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Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms:

Lessons from the Ecuador Indigenous and
Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project

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Cover photos (left to right):

Indigenous community work project—Martien van Nieuwkoop
Participants in stakeholder consultation—Cecilia Guzmán

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Foreword

Martien van Nieuwkoop and Jorge Uquillas have distilled important lessons from their work with Ecuadoran Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples during the past several years. With this paper they share their insights into the practical application of "ethnodevelopment" concepts in actual projects. Ethnodevelopment offers strong potential to sharpen the focus of development initiatives and increase their success so that they yield the greatest benefit for those most at risk.

The Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project, which forms the basis for this analysis, is the first stand-alone World Bank–financed project to exclusively address the development needs of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. It is therefore especially useful that the project team convey to others the lessons they learned. This type of knowledge-sharing about innovative initiatives is essential for maximizing our development impact.

This document is part of the LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper series published by the Latin America and Caribbean Region's Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit (LCSES). The series seeks to disseminate the results of analytical and operational work, present preliminary findings, and describe "best practices" with regard to major sustainable development issues facing the region. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these papers are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, members of its Board of Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

John Redwood
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Executive Summary

It is important to take successful development models from one situation and apply them to other situations, but not without recognizing that different ethnic groups or parts of society undergo development in different ways. They usually benefit most or respond best to approaches and mechanisms tailored to their specific cultural heritage and social characteristics.

This paper seeks to strengthen development projects for indigenous peoples and ethnic groups by examining the critical concepts of "ethnodevelopment" or "development with identity," and how to incorporate them into operational planning and implementation.

Ethnodevelopment builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies to promote local employment and growth. Such qualities include these peoples' strong sense of ethnic identity, close attachments to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources to achieve shared goals. These dynamics are recognized as fundamental to the way in which indigenous peoples define their own processes of development and interactions with other segments of society.

The Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project is the World Bank's first stand-alone investment operation that focuses exclusively on indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities. The process of preparing and designing the project yielded valuable lessons and insights into the factors that make ethnodevelopment work in the real world. These lessons are grouped in three categories:

Critical Entry Conditions	• Minority population with distinct characteristics
	• Strong correlation between poverty and ethnicity
	• Strong social organizations
	• Commitment to finding common ground
	• Enabling policy environment
Success Factors in Project Preparation	• Participatory framework for joint decisionmaking
	• Appropriate division of functional responsibilities
	• Relatively high degree of project autonomy
	• Conducive working environment
	• Transparent rules of the game
	• Mobilization of alliances
	• Hands-on experience
	• Flexible processing schedule
	• Task team continuity
Essential Design Features	• Objective beneficiary targeting mechanism
	• Focus on mobilizing social capital
	• Inclusion of concrete cultural dimensions

The project team has written this paper to share their insights with other development professionals and help bring this innovative approach into the mainstream of the Bank's work.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1993 the World Bank launched its Indigenous Peoples Development Initiative, and has been working ever since to open new and innovative avenues of support for indigenous peoples development. Initial efforts focused on mitigation measures, training and capacity building, and preinvestment operations. Gradually, indigenous peoples development is becoming an integral part of the Bank's loan portfolio.

Because the Bank is still building its knowledge and experience in this field, it is essential to share information and lessons learned from actual operations carried out in partnership with indigenous peoples and their organizations. This paper attempts to distill lessons from the preparation and design of the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project. The project preparation process was long, bumpy, and exhausting, but also exciting, fulfilling, and instructive.

The project is the first stand-alone investment operation financed by the World Bank that focuses exclusively on indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities. It the first time that Ecuador borrowed resources specifically for investments to benefit its indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations. It is also the first time that indigenous organizations and the Ecuadoran government have joined forces in an effort explicitly based on putting into practice the vision of "development with identity," or "ethnodevelopment." This vision builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies—such as their sense of ethnic identity, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources for shared goals—to promote local employment and growth.

The Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project invests in local capacity building, small-scale demand-driven rural subprojects, land tenure regularization, cultural heritage activities, and institutional strengthening of the Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador. The total project budget is $50 million ($25 million from the World Bank, $15 million from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and $10 million from the Ecuadoran government and from Ecuadoran indigenous communities and organizations. The project was prepared beginning in early 1995, approved in early 1998, and became effective in September 1998 (see Annex I for a detailed timeline).

