What Should This Fight Be Called?: Metaphors of Counter-Terrorism and Their Implications

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Abstract

This paper examines from a psychological perspective the use of metaphors in framing counterterrorism. Four major counterterrorism metaphors are considered, namely those of war, law enforcement, containment of a social epidemic, and prejudice reduction. It is shown how each metaphor captures some aspects of counterterrorism’s effects while neglecting others. Accordingly, it is suggested that an exclusive commitment to a single counterterrorism metaphor may be ill advised and likely to unduly constrain the required flexible multi-disciplinary response. Rather, an integrated approach to counterterrorism seems called for based on a collaboration between policy makers, social scientists and area experts. Such an approach would maximize the likelihood of enlightened decision making concerning contemplated counterterrorist moves given the complex tradeoffs that these typically entail.
Though modern terrorism has captured the world’s attention intermittently since the late nineteenth century (Rapoport, 2002) its contemporary forms pose a particularly acute danger to orderly societies. The coordinated twin city attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C, symbolic pillars of American economic and military might; the March 4, 2004 bombing of the Madrid train station, the London transit bombing of July 5, 2005, the daily suicide bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan, the political ascendancy of fundamentalist terrorism-using groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, the emergence of the semi-autonomous global Salafi jihad inspired by Al Qaeda, and the specter of the acquisition and use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction have made the task of opposing terrorism as difficult as it is pressing. As one author put it, “international terrorism [is] the most serious strategic threat to global peace and safety” (Ganor, 2005, p. 293).

As a form of intelligible human behavior, terrorism has fundamental psychological aspects. It rests on its own subjective rationality (Crenshaw, 1990/1999), Post, 1990), and is anchored in beliefs about its utility and ethical justifiability (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). It is driven by goals it is presumed to serve for groups and individuals. It is claimed to be enabled by mechanisms of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990/1999), and is heavily dependent on processes of communication and persuasion, leadership and group dynamics (Post, 1986). These varied psychological factors need to be taken into account in devising effective strategies for undermining terrorism and reducing its appeal for sympathizers and potential recruits.
As with any systematic initiative, policies aimed at opposing terrorism require a guiding conception affording a plan of action and forecasting its likely consequences. Perhaps because terrorism is refractory to a broadly accepted definition (e.g., Schmid & Jongman, 1988) it has been often understood metaphorically, as has counterterrorism. In the present paper we review several major metaphors of counterterrorism and assess their likely psychological impact and policy implications. Specifically, we seek to identify the complex tradeoffs, intricate ramifications and unintended outcomes that adopting a given counterterrorism metaphor may promote.

The use of metaphor is commonplace in the construction of new knowledge. It involves an assimilation of a relatively unfamiliar and poorly understood phenomenon (such as terrorism) to a well known concept embedded in a different domain (Gentner & Jeziorski, 1995, p. 448). Metaphors are ways of understanding complex situations. They structure thought in application to particular events. They constitute ways of simplifying complex realities, and they induce a sense of familiarity and comprehension. Metaphors enable problem setting and the generation of proposed solutions (Shon, 1993). These advantages may be offset by potential over-simplification, stereotypy, and judgmental error. In other words, the “mapping” of one experiential domain onto another may be inaccurate. As Lakoff (1990) has argued (Chapter 3), understanding something in terms of a particular metaphorical concept necessarily conceals other aspects of what we are seeing that may be inconsistent with the metaphor. Metaphors can thus hide aspects of experience.

Shimko (2004) highlighted the differences between metaphors and analogies. Both are based on comparisons, but analogies apply to “within-domain” comparisons,
whereas metaphors apply to “cross-domain” comparisons. In terms of impact, analogies provide specific policy guidance, while metaphors frame or represent problems. Our view is that metaphors construct a conceptual framework within which historical analogies can be evoked. For instance, without the “war” metaphor of counterterrorism (considered subsequently), the historical analogies to specific wars would not enter the debate.

As is the case with flawed theories generally, flawed metaphors may be abandoned when confronted with inconsistent facts. However, a strong motivational commitment to a metaphor may lead to a selective perception of the facts. Such commitment may be augmented by individuals’ prior investment in the metaphor’s implications (e.g., policy makers’ investment in strategic activities implied by a metaphor), and/or by the degree to which such implications serve the user’s alternative goals, or specific interests (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990). Adoption of a metaphor can lead to “top-down processing,” in which actors’ perceptions are biased by the schema rather than faithfully reflecting the realities at hand. Such biases are particularly likely when the facts are ambiguous (Hsee, 1993; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990) as they often are in the realm of terrorism and counterterrorism.

In the present paper, co-authored by scholars with varied disciplinary backgrounds,2 we first outline our psychological assumptions regarding the possible objectives of counterterrorism. We then describe four major metaphors in which terms counterterrorism has been characterized and consider their implications for pertinent strategies and tactics of counterterrorism. The closing discussion compares the various

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2 Specifically, our team consists of a political scientist (M.C.), a psychiatrist (J.P.), a neuropsychiatrist (J.V.) and a social/cognitive psychologist (A.K.)
counterterrorism metaphors in terms of their potential contributions for controlling terrorism, as well as their pitfalls and pratfalls.

*Psychological Objectives of Counterterrorism.*

We assume that counterterrorism has short term and long term objectives. In the short run, its objective is to *thwart* specific terrorist attacks. In the long run, it is to *minimize* their occurrence. From a psychological perspective, such minimization amounts to reducing a party’s *motivation* to pursue terrorism. If the motivation to engage in terrorism persists, attempts at thwarting, however successful, may have merely temporary effects. They may hamper the terrorists’ *ability* to carry out attacks in given circumstances, yet sooner or later motivated actors may find other ways and means of doing so. Targeted assassinations of leaders may prompt the ascendance to leadership positions of fresh operatives (Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal & Samban, 2005), physical barriers and fences may be surmounted by a rocket technology, detection of metal explosives may encourage the use of liquid explosives, protection of symbolic targets may put at risk ordinary targets, and so on.

In contrast, absent the attraction of the path to terrorism, there may be nothing to thwart hence no need to invest costly resources in interminable “cat and mouse games” with the terrorists. In this sense, an approach that promises to reduce terrorists’ motivation to pursue violence and discourage potential terrorists from joining the group in the first place may seem superior in the long run to an approach aiming to foil plans for specific acts of violence. But how does one reduce terrorists’ motivation?

Recent analyses of terrorism (Atran, 2003; Bloom, 2005; Pedahzur, 2004; Post, 2005, Sageman, 2004; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Stern, 2005) imply that the
heterogeneous motives underlying terrorists’ activities around the globe may be subsumed within three broad motivational categories. One category relates to terrorists’ personal traumas or humiliations, the second to the ideologies they subscribe to, and the third to social influence of their peers and revered authorities. These motivational categories may often function in concert and address different aspects of the process that pushes individuals toward terrorism.

Empirical research suggests that ideological themes (of religious or ethno-nationalist varieties) are ubiquitous in terrorists’ narratives (Atran, 2003; Hafez, 2006; Fishman, Orehek, Dechesne, Chen & Kruglanski, 2007; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & Orehek, 2007; Post, 2007; Smith, 2004) and that they likely constitute important conscious reasons for their commitment to militancy. Yet, personal traumas and frustrations may create the emotional push to “buy into” the ideologies. In other words, personal frustrations and pain that one is powerless to undo (having a loved one killed by an occupying force, experiencing alienation, and discrimination by a majority culture, suffering ostracism from one’s community in response to one’s normative infractions) may translate into embracing a terrorism justifying ideology that identifies a collective grievance said to be rectifiable via militancy (Kruglanski et al., 2007; Post, 2007; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Finally, the social influence by members of one’s group (e.g., pressure from peers, comrades, and venerated leaders) may instill in one the motivation to accept the ideological contents they subscribe to as true and valid.

Based on this account, long-term counterterrorism efforts may attempt (1) to alleviate as much as possible the frustrations that prompt individuals to embrace terrorist ideologies, (2) to invalidate those ideologies, e.g. by arguments that the collective
grievance claim is false, that terrorism isn’t an efficient means of addressing the grievance (if it is real), and/or that it is incompatible with other important objectives and moral values. Such invalidation may be carried by (3) a social influence process, involving communicators or “epistemic authorities” (Kruglanski, et al., 2005) that the terrorists and/or their sympathizers find credible. The various counterterrorism metaphors discussed subsequently may be assessed in reference to these objectives.

In this paper, we describe four major metaphors in which terms counterterrorism has been characterized. These are: (1) Counterterrorism as war (as in the “global war on terrorism.”), (2) Counterterrorism as law enforcement, (3) Counterterrorism as containment of a social epidemic, and (4) Counterterrorism as a program of prejudice reduction. We proceed to describe them now in turn.

*Counterterrorism as War*

Framing post 9/11 counterterrorist policy as a “global war on terrorism” or a “war on terror” represents a conceptual construction, a metaphor reinforced by historical examples, or analogies (Shimko, 2004). The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are a reality, although neither fits perfectly the concept of war that buttresses the Bush administration’s policies. The war metaphor helps define the American perception of the threat of terrorism. Furthermore, in speeches and writings of American officials, the metaphor of war is strengthened and made more concrete by references to specific past wars, such as the Second World War or the Cold War. Such references evoke distinct narratives and have an emotional and cultural resonance with the public. This dramatic framing of the threat is a departure from its portrayal by past administrations, although the U.S. had previously “gone to war” against social problems such as drugs and crime and earlier administrations had employed military force, albeit in limited fashion (Reagan vs. Libya
in 1986, Clinton vs. Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998). Furthermore, what might initially have seemed an abstraction or a rhetorical flourish – the idea of a “war” as a method of violence – became real and literal with the wars in Afghanistan in October of 2001 and especially in 2003 in Iraq. Whether or not the war in Iraq is part and parcel of the war on terrorism is a subject of political dispute, and critics of the Iraq war themselves appeal to a different historical analogy: Vietnam.

One question that is often raised is whether or not powerful metaphors and analogies are adopted for public consumption only, rather than actually guiding decision-making. In a study of the 1965 decisions during the Vietnam war, Khong (1992) found that the private deliberations of policy makers mirrored their public stance. American leaders were genuinely influenced by their choice of analogy (in this case, the Korean war was the dominant historical analogy). As Vertzberger (1990, p. 306) noted:

“argumentation by reference to history is a vital component of policy formulation and serves as a means of persuading both the self and others.” Holmes (2006) similarly sees the Bush administration as guided by the same references that are presented to the public. In short, metaphors and historical analogies seem relevant to policies. They can increase the intensity of motivation for a particular action, or remove inhibitions. They legitimize particular policies, and lend them force. In short, they exert a clear and present influence on world affairs.

The Break from the Past

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3 The source is the Public Papers of the Presidents. Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/index.html.
The idea of a “war on terrorism” represents a departure from the conceptions of past administrations in regard to this problem. After all, terrorism against the U.S. isn’t a new phenomenon. It has threatened American interests since the mid 1960s, so that in 1972 the government saw fit to establish a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

The Nixon administration faced Palestinian terrorism abroad and violence at home accompanying the student protest movement against the Vietnam War. President Nixon tended to prefer a disease metaphor and interpreted the two phenomena as the same threat: Palestinian hijackings and a bombing at the University of Wisconsin were thus described as the same “cancerous disease.” He expressed fears that society would accept such violence and permissiveness and, in effect, that it would be contagious. The disease metaphor wasn’t exclusive of other negative metaphors and epithets in which terms Nixon depicted terrorists. They were defined as “international outlaws” and terrorism was said to threaten “the very principles on which nations are founded.”

The Carter administration had to deal with the Iran hostage crisis. The president frequently expressed a fear of anarchy and of rules being abandoned. He described terrorism as a threat to civilization, the rule of law, and human decency. The Iranian hostage crisis, in his somewhat introspective view, was a “test for America.” Carter brought a religious dimension to his perspective: “America is brought to its knees not in submission but in prayer.” Moreover, he stressed that American concern for the hostages showed that it was a moral nation with character, strength, and greatness. His speeches contained frequent references that equated the Iranian government with a “mob” and

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4 The disease analogue is central to the social epidemic metaphor considered later.
term their actions blackmail. His focus was on unity at home, American vulnerability to foreign oil supplies, and the need to protect human rights.

Reagan came to power believing that Carter’s response to the hostage crisis was unacceptably weak. He referred to “swift and effective retribution” at the welcoming ceremony for the 5 returning hostages in January of 1981. His consistent themes were the need for firmness: terrorism would not be tolerated, the U.S. would not be intimidated, and its resolve would not be shaken. National pride, not national security, was said to be at stake. Terrorism was defined as an attack on democracy, freedom, and even civilization itself. It was described as a form of **surrogate** warfare, which linked it to states, particularly the Soviet Union and its allies. Reagan warned that sponsors would be held responsible, and put these words into practice in 1986 when the U.S. bombed Libya in retaliation for its involvement in a terrorist attack in Germany. Terrorism was said to blur the distinction between peace and war. Like Nixon, he favored the disease metaphor: we cannot let terrorism succeed or “it will spread like cancer” or “a plague.”

Reagan’s rhetoric tended toward the imaginative and extravagant: at different times he called terrorists fanatical, cowardly, cynical, madmen, skulking barbarians, vicious, ruthless, savage, criminals, thugs, despicable, repulsive, pitiless, crude, indiscriminate, evil, contemptible, and abhorrent. Terrorism was described as senseless, ugly, wanton, grisly, intolerable and heinous. It was defined as an atrocity and an affront to humanity.

Clinton entered office determined to tone down the government’s rhetoric and avoid any suggestion of a “clash of civilizations.” (Huntington, 1998) His general

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5 As in the *(epidemiological)* metaphor considered later.
themes were the pursuit of justice, law enforcement, and international cooperation. Terrorism was compared to other intractable global problems such as drugs, crime, the environment, and disease. These common dangers were defined as boundary-crossing threats prevalent in the post Cold War world, part of an environment characterized by modernity, open societies, open borders, technological advance, and access to information. Terrorism was often discussed in the context of nuclear proliferation and ethnic and nationalist conflict. (Clinton was particularly concerned with the threat of chemical and biological terrorism.) Even though the Administration acknowledged that Osama bin Laden had declared war against the U.S. and used military force to retaliate against the Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 embassy bombings, Clinton did not adopt the war metaphor but employed more moderate if somewhat combative language, such as denying “victory” to terrorists, “battling” terrorism, and “taking the fight” to the terrorists.

In his farewell address to the nation in January, 2001, Clinton remained temperate about terrorism in providing his thoughts for the future: “because the world is more connected every day, in every way, America’s security and prosperity require us to continue to lead in the world. At this remarkable moment in history, more people live in freedom than ever before. Our alliances are stronger than ever. People around the world look to America to be a force for peace and prosperity, freedom and security. The global economy is giving more of our own people and billions around the world the chance to work and live and raise their families with dignity. But the forces of integration that have created these good opportunities also make us more subject to global forces of destruction, to terrorism, organized crime and narcotrafficking, the spread of deadly
“weapons and disease, the degradation of the global environment.” Terrorism is thus only one of several “forces of destruction.” Agency is left out.

The War Metaphor

President Bush adopted the war construct immediately, in the heat of the moment, according to Woodward (2002), although Suskind (2006, p. 19) recounts that in the period between September 11 and September 20, when the “war” was first declared, the meaning of the term drifted and several “facsimiles” were floated. Woodward (2002, p. 30-31) reports that Bush’s chief speechwriter, Michael Gerson, included the sentence “This is an act of war” in the first draft of the President’s brief speech to the nation on the evening of 9/11, and that other assistants (communications director Dan Bartlett, for example) supported the declaration, but that the President ordered it taken out (and stuck to his decision) because he wanted to reassure the public. However, on the morning of September 12, after a meeting of the National Security Council, the President told reporters “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Woodward, 2002, 45—Woodward describes this as a deliberate escalation of public rhetoric).

It is comprehensible that the enormity of the destructiveness of the 9/11 attacks would lead the president to reach for a comparison with the worst threat that could be imagined. Certainly the attack itself seemed to meet the requirements of an “act of war.” Had it been committed by a state, the U.N. Charter certainly would have permitted the U.S. to use force in self defense. Furthermore, being a “wartime President,” seemed to suit Bush’s personality; Suskind comments that he liked to call himself by this role (p. 72). His swift decision-making style also seemed appropriate for a crisis situation,
whereas prior to 9/11 it might have been a liability. The President liked to hear “tales of combat” when he was briefed by the intelligence community and was apparently deeply interested in individual Al Qaeda leaders. Suskind recounts in the early days much boasting about putting their heads on sticks or bringing their heads back in boxes (p. 21). President Bush is also known to resist reconsidering decisions once made.

