The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives

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Two psychological perspectives on terrorism are distinguished, approaching it as a “syndrome” and as a “tool,” respectively. According to the “syndrome” view, terrorism represents a psychologically meaningful construct with identifiable characteristics on individual and group levels of analysis. According to the “tool” perspective, terrorism represents a strategic instrument that any party in a conflict with another may use. Research thus far has found little support for the “syndrome” view. Terrorists do not seem to be characterized by a unique set of psychological traits or pathologies. Nor has research uncovered any particular “root causes” of terrorism. The vast heterogeneity of terrorism’s users is consistent with the “tool” view, affording an analysis of terrorism in terms of means-ends psychology. The “tool” view implies conditions under which potential perpetrators may find terrorism more or less appealing, hence offering guidance for the “war on terrorism.”

Keywords psychology, syndrome, tool, terrorism, morality, instrumentality

Few would disagree that terrorism is the scourge of our times. Though hardly a new phenomenon, its development and proliferation in the latter part of the twentieth century have turned it into a formidable menace, threatening human lives worldwide and bent on unraveling the economic and political orders of contemporary societies.

Social scientists’ interest in the problem has been growing steadily, paralleling the growth and proliferation of terrorism itself. An unprecedented impetus to this research was lent by the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, with significant “boosters” of the Madrid March 11, 2003 and the London July 7, 2005 bombings. Currently, considerable efforts in the U.S. and abroad are being expended on studying diverse aspects of terrorism in quest of a solid, empirically based knowledge into its workings on which effective countermeasures could be based. Psychological science plays an essential part in this enterprise.

Psychologists’ interest in the study of terrorism is not surprising. Terrorism, after all, is a behavioral phenomenon governed by human agency. Individuals must decide to execute a terrorist act and be motivated enough to perpetrate the carnage.

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often to the point of taking their own lives in the process. Terrorists’ acts of self-immolation and their indiscriminate killings of innocent civilians strike one as horrific and bizarre. They simply cry out for a psychological explanation.

"How can terrorists bring themselves to perpetrate the horrors that they do? Why do they hate us so much? Are they mentally disturbed? Do they have a death wish? Were they driven to their heinous deeds by sheer desperation? Are we to blame? These questions on many people’s minds pose a challenge to psychology as a field of science, with a great deal of importance riding on the answers.

It is possible to distinguish two contrasting psychological approaches to terrorism, presently labeled as the syndrome versus tool perspectives. By “syndrome,” we mean a conception of terrorism as a monolithic entity, a meaningful psychological construct with identifiable properties. This approach resembles the “medical model” of psychopathology in portraying terrorism as a kind of “disease” with a definite etiology, developmental trajectory, and consequences. It implies that “terrorists” should be demarcated from non-terrorists by their internal psychological make-up, that is, their personality traits, motivations, and socialization history. It suggests that a generic “terrorist group” should turn out to have a distinct organizational structure and evolutionary sequence. It implies that “terrorism” should be found to emanate from a set of external “root causes” (e.g., poverty, poor education, or political oppression). Above all, it suggests that one could generalize one’s insights about a given terrorist group to all others. Carrying out such reasoning to its logical conclusion implies, for example, that the way the Weathermen organization in the U.S. progressed through various crisis stages culminating in full blown political violence or the way the Red Brigades terrorism in Italy was dismantled through the Italian “repentance laws” will have important lessons for understanding other brands of terrorism, e.g., the Salafi terrorism currently menacing the West, various South American terrorist groups, or the ancient Zealots of the first century A.D.

The “tool” approach is rooted in the psychology of goal-means relations. It assumes rather little about the uniform psychological properties of terrorists or their organizations. Instead, it views terrorism as a means to an end, a tactic of warfare that anyone could use. It suggests that, like the rocket launcher, the tank, or the AK-47 assault rifle, terrorism may be employed by non-state militias, state-sponsored armies, even lone perpetrators. Rather than adopting a “bottom-up” approach seeking to psychologically characterize certain terrorist groups, in the hope that this would generalize to other terrorist groups, it takes a “top down” perspective based on a conceptual distinction between terrorists (potentially any social entity or actor) and terrorism as a means to an end. The “psychology” here is very different from that of the “syndrome” approach. It is a psychology of means employment. Its major concern is the conditions under which an individual or a group would opt for a given course of action versus its possible alternatives, given these actors’ objectives.

**Terrorism as a Syndrome**

**The Terrorist Personality**

Even though the anti-colonial wave of terrorism was clear in its implication that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” and hence, that the search for a uniform, psychologically meaningful “terrorist syndrome” is unlikely to be fruitful, the search for such a personality has not abated. John Horgan, in a review
of terrorist personality literature, points out that as late as 1981, a review of the
literature on terrorism and mental disorders found that psychopathy was the feature
most commonly associated with terrorists. Andrew Silke concurs. In his words, “in
the early 1970s...it was widely believed that terrorists suffered from personality
disorders and that there would be an exceptionally high number of clinical psychopaths,
narcissists and paranoids in the ranks of the average terrorist group.” Similar beliefs
continue to this day to permeate psychological thought on terrorism. Thus, follow-
ing the events of September 11, 2001, Walter Laqueur wrote that “all terrorists
believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form
of delusion and persecution mania...The element of...madness plays an important
role” in terrorism.

Yet, the systematic quest for a unique terrorist personality has yielded few
encouraging results. Painstaking empirical research conducted on the German Red
Army Faction (the Bader Meinhoff Gang), the Italian Red Army Brigades, the Bas-
que ETA, and various Palestinian organizations did not reveal anything particularly
striking about the psychological make-up of members of terrorist organizations. As
Clark McCauley eloquently put it:

The results of these investigations take several feet of shelf space, but are
easy to summarize. The terrorists did not differ from the comparison
group of non-terrorists in any substantial way; in particular, the terrorists
did not show higher rates of any kind of psychopathology.... Indeed ter-
rorism would be a trivial problem if only those with some kind of psycho-
pathology could be terrorists. Rather we have to face the fact that normal
people can be terrorists, that we are ourselves capable of terrorist acts
under some circumstances. This fact is already implied in recognizing that
military and police forces involved in state terrorism are all too capable
of killing non-combatants. Few would suggest that the broad range of
soldiers and policemen involved in such killing must all be suffering some
kind of psychopathology.