Chapter 2 of this paper focuses on conditions that are considered critical for project entry, and which preferably should be met before initiating the project preparation process. These conditions include a) a minority population with distinct characteristics, b) a strong correlation between poverty and ethnicity, c) strong social organizations, d) commitment to finding common ground, and e) an enabling policy environment.

Chapter 3 examines the factors that determine success in the preparation phase. Our findings stress the importance of a) a participatory framework for joint decisionmaking, b) an appropriate division of functional responsibilities, c) a relatively high degree of project autonomy, d) a conducive working environment, e) transparent rules of the game, f) mobilization of alliances, g) hands-on experience, i) a flexible processing schedule, and j) continuity of the task team.

Chapter 4 presents essential design features for projects that aim to put into practice the vision of ethnodevelopment. These include a) an objective beneficiary targeting mechanism, b) a focus on mobilizing social capital, and c) inclusion of concrete cultural dimensions.

This paper is not a formal, quantitative, statistically rigorous survey, nor is it an informal, rapid, qualitative assessment. It is an attempt to distill and present in a systematic way the collective knowledge of the task team that worked on the project for over three years, from project identification to project launch and beyond.[1]

2. CRITICAL ENTRY CONDITIONS

The task team identified certain conditions that they considered critical for project entry, and which preferably should be met before initiating the project preparation process. These include a) a minority population with distinct characteristics, b) a strong correlation between poverty and ethnicity, c) strong social organizations, d) commitment to finding common ground, and e) an enabling policy environment.

Minority Population with Distinct Characteristics

The existence of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations with distinct characteristics is a rather obvious precondition for the launch of an investment project dedicated to their development. Indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans are important parts of Ecuador's multicultural society. They differ from the mainstream Hispanic (white and mestizo) population both in their degree of economic deprivation, their high level of social capital (particularly among indigenous peoples), and their cultural and social characteristics.

Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples together represent almost 30 percent of the population, although estimates vary widely.[2] There are 13 officially designated, non-Hispanic ethnic groups or nationalities in Ecuador.[3] The largest nationality group comprises the highland Quichua-speakers (also known as the Runa) who constitute more than 90 percent of Ecuador's indigenous peoples. However, the Runa themselves are culturally diverse, as demonstrated by the contrasts between subgroups such as the Otavalo and Saraguro, or the Chibuleo and Cañari peoples.

Many indigenous people have moved to urban areas and in some cases have become assimilated into the dominant mestizo society. However, in rural areas they have tended to maintain their

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1. Task team members included: Martien van Nieuwkoop, Jorge E. Uquillas, Maurizio Guadagni (LCSES); Surajit Goswami (LCC3C); Marta Molares-Halberg (LEGLA), Pablo Glikman (IFAD) and Dino Francescutti (FAO).
2. Indigenous organizations often give higher estimates (about 40 percent of the total population), while some social scientists (such as Knapp) put the figure closer to 10 percent on the basis of census data.
3. Indigenous peoples in Ecuador prefer to be designated as "nationalities" or "peoples" rather than "ethnic groups." The first two terms imply having standing as a nation, and a broad range of rights established in United Nations instruments and the International Labor Organization's Convention 169. Non-Hispanic nationalities in Ecuador are: Runa, Shuar, Huao, Siona, Secoya, Cofán, Huancavilcas, Manteños, Punaes, Chachi, Epera, Tsáchilas, Awa, and Ecuador's black population.

distinct identity. Ecuador's rural population of indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans is concentrated in 288 of the country's 966 parroquias (parishes, the smallest division in the country). This segment of the Ecuadoran population, more than 815,000 people, has the country's highest indices of poverty measured both in terms of income and unsatisfied needs.

The size and distribution of the ethnic population may also be an important factor in deciding what type of project to implement. If the population is relatively small and widely dispersed, sophisticated beneficiary targeting mechanisms are required, making a dedicated program quite complex. On the other hand, a relatively large and concentrated target population may seem like obvious justification for a dedicated project. However, in that case there is also a question of whether to implement a development project specifically targeted to the ethnic group, or if it is more appropriate to have a rural development project (with a strong ethnic perspective) targeted at an area rather than a specific group.

If existing, nondedicated investment projects and programs are successfully reaching out to indigenous peoples, there is not as strong a case (from a poverty alleviation perspective) to implement a targeted project. Without judging other situations, in Ecuador general rural development projects do not successfully reach the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations, making a dedicated program justifiable.