Framing counterterrorism in terms of the war metaphor also suited many of the prior policy interests of the administration. Among these were, primarily, increasing the power of the presidency, dealing with “rogue states” that possessed or threatened to acquire weapons of mass destruction, removing Saddam Hussein from power in particular, and generally exercising unilateral power on the world stage.

*Essentials of the war metaphor.* The war metaphor is as follows. Wars are fought by states. The enemy is thus an identifiable entity whose interests fundamentally oppose your own. The stakes could not be higher since the national security, indeed the existence, of each side is threatened. The conflict is zero-sum; the outcome will be victory for one side or the other. The enemy necessarily wishes to destroy you, the defender, typically by conquering or destroying your territory. (Thus the frequent admonition with regard to Iraq: “if we weren’t fighting them there, we would be fighting them here.” Wars are about defending the homeland.) By “war,” we understand the Clausewitzian sense of “total war.” There is no compromise.

Being in a state of war has other connotations for domestic politics. National unity is required. The population must be mobilized in support of the cause. Dissent is thus

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6 We also have the concept of civil war, which involves a government fighting an army of its citizens for control of the country. But since the threat in this instance issues from outside the nation’s boundaries, the basic concept of interstate war is the relevant one.
easily interpreted as unpatriotic, even giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Going to war
calls up the values of solidarity, heroism, valor, and sacrifice. And in war, of course, God
is always on one’s side. The moral dimension is clear.

The prescriptive part of the war metaphor is also straightforward. Nations do not
go to war without using military force. The solution to the problem as diagnosed has to
be military. Thus, necessarily, the Department of Defense must play a lead role in
shaping policy (and DOD began planning the invasion of Afghanistan in November
2001, although early on the CIA took the lead role in the fight against Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and around the world).

Furthermore, if the struggle against terrorism is a war, the President’s role as
Commander in Chief must dominate his other roles. In wartime, leaders are given
extraordinary powers. Measures that would not be acceptable in peacetime (restrictions
on civil liberties, brutal interrogation practices, etc.) are now necessary. Thus an
expansion of executive power accompanies the war metaphor.

*Issues of fit.* The fit of the generic war metaphor to combating terrorism is
problematic at the outset. First, there is the question of who the enemy is. The entity that
attacked us in 2001 was not a state. It was an organization, Al Qaeda, with a territorial
base within a weak “failed state” Afghanistan, whose ruling Taliban regime was not
internationally recognized. The regime in partial control of that state, which had
harbored Al Qaeda, was quickly overthrown, although the Taliban still exists and is now
resurgent. However, since 2001, as a result of pressures that are due only in part to the
war in Afghanistan, the threat of terrorism has been transformed into something much
more amorphous and diffuse. The agency behind the threat thus has even fewer of the
qualities of a state adversary than it did prior to the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, even at the beginning Al Qaeda lacked the capacity to defeat or destroy the U.S. (nor is it certain that Bin Laden had the intent to do so). It posed little threat to our armed forces. It could not conquer the country or deprive it of vital resources.

Suskind refers to the war in Afghanistan as a “bridge” between the old and the new (p. 53) and as a prelude to Iraq (p. 79). It also seemed to end in clear cut victory (although as time has passed its outcome seems less certain). The threat from Iraq fit the war metaphor even more easily, and it too was an effective bridge between conventional war and war on terrorism. The initial rationale for war was that Iraq was hostile to our interests, possessed weapons of mass destruction, and might give them to terrorists who had already demonstrated their harmful intent. Iraq had also conquered one neighbor and threatened others, in line with traditional state expansionism. Thus fighting in Iraq could be seen as a way of making the reality of counterterrorism fit the abstraction of the war metaphor.

The administration used the “counterterrorism as war” construct to argue that the post-2003 war in Iraq is an integral and necessary part of the “war on terrorism,” but for many the connection weakened as the war progressed.\(^7\) While most observers agreed that the 2001 war in Afghanistan was essential to diminishing the threat of Al Qaeda, whether or not they accepted the war metaphor for counterterrorism policy, the issue of Iraq provoked fierce debate both within and outside the country. Critics of U.S. policy argue

\(^7\) But see Gershkoff and Kushner (2005), who argue that the war in Iraq received public support because it was successfully framed as an extension of the global war on terrorism. They also note the absence of public debate over the war framing. They analyze Bush’s speeches from September 11, 2001, to May 1, 2003. The 2006 elections indicate, however, declining support.
that the war in Iraq is a distraction from the struggle against terrorism. They contend that the war in Iraq actually increases the threat of terrorism and makes the U.S. less secure. The war gives the “violent extremists” against whom the U.S. is fighting both valuable experience and a popular cause, defending Islam against Western military incursions.

Public opinion polls by The New York Times and CBS News in August of 2006 showed that a bare majority of 55% of those surveyed approved of the President’s handling of the campaign against terrorism (this figure was up slightly from the previous week). Also, 51% of the sample thought that the war in Iraq was independent of the war on terrorism, an increase of 10 percentage points since June (Hulse & Connelly, 2006).

*War against what?* Over the five years since 2001, the definition of the enemy has shifted from *entity or entities* of some sort (the so called “terrorist organizations”) to an *ideology* that aspires to world domination. Despite Iraq – or perhaps because it was revealed that Saddam Hussein did not have connections with Al Qaeda -- it has not been easy to develop a clear conception of what or who the enemy is. The 2006 National Security Strategy defines the enemy as a “murderous” movement united by an ideology of oppression, violence, and hate, which wishes to establish totalitarian rule over a world empire. (It thus combines elements of the criminal and the deadly state foe.) This enemy threatens “global peace, international security and prosperity, the rising tide of democracy, and the right of all people to live without fear of indiscriminate violence.” (David Brooks, writing in The New York Times on September 21, 2006, expressed frustration: “The definition of the threat determines the remedies we select to combat it, and yet what we have now is a clash of incongruous definitions and an enemy that is
chaos theory in human form – an ever-shifting array of state and non-state actors who cooperate, coagulate, divide, feud, and feed on one another without end.”)

The detainee issue. Further political complications were created by the issue of how to treat captured members of enemy forces. Strict application of the war metaphor would require that they be considered prisoners of war and thus subject to the provisions of international law embodied in the Geneva Conventions. Because the administration did not wish to accord its prisoners these rights, it devised the awkward category of unlawful enemy combatants. The treatment of detainees continues to be politically controversial, damaging to the country’s moral claims, and subject to legal challenge.

Criteria for victory. A second question is what victory in a “war on terrorism” would mean. How will we know when we have won? An ideal-type real war would end in the capitulation of the enemy (although real wars sometimes end in messy stalemates on the ground with no formal treaty to terminate the conflict), but the proponents of a war on terrorism do not expect Al Qaeda to issue a formal surrender. The National Security Strategy of 2002 described victory as “a world in which terrorism does not define the daily lives of Americans and their friends” and the national goal as the elimination of terrorism as a threat to the American way of life. In 2006, the revised strategy set its goal as “bringing an end to the scourge of terrorism” and “defeating” violent extremism around the world. It will be difficult to tell when these objectives, eradicating a method of violence and a way of thinking, have been met.

Another problem with employing the war metaphor is that it structures expectations about victory (despite administration warnings from the start that the war would be long). At the least, it leads opinion pollsters to ask whether their respondents
think the government is winning the war. Thus, according to a survey by Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress in the summer of 2006, most of the experts who were surveyed (a bipartisan majority of 84%) did not think that the U.S. was winning the war on terrorism (Foreign Policy, 2006, p.49-55). Almost 80% of the over one hundred experts who were questioned had worked in the American government. Asked if they thought the world was become safer or more dangerous for the United States and the American people, 86% thought that the world was much or somewhat more dangerous.

On the other hand, James Fallows (2006) thinks that the U.S. is succeeding and that it is time to declare victory. He claims that the sixty odd experts he interviewed are quite positive about the outcome of the war on terrorism (although they disapprove of the war in Iraq). In his view, Al Qaeda “Central” has been defeated, and a second 9/11 is highly unlikely. In Fallows’ opinion, the U.S. is its own worst enemy by responding clumsily to provocations. To him the answer is simply to declare that we have won the “global war on terror.” Maintaining a standing state of war indefinitely offers no advantages. Instead, he says, it “cheapens the concept of war, making the word a synonym for effort or goal” (p.71). It predisposes us to overreaction and maintaining a permanent state of emergency, encourages fear by raising public anxieties, and (as we would expect from the effects of a metaphor) blinds us to possibilities other than military force, such as more effective diplomacy. He also argues that an open-ended war is an invitation to defeat because more terrorist attacks are bound to happen. A victory declaration could thus be a means of escaping the metaphor trap that the Administration set for itself.

*Analories and the Lessons of History*
The generic and abstract war metaphor has been reinforced by concrete historical analogies to World War II and to the Cold War, including both its conduct and its ending. In the context of the second world war, two events stand out: Munich and Pearl Harbor. These are the source of trans-generational analogies, in that they influence both the generation that lived through them and later generations who did not have the same formative experience. Both events have deep meaning in American culture and memory. They are available, vivid, and persistent myths with enormous affective power, resistant to disconfirmation by new information (see Vertzberger, 1990, p. 329). In the post-2003 debate over the Iraq war, critics of the Administration increasingly refer to a more recent counter-analogy: the war in Vietnam. It suggests a much more negative policy outcome.

The President also made unfortunate allusions to the Crusades in the early post 9/11 period. Here it was probably the case that he meant the reference as a general metaphor to imply a “moral crusade” against evil rather than as a specific comparison of American policy to the Western assaults on Muslims during the Middle Ages, which is how Osama bin Laden uses the term when he refers to his enemy as “Jews and Crusaders.”

It is easy to misjudge the emotional effect of an analogy on an unfamiliar audience. Misplaced analogies can be politically dangerous.

Pearl Harbor. The Pearl Harbor analogy appeals to anyone trying to understand the 9/11 attacks, since it also was a deadly surprise attack from the air. It supports the war metaphor because Pearl Harbor led to war against Japan. It also supports the concept of the enemy as an entity that wishes to establish totalitarian rule over a world empire (as

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8 But see Graham, Keenan, & Dowd, 2004. They compare the President’s speech to that of Pope Urban II in 1095, which launched the Crusades, as “call to arms texts.” I am indebted to Joanna Scott for calling this article to my attention.
per the 2006 strategy statement). The analogy does not fit the current adversary or even pre-2001 Al Qaeda very well, of course, since Japan was a major military and economic power fully embarked on expansionist policies in Asia. It was already an empire. Furthermore, the attack was on an American military target, not civilians in the U.S. homeland. Yet the Pearl Harbor analogy also implies a conclusion about how a war following an unjustified and devastating surprise attack will end: victory, unconditional surrender of the adversary, occupation of the enemy’s homeland, and restoration of that enemy to the ranks of civilized nations by transforming it into a democracy. If the war in Iraq is part of the war on terrorism, then the lessons of history are clear.

The Pearl Harbor analogy may also contribute not just to the assumption that the proper response is war but that preemption is essential to a defensive military strategy. If we are at risk of surprise attack, and cannot prevent it (as Roberta Wohlstetter’s classic 1962 study advises, since intelligence services cannot distinguish between signals and noise), then the best strategy is to preempt the adversary. Preemption (which shaded easily into preventive war) was a hallmark of the 2002 National Security Strategy, although it was less prominent in the 2006 version. It helped justify war in Iraq. If the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction had been true, then he could have been capable of an even more horrifying surprise attack than 9/11 or even Pearl Harbor. (It is interesting that what Ramzi Youseff, Bin Laden, and others invoke with regard to the Pacific war is the American use of atomic weapons against Japan.) Woodward (2002, p. 22-23, also p. 283) reports that surprise was one of Donald Rumsfeld’s major themes when he became secretary of defense. Rumsfeld is said to have handed out copies of Wohlstetter’s book to subordinates. Woodward also reports
that the President wrote in his diary on the night of September 11: “The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today” (p.37). The comparison between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor remained a main theme. For example, in December, 2005, on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the President gave a speech emphasizing the continuities between the two events to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington: “Like generations before us, we're taking the fight to those who attacked us -- and those who share their murderous vision for future attacks. Like generations before us, we've faced setbacks on the path to victory -- yet we will fight this war without wavering. And like the generations before us, we will prevail” (Bush, 2005).

*Munich.* The Munich analogy is arguably even more compelling than the Pearl Harbor analogy. It is pervasive and persistent in American history. Its lesson is that any concession to an adversary is fatal. “Appeasement” is the worst option to choose when confronted by an aggressor. Chamberlain’s sincere attempt to avoid war by accepting what appeared to be minor, even justifiable, demands on Hitler’s behalf only made war more likely.⁹ Restraint and patience only encouraged aggression. The enemy, as in the Japanese case, was a totalitarian empire that aspired to world domination. Germany was also a deceptive enemy, pretending to be satisfied with small gains while hiding a desire for world conquest. Victory required unconditional surrender, military occupation, and democratization, as in Japan. In both cases, the long term outcome was highly positive: a stable and democratic ally. This part of the analogy is applied to Afghanistan and Iraq.

⁹ In fact David Brooks (2006) referred to one wing of the conservative foreign policy camp as “Churchillians.” Churchillians “know that occasionally civilization is confronted by enemies so ideologically extreme and so greedy for domination that decent nations must use military power to confront and defeat them.”
not Al Qaeda. But if success in Iraq is defined as success in the war on terrorism, then the analogy is prescriptive.

Second World War. The reference to an “axis of evil” in the January 2002 State of the Union speech also recalled the axis powers of the second world war. Thus states labeled as supporters of terrorism (Iran and Syria primarily) become the equivalent of 1930s and 1940s Germany and Italy. In addition, the general World War II framing surely contributed to the use of the labels “Islamic fascists” and “Islamofascist,” terms used by the President in 2005 and 2006. Although the use of the label appears to date at least back to 1990, well before the war on terrorism, the President’s references provoked a storm of controversy.

These analogies contribute to a view of the global jihadist movement, described by the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate as “Al Qaeda, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells,” and as “decentralized, lacking a coherent global strategy, and increasingly diffuse,” as a monolithic and powerful enemy. The analogy makes the threat appear uniform contrary to its characterization by experts as diverse and dispersed. The often loosely connected jihadist movement appears something like interwar fascism, a genuine mass movement capable of capturing state power, rather than an ideology with limited appeal. The NIE finds that the jihadist idea

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of governance is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. In the view of the intelligence community, then, in practice jihadism does not resemble the historical examples of national socialism in Germany or fascism in Italy.

_The Cold War._ The war on terrorism is also compared to the Cold War. This analogy predicts that the war will be long, a “generational struggle” according to the strategy statements, rather than over in a matter of years as World War II was. It also predicts that the opponent will eventually collapse if sufficient military power is exerted. Holmes (2006) gleans from Fukuyama’s analysis of the administration’s Iraq decisions the thought that the administration misunderstood the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, attributing it to the pressure of American military power. In thinking that an adversary can be completely destroyed by superior force, administration policy makers have apparently forgotten that the strength of the Soviet Union was consistently overestimated. The Cold War required a state of permanent crisis, with the nation constantly under mortal threat, and this perception of the world carried over to the post Cold War world. Furthermore, the analogy encouraged the use of old Cold War “tropes,” such as charging opponents of one’s policy with being “soft” on Communism/terrorism. Holmes contends: “Under such conditions, a counterterrorism policy that aims at extirpating the terrorist threat is bound to be delusional. Promoted by an unsound analogy with the end of the Soviet Union, such utopian impatience can also be profoundly self-defeating, especially if it prompts policy-makers to focus irrationally on the wrong part of the threat – for example, on a minor danger that happens to lend itself to definitive obliteration. Saddam Hussein comes to mind.”
The Vietnam War. The war metaphor also permits critics of the war in Iraq to call up a hotly contested competing analogy: the Vietnam War. As early as May, 2004, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College issued a report arguing that the military dimensions of the two wars could not be compared (and referring to a host of press articles making the comparison) (Record and Terrill, 2004). They conclude, however, that “reasoning by historical analogy is an inherently risky business” (p.61). Policymakers’ knowledge of history is often poor, and they are predisposed to choose analogies that suit a preferred policy. Thus proponents of the Iraq war embraced the Munich analogy, and opponents cited Vietnam. The authors acknowledge that, as in Vietnam in 1965, U.S. power and prestige have been massively committed. Under no circumstances other than the descent of Iraq into civil war [italics added] should the U.S. abandon Iraq as it did Vietnam in 1975. And we should not underestimate the insurgents in Iraq, as we did the Vietcong. They recommend that policy makers consider two instructive dimensions of the analogy: the need for effective state-building, on the one hand, and the need for domestic public support, on the other. Furthermore, policy makers should note that Iran might come to play the role of North Vietnam.