John Horgan expressed a similar view, writing that, “despite their attractiveness
(via the simplicity any potential results would imply), personality traits are useless as
predictors for understanding why people become terrorists.” As we shall argue
later, however, personality traits are not necessarily irrelevant to terrorism even
though they may not constitute the unique psychological determinants of terrorism.

“Root Causes” of Terrorism?

If no internal personality factors, then perhaps external “root causes” may form the
unique psychological determinants of terrorism. Major such suggested “root
causes” have been socioeconomic status, age, and education along with frustration,
relative deprivation, and religious faith. According to Marc Sageman, the “root
causes” approach suffers from the “fundamental issue of specificity.” Although
many people may be exposed to the same hardships in life or share similar back-
grounds, very few of them actually become terrorists. Thus, none of the suggested
factors can be expected to constitute both the necessary and the sufficient causes of
terrorism.
Consistent with this notion, a number of large-scale empirical studies have found no relationship between poverty and terrorism, both at the level of the individual terrorists and at the aggregate level of their country of origin. Sageman's research on the Salafi jihad movement uncovered that its leadership and its largest membership cluster had come mostly from the upper and middle classes. Robert Pape's recent study of suicide bombers' demographic profile indicated that only seventeen percent in their midst were unemployed or part of the lower classes, considerably less than their fair share representation in their societies, of which they make up about one-third overall.

On the aggregate level, in the late 1990s and 2000, when terrorism against Israeli citizens was soaring, the average Palestinian was reporting an optimistic economic forecast, and unemployment was declining. Claude Berrebi performed a time-series analysis looking at the relationship between economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the number of terrorist incidents and found none. Nor does lack of formal education appear to constitute a root cause of terrorism. Sageman's examination of the Central Staff of the global Salafi jihad finds that eighty-eight percent had finished college and twenty percent had doctorate degrees. In fact, only a quarter of his sample could be considered unskilled workers with few prospects. Similar results can be found in other empirical studies looking at education, occupation, and terrorism.

The above studies imply that poverty and lack of education are neither necessary nor sufficient causes of terrorism. Some recent data hint at the possibility that many of today's terrorists originate in countries that suffer from political repression. But there are reasons to doubt a general causal link here as well. Recall that Western democracies such as Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Canada, and the U.S. have all seen instances of indigenous terrorism, whereas Stalin's Soviet Union, for example (a repressive regime by all criteria), or Hitler's Nazi Germany, saw none.

**Presumptive Psycho-logic of the "Root Cause" Notion: Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation Hypotheses**

Presumably, the logic underlying the "root cause" notion is that conditions of absolute or relative deprivation (due to poverty, political oppression, discrimination, and low social status) are frustrating, fomenting aggression against others that translates into terrorism. But in scientific psychology the simple frustration-aggression hypothesis has long been questioned. Just because one is frustrated does not necessarily mean that one would aggress against others. Frustration could lead to withdrawal, depression, escape, or aggression against the self rather than against others. Frustration could also motivate the search for alternative means to one's objectives, not necessarily violent means. Indeed, studies have shown that terrorism does not appear to constitute a strategy of last resort, used when all other means have been exhausted. In this vein, Sageman argues that relative deprivation is a probable necessary condition for terrorism but not a sufficient condition. As he points out, many individuals are frustrated in their own lives or feel economic deprivation but very few become terrorists.

In short, the "root cause" notion seems to have garnered little empirical support or conceptual grounding, if by this notion is meant the necessary and sufficient conditions for some event. This does not mean, however, that various personality traits or motivations, fueled by such conditions as poverty, political oppression, or feelings
of injustice, discrimination, or relative deprivation are irrelevant to terrorism. In the next section we consider the manner of their potential relevance.

Root Causes versus Contributing Factors

Although no one factor of those suggested may qualify as a "root cause" of terrorism, many could serve as contributing factors to terrorism. By contrast to "root causes," "contributing factors" may show correlations with a given variable of interest under specific circumstances. In this vein, Andrew Silke describes how the vast majority of terrorists neither suffer from mental disorders nor can be classified by a certain personality characteristic; instead "their involvement in political violence is a result of a series of understandable factors which combined result in a process of deepening involvement in violent extremism." In other words, none of these factors is a sufficient or a necessary cause of terrorist behavior; however, under certain conditions and in the right combination they may contribute to an individual's support of or enrollment in a terrorist organization.

Relative Deprivation as a Contributing Factor

Sageman describes how the Core Arabs (those from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait) sent abroad to study by their wealthy families were alienated, underemployed, and perhaps discriminated against, thus, in a state of relative deprivation as compared with the native citizens of their host countries. Such circumstances may have produced a sense of unhappiness and humiliation felt also by the Maghreb Arabs living or born in an unfriendly French society. In both cases, these individuals' sense of relative deprivation may have been alleviated by an embrace of radical Islam, seen as "a way to restore their dignity, gain a sense of spiritual calling, and promote their values." In this way then, relative deprivation may be considered a contributing factor to terrorism under specific circumstances.

It is doubtful, however, that relative deprivation needs to be present in all instances of terrorism or that it invariably defines the necessary condition for terrorism. For instance, there seems to be little evidence that the Weathermen in the U.S., the Bader Meinhoff in Germany, or the anti-colonialist movements in the mid-twentieth century were all fueled by a sense of relative deprivation or a direct and invidious comparison with a group they were attacking. True enough, they all wanted something (e.g., social justice, sovereignty, independence) and they viewed terrorism as a means to attain it (about which more later). But it would seem rather imprecise to label this a state of relative deprivation, unless the meaning of this term is stretched so as to refer to all instances of goal striving, which would render it over-inclusive, and of a limited explanatory utility.

Mortality Salience

Anxiety over one's own eventual demise (mortality salience) can also be seen as a contributing factor to supporting terrorism under the appropriate circumstances. Recent research by Tom Pyszczynski and his colleagues looked at the effect of mortality salience on Iranian and American students and their respective support for martyrdom (terrorism) or extreme military intervention (counterterrorism). When Iranian students answered questions about an aversive topic (unrelated to death), they evaluated a fellow student who opposed martyrdom attacks against the United
States more favorably than a student who supported martyrdom attacks. However, the reverse was found when Iranian students answered questions about their death. In this instance, they rated the student who supported martyrdom as higher than the student who opposed martyrdom.