Strong Poverty-Ethnicity Relation

The World Bank's 1995 poverty assessment for Ecuador found a strong correlation between being indigenous and being poor (as is the case in most countries). If there were not a strong correlation, or if existing programs were reaching ethnic minorities, a targeted project still might be justifiable to address the cultural or identity dimensions that are an essential element of ethnodevelopment. But such a project would have a stronger cultural than economic focus, and the World Bank would have to assess its comparative advantage before carrying out the program. However in Ecuador the very strong poverty-ethnicity correlation calls for a program focusing on economic development, an area in which the Bank has a well-established comparative advantage.

Thirty-five percent of Ecuador's population lives in poverty and another 17 percent is highly vulnerable to poverty. Overall, the relationship between poverty, household characteristics, and social indicators varies considerably both across and within regions and areas. Urban poverty is associated with low educational achievement, employment in the informal sector, rented housing rather than home ownership, and low rates of participation in the labor force by women. Rural poverty is associated with lack of education, little access to land, a low degree of market integration, and lack of employment in the vibrant nonfarm rural sector. However, poverty and ethnicity are closely correlated both in rural and urban areas. Households in which an indigenous language is spoken are more likely to be poor than are Spanish-speaking households, and strongly indigenous cantons are worse off with respect to a wide variety of social and service variables, such as education, nutrition, water, and sewerage. In parroquias with an indigenous majority, the poverty rate (including those highly vulnerable to poverty) is approximately 85 percent. This is 14 percentage points higher than the rural average, and 32 percentage points higher than the national average.

Presence of Strong Social Organizations

Having strong social organizations is an essential entry condition because they are agents for change and are vital tools for self-management—a crucial element of ethnodevelopment. They form the foundation from which a project can put the notion of ethnodevelopment into actual practice. If social organizations are weak or nonexistent, considerable local capacity-building efforts are required. The question is whether these efforts should be built into the dedicated investment project itself, or whether a technical assistance operation should precede the investment project. Compared to other countries, indigenous peoples in Ecuador have relatively strong organizations.

In general, indigenous peoples in Ecuador suffer from economic deprivation, but are well endowed in social capital (for example, organization, solidarity patterns, and shared social and cultural values). They are extremely well organized at the grassroots, regional, and national levels. Their forms of organization vary. In some cases they are principally organized along the lines of political parties and labor unions, in others by religious affiliation, and in still others directly by ethnic affiliation. This diversity of origins and organizations has caused friction among regional and national federations, particularly after the 1998 Constitution elevated the legitimacy of ethnic-based organizations. However, they all are part of a vibrant social process that is contributing to the revitalization of the indigenous identity and leading to the formulation of a uniquely indigenous vision of development.

The indigenous population of Ecuador is highly organized. Organizations along ethnic lines were recognized during the Inca Empire. The *Conquistadors* tried to dismantle and destroy these organizations, and during colonial times community-based organizations were used by the Spaniards to wring taxes and labor from the indigenous population. However, the organizations persisted, and in the period following Ecuador's independence they were known as *parcialidades indígenas*. With approval of the *Ley de Organización y Régimen Comunal* in 1937, the organizations were formally recognized and became known as *comunas*. The 1964 *Ley de Reforma Agraria* as well as subsequent reforms in 1973 also specifically recognized the *comunas* as an element of Ecuadoran society. Originally *comunas* were managed and held land resources jointly, but in recent years there has been a trend toward individual land ownership. However, contributing labor for community enterprises (*mingas*) is still common, especially for small infrastructure projects.

There are about 2,300 grassroots indigenous organizations (communes, centers, and cooperatives) at the community level. These, in turn, have formed about 180 second-tier organizations (organizaciones de segundo grado, or OSGs). The OSGs may be considered associations, unions, or federations, and frequently are affiliated with provincial, regional, and national organizations. The overall coordinating body for these groups at the time the project was prepared was the *Comité del Decenio*.

Grassroots indigenous organizations are distinguished by features such as their members' sense of belonging to a community, communal territoriality, their own system of government, solidarity through collective works, and joint celebrations and communal calendars.