In December, 2005, the President sharply criticized Howard Dean, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, for making the analogy (because it assumes that the U.S. will not win). In the spring of 2006, Stephen Biddle writing in Foreign Affairs also denied the relevance of the analogy. Although he thinks that the parallel does not hold (Vietnam was a Maoist peoples’ war, Iraq is a communal civil war), he argues that the
administration is actually following the same policies. Changing policy will require replacing “a Manichaean narrative featuring evil insurgents and a noble government with a complicated story of multiparty interethnic intrigue.”

Understanding the contested nature of the Vietnam analogy may help explain why the administration resists the charge that Iraq is slipping into civil war (see Sambanis, 2006). And why former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the term “insurgents” in favor of “enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government” (see Ulrich, 2005).

Concluding Comments: Psychological Aspects of the War Metaphor

Why does the administration’s conception of counterterrorism policy as a “war” matter? It seems clear that the metaphorical and analogical reasoning this construct displays is a genuine reflection of key policy makers’ views, not just a way of framing the issue in order to mobilize the public behind a new policy that is potentially more risky and costly than past responses to terrorism. The war metaphor is totalistic and extreme in its demands. Arguably, it was adopted in light of the immensity of damage and national hurt produced by the 9/11 attack. In addition, it might have suited the beliefs, policy objectives, and personal styles of key decision makers and was useful in implementing policy interests that entered with the Bush administration. It has insinuated itself into the public discourse about counterterrorism, and guided policy but has also met challenges because of lack of fit and the availability of counter-analogies with different lessons of history.

Another analogy cited by critics is the British experience in Iraq after the first world war. See Rayburn, J. (2006, March-April). The last exit from Iraq, Foreign Affairs, 85, 29-40.
Suskind (2006) offers a motivational explanation for the relatively unchallenged development of the war metaphor and its acceptance in the early days:

...9/11 allowed for preparation to meet opportunity. The result: potent, wartime authority was granted to those guiding the ship of state. A final, customary check in wartime – demonstrable evidence of troop movements or casualties, of divisions on the move, with correspondents filing dispatches – was also missing once the Afghanistan engagement ended. In the wide, diffuse ‘war on terror,’ so much of it occurring in the shadows – with no transparency and only perfunctory oversight – the administration could say anything it wanted to say” and the public was motivated to accept its interpretation in order to escape the ambiguity, and attain cognitive clarity and closure. (p. 98-99)

The war metaphor focuses on an actor who employs terrorism as a tactic, and is defined as the enemy. The psychological rationale of war is to bring the enemy to its knees, and convince it and its support base, that terrorism is counterproductive. In this sense, the logic of warfare is to address that part of the terrorists’ belief system which claims that terrorism is efficient, and to demonstrate compellingly that it is not (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

Does this “logic” work? Cumulative experience (in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ireland, or Palestine) suggests that the use of military force to “prove” the inefficacy of terrorism may have limited success. Typically, the effects of military strikes against terrorist targets have had short term effects involving temporary interference with terrorists’ ability to launch their operations. They have not undermined their motivation, and may have even boosted it (Kaplan et al., 2005) due to the enmity that foreign
occupation typically engenders, and to the injustice and excesses that the waging of war typically entails. In this connection, Cordesman (2006) recently stated that the “US ...needs to give avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage the same priority as directly destroying the enemy” (p.15). A recent news item (June 25, 2007; Aliza Tang/Canadian Press and Associated Press) states that more Afghan civilians were killed by US or NATO forces (namely 203 from January 1st to June 23rd) than in attacks by the Taliban (namely 178). In response President Hamid Karzai “directed…his anger at foreign forces for being careless and viewing Afghan life as cheap” (ibid.). Evoking such anger is a seemingly unavoidable (if unintended) consequence of waging a massive war against the terrorists and the result of conflating the “war on terrorism” with interventions in insurgencies and civil wars.

The perpetrators of terrorism claim considerable staying power, as well as numerous achievements on the ground. The Hezbollah boasts having forced the withdrawal from Lebanon of the French, the Italians and the Americans in 1984, and of the Israelis in 2000. Hamas credits its waves of suicidal terrorism for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005. The destabilization in Iraq perpetrated by terrorist attacks, with partial involvement of Al Qaeda, highlights the considerable hardships of defeating terrorism by military force alone. The apparent staying power of the terrorists, and their survival of massive assaults by superior military powers, in a war that they themselves declared on the U.S. in 1996, feeds the belief that the West is vulnerable and that it tends to run out of steam, so that despite momentary setbacks (like that in Afghanistan), insurgency will prove efficient and, ultimately, victorious.
Nor is the war concept attuned to the sources of terrorists’ motivation. By framing
the issue squarely in terms of “good” versus “evil” it minimizes attempts to appreciate the
other side’s concerns, address the frustrations and grievances that may have fostered
terrorism, as well as the belief systems (jihadism) that may have lent it ideological
sustenance.

Finally, framing counterterrorism as war may exact considerable costs from
society. It threatens to corrupt its values, disrupt its orderly functioning and reshuffle its
priorities. We have already commented on war’s all encompassing nature. It calls for the
disproportionate investment of a nation’s resources, with correspondingly less left for
other concerns, including the economy, health, welfare or education (McCauley, 2007).
For a nation at war, security is the overriding goal, and it trumps (or renders less
psychologically accessible) alternative national objectives or ethical values. As a
consequence, putative means to security become liberated from constraints usually
dictated by alternative objectives (Kruglanski, et al., 2002). “Collateral damage,” ethnic
profiling, overly harsh interrogation tactics, unlimited internment of suspects, etc., may
all be condoned given the centrality of security concerns, and, excused by the uniqueness
of circumstances the war concept implies.

Most problematic is the difficulty with war termination. Despite the
administration’s cautions concerning a “long war” and the attempts to redefine “victory,”
inevitably the image in the public’s mind is that of a surrender ceremony on the deck of
the USS Missouri, marking the unconditional surrender of the adversary and cessation of
conflict. Imprisoned by the metaphor, as long as terrorist bombs keep exploding, the war
is not over, and the nation must remain on a war footing.
**Counterterrorism as Law Enforcement**

*Magnitude of the challenge to state authority.* Some of the drawbacks of the war metaphor are addressable in the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism. These two approaches share an important commonality in that both constitute major ways in which states are geared to protect their citizens from harm. The choice between them will often depend on the perceived magnitude of the challenge, law enforcement constituting the response to a relatively restricted challenge to the state’s authority, and war to a massive one. For instance, on February 16, 1993 Ramzi Yousef and his co-conspirators placed a truck bomb in the parking garage of the World Trade Center that resulted in six deaths, hundreds of injuries and a property damage not exceeding half a billion dollars (McCauley, in press). The response to this event was entirely in terms of law enforcement, including extensive police work, prosecution, trials and convictions.

Compare this with the devastating attack on the WTC on 9/11/01 that caused close to 3,000 deaths and untold tens of billions in damage. The response to that attack was war. The implicit attributional logic of such differential responding could be that a high magnitude effect requires a cause of a comparable magnitude (Kelley, 1971), which elimination, in turn, requires a commensurately powerful response.

*Qualitative differences between war and law enforcement.* Beyond the difference in response magnitude, the war and the law enforcement metaphors have qualitatively distinct implications for how terrorism is understood and reacted to. Whereas the war metaphor is focused on the actor defined as the enemy, the law enforcement metaphor is focused on the act (the “crime”) deemed unacceptable and unlawful. In support of this approach, Shibley Telhami (2004) argued that “if American efforts focus on defeating
'terrorist means’ defined as the deliberate targeting of civilians, the United States would have a better chance of succeeding.. [This would involve rallying] the international community to apply the principle universally… In this way a deliberate attack on civilian targets in one state would become an attack on all” (p.10). Similarly, senator John Kerry in a presidential candidates’ debate in South Carolina in 2004 stated that though counterterrorism will be “occasionally military,” it should be “primarily an intelligence and law enforcement operation that requires cooperation around the world” (Will, 2006). The United Nations has never been able to agree on a definition of terrorism, but has developed several articles prohibiting particular acts, such as airline hijacking, and violence against diplomatic persons, again consistent with a law enforcement metaphor.

Beginnings and endings. In a recent chapter, McCauley (2007) systematically compared the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism to the war metaphor, and identified a number of major differences between them. Unlike war that typically has clear cut beginnings and endings13, law enforcement is a continual enterprise. Law enforcement begins with a clear infraction of a criminal code. War on the other hand, if defined less clearly and is determined somewhat subjectively by “a declaration from one government to another that a state of war exists between them.” (McCauley, 2007, p.58). Unlike criminal investigation that requires investigation or discovery, war requires neither, and “an attack or ultimatum is typically the clear occasion of war.” (ibid.)

Thus, in a videotaped conference that took place on May 26th, 1998 bin Laden formally declared war on the United States. “By God's grace,” bin Laden says on the tape, “we have formed with many other Islamic groups and organizations in the Islamic

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13 We enter a state of conventional war on a specific date (like December 8, 1941) and leave on another date.
world a front called the International Islamic Front to do jihad against the crusaders and Jews.” And President George W. Bush in a speech to the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 labeled the 9/11/01 attack as an act of war. In his words “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country” (Bush, 2001).

In contrast to the state of war which extraordinary nature requires a special declaration by a nation’s leadership, law enforcement represents an ongoing concern as the potential for crime is ever present in orderly societies, arguably serves important function for society (Durkheim, 1947), and presumably will even exist “in a society of saints” (Erickson, 1966, p. 4). Moreover, war’s special nature, and presumed circumscribed duration justify pumping extraordinary resources into the war effort. By contrast, as an ongoing concern law enforcement must compete for resources with problems of education, jobs, housing and welfare policy. Taking issue with the terrorism as war framework, an opinion piece by General Wesley Clark and Kal Raustalia (2007) argues that terrorists should be viewed as criminals, and “ought to be pursued, tried and convicted in the courts.”

Compatibility with alternative societal concerns. Because it forms part of a comprehensive network of arrangements designed to address society’s varied needs, the law enforcement approach is less likely than the war approach to collide with alternative values and rights similarly protected under such arrangements. McCauley (2007) put it as follows: “In time of war, talk about money cost or opportunity cost or human rights cost is unpatriotic; in the criminal justice system, these costs can be counted in the balance of competing values and priorities” (p.62).
Perceived violations of human rights, afforded by the war approach to counterterrorism, evoked considerable criticism both in the U.S. and abroad. Washington has not been unresponsive to these concerns. Specifically, “The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Bush administration’s attempts to exclude Guantánamo from U.S. legal protections or to prosecute alleged terrorists before military commissions that violate the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. Congress rejected a Bush administration claim that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment does not protect non-Americans held by U.S. forces outside the United States. These developments, coupled with revelations of the CIA’s secret detention centers and growing public pressure, led President Bush to close those secret prisons, at least for the moment. Uniformed members of the U.S. military, successfully resisting pressure from their civilian superiors, have reaffirmed rules against the abusive techniques that those superiors had authorized (Roth, 2004).

A major advantage of the law enforcement approach to counterterrorism is its focused nature. If one conceives of the actual terrorists as an apex of a pyramid, at the base of which are sympathizers who support the terrorists goals even if they aren’t themselves prepared to engage in terrorist attacks, law enforcement is much more likely to target the apex and avoid the base. This suggests precision of counterterrorist initiatives, and minimization of possible overreactions to terrorist strikes.

Minimization of costly mistakes. McCauley (2007) points out that the costs of mistakes incurred in course of counterterrorist operations are considerably smaller under the law enforcement (versus the war) metaphor. Civilian casualties, nearly unavoidable in bombing raids of terrorist targets implementing the war metaphor, are unlikely under law
enforcement policies. As already noted, such casualties (the so called “collateral
damage”) could represent a major factor fueling anger and increasing their support of
terrorist organizations (Kaplan et al., 2005). As an Irish Republican Army member
remarked “the British security forces are the best recruitin’ officer we have” (Geraghty
2000, p. 36).

“The criminal justice system also makes mistakes, but these mistakes are more
likely to lead to imprisoning the wrong people than killing the wrong people” (McCauley,
penalty—execution—is used rarely in criminal justice, even in democracies such as the
United States that have not banned its use” (p. 9). In contrast, the killing of innocents in
war is seen as inevitable and morally acceptable, even if sad and deplorable. As Ghate
(2003) put it “The moral principle is: the responsibility for all deaths in war lies with the
aggressor who initiates force, not with those who defend themselves” (p.1); in so far as
each side tends to view the other as aggressor—the killing of innocents on both sides is
treated as excusable.

*Focus on the act.* Another advantage of the law enforcement metaphor is its focus
on the criminal act, rather than on the actor vaguely defined as the “enemy.” This reduces
the tendency of those who combat the terrorists to stereotype them, and to discriminate
against (innocent) members of the broad social categories to which they may belong (e.g.
Muslims, Saudi Arabians, Mid Easterners) (McCauley, 2007).

*Terrorism as crime.* Lafree & Dugan (2004) enumerated several major features
that terrorism and crime share in common. Thus, “Terrorism, like common crime, is
disproportionately committed by young males” (p. 56), “sustained levels of terrorism,
like sustained levels of crime, undermine social trust” (ibid). Primarily, however, “terrorism is ...closely related to breaking of laws” (p. 53), as does crime. As Osama bin Laden expressed it: “let history be a witness that I am a criminal” (Rahimullah, 1999).

Indeed, terrorists often engage in crime as conventionally defined. And “while terrorist activities typically constitute multiple crimes (e.g. Murder, kidnapping, extortion), for many nations a specific crime of terrorism does not exist” (LaFREE & DUGAN, 2004, p. 57). Accordingly, ”suspected terrorists in the United States are typically prosecuted for a variety of criminal offenses rather than terrorism...in a study of federal prosecution of terrorists in the U.S. from 1982 to 1989, SMITH & ORVIS (1993, p. 669) show that the most common subjects of terrorist prosecutions have been racketeering (30.2% of the total), machine guns, destructive devices and other firearms (16.7%), and conspiracy (9.3%). This situation began to change in the United States after the mid 1990s, and especially after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, even today, most persons suspected of terrorism in the U.S. are being prosecuted not for terrorism per se, but for a range of crimes commonly associated with terrorism…”

Though terrorist activities as such are often classifiable as criminal, terrorists often engage in additional criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, bank robberies, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and smuggling, aimed at financing terrorist operations. For instance, in 1994, Reuters News Agency quoted Interpol's chief drugs officer, Iqbal Hussain Rizvi, as saying that “Drugs have taken over as the chief means of financing terrorism” (NAQVI, 1994). Because the law enforcement system is oriented and equipped to cope with criminality in its varied forms, it is ipso facto equipped to cope with those aspects of the terrorists’ operation that are criminal in the conventional sense of the term.
Police work. But the efficacy of law enforcement as an approach to counterterrorism extends even further. Experience of the Israelis and the Brits suggests that effective counterterrorism often resembles painstaking police work more than it resembles war. McCauley (2007) notes that “Effective police work requires understanding a local culture, knowing the details of social and physical geography in a local area, developing local relationships and cultivating local sources of information ... modern army … is ill prepared for police work or the kind of economic and community development work that can support effective police work. At a minimum, effective police work requires speaking the local language, but learning foreign languages is not typically a high priority in military training. (p. 61)

International cooperation in counterterrorism is also more likely under the law enforcement versus the war approach. According to John Kerry’s analysis (described by the New Yorker magazine of October 10, 2004) cooperation between Pakistani and British law enforcement agencies has shown that “many of the interdiction tactics that cripple drug lords, including governments working jointly to share intelligence, patrol borders, and force banks to identify suspicious customers can also be some of the most useful tools in the war on terror.” McCauley states in this connection (2007) that: “International cooperation is crucial for fighting international terrorists... International police cooperation is a better model of this kind of sharing than international military cooperation; police and security services are more likely than the military to have useful information about terrorist individuals and terrorist groups” (p. 61).

International cooperation. Whereas the international community is basically in favor of law and order, and hence likely to support international law enforcement treaties
aimed at stopping terrorism, the war metaphor might be too committing and demanding for numerous states to embrace, it might encourage neutrality in the struggle against the terrorist “enemy,” and sitting on the fence.

For instance, in 2003 while political tensions between the United States and France ran strong because of France's opposition to the Iraqi war, there has been highly effective cooperation between American and French law enforcement since 9/11. Thus, a joint American-French investigation effected the bringing to justice of Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber. Similarly, France and the US shared evidence in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, allegedly involved in the 9/11 attacks. International cooperation in law enforcement resulted in the apprehension and trials of suspected terrorists in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, and other European countries (Nacos, 2003). Nonetheless, as observed ruefully by the secretary general of Interpol, one of the impediments to sharing information through the international police organization is that states supporting terrorism belong to Interpol, in particular Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya (personal communication, interview with Secretary General of Interpol, by Jerrold Post, 1986).