In contrast, among politically conservative (but not politically liberal) American students, mortality salience increased support for extreme military interventions by American forces. These findings suggest that under some circumstances, e.g., those found in Iran, a variable like mortality salience may increase the support for terrorism, whereas under different circumstances (e.g., those found in the U.S.) the very same variable may prompt a support for counterterrorism. This would qualify mortality salience as a possible contributing factor to terrorism.

**Right-wing Authoritarianism**

The contributing factor label may also apply to right-wing authoritarianism. In this connection, P. J. Henry and colleagues found that Lebanese individuals who scored high (vs. low) on a measure of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) were more supportive of terrorist aggression against the U.S. By contrast, Americans who scored high (vs. low) on RWA were more supportive of tough anti-terrorism policies. Thus, the very same personality inclination may foster support for terrorism and counterterrorism under different circumstances.

**Collectivism**

In circumstances where terrorism is framed as a tool of collective struggle, people with collectivistic versus individualistic motivations might be more inclined to endorse its use. Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank surveyed IBM employees in forty different nations and found that individuals in collectivist cultures are more likely to support attacks against foreigners. These findings are consistent with the results of Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, based on interviews with incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists.

**Sensation Seeking**

Another psychological variable suggested as a possible correlate of an attraction to terrorism is sensation seeking, having to do with the inherent danger and excitement that a terrorist career may offer. Although there are no empirical data yet to support this claim, researchers have argued that it seems highly plausible that sensation seekers may be more likely to identify with an organization that uses violent tactics. Again, if such a correlation were found, it is most likely to be restricted to specific circumstances, say to Middle Eastern circumstances, where terrorism appeared acceptable on other grounds. In other circumstances, e.g., in the U.S., sensation seekers might find other, more acceptable avenues to express their quest, e.g., via extreme sports of various sorts, rather than terrorism.

**Cognitive Styles**

Cognitive style, the way that individuals think about the world including biases, prejudices, or attributional tendencies may constitute a contributing factor to the
support for terrorism. Substantial evidence exists that violent behavior is influenced by cognitive capacity and/or style, thus it seems plausible that these factors may also foster individuals' support for terrorist organizations. Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle speculate that those who join terrorist organizations make a fundamental attribution error, imputing devious and evil motives to the oppressors. Though further evidence is needed to support this claim, the tendency to externalize blame might translate into the support for terrorism in situations where terrorism is already regarded as an acceptable tactical option in dealing with an adversary.

Similar considerations apply to other cognitive style variables of potential relevance to support for terrorism under circumscribed circumstances, such as the need for closure which motivates individuals to think in clear-cut dichotomous categories (such as good and evil), cognitive complexity, need for cognition, regulatory mode, and others. Where the terrorism option is available, such variables might contribute to it appearing as reasonable and desirable.

In summary, though no one personality variable or situational condition appears to constitute a “root cause” of terrorism in the strong logical sense of necessity and sufficiency, a wide variety of personality traits (mortality salience, authoritarianism, sensation seeking, etc.) and situational conditions (poverty, oppression, relative deprivation) continually referred to in terrorism research may well qualify as contributing factors to terrorism. Where a terrorism-related ideology was available and readily accessible, such variables may contribute to its acceptance as compelling and valid.

**Group Dynamics**

Is the terrorist group characterized by a unique manner of functioning? Different terrorist organizations vary widely on various dimensions, such as their size and their organizational structure. Members of some well-known organizations such as the Red Army Faction (the Bader Meinhoff gang), the Italian Red Brigades, or the Weathermen underground in the U.S. have had relatively few active members, counting in the tens. Other organizations, such as Hizballah or Al Qaeda, are estimated to have active membership counting in the thousands. Some terrorist organizations have tight organizations (Hizballah is often likened to a well-disciplined military), whereas other organizations have a diffuse network structure (it has been said, for example, that Al Qaeda now merits more the label of an ideology or a “spirit” that pervades various unconnected cells than that of an organization). Some organizations seem to revolve around the personality of a charismatic leader [e.g., the Shining Path has been said to center around the personality of Abimail Guzman and the Kurdish Workers' Party (the PKK) has been said to center around the personality of Abdullah Ocalan], Other terror-employing organizations seem to be less centered around a single leader (e.g., the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas).

Some authors have highlighted the broad base of support that terrorist activities require. Recently, McCauley discussed such support in terms of the “pyramid model.” The foundation of the pyramid consists of sympathizers with the terrorist cause who may not be prepared themselves to launch terrorist activities. This is the “sentiment pool” on whose support terrorists may count in times of need. In Northern Ireland, for instance, the base of the pyramid is all who agree with “Brits Out.” In the Islamic world, the base of the pyramid is all those who agree that the
U.S. has been hurting and humiliating Muslims for fifty years. The pyramid is essential to the terrorists for cover and for recruits. According to Silke, “even ‘popular’ terrorist groups...represent a violent and extreme minority within the immediate social group that shares the terrorists’ beliefs and backgrounds. While the terrorist...may be largely tolerated within their communities, the number of individuals actively involved in the campaign of violence is always relatively low.”

Ted Gurr comments that the “erosion of political support is not an immediate cause of decline in terrorist campaigns but an underlying one.” For instance, the decline in the 1970s of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) may be attributed to the decline of political support for its activities by the separatist Parti Quebecois. Similarly, the decline in the U.S. of the Weathermen has been attributed to a withdrawal of public support from the deadly violence it perpetrated. According to Gurr, “The general public’s reaction to the rhetoric, disorder, and violence of this era crystallized in...widespread opposition to the advocacy of radical social change and sharp resentment against groups making extreme demands or using disruptive or violent tactics.”

Whereas the above examples demonstrate fluctuations in the public’s support for terrorism within a given organization across time, there are also likely to exist appreciable differences in such support between different terrorist organizations. The degree of social support for terrorism is likely to constitute a dimension on which terrorist organizations may vary. For instance, throughout much of the second intifada, the West Bank and Gaza population extended considerable support for the idea of suicide terrorism. The degrees of support that the Red Brigades or the Red Army Faction have received from the Italian and the German populations respectively have been appreciably lower.

Any social organization, including the terrorist organizations, requires means to its survival in the form of some kind of (ideological and material) social support. What is less clear, however, is whether such support should invariably come from the broad population base wherein a given terrorist activity is taking place. Alternative forms of support may come from states (in the form of financing, training, and provision of safe haven for terrorist activities), other terrorist organizations (e.g., the recent support extended by the Hizbollah to the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, or by the PLO to the Bader Meinhoff group in the 1970s), or from a virtual community of sympathizers assembled via the Internet.