The black population in Ecuador has less formal organization than the indigenous population. The main organization for most Afro-Ecuadorans is at the community or grassroots level (commune, compound, cooperative, committee, union), and only recently have they begun to form more complex organizations. The main features of black grassroots organizations are a sense of belonging, a recognizable territoriality, certain forms of self-government, and calendars of celebrations. Black grassroots organizations are formed more through real or ascribed family networks than as community societies.

Commitment to Finding Common Ground

The views of Ecuador's indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans about development are based on a combination of theoretical elements from the Latin American school of ethnodevelopment and their own experiences as ethnic minorities in Ecuadoran society. Until around 1990 the indigenous perspective revolved around four fundamental propositions of ethnodevelopment: a) strengthening of one's own culture, b) identity as a people, c) self-determination and territoriality, and d) self-management. In recent years, however, this perspective has evolved toward finding common ground as a platform for concrete initiatives. The new terms of this perspective can be summarized as follows:

a) *Interculturalism.* Stemming from the need to strengthen one's own culture in order to have a clear identity as a people, it is considered necessary to "build a bridge of communication with mestizo culture."

b) *Political economy and comanagement.* The principle of self-determination of peoples and territoriality has progressed to one of political autonomy, understood as being synonymous with decentralization in public administration and resource management, and to indigenous representation at the national level.

c) *A "viable" development model.* Previously indigenous people insisted that only an endogenous development model was suitable, but now there is greater openness to adopting elements of exogenous models, including project management and evaluation, new technologies and socioeconomic growth objectives, and the participation of multiple actors in the development process.

d) *Generation of coordinated state policies.* Confrontation has gradually given way to coordination, and demand for short-term measures has given way to adopting long-term policies. One example is the case of bilingual education, which has four general features: a) the state devolves management of education to indigenous organizations, b) the government provides operating funds, c) long-term effectiveness is the main goal, and d) teaching in native languages, as well as bilingualism and interculturalism, are institutionalized to both preserve native culture and improve communication with the broader society.

e) *Proposal on a national scope.* The new indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran proposals are relevant for society as a whole as well as for the state. This stems from the realization by indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations that favorable changes require coordination with nonindigenous peoples and that proposals for indigenous and Afro-

Ecuadoran development may benefit nonindigenous sectors as well, provided they contribute to the construction of an alternative, civilizing proposal.

f) *Redefinition of identity.* Originally it was proposed that "indigenous" be defined as an individual's membership in a specific ethnic group. But this has given way to a more flexible approach that, while keeping the idea of membership in an ethnic group, also defines "Indian-ness" on an indigenous–peasant continuum and acknowledges that some indigenous persons do not belong to a specific ethnic group nor exhibit ancestral symbols of identity.

Existence of an Enabling Policy Environment

State policy regarding indigenous peoples has not been clearly defined and has numerous ambiguities, but certain general trends may be distinguished. Since the creation of Ecuador in 1830, attempts have been made to integrate indigenous peoples into the general society by promoting acculturation. However, at times certain forms of social exclusion persisted, such as limitations on collective indigenous private property, citizenship rights (for example, by not allowing illiterate persons to vote or be elected), land ownership, and the right to maintain their own forms of government.

Since the 1980s there has been a gradual shift toward greater openness to the interests and demands of indigenous peoples. Although agrarian legislation has many gaps, significant progress has been made in acknowledging indigenous land rights.[4] Bilingual education has been legitimized, with autonomous management by indigenous organizations. Opportunities have been created for the training and legal recognition of second- and third-tier organizations, from community associations to provincial federations to regional and national organizations. The 1998 National Constitution states that the country is multicultural and establishes that indigenous "jurisdictions" will be created in areas of their domain. Moreover, processes have definitely begun that will allow the inclusion of indigenous people in national society, within the context of cultural diversity.

By the mid-1990s a combination of favorable factors led to the preparation of the Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project—the first World Bank operation focusing exclusively on ethnic minorities.

First, indigenous peoples' level of organization and capacity for social mobilization had grown substantially. In a demonstration of their new-found power, in 1990 indigenous peoples marched from Puyo, in the eastern lowlands, to Quito to push their demands for recognition of collective title to the lands they occupied. In 1992 indigenous and black organizations joined forces and formed the *Coordinadora Agraria* (Agrarian Coordinating Commission) to pressure the government to revise its recently approved Agrarian Law. After the United Nations declared 1995–2004 the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, and called for the formation of joint government and indigenous peoples committees, the Coordinadora Agraria

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4. The Land Regularization Component of the Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project includes initiatives that aim to improve existing agrarian legislation, particularly with respect to the definition and application of ancestral property rights.

was transformed into the Committee of the Decade (*Comité del Decenio*) with the mandate to propose and to respond to proposals for development activities for member organizations.