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Law Enforcement Metaphor

The law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism offers appreciable advantages. Primarily, it avoids some of the major pitfalls of the war metaphor. It affords an approach to counterterrorism that is focused on the actual perpetrators and that balances security needs with human rights concerns. Thus, it may minimize the outrage (and support for terrorism) that civilian casualties, human rights abuses, or stereotyping and discrimination commonly inspire. Moreover, it rests on solid professionalism of police
work and intelligence gathering efforts and encourages international cooperation that transcends shifting political contingencies. In view of these obvious advantages McCauley (in press) asserted that “Criminal justice can be a treatment of choice for a chronic terrorist threat” (p. 22).

Nonetheless, a careful scrutiny suggests that the law enforcement approach to terrorism also has limitations. A main issue is that terrorism, unlike typical crime, is ideologically inspired (e.g., by religious, ethno-nationalist, or political beliefs). As LaFree & Dugan (2004, pp. 59-60) noted “criminals often have selfish, personal motivations and their actions are not intended to have consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the criminal act. By contrast, the fundamental aim of terrorists is often a political motivation to overthrow or change the dominant political system … few criminals see their crimes as altruistic behavior. By contrast, many terrorists see themselves as altruistic. In this vein, Hoffman (1998, p. 43) claims that terrorists frequently believe that they are serving a cause that will achieve a greater good for some wider constituency…” In a similar vein, Pape (2005) stated that “altruistic motives… play an important role (in terrorism)” (p.187), Gunaratna (2007) noted that “what actually motivates Al Qaeda is not power, wealth or fame but an ideological belief…” (p. 29), and Atran (2004) observed that terrorists “…are motivated not by personal comfort or immediate gain but rather by religious or ideological conviction and zeal” (p. 68-69).

These differences between crime and terrorism have far reaching implications for counterterrorism. Because of their ideological commitments and collective motivations terrorists often inspire admiration and respect on part of the larger communities in which they are embedded. The “cult of the suicide bomber” is widespread in West Bank and
Gaza, for example. During much of the second Intifada public opinion polls conducted among the Palestinians have revealed support for suicide attacks against Israelis to be at the 80% level. Thus, terrorist activities in Palestine and other locations often are anchored in a solid base of community support.

The reason this matters is that effective police work requires extensive community support, including the collection of background information and its transmittal to the law enforcement agents (Siegel & Senna, 2004). As Akerlof & Yellen (1994) remarked: “the major deterrent to crime is not an active police presence but rather the presence of knowledgeable civilians, prepared to report crimes and cooperate in police investigations” (p. 174). In a larger sense, effective police work requires driving a wedge between the community and the criminals, and the same applies to affective and physical separation of the insurgents or the terrorists from their communities. In this vein, Ucko (2007, p. 63) comments on the successful campaign of the British and Commonwealth forces against the insurgent Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in 1948-1960. Specifically, the construction of New Villages built as progressive communities where the Chinese villagers could own land, work, engage in local politics and move freely...effectively minimized the incidence of ‘collateral damage’- an inflammatory and counterproductive feature of most counter-insurgency campaigns... [Too] the separation of combatants and civilians made the MRLA more desperate and therefore easier to spot. Denied access to the civilian population, the MRLA found it increasingly difficult to attract fresh recruits, particularly as the political and economic opportunities afforded to the inhabitants of the New Villages had removed...
the primary incentive to join the guerilla ranks… Gaining information from the wider population [required] the provision of security, of services and of a political strategy deemed largely legitimate by the populace and as worthy of support. (Ucko, 2007, p. 66)

On the flip side of the coin, community cooperation with law enforcement may be difficult to secure if terrorists’ activities are supported by their communities, as they often are. In such a case collaboration with law enforcement is often seen as treason to the cause. For instance, according to a recent account, in the West Bank-- approximately one person a day is killed having been accused of collaborating with the Israeli security forces (B’tselem). Thus, despite the Israelis’ successes in information gathering, arrests of suspected terrorists, targeted assassinations, etc. their law enforcement efforts are a daily struggle against stubborn community resistance.

In this connection too, law enforcement attempts aimed at defeating terrorism may be countered by a widespread perception in communities whose legitimate rights the terrorist are claiming to defend that law is sometimes devised and followed hypocritically. For example, (1) Many Palestinians would argue that the U.S.’s refusal to hold Israel to UN resolutions is at odds with international law; (2) the US definition of terrorism carefully excludes state actors from any culpability; (3) the US refusal to submit to the legal oversight of the World Court diminishes the credibility of American claims of pursuing justice through law.

Finally, despite relatively successful policing operations including intricate local knowledge, effective information gathering apparatus, and so on—-attempts to quell terrorist activities have often been unsuccessful in the long run. The various ethno
nationalist movements (e.g. in Algiers, Israel, or Kenya) have used terrorism successfully to attain national independence for their peoples. The research literature on human goals (see Kruglanski et al., 2002 for a review) suggests that the higher the importance of a goal—the greater the number and variety of means to that goal that individuals are likely to generate. Terrorists’ ideological commitment particularly if supported by their broader community, suggests the supreme importance that they attach to their goals.

Law enforcement operations however successful may be countered by the terrorists’ creativity in finding effective countermeasures to the counterterrorism initiatives (Kruglanski et al, 2007). Difficulties of finding escape routes and the costs involved in keeping an intricate network of safe houses may prompt the “invention” of suicide terrorism. Hard to penetrate boundaries, may lead to increased use of rocket technology that overcomes distance and barriers (Sharvit, 2005). Indeed, as compared to common criminals terrorists have been often credited with considerable inventiveness (Lafree & Dugan, 2004).

Ultimately, it seems that despite several advantages, the law enforcement metaphor exhibits a partial mismatch with the realities of terrorism. Especially, it may temporarily hamper the terrorists’ ability to launch attacks without exerting an appreciable effect on their motivation to do so. To the extent that terrorism is part and parcel of a broader, ideologically based, social movement it is distinct from mere crime in significant ways.

Counterterrorism as Containment of a Social Epidemic

Partitioning the ingredients of Jihadist terrorism. Both the war and the law enforcement metaphors of counterterrorism deal with the violent manifestations of
terrorism, rather than with the constellation of factors that may have engendered terrorism in the first place. These latter factors are addressed by the epidemiological metaphor of terrorism considered next.

The epidemic spread of ideas has long been a subject of study. In *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds*, Charles Mackay in 1843 wrote of the tulip mania that consumed the Netherlands in the first part of the 17th century, especially 1636-1637, when a speculative frenzy developed in the tulip market, with vast fortunes were spent for a single tulip bulb. Indeed, the term “tulipomania” was applied to the so-called dot.com bubble, 1995-2001. Gustav Le Bon’s, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1896) addressed herd behavior and crowd psychology, emphasizing the role of the media in spreading ideas. In *Crowds and Power*, the Nobelist Elias Canetti likened the spread of the psychology of mass hatred to a forest fire or a flood.

The public health epidemiological model originally conceptualized in response to infectious disease epidemics was usefully applied to the epidemic of terror that followed the 9/11 attacks by a special committee of the Institute of Medicine (ref.) *Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Science, 2003.* They observe that the model of transmission of infectious disease can clarify the epidemic-like transmission of ideas. Their model utilizes what has been designated the epidemiologic triad, including (1) an external agent, (2) a susceptible host, and (3) an environment that brings them together. An important element of the environment is what is known as (4) the vector (p. 23). So, for example, for a malaria epidemic, such as that which almost brought the Panama Canal project to a halt, the pathogen was the protozoan *Plasmodium Falciparum*; the vector, the *Anopheles*
mosquito; the vulnerable host was the non-immune population, and the environment the tropical jungle with standing water that fostered the breeding of the mosquitoes. A major contribution to countering the epidemic was preventive methods, such as spraying the ponds of stagnant water in which the mosquitoes bred, protective clothing, screening and mosquito nets; chemoprophylaxis is currently employed to protect susceptible individuals, traveling or working in endemic areas.

In applying this metaphor to the psychological reactions to 9/11 the Institute of Medicine study characterized as the Agent, the violent act or threat, as the Host, affected individuals and populations, as the Vector or vehicle, the way terror is propagated, including the role of the media, and as the Environment characteristics both of the physical and the social environment. (p. 29)

The epidemiological metaphor of terrorism was depicted in a recent paper by Stares and Yacoubian of the United States Institute of Peace (Stares and Yacoubian, 2006). The authors note the several practical advantages that the epidemiological approach may afford. First, it guides intelligible questions as to “… the origins, geographical and social contours of an outbreak, where is the disease concentrated, how is it transmitted, who is most at risk or “susceptible” to infection, as well as why some portions of society may be less susceptible or immune” (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006, p. 88). Secondly, “epidemiologists recognize that diseases emerge and evolve as a result of a complex interactive process between people, pathogens and the environment in which they live” (ibid). Thirdly and relatedly, “just as epidemiologists view disease as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon so public health officials have come to recognize that success in controlling and rolling back an epidemic typically results from a carefully
orchestrated systematic, prioritized multi pronged effort to address each of its constituent elements” (ibid).

Stares and Yacoubian (2006) adopt the classic epidemiological partitioning of factors involved in an epidemic into the host, the agent, the vector and the environment described above. In their scheme, “The agent refers to the pathogen (e.g. a virus, or bacterium) that causes disease, the host refers to a person infected by the disease (“infective”), while the environment refers to a variety of external factors that affect both agent and host… the vectors (are) the key pathways or conduits that help propagate the disease” (ibid., p. 89).

In the specific application to Jihadist terrorism, the agent refers to the militant Islamist ideology, the environment “refers to key factors specific to the Muslim world that promote exposure to Islamist militancy – conflict, political repression, economic stagnation, and social alienation… Vectors… refer to a variety of known conduits… used to propagate the ideology and associated action agendas such as mosques, prisons, madrassas, the Internet, satellite television and diasporic networks” (ibid., p. 90). It is important to emphasize in this context that the pathogenic ideology identified by Stares and Yacoubian (2006) is militant Islamism, an ideology which may be adhered to by a group significantly larger than the terrorists per se (as in the “pyramid” model depicted above). Thus a broader population may approve of what the terrorists are doing, as well as gratefully accept their financial and logistical aid to the community at large without taking the leap to “killing in the name of God.” Nonetheless, this larger supportive “sentiment pool” is not irrelevant to counterterrorism as it constitutes the population of
which some members may be particularly prone to move to active militancy, prompted, for example, by the death of a close friend or a relative.

In specifying the four epidemiologic elements of Agent, Host, Vector, and Environment, the epidemiological metaphor usefully focuses the challenges of counter-terrorism on these four essential ingredients discussed specifically in what follows.

Ideology. It is of interest to consider more fully the psychological ingredients that form the gist of the agent in this model, the terrorism-justifying ideology, and lend it motivating force.\textsuperscript{14} Basically, such key elements include (1) a depiction of some sort of collective grievance (2) attribution of responsibility for the grievance to some actor (e.g. a state, a regime, or a form of governance) identified as a culprit, (3) portrayal of terrorism as a morally justifiable as well as an efficient tool for redressing the grievance (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006), (4) the bestowal of status and prestige on those willing to risk or sacrifice their lives for the cause by engaging in terrorist activities. Those elements may exist in any terrorism justifying ideology, e.g. of social, nationalist or religious type.

The ideology articulated by a hate-mongering leader provides a sense-making device for the group, and in identifying an external cause for the members’ frustration and alienation helps promote a potent “us versus them” social psychology, setting in motion powerful group dynamics centered on the ideology. Indeed, a principal conclusion of the Committee on the Psychological Roots of terrorism, which developed a

\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Stares & Yacoubian (2005, p. 89) distinguish “two primary strains [of Islamist militant ideology] (1) a transnational Salafist/jihadist ideology as espoused by Al Qaeda, and (2) a nationalist/insurgent Islamist militant ideology as espoused by groups such as the Hizbollah, Hamas, and some of the Kashmiri militant groups
consensus document for the March 2005, International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security was that group, organizational and social psychologies with a particular emphasis on collective identity, provided the greatest analytic power in understanding terrorism and its spread. (Post, 2005”Psychological Roots of Terrorism” Volume 1, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism 2005, Vol. 1).

Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003) carried out extensive interviews with 35 Middle Eastern terrorists incarcerated in Israeli and Palestinian prisons. The contents of these interviews afford glimpses into central facets of terrorists’ ideological reasoning. The following excerpt from one of the interviews contains references to all three ideological ingredients mentioned earlier, namely the grievance, the culprit, and the tool of terrorism for redressing the grievance:

You Israelis are Nazis in your souls and in your conduct. In your occupation you never distinguish between men and women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of collective punishment; you uprooted people from their homeland and from their homes and chased them into exile. You fired live ammunition at women and children. You smashed the stalls of defenseless civilians. You set up detention camps for thousands of people in subhuman conditions. You destroyed homes and turned children into orphans. You prevented people from making a living, you stole their property, you trampled on their honor. Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way. (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003, p. 178)
An ideology constitutes a belief system, and belief systems are typically anchored in a shared reality defining a world view of a given group (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). The scope of such group can very from a limited network of close friends and associates (Sageman, 2004) to a broader community with which one identifies.

Relevant in this connection is the observation that group dynamics differ considerably between social revolutionary and nationalist-separatist type of terrorists (Post, 1984). To join a social revolutionary group may mean to go underground and isolate oneself from the broader society whose workings one is attempting to alter. It is a fundamental decision, which the German Red Army Faction terrorists called, “Der Sprung” (The Leap.), an act which in a certain sense may be seen as rebellion against the parents generation, loyal to the regime. This is the opposite of the generational dynamics of nationalist-separatist groups, who are carrying on the mission of their parents’ generation who itself is dissident, and disloyal to the (foreign or imposed) regime. Members of such groups are often well known and respected in the surrounding community, which values they are expressing in fact.

Not unlike the latter, the jihadist groups are also based on a set of cultural values that they are expressing in practice. These are the values of radical Islamist ideology that has been growing in popularity over the last several decades (Moadel, 2005) and that generates a continuing supply of recruits to terrorism, including suicide terrorism, what Merari has called a “suicide bomber production line”(Merari, 2004). To counter the growing threat of Islamist terrorism it is imperative to understand and address the broader ideological context from which it emerges.
Indeed, major theoretical analyses of terrorism (e.g. Gurr, 1990/1998) have highlighted the broad base of support that terrorist activities require. McCauley (2004) discussed such support in terms of the “pyramid model.” The foundation of the pyramid consists of sympathizers’ with the terrorist cause who may not be prepared themselves to launch terrorist activities. This is the “sentiment pool” on whose support terrorists may count on in times of need. The apex of the pyramid are individuals who actually engage in terrorist operations. According to Silke (2003), “even ‘popular’ terrorist groups… represent a violent and extreme minority within the immediate social group that shares the terrorists’ beliefs and backgrounds. While the terrorist… may be largely tolerated within their communities, the number of individuals actively involved in the campaign of violence is always relatively low” (p. 30).

Gurr (1990/1998) comments that the “erosion of political support is not an immediate cause of decline in terrorist campaigns but an underlying one” (p. 94). For instance, the decline in the 1970s of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) may be attributed to the decline of political support for its activities by the separatist Parti Quebecois. Similarly, the decline in the U.S. of the Weather Underground has been attributed to a withdrawal of public support from the deadly violence it perpetrated. According to Gurr (1990/1998): “The general public’s reaction to the rhetoric, disorder, and violence of this era crystallized in… widespread opposition to the advocacy of radical social change and sharp resentment against groups making extreme demands or using disruptive or violent tactics” (p. 97).

Scope of the support. Though minority groups that espouse terrorism can maintain world views at odds with those of the majority (Asch, 1946; Moscovici, 1980), this may
require considerably greater effort than the maintenance of popular, broadly supported opinions. Maintenance of discrepant views may require isolation of the minority from majority influence and the maintenance of strictly controlled opinion environment that assures consensus around the group’s ideology.