All such latter forms of support may substitute for a general endorsement of the terrorist activities on the part of populations wherein given organizations are operating, providing an exception to the pyramid model as a general characterization of terrorist groups. Thus, different terrorist organizations vary in the degree to which their support comes from the general community wherein they function. Correspondingly, they differ in their readiness to expend efforts in order to secure such support. For instance, Hamas, an organization whose support derives primarily from the Palestinian community in Gaza and the West Bank, seems more sensitive to public opinion (e.g., by a careful consideration of the implications of its actions for its public image) than is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, whose support and financing come to a large extent from Iran.

In short, the considerable variability in the extent and kind of social support in group size and in organizational structure exhibited by various terrorist organizations is inconsistent with the “syndrome” notion of terrorism as a uniform sociopsychological phenomenon. In this sense, considerations of group dynamics, along with
those concerning the “terrorist personality” and the “root causes” of terrorism, combine to suggest that a quest for the terrorist syndrome could be a “will-of-the-wisp.”

Discarding the notion of terrorism as a psychological syndrome raises the question of what the psychology of terrorism might consist of; after all, the answer would seem to require that we first clarify what exactly is meant by “terrorism” as a category. Unfortunately, the conceptual picture in this department is rather murky.

**Defining Terrorism**

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, in their comprehensive volume *Political Terrorism*, list no less than 109 definitions of terrorism, and they do not even pretend to be exhaustive. Why is it so difficult to agree on a definition? A major hardship stems from the fact that the term “terrorism” is highly pejorative these days, evoking the motivation to distinguish it from forms of aggression that one wishes to condone. Consider a recent definition of terrorism by the U.S. Department of State. It asserts that “terrorism” is a premeditated, politically motivated violence (conducted in times of peace) perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience to advance political ends.”

This allows one to demarcate terrorism from (a) state originated violence at times of war (e.g., the bombings of German or Japanese cities during WWII), (b) incidental killings of noncombatants (so-called “collateral damage”), and (c) underground resistance to occupation. One cannot but wonder whether this definition of terrorism and many others has been shaped by the desire to set it apart from forms of violence that one’s own nation or its allies were engaged in, and that one wished to defend as legitimate and moral. Indeed, one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter, an inevitable consequence of allowing one’s motivations to dictate one’s definitions. As a case in point, Khalil Shikaki’s public opinion poll of December 21, 2003 found that 98.1 percent of the Palestinian’s surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that, “the killing of 29 Palestinians in Hebron by Baruch Goldstein at al Ibrahami Mosque in 1994” constitutes terrorism, whereas 82.3 percent of the same respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that, “the killing of 21 Israeli youths by a Palestinian who exploded himself at the Tel Aviv Dolphinarium” constitutes terrorism.

One way out of this quandary is to define terrorism in terms of a core element explicit or implicit in nearly all the definitions: the strategic use of terror for the advancement of one’s objectives. In this vein, R. P. Hoffman proposed that “terrorism is a purposeful human political activity...directed toward the creation of a general climate of fear and...designed to influence in ways desired by the protagonist, other human beings, and through them, some course of events.” Similarly, Anthony Marsella argued that all definitions include the idea that terrorism is “the use of force of violence by individuals or groups that is directed toward civilian populations and intended to instill fear as a means of coercing individuals or groups to change their political or social positions.” Bruce Hoffman proposed that “terrorism [is] the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Boaz Ganor suggested that “the terrorists’ primary aim is to create fear within the target population.” Finally, Caleb Carr stated that “terrorism...is simply the contemporary name given to the modern permutation of warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose
of destroying their will [presumably via terror] to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable.”

Carr fully realized that his definition “draws no distinction between conventional military and unconventional paramilitary forces.” Yet to him, this, precisely, was the point, because:

Anyone who asserts that a particular armed force or unit or individual that deliberately targets civilians in the pursuit of a political goal is for some reason not an exponent of terrorism has no genuine interest in defining and eliminating this savage phenomenon, but is rather concerned with excusing the behavior of the nation or faction for whom he or she feels sympathy.  

**Terrorism as a Tool**

The latter approach represents a shift from a syndrome perspective on terrorism to a view of terrorism as a tool, deployed for whatever purpose. In this vein Shibley Telhami criticized the “syndrome” views inherent in “the global war on terrorism as if [it were] a movement, an ideology or a political coalition, with little differentiation between cases.” Instead, he proposed to view “terrorism... as an instrument, not a movement; as an immoral means employed by groups some of which have just causes, some of which do not.”

The “tool” view of terrorism as a utilitarian use of fear requires the coming to terms with the fact that in recent history numerous organized states actually perpetrated “terrorism.” Rudolph J. Rummel estimates that during the twentieth century, 169,000,000 people were killed by the activities of governments, including 130,000,000 killed by people’s own governments. The remaining 39,000,000 are the estimates of civilians killed by enemy forces during various wars. In the preponderance of those cases, “killing by government” was carried out in order to break the enemy morale and hence, to advance the state’s objectives. This, of course, is quintessentially “terroristic.” It is striking in this context that according to Rummel, merely 518,000 civilians were killed in the twentieth century by non-state groups of which genuine “terrorists” (e.g., as opposed to guerilla fighters) are only a part. This amounts to less than half of a percentage point of civilians whose demise was brought about by state power. As McCauley observed: “State terrorism was not only first, it continues to be more dangerous.”

Rounding off this discussion of terrorism’s users is the realization that isolated individuals too can, and have, employed this tactic. Ted Kaczynski, the ill-famed “Unabomber,” used terrorism in pristine isolation. Erik Rudolph, the Atlanta bomber, appears to have been a “lone gunman,” relatively speaking. John Muhammad and Lee Malvo induced terror for their pecuniary purpose in a pair-wise formation.

**Implications of the “Tool” View**

**The Moral Dimension**

A major implication of the “tool” view of terrorism has concerned its presumed moral unacceptability, warranting a total “war on terrorism” aimed at eradicating it in all of its shapes and forms. Telhami expressed it clearly: “The argument against
terrorism is essentially moral: To dissuade others from using such tactics, one has to speak with moral authority... The ends no matter how worthy cannot justify the means... The deliberate attack on civilian targets is unacceptable under any circumstances.” Carr similarly branded terrorism as “murderous,” “brutal,” and “savage,” on an equal plane with such morally reprehensible activities as genocide, piracy, and slavery. Much like Telhami, Carr could see “no circumstances under which terrorism is excusable.” He ultimately argued for the use of an unremitting force against terrorism, amply justified by the essential immorality of the phenomenon and its evil nature.