Second, in 1994 the Ecuadoran government created the National Secretariat of Indigenous and Ethnic Minorities (SENAIME), and appointed an indigenous entrepreneur as its first secretary. Immediately thereafter Ecuador initiated a series of contacts with donors to request support for SENAIME and its proposed operations to benefit indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans. The government of Ecuador conveyed its interest in this matter quite strongly to the World Bank through direct contacts between the president of Ecuador and the vice president of the Bank's Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, a visit by the secretary of SENAIME to the Bank's headquarters in Washington, and other means.

Third, partly in anticipation of the United Nations International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, in 1993 the World Bank started its own Indigenous Peoples Development Initiative, hiring more social science staff, organizing workshops to discuss alternatives for indigenous peoples, and designing preinvestment operations—particularly a technical training program for indigenous peoples in Latin America. Thus, the institution was relatively well positioned to respond to requests such as that from Ecuador.

In early 1995, in response to Ecuador's requests, the Bank decided to begin preparation of a project that would focus exclusively on Ecuador's indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations, thereby embarking on the road presented in detail in Annex 1.

3. SUCCESS FACTORS IN PROJECT PREPARATION

This chapter examines the factors that determine success in the preparation phase. Our findings stress the importance of a) a participatory framework for joint decisionmaking, b) an appropriate division of functional responsibilities, c) a relatively high degree of project autonomy, d) a conducive working environment, e) transparent rules of the game, f) mobilization of alliances, g) hands-on experience, i) a flexible processing schedule, and j) continuity of the task team.

Participatory Framework for Joint Decisionmaking

From the very beginning of project preparation the Bank committed itself to three basic guiding principles: a) alleviation of poverty by targeting resources at the poorest sectors of the population, b) promotion of participatory processes to ensure that project design responds to grassroots demands, and c) close coordination between governmental and nongovernmental organizations to increase project efficiency.

Preparation started with a project concept paper based on a proposal from the Ecuadoran government and the knowledge of Bank staff about the situation of indigenous peoples in Ecuador. The concept paper, along with an invitation to a project inception workshop, was sent to key government offices, NGOs, and national indigenous organizations. Participants at the workshop discussed the objectives, basic components, design methodology, and preliminary work plan for the project. The initial response to the project concept was favorable.

Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the indigenous organizations had reservations about working with the government and the World Bank. The largest indigenous organization, CONAIE (claiming to represent 70 percent of all indigenous peoples in Ecuador), turned out to be a particularly tough negotiator. In the early 1990s CONAIE organized well-attended popular marches to put forward claims for indigenous rights, thereby gaining very high credibility with the indigenous population as the genuine representative of their interests. With relations between the government and indigenous organizations historically defined by confrontation rather than cooperation, it was clear that a substantial change in the mindsets of both sides was required before they could engage in constructive dialogue (even though they recognized that such dialogue was desirable).

Moreover, it also became clear that although the national indigenous organizations had come together in the *Comité del Decenio*, they were not particularly well linked and did not necessarily speak with one voice. In fact, there was a fair degree of rivalry and continuous jockeying for the best position at the negotiating table. The role of the Bank as a honest broker and intermediary to assist the stakeholders in defining common ground for joint action turned out to be crucial at this stage of the project preparation process.

It took several months to gain a formal commitment from the indigenous organizations to participate in the project. At first the government suggested the creation of a Consultative Group in which indigenous organizations would be represented, but with a minority status. This model of participation was rejected by the indigenous organizations. Instead, they proposed a model in which indigenous organizations had a direct relationship with the Bank, and administered project preparation and implementation themselves without the participation of the government. Because the World Bank's charter mandates that it work with national governments, this model could not be accepted by the Bank or the government. Further negotiations led to a coadministration model in which decisions would be made by a Managing Committee (*Comité de Gestión*) with equal representation by government and indigenous peoples. The government would be represented by three delegates from SENAIME, and the indigenous organizations by three representatives selected by the *Comité del Decenio*. In addition, the parties agreed to create a Technical Unit (*Unidad Técnica*) to support the work of the *Comité de Gestión*. The coordinator of the *Unidad Técnica* was also a member of the *Comité de Gestión*.[5] This helped ensure a strong link between the decisions of the Comite de Gestión and implementation of those decisions by the *Unidad Técnica*. Because the coordinator was selected from a list of three candidates provided by the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations, in effect they gained an extra representative on the *Comité de Gestión*. Annex 2 provides an overview of the agreed institutional structure.