*Presumed Efficacy of Terrorism.* An important component of terrorists’ ideological belief system is that the violence they perpetrate will advance their cause. To interviewees of Post et al. (2003) armed attacks seemed essential to the operation of the organization. One interviewee stated:

> You have to understand that armed attacks are an integral part of the organization’s struggle against the Zionist occupier. There is no other way to redeem the land of Palestine and expel the occupier. Our goals can only be achieved through force, but force is the means, not the end. History shows that without force it will be impossible to achieve independence. The more an attack hurts the enemy, the more important it is. That is the measure. The mass killings, especially the “Martyrdom Operations”, were the biggest threat to the Israeli public and so most effort was devoted to these. The extent of the damage and the number of casualties are of primary importance. (Post et al., 2003, p. 179)

Another interviewee remarked:

> I regarded armed actions to be essential, it is the very basis of my organization and I am sure that was the case in the other Palestinian organizations. An armed action proclaims that I am here, I exist, I am strong, I am in control, I am in the field, I am on the map. (Post et al., 2003, p. 183)
Explicit emphasis on the efficacy of terrorism is apparent in an interviewee’s comment that, “the various armed actions (stabbing, collaborators, martyrdom operations attacks on Israeli soldiers) all had different ratings. An armed action that caused casualties was rated highly… [and seen to be of great efficacy in advancing the organization’s cause.] An armed action without casualties was not rated” (Post et al., p. 183).

Terrorists’ concern with the efficacy of their activities is attested directly by recent data reported by Benmelech and Berreby (2007). These investigators find that in the Palestinian context older and better educated individuals are assigned more important missions (indexed by the size of the population centers attacked and the civilian (vs. military) nature of the targets than younger and less educated individuals. Specifically, age of the suicide bomber was found to be significantly associated with the attack being carried out in a big city, and education of the suicide bomber was significantly associated with the attack being carried out against a civilian (vs. a military) target, both assumed to constitute indices of targets’ importance. The tactical decisions of terrorist organizations to assign more important missions to older and better educated operatives seem to be warranted by factual outcomes: Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) report that “older and educated suicide bombers kill more people in their suicide attacks when assigned to important targets... also older and educated suicide bombers are less likely to fail or to be caught when they attack” (p. 16).

If individuals’ belief in the efficacy of terrorist attacks is an essential moderator of their use, one reason for why a person may desist from terrorism is a loss of faith in their ability to advance the causes they purport to serve. In an interview with Alison Jamieson
(1989), Adriana Faranda, a former member of the Italian Red Brigades who later disengaged from the movement talked about questioning of “Marxism, violence ...[as] a way of working out problems” apparently indicating a loss of faith in terrorism as a tactic (as cited in Horgan, 2005, p.148).

In summary, there is evidence that the belief systems of members of terrorist organizations include as essential ingredients the notions of grievance (e.g., humiliation of one’s nation or one’s religion), culprit (the party deemed responsible for the grievance) and method portraying terrorism as an efficient tactic for attaining the terrorists’ objectives (i.e., for addressing the grievance). Of considerable importance is the fact that as with any ideology or belief system, a terrorism supporting belief system is grounded in a shared social reality (Festinger, 1950; Hardin & Higgins, 1996), that is, in a consensual support for the ideology within one’s relevant reference group, whether it is a small cluster of intimates or one’s broader community.

The vectors of terrorism: (1) The mosque. Post et al. (2003) report that the mosque was consistently cited as the place where most members were initially introduced to the Palestinian cause. Authority figures from the mosque were prominent in all conversations with group members, and most dramatically so for members of the Islamist organizations. The unquestioning reverence of Allah and other authorities appears to be instilled in Palestinian Muslims at a young age and it continues to be evident in the individual members’ subservience to the larger organization. The preconditioning of absolute acceptance of authority seems to be most explicit among members of the Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. One interviewee stated:
My initial political awareness came during the prayers at the mosque. That’s where I was also asked to join religious classes. In the context of these studies, the sheik used to inject some historical background in which he would tell us how we were effectively evicted from Palestine. The sheik also used to explain to us the significance of the fact that there was an IDF military outpost in the heart of the camp. He compared it to a cancer in the human body, which was threatening its very existence. At the age of 16 I developed an interest in religion. I was exposed to the Moslem Brotherhood and I began to pray in a mosque and to study Islam. The Koran and my religious studies were the tools that shaped my political consciousness. The mosque and the religious clerics in my village provided the focal point of my social life. (Post et al., 2003, p. 177)

(2) The madrassas. Do the madrassas, Muslim religious schools, (e.g., in Pakistan, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia) constitute breeding grounds for terrorism, and should they, therefore, be subject to tight governmental supervision and control? Different views have been expressed on this topic with little hard evidence brought in their support. The emerging consensus seems to be that (a) there do exist radical madrassas that preach extremist views and encourage jihadism, though many madrassas focus squarely on religious teachings and eschew politics, (b) if anything, the radical madrassas impart the ideology and foment the positive attitude toward jihad as opposed to providing actual training in the tactics of terrorism and insurgency, (c) attending the madrassas isn’t a necessary condition for recruitment to, or embarkation upon terrorism.

Bergen and Pandey (2005) in a New York Times article titled “The Madrassa Myth” criticize the view that madrassas are an important source of recruits to terrorism.
In their words “While madrassas may breed fundamentalists…such schools do not teach 
the technical or linguistic skills to be an effective terrorist. Indeed, there is little or no 
evidence that madrassas produce terrorists capable of attacking the West.”

Bergen and Pandey (2005) examined the educational backgrounds of “75 terrorists 
behind some of the most significant terrorist attacks against Westerners” and found that 
“a majority had college education often in technical subjects like engineering… Of the 75 
terrorists… only nine attended madrasss, and all of those played a role in one attack- the 
Bali bombing. Even in this instance, however, five college educated ‘masterminds’—
including two university lecturers- helped to shape the Bali plot.”

(3) Self recruitment. In a recent report, Colsaet (2005) wrote of evidence from 
European security agencies for a “growing tendency of self-radicalization and self-
recruitment of individuals [so that] self recruitment now appears to have become a more 
important source of jihadi recruitment than any organised international network of 
recruiters” (p.6). Colsaet (2005) characterizes self recruitment as 

the result of an individual track of self-radicalization outside usual meeting places 
such as mosques. It more often than not involves individuals with college education 
(Bergen & Pandey, 2005)… It mixes a psychological process of personal 
reidentification … implying searching (through chat rooms, prisons, backroom 
meetings) for others with a similar world view… In this process groupthink 
gradually eliminates alternative views, simplifies reality and dehumanizes all who 
are not subscribing to their extreme views (p. 6-7).

Indeed, it is now estimated that some 80% of new recruits to the global Salafi jihad 
emerge from the diaspora. Sons and daughter of Muslim émigrés to Western Europe who
emigrated for a better life, they have not found acceptance within the host society and have become radicalized within radical mosques in Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium Netherlands, Spain, etc. (Post & Sheffer, 2007).

Experts agree that the internet is playing an important role in the radicalization and self-recruitment process into terrorist groups; in epidemiologic terms, it constitutes a major vector affording the spread of extremist ideologies. It targets potential recruits’ “soft spots” and inflames their imagination. CBS news of March 4, 2007 recently quoted Army Brigadier General John Custer, head of intelligence at central command, responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan who stated: “Without doubt, the Internet is the single most important venue for the radicalization of Islamic youth. It is estimated that over 5,000 jihadi sites are currently in operation.”

To illustrate the role of the internet as a conduit of terrorists’ tactical planning consider the following message that appeared on an al-Qaeda website four months before the Madrid train station bombing of March, 2004.

In order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq, the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. . . It is necessary to make the utmost use of the upcoming general election in March next year. We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops remain in Iraq after these blows, the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral program.

With the increasing role of the Internet in the socialization of youth, there is a growing hazard of extremist ideas propagated on the Internet contributing to a virtual
community of hatred (Post, 2007). And, well aware of efforts to counter this vector, al Qaeda has provided the following counsel to Muslim internet professionals:

Due to the advances of modern technology, it is easy to spread news, information, articles and other information over the Internet. We strongly urge Muslim internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their own websites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes down before you have done this, you may hold you to account before Allah on the Day of Judgment… This way, even if our sites are closed down, the material will live on with the Grace of Allah. (Al-Qaeda’s websites)


In addition to seeking converts by using the full panoply of website technologies (audio, digital video, etc.) to enhance the presentation of their message, terrorist organizations capture information about the users who browse their websites. Users who seem most interested in the organization's cause or well suited to carrying out its work are then contacted. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet technology to roam online chat rooms and cybercafes, looking for receptive members of the public, particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards and user nets (issue-specific chat rooms and bulletins) can also serve as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits. [Furthermore] some would-be recruits use the Internet to advertise themselves to terrorist organizations. ...More typically,
however, terrorist organizations go looking for recruits rather than waiting for them to present themselves.

The SITE Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based terrorism research group that monitors al Qaeda's Internet communications, has provided chilling details of a high-tech recruitment drive launched in 2003 to recruit fighters to travel to Iraq and attack U.S. and coalition forces there. Potential recruits are bombarded with religious decrees and anti-American propaganda, provided with training manuals on how to be a terrorist, and—as they are led through a maze of secret chat rooms—given specific instructions on how to make the journey to Iraq. (p. 8)

Though the internet may constitute an invaluable tool in the recruitment of terrorist operatives, it is unlikely to constitute a sufficient condition for recruitment. Before they become a part of the individuals’ world view sufficiently crystallized to stir them to action, the notions espoused on terrorists’ websites need to be integrated into the potential recruits’ shared reality evolved through intensive discussion with trusted friends and members of one’s inner circle (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). In a recent report on the recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe, Taarnby (2005) writes that “While there have been examples of top-down recruitment the general trend both before and after 11 September 2001 is largely a bottom-up process. While many European Muslims were sensitized to current issues on the Internet and developed a sense of collective social identity through it, none went straight from interacting on the Internet to Jihad. Personal acquaintances are still required” (p. 50). In the same vein, Sageman’s (2004) research on terrorist networks emphasizes the role of face to face interaction among friends as a major ingredient in the formation of action oriented cells such as involved in the Madrid
3/11/04, or the 7/7/05 London bombings.

*Counterterrorism on the internet.* The internet affords significant possibilities for counterterrorism as well. Two are of particular interest, related to information gathering about terrorist activities, and counterterrorism argumentation respectively. Information gathering activities may include efforts to infiltrate the innermost terrorist websites, and chat rooms in the guise of potential recruits for terrorist missions. For instance, the SITE institute (Search for International Terrorist Entities), “through [their] continuous and intensive examination of extremist websites, public records, and international media reports, as well as through undercover work on both sides of the Atlantic... locates link among terrorist entities and their supporters” (SITE Institute). SITE spokesperson, Rita Katz, cites in her congressional testimony the Christian Science Monitor according to which “information on the SITE website was used within hours of posting to prevent a terrorist attack in Iraq, demonstrating that third party analysis has become a key component of intelligence” (Online Jihadist Threat, p. 3). Furthermore, “the SITE institute has provided intelligence to foreign governments that has aided in preventing jihadists from leaving European countries to join jihadists in foreign countries to attack coalition forces... The European governments determined that the intelligence was indeed actionable and promptly detained the individuals” (ibid).

Counterterrorism argumentation on the internet is exemplified by the Saudi Al-Sakinah (“Tranquility”) campaign, an “independent initiative for online dialogue with Islamists in order to prevent the spread of extremist views via the internet” (MEMRI, 2006). In this project “some 40 ulema and propagators of Islam who have Internet skills enter extremist websites and forums and converse with the participants in order to bring
them to renounce their extremist ideas” (ibid., p. 8). This initiative assisted by psychological and sociological experts in addition to Sunni clerics is claimed to have been “successful in persuading extremists to renounce their views” (ibid).

In summary, the vector component of the epidemiological metaphor focuses attention on several potentially important conduits of the terrorist rhetoric, the radical mosques, and madrassas, the 24/7 cable channels, such as al Jazeera, and increasingly the extremist websites on the internet\textsuperscript{15}. Though possibly insufficient in and of itself to effect conversion to a terrorism-justifying ideology or recruitment for terrorist missions, exposure to such a rhetoric may be necessary to provide the guiding conceptual frame within which embarkation on a terrorism project is carried out.

The susceptible populations: (1) Socialization. The epidemiological metaphor highlights the importance of susceptibility to terrorist rhetoric and its determinants. It is possible to distinguish two general categories of such determinants: (1) early socialization to a terrorism-justifying ideology, and (2) current personal circumstances that render such ideology appealing. Post (2005b) writes about cases in which ideological education into a terrorism glorifying ideology was established early in the socialization process, so that “hatred [was] bred in the bone” (Post, 2005).

Young children’s mentality is especially malleable and vulnerable to persuasion by adults, constituting revered “epistemic authorities” for their targets (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2005). Recently, the Egyptian daily Ruz al Yusuf (of August 18, 2006) has published a report about the Hezbollah Shi’te youth movement “Imam al-Mahdi Scouts.” These

\textsuperscript{15} Beside serving as a recruitment tool, the numerous websites used by the terrorist organizations convey operational knowledge regarding the production of explosives, and the construction of rockets, constitute an avenue of communication between command centers and operational infrastructures, and accomplish important fund raising functions.
children range in age from 8-16, number in the tens of thousands, and are indoctrinated with the ideology of radical Iranian Islam. According to Ruz al Yusuf the objective is “to train high caliber Islamic generation of children who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah (awlad istishhadiyyun). Kindergarten children are an important target audience for the educational efforts of Hamas. On May 31, 2007 Hamas Al-Aqsa TV satellite channel featured an end of the year party kindergartens belonging to the Al-Mujamma’ al-Islami society (a Muslim Brotherhood Society operating in the Gaza Strip). The children paraded in camouflage suits, carried plastic rifles and demonstrated military exercises of various sorts. Then one of the children posed a series of questions answered in the unison by the group, namely “Who is your model? The prophet Muhammad,” “What is your path? Jihad,” “What is your greatest aspiration? To die for the sake of Allah!” (IICC Report). In brief then, the adoption of ideological goals (such as jihad) can represent a shared reality deliberately engineered by an organization, and inculcated in its members from an early age.

(2) Personal circumstances. Personal suffering and frustrations can render individuals particularly vulnerable to terrorism-justifying ideologies. Many of the interviewees of Post et al. (2003) reported growing up or currently living in repressed or limited socio-economic conditions. Their ability to work was regulated, the ability to travel freely was severely restricted and they had felt unable to advance economically. There was a common theme of having been “unjustly evicted” from their land, of being relegated to refugee status or living in refugee camps in a land that was once considered theirs. Many of the interviewees expressed a sense of despair about the future under Israeli rule. Few of the interviewees were able to identify personal goals that were
separate from those of the organization to which they belonged. Most interviewees reported enhanced social status for the families of fallen or incarcerated members. “Success” within the community was defined as fighting for “the cause” – liberation and religious freedom were the values that defined success, not necessarily academic or economic accomplishment. As the young men adopted this view of success, their own self-image became more intimately intertwined with the success of the organization. With no other means to achieve status and “success,” the organization’s success become central to individual identity and provided a “reason for living.”

In a recent analysis of terrorists’ motivations Kruglanski, et al. (2007) suggested that personal traumas stemming from having a relative or friend killed by the enemy, humiliation and shame delivered on hands of one’s fellow group members, alienation and estrangement felt by Muslim minorities in European diasporas (Sageman, 2004) may all produce a sense of significance loss prompting the quest for significance restoration accomplished through the adoption of collectivistic causes.

Spekhard & Akhmedova (2005) carried out an extensive study of Chechen suicide terrorists via interviews with their family members and close associates and with hostages who spoke with the terrorists during the three days siege in Moscow’s Dubrovka theater. All of the interviewees mentioned traumatic events that appeared to alter the course of the fallen terrorists’ lives. Accordingly, the authors concluded: “when we looked for the primary motivation in our sample of terrorists we would have to say that it was trauma in every case” (Spekhard & Akhmedova, 2005, p. 25). Of particular interest, Spekhard and Akhmedova (2005) observed that their subjects sought out ideological inspiration in response to their personal trauma. Specifically, “In the interviews concerning the
accomplished suicide terrorists eighty-two percent (28/34) were secular Muslims prior to their experiences of trauma. Of these twenty-seven had no prior relationship to fundamental militant groups but sought out the Wahhabists radical groups in direct reaction to the traumas they had endured knowing full well of the groups’ beliefs and terrorist practices” (p. 22) It appears then that personal trauma, feelings of alienation, and disenfranchisement, etc., may spur a quest for significance that in cases of a severe intergroup conflict may be afforded by a terrorism-justifying ideology.