Moral Dilemmas

But the “end does not justify the means” doctrine, though intuitively appealing, turns out to be troublesome on both moral and psychological grounds. For strictly speaking, it is precisely the end that justifies a means—what else? Why else would one get into a car and drive (the means) if not to get somewhere (the end)? Why else would one maintain a diet (the means) if not for one's health or appearance (the end)? At least in its literal sense then, the “end does not justify the means” statement seems inaccurate.

A more nuanced interpretation of this phrase, however, is reasonable. Its intent is that a given end does not justify the means if the latter undermined another important goal. For instance, advancing “freedom from oppression” may not appear to warrant the means of “targeting civilians” because this undermines the superior end of “preserving human life.” That makes sense. But what if the undermined end was less important than the end advanced? For instance, would one lie to save a child’s life? Would one steal from the rich to give to the poor? Both latter cases exemplify Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas in which an activity, (e.g., lying, stealing) detrimental to one goal (such as that of honesty), may serve a superior end (the saving of a life, alleviation of suffering). In fact, Kohlberg regards the decision to lie or steal under these circumstances a more evolved form of morality than a rigid adherence to the compromised objective.

In essence, whether an end justifies a means depends on a moral calculus: an end may justify terrorism if it exceeded in its moral significance the end obstructed by terrorism, but it may not justify terrorism if the opposite held true. It is in precisely those terms that in August 1945, Harry Truman justified the use of the A and H bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ending the war and saving countless American and Japanese lives was more important than the preservation of the fewer lives the bombing would claim. Numerous Americans agreed. In short, rather than in black and white, morality often comes in shades of gray.

The moral calculus implicit in the “end justifying means” issue is not just a matter of arm-chair philosophizing. It has substantial implications for the “war on terrorism.” First, even though we may regard terrorism as atrocious, the terrorists and their supporters may feel morally justified in their activities if they deemed the ends advanced by terrorism superior to the ends forestalled. As a case in point, in a recent work, Anat Barko interviewed the launchers of Palestinian suicide bombers in Israeli security prisons and found that moral justifications constituted a dominant explanatory category of their actions.

Secondly, under the appropriate circumstances, the counterterrorists too may sacrifice (what to them appear) the less important in favor of more important
objectives. Thus, in the war against terrorism, military forces often risk inflicting “collateral damage” and killing innocent civilians because they deem such risks unavoidable. Thirdly, the fight against terrorism itself might appear morally unjustifiable if the end it promised to achieve (e.g., elimination of a terrorist group at a far corner of the globe fighting a just cause against a ruthless and corrupt dictatorship) threatened to hinder one’s own foreign policy priorities (e.g., the spreading of democracy or the protection of civil liberties). In this connection, David Rapoport noted that:

Despite its pre-eminent status as a victim, Cold War concerns led the U.S. sometimes to ignore its stated distaste for terror. In Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere the U.S. supported terrorist activity, an indication of how difficult it was to forgo a purpose deemed worthwhile even when deplorable tactics had to be used.69

It is arguably for these reasons that international coalitions, forged to fight terrorism, may be fragile. Thus in the 1890s, the so-called “Golden Age of Assassination,” a consensus emerged to fight terrorism through international police cooperation and improved border control. The underlying sentiment of this agreement is expressed poignantly in the following pronouncement by Theodore Roosevelt against anarchist terrorism (that with slight changes of terminology might well be misattributed to George W. Bush): “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race, and all mankind should band together against the Anarchist. His crimes should be made a crime against the law of all nations declared by treaties among all civilized powers.”60 Yet:

The consensus lasted three years only. The U.S. refused to send a representative to a St. Petersburg signing ceremony for a German/Russian sponsored protocol to meet these objectives. In a second chapter of this story, the Americans refused to adhere to it even when asked to do so later. They feared that an extensive involvement in European politics might be required.... Italy refused, too, for a very different... concern. If Anarchists were returned to their original countries, Italy’s domestic troubles might be worse than its international ones.61

In other words, a concerted and unrelenting counterterrorist effort may not only require considerable investments but might clash at times with the political and morally inspired interests of members of the international community, who may, therefore, support it only by word, rather than by deed, if that.

The Psychological Dimension

In an important sense, whether one views terrorism as moral or immoral is a matter of deciding which end is more important (that advanced or that hindered by terrorism). This is often a matter of subjective perception driven by psychological factors. Research has uncovered a phenomenon of “focalism” whereby increasing the subjective focus on a given objective leads to the suppression of alternative objectives.62 Increasing the perceived importance of ends, assumed to be served by terrorism (e.g., a defense of one’s religion, freedom from oppression), may psychologically inhibit and dwarf the perceived importance of other incompatible ends (protection of innocents, peaceful co-existence with one’s neighbors). In the same way, a focus
on security (substantially intensified in the wake of the 9/11/01 attacks in the U.S., the 3/11/04 attacks in Madrid, and the 7/7/05 attacks in London) may jeopardize other important concerns, such as individual rights or good foreign relations. Psychological considerations thus add a layer of complexity to deciding the "end justifying means" issue in the context of fighting terrorism.

**Global War on Terrorism**

All of which suggests that the "global war on terrorism" concept may need to be reassessed. First, it seems unrealistic. Because anybody can, has, and potentially will, use the "fear factor" in an attempt to advance their important objectives—taking seriously the fight against all "terrorism" could mean a fight on too many fronts and against too many adversaries. Secondly, because of the moral complexities involved, we need to choose our battles carefully and focus on terrorists whose defeat is truly worth the price. This means replacing the indiscriminant globalism of our struggle with focused specificity. In contrast to a general "war on terrorism," it suggests restricting the struggle to specific groups that use terrorism. In words of the 9/11 commission: "the enemy is not just 'terrorism,' some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific."  

