laws?" NBER WP 8675.
Anderson, J. 1979. “A
Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation." American Economic Review, 69,106-116.
1.4.2
Effects
of trade costs on the composition and volume of trade
*Anderson, J. and Eric Van Wincoop. 2003. “Gravity
with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle." AER.
*Hummels, D. 1998.
“Toward a Geography of Trade Costs." mimeo.
s*Rose, A. K. 2004. “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?” American
Economic Review, 94(1).
Limão, N. and Anthony Venables. 2001. “Infrastructure, Geographical
Disadvantage, Transport Costs and Trade." World Bank Economic Review,
15, 451-479.
McCallum, J. 1995. "National
Borders Matter: Canada-US Regional Trade Patterns." American Economic Review 85, 615-623.
Rauch, James. 1999.
“Networks
Versus Markets in International Trade." Journal of International Economics, 48 (1), 7-35.
Subramanian, A. and Shang-Jin Wei. 2003. “The WTO
Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly,” NBER WP No. 10024.
2.1 Theory
2.1.1
Factor
accumulation
2.1.2
Exogenous
technological progress
*r G. Grossman and
2.1.3
Learning-by-doing
Young,
Alwyn. 1991. “Learning
by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2), 369-405.
2.1.4
R &
D
*Grossman,
Gene and E. Helpman, 1991
Grossman,
Gene and E. Helpman, 1991 Chs. 3, 13.
Rivera
Batiz, Luis A. and Paul Romer. 1991. “Economic
Integration and Endogenous Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 531-55.
2.2 Cross-country evidence
s*Frankel,
J. and D. Romer. 1999. “Does
Trade Cause Growth”. American
Economic Review; 89(3),
379-399.
r Edwards,
S. 1998. “Openness,
Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” Economic Journal, 108, 383-398.
r Rodriguez,
F. and Dani Rodrik. 1999. “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A
Skeptic's Guide to Cross-National Evidence." NBER WP 7081.
Ben-David, D. 1996.
“Trade
and Convergence among Countries.” Journal
of International Economics; 40 (3/4), 279-298.
2.3 Evidence on international knowledge/technology diffusion
*Branstetter, L. 2001. "Are
Knowledge Spillovers International or Intranational in Scope? Microeconometric Evidence
from the US and Japan." Journal
of International Economics, 53 (1),
53-79.
*Coe, D. and E. Helpman. 1995.
"International
R&D Spillovers." European
Economic Review 39,859-887.
s*Keller, W. 2002. “Geographic
Localization of International Technology Diffusion,” American Economic Review; 92(1), 120-142.
Eaton, J. and S.
Kortum. 1999. "International
Technology Diffusion: Theory and Measurement," International
Economic Review, (40)3,
537-569.
Hu, A. and Adam B.
Jaffe. 2001. “Patent Citations and International
Knowledge Flow: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan." NBER WP 8528.
2.4 Trade and productivity: Plant and firm level evidence
*Bernard, A., J. Eaton, J. Jensen and S. Kortum,
"Plants
and Productivity in International Trade," American Economic Review,
September 2003, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1268-1290.
s*Clerides,
Sofronis, Lach, Saul, and James Tybout. 1998. "Is
‘Learning-by-Exporting’ Important? Micro-dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico
and Morocco." Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 113(3), 903-47.
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Epilogue
1. Trade shocks: uses and misuses as exogenous
variation for non-trade outcomes
1.1 Wages and productivity
1.2 Inequality and poverty
1.3 Institutions