In summary, personal suffering and frustrations, represent a significance loss, motivating the quest for significance restoration. Where the direct restoration of one’s lost sense of personal significance seems impossible, the individual may seek to do so indirectly through alternative means, including an identification with a collective loss (one’s group’s relative deprivation) that affords a clear path to renewed significance via participation in militancy and terrorism. Thus, through a kind of “collectivistic shift,” or fusion of one’s personal identity with that of the group individual powerlessness may be overcome by an empowering collectivistic ideology in which name terrorist acts are carried out (Post et al. 2003). Adoption of ideologically based means (terrorism in this instance) may constitute a substitute vehicle for significance restoration, if individual means for doing so were thwarted (Kruglanski, et al., 2002). The ideologies elucidate what a significance gain according to one’s group, consists of, and afford a way of preventing a significance loss involving adherence to these ideological dictates.

The notion of population susceptibility inherent in the epidemiological metaphor draws attention to the motivational bases of participation in terrorism. These include (1) ideological frames that identify collectivistic goals for individuals, that portray terrorism
as an effective and morally warranted means to these goals, (2) personal circumstances that affect individuals’ readiness to subscribe to these ideological frames. By implication, immunization of the susceptible population can occur, when there are alternate pathways for success within society, when bright educated individuals can succeed and do well within their culture rather than being driven to strike out in despair.

Conclusions and Psychological Implications of the Epidemiological Metaphor

In its threefold partition between ingredients of terrorism, the epidemiological metaphor is more comprehensive than either the war or the law enforcement metaphors. It addresses at once the individual level of analysis represented in the focus on the susceptible population, the social/organizational level represented in the focus on the vector that accomplishes recruitment, and indoctrination of potential terrorists (e.g., via the internet, the mosques or radical madrassas), and the cognitive level of analysis represented in the in focus on the ideological “virus” (radical beliefs and terrorism justifying arguments). Thus, it implies a varied array of efforts meant to counteract, and discourage the development of attitudes and beliefs likely to translate into terrorism: Individual disaffections may need to be ameliorated in order to reduce people’s readiness to buy into terrorism warranting ideologies, the ideologies themselves may need to be countered by credible authorities presenting cogent counterarguments to the extremist rhetoric, especially countering the extremist messages found on radical websites, including sermons of radical imams preached in the mosques.

De-radicalization programs. More than alternative metaphoric framings of the counterterrorism effort, the epidemiological metaphor implies the need to focus particular attention on the ideological struggle against jihadist extremists, with the aim of winning
the hearts and minds of potential recruits to jihadism. Indeed, in 2007 Al Qaeda has intensified its propaganda efforts releasing a video every three days aimed to generate substantially more recruits and support for its cause. Furthermore, there are signs that the Al Qaeda Media Committee, headed by Abu Abdel Rahman al Mghrebi (the son in law of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri) is only meaning to step up their propaganda activities in the coming months (Gunaratna, 2007).

In an attempt to counteract this virulent lobbying enterprise, moderate Muslim communities and governments in states with substantial Muslim populations (e.g. in Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Pakistan) have initiated systematic de-radicalization programs designed to “cure” the jihadists from adherence to their pernicious ideology, and to immunize against such ideology youths who might find it appealing. We have already mentioned the online dialogue with jihadists by moderate clerics and jurists supported by the Saudi ministry of the interior. In addition, there exists a program carried out in Saudi prisons in which moderate Muslim clerics abetted by psychologists and sociologists attempt to dissuade the detainees from their pernicious ideology and incite them to abandon their radical beliefs.

A particularly comprehensive de-radicalization effort directed at Al-Jemah Al-Islamiya detainees in Singapore has been launched in 2003 by the Religious Rehabilitation Group, a Muslim organization based in the Khadija Mosque of hat city. In addition, the Taman Bacaan, or the “After care” organization (Bin Kader, 2007) has been attending to the needs of the detainees’ families and organizing educational and media events (workshops, lectures, artistic performances) for Singaporean youths (Muslim, as well as non Muslim) designed to carry a powerful ideological antidote to jihadism.
What is uniquely impressive about the Singaporean de-radicalization efforts is their psychological comprehensiveness. Specifically, they target not only the minds (i.e., ideological beliefs) of the detainees and potential recruits to terrorism, but also their hearts (i.e. feelings and desires). Just as the anger at the West (fueled by the Al Qaeda propaganda machine through messages and videos portraying the suffering of Muslims in the hands of their enemies) may increase Muslims’ readiness to open up to vengeful interpretations of Islam, so assuaging the detainees’ anger and frustrations by showing authentic concern for their families, actually funding the children’s education (through private donations) and offering professional training for the wives may increase their readiness to open up to moderate religious interpretations, and to accept the notion that jihadism is contrary to the humane principles on which Islam is founded. Similarly, the twin efforts to address the concerns of the detainees and of their communities (and families) supports the classic psychological principle that changing the individual’s belief systems (ideology in this case) requires the change of the group norms to which this individual belongs (Lewin, 1947). Though such de-radicalization efforts are promising and constructive, their actual socio-psychological impact is in need of careful evaluation. Assessment of these programs poses, therefore, an important challenge for psychological researchers.

Finally, it is noteworthy that whereas the war and the law enforcement metaphors address the proximal “here and now” of terrorist activities, the epidemiological metaphor takes a distal, long range, view highlighting the motivational, cognitive and social/organizational processes that over time increase the likelihood of terrorism. Nonetheless, all three metaphors approach terrorism as an external “problem” in need of
treatment via action against its actual and/or potential perpetrators. In contrast, the analysis considered next views terrorism as a “two way street,” focused on the social relations between terrorists and their potential targets.

Counterterrorism as Prejudice Reduction

Framing counterterrorism in terms of prejudice reduction maintains the focus on terrorism’s broad base of support while adding a dimension largely absent from prior metaphoric depictions. Instead of focusing exclusively on the perpetrators of terrorism it addresses the interaction between two communities whose intergroup conflict may breed terrorism. This shifts the focus from a unilateral to a bilateral concern, and acknowledges the contribution to intergroup tensions that the party targeted by terrorists may make. The main premise of the prejudice reduction framing is that terrorists represent a subset of a group of people who have an unfavorable attitude toward another group of people. Interviews with sub-state terrorists, trial transcripts, terrorist writings, public pronouncements and internet communications suggest that terrorists typically harbor highly negative sentiment toward those they target for attacks (Cordes, 2001; Alexander 2002; Oliver and Steinberg 2005). Hence, terrorism could be viewed as one expression of tense and deteriorating intergroup relations. A particularly poignant example of a deteriorating interaction between groups, potentially prompting radicalization and extremism, concerns the relations between Muslim immigrants in Europe and the (ethnically) native European populations. We begin the discussion with the story of the perpetrators of the infamous attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington.

Intergroup Relations in Western Europe
On that fateful date, three young Muslims—Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—each piloted an airplane in a spectacular strike on the United States and its citizens. Atta is thought to have been the tactical leader of the 9/11 plot. Ramzi Binalshibh, who shared an apartment with the first two, probably facilitated the plot. All four were apparently radicalized while living in Hamburg, Germany, probably influenced, at least in part, by cleric Mohammed Haydar Zammar at the Quds Mosque (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the US, 2004). One of the most important discoveries of the 9/11 investigation was that young Muslims who had spent substantial time living and working in Western Europe could become principals in the most infamous anti-Western terrorist act in history.

The story of the 9/11 cell is hardly unique. Since then, a series of attacks, interrupted attacks, or plots has been linked to other young Muslims with European background: On December 22, 2001, Bromely-born Richard Reid attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight en route to Miami. He had apparently converted to Islam while incarcerated in Feltham young offenders’ institution and is thought to have become radicalized while attending the Brixton Mosque in south London (BBC News, 2006).

On November 2, 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a 26-year-old Amsterdam-born Mohammed Bouyeri, who apparently became radicalized in 2003, perhaps influenced by visits to the El Tawheed Mosque (BBC news 2005). Also in 2004, Operation Crevice led to discovery of a 1300-pound cache of ammonium nitrate and the arrest of seven young British Muslim men, including 24-year-old Omar Khyam, accused of plotting to bomb a shopping mall or nightclub (Rotella, 2006a). In late 2005, French police arrested 35 year old Safe Bourada and 31 year old Oussani Cherifi—both
of Algerian descent, both of whom grew up in the tough suburbs of Paris, both accused of organizing multiple bloody plots for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (known by its French initials GSPC) (Rotella, 2006b).

The life stories of the Madrid train bombers of March 11, 2004, of the London transport bombers of July 7, 2005, and of those suspected in a U.K. plot publicly revealed in August 2006 to blow up airlines en route to the U.S. have also been documented. Most recently eight Muslim doctors or doctors in training working in British hospitals were arrested in connection with two attempts to explode car bombs in downtown London on June 29, 2007 and an attempt on the subsequent day to ram a flaming Jeep into the main entrance of Glasgow airport. All of the known perpetrators and suspects in these varied incidents were young Muslim men who had either been born and raised, or lived and worked for extended periods of time in Western Europe. In terms of McCauley’s (1991) pyramid model these individuals represent the tiny apex of a much larger group: the disaffected Muslim diaspora population of Western Europe.

The size of the Muslim population in Europe, and its increasing proportionality in European societies can be explained by two factors: (1) the considerably greater natural growth of the Muslim versus the Europe’s ethnically native populations (the UK’s National Intelligence Council predicts Europe’s Muslim population will double by 2025)

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16 Between 1965 and 1990 the world’s population rose from 3.3 to 5.3 billion with an overall annual growth rate of 1.85%. Muslim societies, however, exhibited growth rates from 2 to 3% (UN populations division, 1993). Meanwhile, the EU’s ethnically native population has not even been replacing itself since 1973 when, for the first time, the fertility rate fell below the critical replacement rate of 2.1. That rate has continued to plunge and currently stands at just 1.5 (Eurostat 2006). As Huntington noted (2003), in part as a result of this differential growth rate, in 1900 Muslims comprised just 4% of the world’s population but by 2025 they are predicted to comprise 19%. 

(Nielsen, 1999; Hunter, 2002; Pauly, 2004), and (2) the unprecedented migration of people from the underdeveloped, often politically oppressed Muslim states into Europe. The actual Muslim population of most European nations is unknown due to restrictions on gathering religion data, but estimates put the current number between 15 and 20 million, or four to five percent of Europe’s total population.

The problem is that Muslims and non-Muslim Europeans are failing to integrate. Data confirm the development of highly negative attitudes on both sides of the divide defining an EU-wide apartheid, strikingly reminiscent in many ways of the state of relations between blacks and whites in the mid-twentieth century U.S. Several factors might be contributing to this problem: the cultural differences in values and world views separating the Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans (Huntington, 1998), the sheer size of the immigrant population affording newcomers a coherent shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) distinct from that of the host countries, reducing their psychological need to integrate (Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro & Mannetti, 2004), and a lack of coherent immigration policies in EU countries, breeding uncertainty and intergroup tension (Kosic et al., 2004).17

Attitudes of the Muslim Diaspora Community

In a telephone survey released July 6, 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Muslims in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain were asked, “What do you

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17 Generally, member-countries of the European Union have tended to adopt an assimilationist policy towards immigrants (exception being the Netherlands, Sweden and England which support multiculturalism). Italy, for instance, initially pursued an assimilation policy, but in the last years concepts of multiculturalism and cultural diversity have been articulated with some frequency by policy makers, occasionally prompting specific initiatives for the promotion of multiculturalism.
consider yourself first? A citizen of your country or a Muslim?" With the exception of Spain where the percentage of religious (46%) vs. national (42%) identifications was about equal, the overwhelming majority of these European Muslims embraced their religious identity ahead of their national identity (81% vs. 7% in the UK, 69% vs. 3% in France, and 66% vs. 13% in Germany.) Strikingly, the religious identification of European Muslims is higher than that reported by Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, or Indonesia. For comparison purposes, 59% of Christians in Great Britain, 83% in France, 59% in Germany and 60% in Spain put their national identity first (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006a).

These data tell us that European Muslims tend to hold strikingly different identity attitudes than do non-Muslim Europeans. The typical young Muslim living in Western Europe identifies himself as belonging to a separate community—a religious collectivity not bound by geography, or by temporal limits—consistent with a stereotype held by many non-Muslim Europeans. In this vein, Roy (2004) writes of the recent emergence of Islamic Neofundamentalism “…a view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension in favor of the ummah, the universal community of all Muslims, based on sharia (Islamic law)” (p. 1). According to Roy “Neofundamentalism has gained ground among rootless Muslim youth, particularly among second-and third generation migrants in the West. These Muslims experience a deterritorialization of Islam” (ibid., p. 2).

The 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project reveals that about half of British, German, French and Spanish Muslims regard Western people as selfish, arrogant, greedy, immoral and violent. There is general agreement on both sides that relations are bad between Muslims and Western people, but sharp disagreement about who is to blame: Between
58 and 70% of both Muslims and non-Muslims in Great Britain, France and Germany say that intergroup relations are bad, with large proportions of the Muslims explicitly blaming Westerners for the poor quality of the relationship and vice-versa (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006b).

Such attitudes are potential harbingers of violent intergroup conflict. For example, 24% of British Muslims and 35% of French Muslims endorse the statement that violence against civilian targets is sometimes or rarely justified in the service of Islam (see table 3). Averaging the respondents’ attitudes toward native Europeans and their support for terrorism it appears that roughly 44% of European Muslims in the countries surveyed hold very negative views of Westerners and 24.25% are actually sympathetic to terrorism. Multiplying by the mean estimate of their total population (17.5 million), one might conclude that about 7.7 million Muslims living in Europe dislike Westerners and more than 4.2 million are sympathetic to terrorism. These could serve as substantial pools from which active terrorists might be drawn.

*Islamophobia*

Europeans feel threatened, angered, and rejecting toward their new Muslim residents. There are variations within this trend. Citizens of some nations express more tolerance than others. Younger, better educated, and urban citizens are more tolerant on average than older, less educated rural citizens (Marsh & Sahin-Dikmen, 2002; EUMC, 2005). And (although one must exercise caution in generalizing U.S. research data to European populations) one project reports that individual traits—including racism, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism—predict stronger anti-Muslim sentiments (Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005).
Research indicates that by the mid-90s there was much *blatant* but even more *subtle* prejudice by Europeans against Turks, Asians, and North Africans. Furthermore, beginning in the early 1990s, political movements swung to the right in response to the perceived threat (Pettigrew, 1998a).

Anti-immigrant sentiments are not equally distributed throughout the EU, nor have they remained stable over time. According to results from the 1997 Eurobarometer attitudes survey, Denmark had the highest level of racial prejudice among the 15 surveyed European nations: 83% of the respondents openly admitted to harboring racists views and 43% admitted to being “very racist” or “quite racist” (European Commission, 1997). Since then, there has been an increase in the proportion of Europeans who wish to place limits on multiculturalism (European Social Survey, 2003; International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 2005). By late 2001, the Vienna-based European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) had documented a significant increase in violent assaults against Muslims. A 2002 survey by the Policy Studies Institute of London found that ethnic or racial discrimination was the most frequently observed form of prejudice throughout Europe (Marsh & Sahin-Dikmen, 2002). Distrust and hostility have become widespread and anger at Muslims is very high (Harrison, Law, & Phillips, 2005). One measure of these sentiments: the 2004/5 European Social Survey determined that a large proportion of residents of many European nations agree with the statement “If a country wants to reduce tension it should stop immigration” (European Social Survey, 2004/5).

In its most recent surveys, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has developed a more detailed profile of anti-Muslim feelings. For example, many non-Muslim Europeans tend
to hold that Muslims are fanatical, violent, and disrespectful of women. And, after Jyllands-Posten—Denmark’s largest newspaper—published cartoons depicting Mohammed in September of 2005, solid majorities of British, French, German and Spaniards attributed the resulting outrage and violence to Muslim intolerance (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006b).

Most (77% of British, 76% of French, 82% of Germans, and 66% of Spaniards) are very or somewhat concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in their own countries. And, consistent with the impression of self-imposed isolation and the data on religious rather than nationalist identities, most non-Muslim Europeans (64% of British, 53% of French, 76% of Germans, and 76% of Spaniards) perceive Muslim immigrants as wishing to remain separate from their host societies (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006). This suite of attitudes, opinions, and fears has been referred to as Islamophobia.

Islamophobia in Europe contains multiple elements. Exclusion from full political participation, discrimination in housing, employment and services, and prejudice in multiple aspects of everyday life have combined to create a lower caste, overtly or covertly denied citizenly equality. In addition to these formal manifestations, Islamophobia reveals itself in simple day-to-day interactions that allow people to regard themselves as part of the same society. This includes prejudice—on both sides—against patronizing the same stores, entertainment venues, clubs and sporting activities. More profoundly, it includes an almost total mutual prejudice against inter-marriage. The broad psychological impact of such tensions results in a situation wherein Muslims in Europe largely see themselves as isolated from the mainstream of non-Muslim society and living instead as part of a global ummah—a wide-flung community with shared identity,
interests, and destiny (Nielsen 1999; Hunter, 2002; Jordan and Boix, 2004; Coolsaet, 2005; Roy, 2004).