**The Psychology of Means Employment and the Use of Terrorism**

**The Terrorism Tool**

By now, early into the twenty-first century, "terrorism" boasts a rich inventory of tactical techniques, honed by years of terrorist experience, recorded in terrorist manuals, available on the Internet and caught up with cutting-edge technologies. Whereas the nineteenth century Anarchists aimed to induce terror through the gunning down of public figures, subsequent terrorist movements enlarged the repertory of violent moves to include plane hijackings, kidnapping and/or hostage taking, beheading, suicide bombings, car bombings, and poisonous gassings. The greatest current fear is the potential future use by terrorists of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which might bring the terrorist threat to the dreaded next level.  

Today's terrorism has immediate access to the mass media and, hence, to the spreading of its message and instruction in its techniques to billions of people worldwide. According to Betty Pfeifferbaum, "media coverage is an essential weapon of terrorists... [used] to convey their message; to gain recognition of their cause, demands and grievances; and to spread fear and anxiety." For all the foregoing reasons, terrorism these days constitutes a highly appealing and accessible "tool," a means of carrying out a variety of belligerent activities against potential targets.

**Launching Terrorism**

Psychologically speaking, the launching of terrorism on the part of some perpetrators requires a deliberate decision, rooted in the belief that spreading fear in a targeted population will advance their objectives. Indeed, the proponents of terrorism and its ideologues have been at pains to provide elaborate rationales for the
efficacy of terrorism. A well-known rationale, offered by the Russian anarchists of the late nineteenth century and echoed by the leftist terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, was that terrorism would reveal the state’s impotence and provoke it to excessive counter-measures contrary to its stated values, thereby unmasking its hypocrisy and paving the way to a revolution. A similar logic appeared in Carlos Marighella’s mini-manual for the urban guerilla and was cited by left-wing terrorists in Europe and South America. A different rationale for the efficacy of terrorism, grounded in the presumed weakness and degeneracy of the West, was articulated by Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah in his “spider web” theory about the mere appearance, but not the reality, of Western (Israeli) potency.67 A similar justification was offered by Osama bin Laden, who in a 2003 sermon stated:

America is a great power possessed of tremendous military might and a wide-ranging economy, but all this is built on an unstable foundation which can be targeted, with special attention to its obvious weak spots. If America is hit in one hundredth of these weak spots, it will stumble, wither away and relinquish world leadership.68

The Legitimation of Terrorism

Because of its extreme nature involving the killing of innocents and a likely (if not certain) self-destruction in the process, the use of terrorism requires not only instrumental but also moral justification that would lend it legitimacy above and beyond its instrumentality as a means. Such justification has typically rested on lofty collectivist ideologies involving justice to the “people,” freedom from oppression, service to God, or retribution for crimes against one’s nation. For instance, Osama bin Laden in a 1997 interview with CNN had this to say in justifying a jihad against America:

We declared jihad against the United States because the U.S. government is unjust, criminal and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous and criminal... The mention of the U.S. reminds us before everything else of those innocent children who were dismembered, their heads and arms cut off... This U.S. government abandoned even humanitarian feelings by these hideous crimes.69

Similarly inflammatory language appears in incitements to terrorism by other ideologues of various ilks. In summary, because terrorism undermines such important objectives as staying alive and preserving the lives of innocent fellow human beings—it’s launching requires a justification via superordinate ends whose importance exceeds even such commonly cherished purposes. In the terminology of means-ends psychology, the use of the terrorism tool requires the demonstration that in this case the end does justify the means and that the carrying out of attacks against civilians does not undermine one’s objective of living up to the ideals of moral decency and of the preservation of ethical values.

The Place of Ideology

As implied above, the use of terrorism (on the part of organizations or individuals) requires a belief system supporting terrorism. Such a belief system contains notions
whereby terrorism is (a) instrumental to the attainment of the actors' objectives, and (b) justifiable on moral grounds, and hence compatible with these actors' ethics. Such a belief system may be grounded in a variety of different ideologies, including religious faith, as well as ethno-nationalist and socialist ideologies. Individuals' traits, motivations, and psychological states (e.g., brought about by oppression, poverty, or relative deprivation) may dispose them to embrace such terrorism-justifying ideology to a greater or a lesser extent. In that sense, these factors may constitute psychological contributing factors to terrorism. Furthermore, these factors are interchangeable, and hence none may claim to constitute the root cause of terrorism. What seems psychologically necessary for the embracement of terrorism is a justificatory system, that is, an ideology claiming terrorism to constitute an effective and acceptable tool given the actors' objectives.

**Discouraging Terrorism**

The above analysis of the means (or "tool") conception of terrorism has implications for strategies to discourage terrorism. Consistent with the present notions, this may require persuading the perpetrator that (a) this particular means is ineffectual in reference to the actors' objectives, (b) that there exist alternative, more effective means to the actors' ends, and (c) that terrorism constitutes a hindrance to the attainment of other important objectives.

Though schematically simple, implementation of these strategies is anything but, in fact. A major difficulty is that events are subject to construal, often biased by motivations. For instance, throughout much of the second intifada, close to eighty percent of the Palestinian population supported the use of terror tactics (e.g., suicide bombings) against the Israelis, believing this to be an effective tool in their struggle. It is not that motivations imbue judgments directly; rather, they may work through the recruitment of supportive arguments for the desired position. As noted earlier, extreme Islamists have maintained that the West is weak and corrupt; hence, it will crumble under pressure sooner or later. This credo immunizes its believers against present setbacks, viewed as temporary stumbling blocks on the way to an ultimate victory. The Crusader state, re-conquered by the Muslims after centuries, often is invoked as a parallel to contemporary jihad in showing proof of success. In short, proof is in the "eye of the beholder," and it is often shaped by motivation.