Appropriate Division of Functional Responsibilities

Within the agreed institutional setup the *Comité de Gestión* was meant to be the political or decisionmaking body that would operate at the strategic level. The indigenous members on the Comité were chosen by the national indigenous organizations and had the mandate to provide strategic guidance in the project preparation process. Representatives of the government were

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5.   The *Comité del Decenio* sent a letter to the World Bank and to the Government of Ecuador stating its formal commitment to collaborate in the project. In the final analysis, indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations became the majority bloc in the committee, since the coordinator of the Technical Unit was the secretary and a voting member of the *Comité de Gestión*.

selected from SENAIME and the Office of the President. Members of the *Comité de Gestión* were also responsible for informing their respective stakeholder groups about progress in project preparation and for representing their views in the decisionmaking process. The *Unidad Técnica* consisted of professionals that were responsible for implementing the decisions of the *Comité de Gestión* as reflected in the Project Preparation Plan. These professionals could either have an indigenous or mestizo background, the idea being that only technical criteria played a role in their selection process.

This division of responsibilities between the *Comité de Gestión* and the *Unidad Técnica* worked quite well in practice. It enabled both the indigenous organizations and the government to appoint representatives they believed they could trust (*personas de confianza*). Since this criteria did not necessarily imply that all members had a profound technical background, the creation of the *Unidad Técnica* was meant to ensure the availability of the required professional skills to move project preparation forward at the operational level. However, given the political orientation of the *Comité de Gestión*, it was clear that the selection of personnel for the *Unidad Técnica* on professional criteria alone would be quite a challenge. Consequently, while taking an accommodating approach with respect to the selection and appointment of the members of the *Comité de Gestión*, the Bank invested considerable time and effort in reviewing the selection of professionals in the *Unidad Técnica* to make sure the project could count on the best pool of technical expertise available.

A source of continuing debate was where to draw the exact line of responsibilities between the two entities. There was a tendency on the part of the *Comité de Gestión* to micromanage the *Unidad Técnica*. To a large extent this was caused by the fact that the Comité operated on a full-time basis. In retrospect it would have been better to have a part-time *Comité de Gestión* that met on a monthly basis to review progress and agree on the work program of the *Unidad Técnica* for the coming month.

Relatively High Degree of Project Autonomy

The decision to create a stand-alone project office turned out to be a good one. The decision reflected the preference of the indigenous organizations to have their own space. One the one hand this was a positive expression of the importance of self-management in the context of ethnodevelopment. On the other hand, it was partly fueled by the indigenous organizations' uneasiness at becoming too closely identified with the government because their relationship historically had been on of confrontation rather than cooperation. A separate project office provided a neutral space, outside their usual political realms, where government representatives and indigenous organizations could start fostering a constructive relationship and work together toward a common goal.

An important part of building this relationship was the explicit acknowledgement that it would provide a forum for project preparation purposes only. This prevented disagreements in other areas, which could potentially disrupt project preparation, from being interjected into the dialogue of the *Comité de Gestión*. The fact that both sides agreed on the need for an operation to benefit indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities, regardless of their differences about other issues, provided a solid basis for this arrangement. This narrow focus allowed the project to keep a relatively low profile, and despite frequent changes in government (the agency dealing with

indigenous affairs changed its leadership almost every year) and internal struggles among the indigenous organizations of the *Comité del Decenio*, the composition of the *Comité de Gestión* and the *Unidad Técnica* remained virtually unchanged.

The relatively high degree of autonomy of the project was also reflected in the fact that both the coordinator and administrator of the project had authorized signatures for withdrawal applications of both PPF and grant funds that were used to finance the preparation process. Hence, within the framework established by the *Comité de Gestión*, the *Unidad Técnica* was in charge of all operational aspects of the project, including the flow of funds.