Admittedly, the failure of Muslims to integrate into European societies, or intergroup tensions as such may not constitute the sufficient conditions for terrorism. Yet, they may instill the readiness to buy into a terrorism justifying ideology if such was offered, as it abundantly is these days, on thousands of Jihadist websites, in radical mosques, or madrassas, the writings of extremist clerics, etc. To the degree that European Muslim communities see themselves as alienated from their host societies, at war with the West, subject to local perceived discrimination, and steeped in feelings of rage stoked by fundamentalist imams, young European Muslims—like members of the 9/11 cell—are potential recruits to terrorism.

*European Efforts to Enhance Integration*

Multiple initiatives are currently underway aimed to enhance integration and reduce friction between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe. Some initiatives involve efforts to document discriminatory behavior or civil right violations, such as the work of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (including the Danish Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination) or Sweden’s Health and Discrimination project (Racism and xenophobia in Sweden in 2004). Other efforts strive to promote dialogue, such as the Council of Europe’s Expert Colloquies and Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project (e.g., Etienne, 2002).

Yet other initiatives involve legislation to punish discriminatory behaviors in employment, housing, or banking. Some efforts are intra-national, for example a number
of programs in Germany to improve relations with the large Turkish-origin minority, or the community introduction programs in Swedish municipalities. More ambitious projects are being evaluated for possible international adoption—as for example the Council of Europe’s “Shared Cities” program (Wilson, 2003) or the proposals being currently formulated by the eight-nation research consortium, “The European Dilemma” committed to an examination of discrimination and exclusion in both labor markets and educational systems, and meant to offer anti-xenophobia strategies on the EU, local and national levels (The European Dilemma, 2003).

In short, there are in place considerable social engineering efforts aimed at ameliorating charged intergroup relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe. Yet, once again, one vital element is surprisingly rare in this mix: an attempt to evaluate what works. As a result, expenditures of money, time, and human resources take place with no persuasive evidence that they will achieve the desired outcomes—enhancement of social integration, acceptance of multiculturalism, pluralism, and the elimination of intergroup tensions. Yet, there exists considerable social psychological research pertinent to these concerns. We now briefly address this work and its implications.

Prejudice Reduction

Prejudice and discrimination have been among the most intensively studied social psychological phenomena. Since the publication of Gordon Allport’s classic book, The Nature of Prejudice (1954/1979), a massive body or empirical work has been compiled examining what prejudice is and what can be done about it. Obviously, psychological efforts at prejudice reduction alone do not overcome gross disparities in income, and legal inequalities, or remove an intergroup competition for scarce resources. In fact,
prejudice is strongly related to measures of objective disparities, and conflicts and is augmented by a sense of injustice, humiliation and competition. In that sense, psychological efforts at attitude change and prejudice reduction may work best if combined with credible policies aimed at the elimination of objective inequalities.

It is also true, however, that prejudice contains strong elements of misperception: (1) It tends to generalize to individual group members the perceived traits and attitudes that may characterize the group as an aggregate (Fiske, 1998; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Schneider, 2004), and (2) It tends to generalize from some perceived negative traits to other, evaluatively consistent, negative traits producing a “halo effect” for which there may be little if any objective evidence (Nisbett & Wilson’s, 1977).

The promise of prejudice reduction efforts is that they may eliminate those misperceptions and, under proper conditions, may help build a common identity. The less people regard others as a competing, threatening, alien out-group members and the more they come to see them as supportive ingroup members with shared goals, the lower the impetus for discriminatory behavior and the higher the impetus for social cooperation (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). Fifty years of research suggests that prejudice reduction is an essential step toward successful integration. And in the long run, integration may prove to be an effective strategy of counterterrorism. Just as the 50-year desegregation battle in the U.S. was primed by early prejudice reduction experiments, successful integration in the EU could be primed by forward-thinking social science devoted to understanding the most effective ways to achieve inter-cultural harmony.
Origin and Evolution of the Contact Hypothesis

Until the end of WWII, the United States largely ignored the problem of racial prejudice. African Americans were technically freed, and even enfranchised to vote, yet they were subjected to systematic prejudice, discrimination, and outright oppression. By the early 1950s, pioneering social scientists were finally turning their attention to the pernicious problem of prejudice. Gordon Allport’s seminal 1954 text created a watershed moment in the history of social psychology. In his book, Allport laid out the emotional, developmental, cognitive, and cultural roots of prejudice. As well, he described the fitful first efforts to resolve the problem, or at least reduce its magnitude. Hinting at the direction that efforts to reduce prejudice may take, Allport cited a commentary by Lee and Humphrey regarding the Bloody Monday race riots in Detroit in 1943: “People who had become neighbors did not riot against each other. The students of Wayne University—white and black—went to their classes in peace throughout Bloody Monday. And there were no disorders between white and black workers in the war plants” (Allport, 1954, p. 261).

Allport’s main point: contact between rival groups may initially lead to anxiety and competition, but this often gives way to accommodation and eventually to integration. Based on his review of different programs for prejudice reduction, Allport came to what later has become known as the contact hypothesis:

Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority group in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and
provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups. (Allport, 1954/1979)

According to Allport, optimal intergroup contact contains a number of essential elements, namely:

(1) \textit{Equal status} of members of the separate groups that are brought into contact with each other,

(2) \textit{Pursuit of common goals}, that is, adoption of superordinate objectives that members of the separate groups may share.

(3) \textit{Institutional sanction} by respected societal authorities, and

(4) \textit{Positive Outcome}, that is, a realization by members of the separate groups that contact produced desirable results.

By the mid-1990s it became apparent that prejudice reduction required a second look. Allport had explained \textit{how} to reduce prejudice, but not \textit{why} it should work. Some scholars (e.g., Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993) attributed successful prejudice reduction to personal contact between individuals leading to \textit{personalization}, or the breakdown of arbitrary judgments based on social categories. Critics asked how the development of personal friendships through contact would generalize to all members of a stereotyped category (Hewstone, 1996). Some scholars suggested that positive intergroup contact worked, so long as participants maintained identity with their own ingroup (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Others advised that maintenance of ingroup identity was exactly wrong; the success of prejudice reduction interventions depended on the development of a common ingroup identity (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000).
Pettigrew (1998b) offered an important reformulation of the contact hypothesis wherein contact is a process—a change that takes place over time. This process is assumed to consist of three stages. In Pettigrew’s model, initial contact provokes anxiety; but positive personal contact with someone from the other group serves to reduce anxiety and allows liking to take place—albeit liking for that one person, not for her or his group as a whole. Over time, the liking can be extended to other members of the outgroup, perhaps in accordance with Heider’s (1958) balance theoretic logic whereby the friends of a friend are one’s friends as well. This may occur even though the ingroup member is still very much aware of her or his own group membership and identity—consistent with Hewstone and Brown’s (1986) theory. Finally, when the established contact is optimal, a shift in identity may take place as superordinate goals supercede the old ingroup/outgroup differentiation, and—as predicted by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000)—a common ingroup identity may emerge and optimal prejudice reduction may occur. According to Pettigrew, many groups fail to achieve the final step. The crucial question is, what is the best way to optimize the chances of success.

Fifty years after Allport, a wealth of experimental literature has appeared testing ways to reduce intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Lemmer & Wagner, 2006). Multiple methods have been examined, varying the duration, frequency, and type of intergroup contact. Some methods have involved school-based experiences, others community or employment-based encounter groups, yet others recreational groups or groups of fellow travelers. This body of work led to several conclusions.

Perhaps the most significant conclusion was that contact seems to work. In a meta-analytic review of 515 studies involving 713 population samples and 1383 tests,
there was a significant negative correlation between contact and prejudice. While the mean correlation of $r = -0.21$ might be considered modest, the correlation was actually higher among the most rigorously conducted projects, and most robust when measured by direct observation of intergroup contact as opposed to self-report measures. Numerous observations conducted in laboratories, schools, residential settings, recreational activities, or travel contexts yielded evidence of benefits.

Second, some types of interventions appear to work better than others. Generally speaking, incidental contact or travel excursions seem to yield little positive effect (mean $r = -0.113$). Residential interaction appears to fare somewhat better ($r = -0.202$). Educational and work-based settings seem better yet ($r = -0.213$ and $-0.224$). The best effects were seen in studies carried out in recreational contexts ($r = -0.299$).

Third, there was some support for Allport’s suggestions for optimal contact conditions of equality, authority sanction, and cooperation. However, it appears that Allport’s conditions do not assure beneficial effects, nor are they absolutely required for beneficial outcomes. The single most important factor appears to be institutional support: when authorities sanction the contact, it predicts success better than any other factor (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). It may also be essential that the groups achieve success in their cooperative endeavors (the positive outcome condition in Allport’s list), for failure enhances bias and scape-goating (Worchel, Andreoli, & Foger, 1977).

Fourth, there was strong support for the so-called “extended contact” effect. That is, reduction of prejudice was typically generalized not only to non-participant members of the outgroup (for example, to all black) but to other outgroups as well (for example, to the disabled or the intellectually impaired). Overall, the authors concluded “There is
little need to demonstrate further contact’s general ability to lessen prejudice” (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, p. 768).

It must be acknowledged that prejudicial attitudes are by no means the only explanation for aggression toward the outgroup, that may translate to terrorism. Some scholars have claimed that the relationship between prejudice, discrimination, and overt aggression is weak and theorized that other factors may be more important than prejudice in determining discriminatory acts and actual physical aggression (e.g., Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson & Gaertner, 1996). In regard to the 2006 UK mass airline-bombing plot, for example, it has been written:

Nor can it be easily argued that social deprivation or ethnic discrimination breeds radicalism; many of those arrested were from middle class homes—the sort that send their children to university—in standard British multicultural neighborhoods, where Muslims, white Britons and more recent immigrants from Eastern Europe live together. (Elliot, 2006)

Indeed, prejudicial attitudes need not derive from personal experience of deprivation or discrimination but may be stoked by inflammatory rhetoric in mosques or websites, or shaped by events far afield—such as the war in Iraq—as they are represented in the media. In the same vein, individual poverty was not a factor motivating al Qaeda’s 9/11 bombers (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the US, 2004; Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003). Still, the facts of poverty, of income discrepancy, or discrimination in the work place may translate into widespread perceptions and prejudicial attitudes fueling the readiness to embrace extremist rhetoric and to support political violence. Overcoming such prejudice would probably require a co-ordinated set of measures, including media
campaigns, enforcement of strict anti-discriminatory norms and policies, etc., as well as the creation of opportunities for optimal contact between members of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Concluding Comments: Psychological Implications of the Prejudice Reduction Metaphor

The unique aspect of the prejudice reduction metaphor is its explicitly bilateral character. Admittedly, the war, the law enforcement, and the epidemiological metaphors did hint that some counterterrorist tactics employed by the targets of terrorism (e.g., those likely to produce the killing of innocents, destruction of property, and spawning of a refugee problem) may augment rather than reduce terrorism; yet their primary focus has been on the psyche of the terrorists and their supporters. By contrast, the prejudice reduction metaphor recognizes that terrorism may involve a recursive interplay of two types of mentality, that of the terrorists and that of their targets. For instance, the perceived otherness of Muslim immigrants for European hosts and vice versa, as well as the aversion that otherness may often evoke, may feed mutually negative stereotypes motivating actions that may augment and polarize the stereotypes (via an expectancy confirmation mechanism), and hence exacerbate inter-group tensions.

A major social psychological intervention available for employment toward prejudice reduction is the creation of positive contact between members of the conflicted groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Research suggests that the creation of optimal contact, particularly if carried out at an early enough age may contribute to the development of positive attitudes to members of the outgroup. However, positive contact in unique and isolated settings (e.g., at a given school, a recreational facility, etc.) may be counteracted...
by events, initiatives, and rhetorics external to that context, e.g. as these are depicted in
the media and discussed in one’s community. To the extent that such depictions portray
aggressive, humiliating or discriminatory activities perpetrated by one group against the
other, they might well damage the positive will engendered in the restricted, positive-
contact, settings. From this perspective, efforts at prejudice reduction via positive contact
need to be pursued in the context of a larger set of policies, e.g. concerning immigration
laws, educational programs and foreign policy initiatives designed to *augment* the good-
will-generating efforts of optimal contact programs.

*General Discussion*

The four metaphors of counterterrorism considered in the preceding pages
roughly define a continuum ranging from a totalistic, and undiscriminating *war metaphor*
(inherent in the “global war on terrorism” concept) that condemns the enemy group
as “evil” and pulls all stops in order to defeat it, through a more nuanced *law
enforcement* metaphor, that seeks to precisely target the actual perpetrators of terrorism
and separate them from their potential base of community support, through the
*epidemiological metaphor* that addresses the *sources* of such support as they derive from
the ideological belief system that justifies terrorism, and the *mechanisms* of persuasion
and indoctrination that spread the ideological word in the pool of potential supporters, to
the *prejudice reduction metaphor* that highlights the dynamic interplay of perceptions
that conflicted groups may have of each other and the spiral of alienation and increasing
psychological distance (Liberman, Trope & Stephan, 2007) that need to be broken on
both sides of the divide.

*The War Metaphor*
Each of the foregoing metaphors addresses specific psychological “pieces” of the “counterterrorism puzzle” (Ganor, 2005) and each has vulnerabilities as well as points of strength. The flaws of the war metaphor include the massive overcommitment to counterterrorism at the expense of major alternative concerns including the humanitarian value of protecting lives, and ensuring the enlightened treatment of prisoners. Much has been written about the outrage in the affected communities evoked by killing of innocents, destruction of property and dislocation of families. All these may create a “boomerang effect” based on a defiance motivation (Lafree and Dugan, 2007), potentially boosting the stock of recruits to terrorism (Kaplan, et al., 2005).

An additional drawback of the war metaphor, related to overcommitment of resources that the war concept implies, is the arousal of unreasonable expectations as to the war effort’s required duration. In case of asymmetrical struggle against insurgents or terrorists such expectations often involve serious underestimates, breeding general disappointment with the results, and a public outcry to discontinue the effort and bring the troops home. Finally, the war metaphor may evoke conflicting and inconsistent expectations derived from the divergent war analogies one may envision (e.g. the Second World War, the Cold War or the Vietnam War analogies). These may forestall the formulation of a coherent counterterrorism policy and give rise to unhelpful debates based on questionable historical similes.

Undermining terrorists’ capability. These drawbacks notwithstanding, the war metaphor isn’t totally devoid of utility. As Ganor (2005) noted “the military component should not be discounted as a legitimate and effective means for eliminating terrorist attacks, reducing their damage, and hurting terrorist organizations” (p. 40). Primarily,
military measures if properly executed may hamper terrorists’ *ability* to carry out attacks. In a recent paper, Lafree & Dugan (2007) used a continuous-time survival analysis based on Cox (1972) proportional hazard models (see Dugan, Lafree & Piquero, 2005) to analyze the impact of military measures carried out by the British in Northern Ireland. These authors have shown that a massive military intervention by the British, referred to as the Motorman Operation (that involved the participation of 30,000 troops, the use of heavy armor, etc.) appeared to *reduce* over the long term the incidence of subsequent terrorist attacks, whereas more restricted military interventions (namely, the Falls Curfew, the Loughall and the Gibraltar incidents) appeared to significantly *increase* it. Similarly, Chen, Fishman & Kruglanski (2007) using proportional hazard models found that a massive occupation by the Israeli military of West Bank towns, referred to as *Operation Defensive Shield*, and the construction of the defensive fence by Israel decreased the incidence of suicide bombing by Hamas militants, whereas a more restricted operation in Gaza lasting two weeks, and named Operation Days of Penitence, actually *increased* their incidence.

Eppright (1997) concluded that Israel’s massive 1996 incursion into Lebanon significantly reduced the amount of Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel, and Greener-Barcham (2002) reported that the liberation of hostages in the Entebbe airport by Israeli commando markedly reduced the number of airline hijackings against Israeli targets and the seizure of hostages. At least in the short term then, successful military operations might reduce terrorist organizations operational capability and in that sense reduce the threat that their intentions may pose. In the long run, however, it is often suggested that
terrorism, at least one that enjoys a broad base of popular support, has no ready military solution (Ganor, 2005, p. 39).

Motivational effects. Mention was already made of the potential of military operations to evoke outrage and elevate terrorists’ defiance motivation (Lafree & Dugan, 2007). Indeed, Ganor (2005) views as one of the counterterrorism dilemmas the fact that “the more successful one is in carrying out actions that damage the terrorists organizations’ ability to perpetrate attacks, the more… their motivation will only increase” (p. 41). From this perspective, Ariel Sharon has remarked that counterterrorism military activities undertaken by Israel were “successes for periods of time [gaining] breathing space for certain periods of time” (Ganor, 2005, p. 292).