**Multifinality**

Terrorism also might be difficult to give up because, besides its presumed advancement of the perpetrators' ideological (political, religious, ethno-nationalistic) objectives, it affords the emotional satisfaction of watching the enemy suffer, which boosts one's sense of potency and prowess. In that sense, terrorism is "multipurpose" or "multi-final," compounding its appeal. From this perspective, such policies as "ethnic profiling," "targeted assassinations" or the inadvertent "collateral damage" inflicted during anti-terrorist campaigns might backfire by fueling the rage of the terrorists and their supporters, hence amplifying the emotional goal of vengeance against the enemy. A recent empirical analysis suggests that "targeted hits" by the Israeli forces boosted the estimated recruitment to the "terrorist stock," presumably due to the Palestinians' motivation to revenge the fallen comrades. Whereas "targeted hits" do hurt (a repeated demand by Palestinian negotiators was that the
Israelis desist from employing this particular strategy) and may arguably decrease the perception that terrorism is effective (due to the organizational disruptions that the elimination of leaders may create), they concomitantly increase the appeal of terrorism by inflating the intensity of the emotional goal it may serve. In this regard, the research found that the arrests of terrorism suspects (i.e., a less inflammatory means) tended to reduce (rather than inflate) the “terrorist stock” and hence, to lower the incidence of Palestinian terrorism.76

**Feasibility of Alternatives to Terrorism**

Whereas additional goals (such as revenge) may increase terrorism’s appeal, availability of alternative means to the terrorism’s goal may decrease it. For instance, following the election of Mahmoud Abbas to the presidency of the Palestinian authority, representing a renewed chance to revive the peace process (i.e., an alternative means to ending the Israeli occupation), support for suicide attacks among the Palestinians dipped to an all-time low in seven years, reaching a mere twenty-nine percent, according to the Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki.77

Nonetheless, fifty-seven percent of the respondents opposed the steps taken by the Palestinian Authority to punish the launchers of suicide attacks. As Shikaki summarized it: “Public opposition to a crackdown on those who commit violence against Israelis might reflect the belief that the peace process has not yet been revived.... The public seeks to maintain the option of returning to violence if diplomacy fails.”78

**Alternative Objectives**

Dissuading the users of terrorism from its deployment may involve a rekindling of alternative objectives incompatible with terrorism. Ferracuti, in commenting on the Italian government’s “repentance laws” and their success in quelling Red Brigades’ terrorism, writes in this connection that “the activists [even though they endorsed]...leftist politics, held social service or creative jobs” (attesting to alternative goals they adopted, replacing their revolutionary objectives).79 In the Palestinian context, the opposition to suicide attacks is particularly pronounced among Palestinians likely to possess the means to alternative, individualistic goals, e.g., professional, family-related, or material goals. Thus, such opposition reached 71 percent among holders of B.A. degrees compared to 61 percent among illiterates, 75 percent among employees compared to 62 percent among students and, curiously enough, 74 percent among individuals willing to buy lottery tickets, i.e., those presumably interested in material goals compared to 64 percent among those unwilling to buy them.80

**A Means-Ends Classification of Terrorism Users**

The “tool” view of terrorism affords a classification of terrorism users in accordance with their commitment to that particular means as well as to the ends believed to be served by it. Users can be strongly committed to terrorism because of its intrinsic properties, such as the sense of power it bestows or the appeal of violence. Also, terrorism perpetrators may perceive no alternative means to their objectives. As James DeNardo argued, small organizations may resort to violence to compensate for what they lack in numbers.81 In that sense, terrorism may be viewed as a “great equalizer” and a tool of choice for relatively powerless minorities.82
According to Rohan Gunaratna, Utopian Islamist groups exhibit an absolute commitment to the tool of terrorism. Specifically, they “seek to destroy the existing order.... Their doctrinal principles include no negotiation, no dialogue and no peacemaking.” Similarly, Apocalyptic Islamist groups “firmly believe that they have been divinely ordained to commit violent acts and are most likely to engage in mass-casualty, catastrophic terrorism.” Given such depth of commitment to terrorism as a tool and to ends believed to be served by terrorism uniquely—it is unlikely that anything short of a total defeat will convince such groups to relinquish its use.

The situation is rather different for users of terrorism for whom it represents merely one among several available instruments to be launched or withheld in appropriate circumstances. Hamas, Hizballah, or Sinn Fein, for example, though hardly shy of using terrorism, have other means at their disposal (diplomacy, media campaigns) as well as other goals (of political or social variety). Hamas, for example, desisted from the use of terrorism in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestinians, and following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Similarly, following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbollah has substantially reduced its direct belligerence against Israel.

It is of particular interest that terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Hizballah, whose base of support has derived substantially from the local populations (in Gaza and the West Bank and in South Lebanon, respectively) may be reciprocally affected by goals of those populations, whose neglect might undermine their support for the organizations in question. For instance, once the immediate “irritant” of the Israeli occupation was removed with withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon and with dismantling of the Jewish settlements in Gaza, the populations’ goals may have shifted toward rebuilding the economic infrastructure in those locales and the resumption of peaceful life. This may have created a dilemma for the organizations as far as the use of terrorism is concerned, and the risk it entails of destroying the rebuilding efforts.

This dilemma is compounded by the fact that the populations’ support for organizations like Hamas and Hizballah may translate into political prowess, presenting these groups with alternative goals (of political stewardship) to which terrorism may be inimical. Thus, Hizballah has been recently doing well in the Lebanese elections and succeeded in having its supporters serve in the Lebanese cabinet. Similarly, Hamas has done quite well in the elections in Gaza and is ambitiously preparing these days for elections in the West Bank. Such organizational shifts to alternative goals (political leadership), or to alternative means (e.g., negotiations) deemed more appropriate than terrorism to advancing such goals, may be profitably probed in future research.

In short, different organizations may differ in their potential for relinquishing its employment. Whereas (some sense of) negotiating with terrorists, and effecting their shifts to alternative goals or means, is unlikely to work with perpetrators whose commitment to terrorism is total and unconditional, it might work with terrorist groups who may entertain alternative means and value alternative goals.

The Tool Conception at the Individual Level of Analysis

Our discussion of the tool conception has stressed the organizational level of analysis (e.g., as concerns the presence of alternative means to the organization’s goals or the presence of alternative organizational goals incompatible with terrorism). Yet, the
tool conception is equally applicable at the individual level of analysis, in reference to such issues as the individual’s motivation to join a terrorist organization, commit a suicide attack, or abandon the organization altogether. Thus, in the West Bank and Gaza, the considerable celebration of fallen fighters and the glory of martyrdom attached to suicide attacks set participation in terrorist activities as a worthy goal for Palestinian youth. Additional goals in the case of suicide attackers might be provision for one’s family, both materially and in social status, as well as bonding with other members of the organization. In some cases, the goals of joining a terrorist organization or embarking on a suicide mission may be avenging a relative or a significant other. In other cases, it may be atoning for prior infractions and indiscretions, hence regaining the respect of one’s community. In short, according to the tool view, membership in a terrorist organization may serve as a means to multiple individual-level goals.