Conducive Working Environment

The project's high degree of autonomy provided an opportunity to create a business culture conducive to a productive working environment. The subject of business culture was discussed explicitly at various stages during project preparation. Key notions about the appropriate elements of the business culture were even included in an aide-memoire signed by the various parties. The discussions resulted in an agreement that the project's working environment would be based on a) a high degree of tolerance and respect, b) direct, frank, and transparent communication focused on issues rather than persons, c) drive for high quality results, and d) willingness to learn from mistakes and to accept constructive feedback. This provided an agreed code of conduct for people who, until recently, had never worked together. The usefulness of this exercise was reflected in the fact that on various occasions people made reference to the written principles. Agreeing on these principles early in the process definitely helped shape a positive work environment and contributed to an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust.

The mechanisms and processes that were employed within the *Comité de Gestión* to deal with conflicts and differences indirectly contributed to fostering more constructive relationships among the indigenous organizations themselves as well as between indigenous organizations and the government. A case in point is that when the National Council for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Development was established in March 1997, its organizational structure reflected that of the *Comité de Gestión* as agreed in November 1995.

Transparent Rules of the Game

Because all the indigenous organizations were interested in having the project hire professionals affiliated with their particular group, considerable efforts were made to ensure that the rules of the game, particularly the procedures to hire project personnel, were clear to all stakeholders. Terms of reference, qualifications, and selection criteria for each position financed under the project were agreed up front. To acknowledge and validate the goal of having indigenous professionals employed in the project, knowledge of indigenous languages was included as one of the selection criteria for positions in which a pool of qualified indigenous professionals was available. For specialized positions in which there were expected to be very few, if any, qualified indigenous candidates, the language requirement was replaced by a stipulation that the candidate should have relevant experience working with indigenous organizations.

The Bank went to great lengths to ensure that all parties complied fully with what they had agreed on paper. This was necessary because of the significant pressure to appoint consultants

and divide training budgets according to quotas put forward by indigenous organizations. Though it risked being labeled bureaucratic by insisting that the rules be observed, in doing so the Bank actually established a solid reputation as an honest guarantor of due process for all stakeholders. Given the lack of strong trust among the stakeholders, this role was highly appreciated, and probably was one the most valuable aspects of the Bank's role in the preparation process.

Regarding fiduciary issues, the Bank made it clear from the beginning that the project had to comply with the full range of requirements that are applied to other Bank-financed projects, and that obtaining exceptions to these rules would probably be more painful and frustrating than complying with them. This slowed down project preparation because of rather weak institutional capacity and the fact that most project personnel lacked experience working in Bank-financed projects. Nevertheless, it was considered the right thing to do from a long-term perspective. It avoided potentially endless discussions about which requirements would be subject to exceptions, what the alternatives should be, and what would be the minimum justification needed to agree to an exception. It also avoided the trap of creating false expectations. In addition, it was made clear on various occasions that certified compliance with Bank procedures, as implied by nonqualified external audit reports, would in itself be a major benefit because it would demonstrate that indigenous peoples were fully capable of managing public funds. A series of nonqualified external audit reports would establish a clean track record that would help indigenous peoples maintain access to public funds in the long run.

Mobilizing Alliances

Second-Tier Indigenous Organizations

While the national-level indigenous organizations were legitimate representatives of the project's intended beneficiary population, it was recognized that their particular strength was in the political and public policy arena. Given the project's orientation toward generating direct benefits for indigenous communities, it adopted a strategy of also working directly with second-tier indigenous organizations. These organizations, in effect, are the members of the national-level organizations. They usually are based in small urban or rural towns accessible to their community-level member organizations. Since second-tier organizations have a closer relationship with indigenous communities, they are in a better position to know local needs and demands, are inclined to focus on providing services to their members rather than merely representing them politically, and in general have a more pragmatic agenda.

This strategy of making the project known at the regional level, including the second-tier organizations in project preparation, and aligning project design to their pragmatic agenda, created a substantial "pull" effect of second-tier organizations speaking in favor of the project at relevant meetings and forums. Because the credibility of the national indigenous organizations depends to a large extent on effective linkages with their bases, the opinions of second-tier organizations tend to be taken into account by national leaders. Reaching out to the second-tier organizations therefore created a more deeply rooted and more solid base of support for the project, and reduced the risk of facing politically motivated decisions by a few indigenous leaders at the top.

