Kruglanski, A. W., Erb, H. P., Pierro, A., & Spiegel, S. (2003). A parametric
unimodel of human judgment: A fanfare to the common thinker. In L. G.
Aspinwall & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.). A psychology of human strengths:
Perspectives on an emerging field. Washington, D.C.: APA Press.
In this chapter the authors outline a uniform model of human judgment whereby all of its instances can be understood in terms of an intersection of several fundamental parameters at different levels. In furnishing a uniform alternative to dualistic conceptions, the authors’ parametric unimodel parts ways with the notion that the lay thinker is often irrational and hence inferior to the "professional" thinker. In other words, we will be able to understand in the same terms both the idiot's choice and the scientist's assessment of this behavior. The authors assume that judgments are made on the basis of evidence connected to rules of the if-then variety, lending present information its evidential status. The degree to which the individual believes in a given if-then linkage can vary, and so may the momentary accessibility of a particular linkage (the major premise) and the accessibility of relevant situational information (the minor premise). States of the perceiver, such as the degree of (nondirectional) processing motivation, the (directional) motivation to arrive at specific conclusions, and the cognitive capacity at the moment of judgment formation would determine the likelihood that a perceiver will acquire a given rule and use it to arrive at a conclusion.