Several writers stressed that an important way to steer individuals from terrorism is to provide an alternative means to the ends believed to be served by terrorism. As Sageman noted: “Peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups such as the Tablighi Janaat attract the same clusters of alienated young men as the global Salafi jihad and may provide them with a peaceful alternative to terror.” Gunaratna made a similar point in noting that “in the absence of a powerfully articulated counterideology, Al Qaeda can come to represent the truth for some Muslims.”

The saliency of alternative goals, incompatible with terrorism, may also undermine individuals’ support for terrorism. As already noted, the renewed possibilities of the peace process following the 2004 death of Arafat and the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip extended to Palestinians the prospect of participation in the rebuilding efforts and the betterment of their personal conditions, hence apparently undermining these persons’ support for terrorism.

Concluding Comments

In this paper, we have considered two alternative psychological approaches to terrorism. One, based on the “syndrome” view, is grounded in the implicit assumption that terrorism as such represents a psychologically coherent concept. This view implies that terrorists differ from non-terrorists in their personality profile and possibly present a specific pattern of psychopathology. It also means that terrorism has psychological root causes, e.g., frustration arising from poverty or oppression, the removal of which would eliminate terrorism. Though initially appealing, these notions have received little support thus far, and seem problematic on both conceptual and empirical grounds. The emerging consensus is that no systematic personality differences seem to demarcate terrorists as a category from non-terrorists. Nor has there been much support that poverty or oppression are the root causes of terrorism. That does not mean that certain personality characteristics, e.g., authoritarianism, narcissism, collectivism, or sensation seeking could not predispose some people under some circumstances to embrace terrorism-justifying ideologies. Nor does it mean that poverty or oppression could not, under some circumstances, be channeled into a support for terrorism. In other words, personality traits, political and economic conditions, etc., could well constitute contributing factors to terrorism but are unlikely to constitute “root causes” of terrorism in any useful meaning of this term.

The “tool” view of terrorism seems more promising. This view rests on a simple notion that terrorism represents the use of fear-inducing tactics for the advancement
of one’s objectives. It thus suggests that, in principle, any social agent may become a “terrorist”: a non-state player, a state, even a lone individual. Indeed, commentators have long stressed the considerable variety of terrorist groups and organizations, exhibiting heterogeneous scopes, ideologies, and objectives.\textsuperscript{88} Such open-ended diversity paints dim prospects for formulating a uniform psychology of the “terrorism” syndrome, yet it is compatible with the “terrorism as tool” perspective.

The “tool” view of terrorism treats it as a special instance of a broader motivational category, namely of a \textit{means to a goal}. Rather than dwelling on the unique aspects of terrorism as such, this approach draws on the principles of means-ends psychology to elucidate the employment of terrorism.\textsuperscript{89} It implies that terrorism is likely to be utilized when perceived as effective for the attainment of important objectives and that it might be relinquished when its perceived efficacy is undermined, when alternative superior means to the same ends appear feasible, and/or when it is seen to undermine other significant goals. Psychologically, all of these strategies refer to perceptions that members of terrorist organizations may form about their ends and available means. Understanding what those perceptions are and how they might form and change in specific instances (on an individual or group level of analysis) represents a major challenge for the psychological researcher seeking to understand contemporary terrorism and ways of counteracting it.

Notes

1. Distinguished University Professor in Psychology and co-director of START, National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.


8. As quoted in Silke (see note 7 above), 30.


14. Sageman (see note 12 above).
17. Sageman (see note 12 above), 74–78.
18. See Pape (see note 15 above), 203–216; Stern (see note 13 above).
23. Sageman (see note 12 above), 95.
24. Silke (see note 7 above), 94.
25. Sageman (see note 12 above), 93.

31. Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle, Terrorist Lives (London: Brassey’s, 1994); See also Victoroff (see note 9 above), 27.


33. McCauley (see note 10 above), 51.

34. Silke (see note 7 above), 33.


36. To be sure, terrorists groups may receive support not only from their broad population bases, but from political entities such as states whose interests are seen as compatible with the terrorist activities in specific instances. For instance, in the 1930s Italy and Hungary were believed to provide material support to Balkan terrorists; during the Cold War the Soviet Union extended consistent support to anti-colonialist terrorist organizations; Greece extended support to a Cypriot terrorist organization (EOKA); Arab states supported the anti-French Algerian FLN; Syria, Iraq, and Libya extended state support to Palestinian terrorists. See Gurr (see note 35 above), 97; Robert Hager, Jr. and David A. Lake, “Balancing Empires: Competitive Decolonization in International Politics,” Security Studies 9 (Spring 2000): 108–148; David C. Rapoport, “Modern Terror: The Four Waves,” in Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.


41. Historically, this has not been always the case. For instance, in 1878, Vera Zasulich, upon wounding a Russian police commander, threw her weapon to the floor proclaiming “I am a terrorist not a criminal,” Rapoport (see note 36 above).

42. Rapoport comments on how Menachem Begin defined members of his Irgun as “freedom fighters” rather than terrorists, a coinage that was widely adopted in the U.N. debates, for example. See John Dugard, “International Terrorism and the Just War,” in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., The Morality of Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 77–98. Governments, on the other hand, began to refer to all violent rebels as “terrorists.” In this day and age, the suicide bombers in Iraq and elsewhere are variously referred to in the media as “terrorists,” “militants” or “insurgents,” Rapoport (see note 36 above), 46–73.


46. Hoffman (see note 38 above), 43.
49. Ibid.
52. McCauley (see note 10 above), 34.
54. Telhami (see note 50 above), 16–17.
55. Carr (see note 48 above).
59. Rapoport (see note 36 above), 58.
61. Rapoport (see note 36 above), 52.
70. Pope (see note 15 above).
72. Buruma and Margalit (see note 67 above).
75. Atran (see note 13 above).
77. Shikaki, (see note 72 above).
78. Ibid.
79. Ferracuti (see note 3 above), 64.
80. Shikaki (see note 71 above).
84. For example, on Oct. 13, 2005, in ceremony sponsored by Abu Mazen, the President of the Palestinian Authority, one million dollars was distributed to families of Palestinian terrorists, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/al_ansar_e.htm; Stern (see note 13 above), 54; Sageman (see note 12 above), 99–135.
85. Sageman (see note 12 above), 182.
86. Gunaratna (see note 83 above), 19.
87. Shikaki (see note 71 above).
89. Gollwitzer and Bargh (see note 4 above); Kruglanski, “Goal Systems” (see note 4 above).