These insights notwithstanding, it also seems possible that sustained military pressure would ultimately gnaw at terrorists’ motivations and deflate their morale. The Palestinians have repeatedly complained about the Israeli policy of targeted killings and demanded that it be stopped. It also appears that this particular policy instilled a measure of fear in militants’ leaders forcing them to go “partially underground, turning off their cell phones, avoiding official vehicles and restricting their movements” (May 22, 2007, Sarah El Deeb, Associated Press).

Furthermore, sustained military pressure might induce in members of a terrorist group the motivation to disengage from terrorism under some conditions. Ironically, such motivation may arise from the increased “group-centrism” (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & DeGrada, 2006) that external pressures may effect. Horgan (2005) cites in this connection the reflections of Michael Bauman, who disengaged from the German June 2nd movement of which he was member. In Bauman’s words: “The group becomes...
increasingly closed. The greater the pressure from the outside, the more you stick together, the more mistakes you make, the more pressure is turned inward… those are… the things that come together horribly at the end” (as cited in Horgan, 2005, p. 14).

The extensive “group centrism” that external (e.g. military) pressures encourage may come at the expense of one’s individualistic objectives. To the extent that the latter are important to the individual, this may induce a growing desire to disengage from the terrorist organization. The relevant motivational considerations are apparent in Adriana Faranda’s reflections on her dissociation from the Red Brigades (as cited in Horgan, 2005):

Choosing to enter the Red Brigades – to become clandestine and… to break off relations with your family, is a choice so total that it involves your entire life… It means choosing to occupy yourself from morning till night with problems of politics, or organization, and fighting; and no longer with normal life-culture, cinema, babies, the education of your children, with all the things that fill other people’s lives… when you remove yourself from society… you become sad because a whole area of life is missing, because you are aware that life is more than politics and political work. (p. 148).

The individualistically motivated wish to disengage from the group might usher in a rationalization in form of a disenchantment with the group’s ideology, or with the degree to which the group is living up to its ideological commitments. In Adriana Faranda’s words, the process of ideological disenchantment encompassed “everything… It [involved] the revolution itself; Marxism, violence, the logic of enmity, of conflict, of
one’s relationship with authority, a way of working out problems, of confronting reality and of facing the future” (cited in Horgan, 2005, p. 148).

In summary, relentless military pressure on a terrorist organization may generate a complex field of opposing psychological forces acting upon its members and including the motivation to strengthen one’s commitment to the cause, fomenting one’s resolve and defiance in face of the enemy, but also yearnings to liberate oneself from excessive “group centrism” and to regain the freedom to pursue one’s individualistic objectives. Which of these forces may prevail may partially depend on the degree to which the group enjoys a wide degree of support in the larger society in which it is embedded. Members of groups whose world views and shared realities are discrepant from the society at large (as may be the case with urban terrorist organizations such as the Bader Meinhoff group, or the Italian Red Brigades) may be more likely to have access to general societal values and objectives, even if they suppress them for a time. Under external pressure, the members’ dependence on the group may turn into an insufferable psychological burden fostering the motivation to disengage from the group, and allowing the suppressed societal values (e.g. concerns with individual freedom and happiness) to rebound.

Unlike members of those latter groups for whom a reintegration in the larger society and embracement of its values constitutes a potentially viable alternative,\(^\text{18}\) for members of groups whose ideological objectives coincide with values of their community (e.g. Hamas, or Hezbollah) such alternative is less available. For the latter individuals,

\(^{18}\)For instance, in 1979 and 1982 the Italian government enacted Repentance laws meant to facilitate an exit from terrorism and a reintegration into society. The laws “promised substantial leniency if terrorists collaborate with the police and judicial authorities, and a lesser degree of leniency if they only separate themselves from the terrorist group (Ferracuti, 1990/1998, p. 62). These legal initiatives are generally credited with dismantling of the Red Brigades movement in the 1980s.
disengagement from the terrorist organization implies to some extent betrayal of one’s society leaving them with little psychological choice. Unless the ideological climate in the society had shifted, members of such groups might, therefore, respond with defiance rather than acquiescence to military pressures exerted on their organization.

*The Law Enforcement Metaphor*

Like the war metaphor, the law enforcement metaphor has some advantages but also potential disadvantages. One of its main advantages is its targeting precision in focusing on actual perpetrators/conspirators in violation of the legal code. Such an approach avoids the sense of injustice, and the attendant outrage that indiscriminate war related destruction may invite. Relatedly, the targeting precision of law enforcement may allow a separation of the apex of the terrorists’ pyramid (i.e., the actual perpetrators) from its support base (of individuals whose attitudes may be aligned with those of the terrorists, but whose actions are in conformance with the law). Such separation may constitute a precondition for driving a wedge between the broader community and the terrorists, which obvious advantage is the potential for obtaining invaluable human intelligence needed to thwart impending terrorist schemes.

The law enforcement metaphor also has possible disadvantages. One of these emerges in comparison with the war metaphor considered earlier and relates to the limited ability of police forces to launch the massive strikes that may be occasionally required to cripple the terrorists’ capability (even if temporarily) and reduce the damage that such capability might afford. Additionally, massive commitment of force communicates resolve and determination, an asset in the battle of wills that counterterrorism typically involves.
A further limitation of the strict law enforcement metaphor is that it neglects the ideological basis of terrorists’ struggle. It is that feature of terrorism, after all, that distinguishes it from ordinary crime. In this sense, the economic, rational-choice analysis of a cost benefit ratio that collaborating with the police versus the gangs, say, may involve (Akerlof & Yellen, 1994) doesn’t fully apply to terrorism. Especially, in those cases where a strong ideological bond exists between large segments of the broader society and the militant organization (a bond that may exist between the Palestinian population and the Hamas, the Southern Lebanese population and the Hezbollah, or the Tamil population and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam (LTTE)) it may be rather difficult to drive a wedge between the community and the militants without addressing the ideological underpinnings of their collaboration. The latter enterprise may necessitate a “struggle of ideas” in attempts to persuade the broader community that terrorism is (a) ineffectual, (b) immoral, (c) that there exist alternative superior means (e.g. negotiations, diplomacy) to the goals currently pursued via terrorism, or (d) that those goals (e.g. the dream of a global ummah) are unattainable and in the need of adjustment (for discussion see Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

The Epidemiological Metaphor

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19 In this connection, Krueger & Maleckova (2002, p. 9) remark that “The standard economic model of crime suggests that those with the lowest value of time should engage in criminal activity. But… in most cases terrorism is less like property crime and more like a violent form of political engagement…”

20 In recent years several terrorism using organizations seem to have reverted to political means in recognition that the armed struggle has failed to advance their strategic means. The cases in point are the Irish Republican Army (the IRA) following the Good Friday agreement, the ETA organization (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) in Spain declaration of permanent ceasefire in 2006, similar announcements by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) in Algeria, the al-Jihad and Gam’at al Islamiyya in Egypt, and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam) in Sri Lanka (see also Karmon, 2002).
An advantage of the epidemiological metaphor (Stares & Yacoubian, 2006) is the linkage of the terrorism problem to the ideological bases of terrorist commitments (the “virus”), their modes of transmission (the “vector”) and the vulnerability factors present in certain segments of society (the “susceptible populations”) that fuel their readiness to buy into the terrorism-warranting ideological contents. In this sense, the epidemiological metaphor explicitly recognizes the wide ranging efforts needed to combat certain (strongly ideologically entrenched) types of terrorist activity as well as the likely protracted nature of the process that might be needed to eradicate it.

Despite its several advantages, the epidemiological metaphor has limitations as well. Whereas the war and the law enforcement metaphors that focus on the immediate threat neglect the long range process of ideological conversion and radicalization, the epidemiological metaphor, focused on the wider picture, neglects the “here and now” of counterterrorism and the value of resolute strikes and intelligence gathering activities needed to counter terrorists’ concrete schemes and capabilities.

The epidemiological metaphor may also be faulted for its unilateral emphasis on the perpetrators of terrorism and its neglect of the targeted side’s policies and their possible part in offending the Muslim population and fueling its resonance to the terrorist rhetoric.21 As part of the issue, the negative language of the metaphor that likens the

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21 In a recent public opinion survey conducted by the START center at the University of Maryland (National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism) in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia only minorities of the populations surveyed endorsed support for the killing of civilians. Given the overall sizes of the populations involved, however, these minorities translate into millions of terrorism supporters. Thus, in Morocco the 8% minority of terrorism supporters translates into the figure of 2,600,000 people, in Egypt the 15% minority translates into 12,000,000 people, in Pakistan the 5% minority translates into 8,000,000 people and in Indonesia the 4% minority translates into 20,000,000 people.
Islamist ideology to a malignant “virus” (as well as the disease metaphor as a whole) might be offensive to adherents of the Islamist ideology, hence inducing resistance to persuasive campaigns designed to change their hearts and minds.

The Prejudice Reduction Metaphor

The latter problem is avoided by the prejudice reduction metaphor that explicitly locates the terrorism problem at the interface of two communities troubled by deteriorating relations. One advantage of this perspective is its appreciation of the dynamic character of intergroup relations, and of the potential for a spiraling enmity prompting the shutting down of inter-group communication (Deutsch, 1973), mutual blame placing and the entrenchment of positions behind pernicious stereotypes.

Another advantage of the prejudice reduction approach is provision of a specific intervention technique, grounded in the notion of optimal inter-group contact that, if applied broadly, might make an appreciable contribution to the lessening of tensions between the groups and the opening of minds to more constructive reciprocal approaches (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski, Dechesne, & Erb, 2006). In particular, the possibility of applying the technique to children in school settings at a relatively early age might afford an opportunity to psychologically “immunize” individuals’ attitudes (McGuire, 1961) against subsequent, conflict promoting, communications.

In fact, some “optimal contact” programs are already under way, for instance the School Linking Project in Bradford, West Yorkshire where teenaged students are brought together for multiple contact experiences in which they work cooperatively on learning projects. This project, ongoing for the last eight years, and other similar ones, merit careful psychological assessment as to their efficacy in promoting positive inter-group
attitudes, their persistence, and resistance to radical rhetoric. That is, substantial evidence exists that carefully designed prejudice reduction interventions yield measurable short-term improvement in intergroup relations. However, a major gap appears in the literature of applied social psychology: we have yet to demonstrate that such interventions produce long-term enhancement in relations and reduction in intergroup violence. Given the current worldwide tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, rigorous research in this area is urgently needed.

For all its benefits, the prejudice reduction framework, like the previously considered metaphors, captures a particular corner of the terrorism problem, however important, and inevitably neglects other aspects: First, it might be overridden by powerful other influences, including policies of states (e.g. Brittain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. support for Israel) that may be readily interpreted as anti-Muslim. Thus, even if the positive contact program managed to instill positive attitudes toward specific members of the outgroup, large scale events on the social and political levels might undermine their generalization to the outgroup as a whole.

Secondly, in context of the positive contact notion the prejudice reduction framework is free of ideological contents. It is mediated by cooperative activities on neutral tasks, such as the jigsaw classroom (Aronson & Bridgman, 1979), and it fails to address the ideological element (radical Islamism and jihadism) that appears essential to the process of radicalization.

Finally, like the epidemiological metaphor the prejudice reduction concept too neglects the “here and now” of terrorism, and the need to counter specific terrorist schemes and protect societies from the immediate threats that these entail. Thus, the
prejudice framework offers a potential long term solution to one important driver of the psychology of grievance but it neglects the short term challenges posed by terrorism since it does not resolve substantive political issues and grievances, does not disable the terrorists’ method for addressing such issues, and may only impact the communication channels for disseminating ideological arguments and a radicalized belief system after considerable delay.

Concluding Comments

The counterterrorism metaphors examined in this paper beam a search light (to use a metaphor!) onto diverse aspects of the problem each illuminating some of its aspects while leaving others in darkness. Jointly, however, they manage to convey the considerable complexity that systematic counterterrorism efforts must encounter.

Paradoxes of counterterrorism. In part, the complexity stems from the fact that counterterrorist activities that may appear desirable from the standpoint of a given framing of the problem may contradict goals implicit in another metaphor. For instance, the use of military force suggested by the war metaphor might convey one’s resolve and determination, cripple a terrorist’s organization ability to function and apply psychological pressure on its members. Yet at the same time it might fuel the outrage of the population affected by the military activity, and undermine the objective of reducing their support for the terrorists, desirable from perspective of the law enforcement metaphor. The same may be said of tough interrogation tactics, ethnic profiling, discriminatory immigration policies compatible with the war metaphor but rather incompatible with the law enforcement metaphor, or the prejudice reduction metaphor.

Negotiating with terrorists may communicate that there are alternative means to
their goals, outside of terrorism, consistent with the goal of countering the virulent terrorism-encouraging ideology, suggested by the epidemiological metaphor. Yet negotiating with terrorists also conveys that terrorism is an efficient tactic for the attainment of strategic objectives, encouraging its future use. This is consistent with the terrorist-promoting ideology and inconsistent with implications of the epidemiological approach to counterterrorism. Attempting to treat all varieties of terrorism as crime, suggested by the law enforcement metaphor, may encourage international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, but also contribute to a collaboration between terrorist organizations, and forego possible alliances with militant organizations whose activities are consistent with one’s own strategic interests, an approach suggested by the war metaphor.  

As is typically the case with metaphors (Lakoff, 1990) each counterterrorism framing described earlier affords a restricted understanding of the phenomenon. Hence, its unlimited adoption may impose blinders on the decision makers’ vision, leading to potential pitfalls and producing unintended consequences. From this perspective, a comprehensive approach is called for based on appreciation of the complex trade offs that each move in the counterterrorism enterprise may entail. At present, such an integrated

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22 For instance, Israel from the late 1970s supported Hamas seen as an ally against the PLO. Similarly, During most of the 1980’s, the CIA secretly sent billions of dollars of military aid to Afghanistan to support the mujahedeen - or holy warriors - against the Soviet Union, which had invaded in 1979. And writing in July 10, 2007 in the New York sun Daniel Pipes recommends “unleashing” against the Iranian regime, the Iranian opposition group known as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq or MEK despite it being accused of constituting a Marxist-Islamist terrorist cult.
counterterrorism policy seems to be lacking in most nations’ dealings with terrorism. Ideally, it should include the collaboration of military, law enforcement, and area experts with social scientists from pertinent disciplines who may contribute to the tactical and strategic decision making process by highlighting the likely psychological, political or sociological impact of various counterterrorism initiatives.

Admittedly, setting up of such a collaboration may not be easy. The difficulties of coordination and information sharing between the different intelligence gathering and law enforcement agencies in the U.S. received ample commentary, and led to establishment of the office of Director of National Intelligence in 2005 which effectiveness has yet to be determined. No less problematic is utilization by government of academic knowledge. Writing in 1991, Ariel Merari (1991) noted that “For a variety of reasons including resistance to external influences in general and suspicion of academia in particular, government officials have failed to utilize even sound knowledge and competent professional advice of academics” (p. 88).

Sixteen years later, in 2007, the situation seems somewhat different. There seems at least the will (if not the exact way) on part of government to draw on pertinent academic knowledge in regards to terrorism. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 wrote into law the establishment of the University Programs under the Division of Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This initiative has led to the establishment of several centers of excellence (COEs) at different U.S. universities addressing different aspects of terrorism, including its social and behavioral aspects.

23 Ganor (2005), for instance, states that “Most Israeli policymakers who were interviewed... were in complete agreement that Israel does not have—nor did it ever have a written, structured and unambiguous counterterrorism policy” (p. 288).
investigated at The Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START). Thus, an important formal step has been made to set up a communication channel between academic research in the behavioral and social sciences and a government agency entrusted with national security. The common task of the COEs and the DHS is to develop ways in which each is continually kept abreast of the other’s concerns, questions, and pertinent findings. To be sure, the incorporation of long term considerations may seem at odds with, or tangential to, current security needs as seen by the government. Indeed, the appreciation of their essential relevance to policy may require a climate change and cultivation of new cadres of security experts whose outlook would be formed through an educational process in which social and psychological aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism constitute an inseparable part and parcel. Training such cadres is a major task confronting the security community these days.

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24 In commenting on the Israeli approach to counterterrorism, Ganor (2005) writes that “The most prominent disappointment of Israel’s counterterrorism activities has been the failure to understand the phenomenon as morale-psychological warfare… [hence] almost no morale-psychological considerations are taken into account in choosing the counter-terrorism actions that Israel undertakes…” (p. 292).
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