International Fund for Agricultural Development

Since the project was the first of its kind, the Bank recognized that it did not necessarily have comparative advantage in all areas covered by the project. In this context, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) proved to be an appropriate cofinancing partner.

First, IFAD had two ongoing rural development projects—one in the province of Cañar and another in Saraguro—that already worked closely with indigenous organizations at the local and regional level. Learning from IFAD's experience in those projects, whether positive or negative, could benefit preparation of the Bank-supported project. Second, IFAD had a strong interest in starting a rural development project targeting Afro-Ecuadorans in the coastal province of Esmeraldas. Third, IFAD's experience in financing rural credit programs complemented the Bank's experience in financing matching-grant funds. This enabled the project to establish an integrated program of rural investments that could respond to a wide range of demands from indigenous communities, including those with a public-good or a private-good nature. Fourth, IFAD's more flexible stand on financing land purchases made an interesting complement to the Bank's in-house possibilities, and widened the range of options for financing land regularization and conflict resolution programs. Fifth, combining the Bank loan with lower-interest IFAD resources offered a more attractive financial package, and lessened the chance that the government would lose interest in the project even if macroeconomic conditions deteriorated. In addition, bringing IFAD on board added its dialogue with the government to the factors ensuring continued official support for the project.

Inter-American Foundation

Another attractive partner was the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), which was experienced in financing and implementing small-scale initiatives in cooperation with Ecuadoran indigenous organizations. The IAF had a long and successful history in this field, and had established a wide reputation and excellent relations with the indigenous movement in Ecuador. The Bank project provided a good opportunity to build on those experiences and successes, especially since at the time the IAF was downscaling its programs due to cuts in U.S. bilateral aid. To benefit from their experience, the IAF was enlisted to serve as a peer reviewer during project preparation.

This arrangement provided mutual benefits. First, it provided a vehicle for the IAF to increase the scope of the model it had developed. Second, with the IAF as part of the team, the project had unrestricted access to relevant information that was required to design some key aspects of the project, particularly with respect to participatory planning and local capacity building. Third, by associating the project with IAF's efforts and network, IAF officials became effective spokesmen for the project and provided an excellent alternative channel of communication with indigenous organizations. If indigenous organizations were in doubt about the Bank's intentions at some point during the preparation process, they could express their doubts to the IAF officials who they had known and worked with for a long time, and get a response they trusted from people who were knowledgeable about the Bank's opinions and intentions.

Food and Agriculture Organization

During project preparation another alliance was established with the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to create a window of access, almost on a standby basis, to technical expertise on the preparation and implementation of small-scale, demand-driven rural investment subprojects. The arrangement allowed the project to tap into international experiences in this field and to design this project component in line with best practice.

Hands-On Experience

While planning the project preparation process, it became clear that the indigenous organizations did not have a strong interest in spending resources on design studies. They claimed that lots of studies had been done in the past and that any additional investment in studies would not add substantive value. They also made the point that past studies had generated high expectations among the indigenous population, but that those expectations usually were not met. Therefore they expected communities to be strongly skeptical, and reluctant to participate in such research efforts.

Taking into account these reservations, it was agreed that a large number of preparatory activities would be incorporated in the context of a pilot project. The objective of the pilot project was to generate both input for the project design, and direct benefits for the indigenous communities involved. Fourteen second-tier indigenous organizations agreed to prepare and start implementing a demand-driven program of small-scale investments as part of a participatory development plan elaborated by the organizations and their member communities. In this way, indigenous communities benefited directly from the investments made under the pilot. Outputs of the pilot that were incorporated in the project design included the participatory planning methodology, priorities for local capacity building, and detailed formats and procedures guiding the subproject cycle.

The pilot project had a number of benefits that were not explicitly anticipated. First, it provided an opportunity for the *Comité de Gestión* and the *Unidad Técnica* to obtain detailed hands-on experience in procurement and disbursement issues. Second, it enabled the project to establish concrete alliances with a number of second-tier indigenous organizations that consequently became strong supporters and spokesmen for the project. Third, the pilot project's pragmatic approach helped create a results-oriented culture in the project. Fourth, the programs implemented by the 14 second-tier organizations were useful in training other second-tier organizations once the main project was approved and moving toward full implementation.

Flexible Processing Schedule

Project planners recognized from the beginning that for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples to participate effectively they needed time to make their own systems of consultation work. Decisions taken by indigenous leaders usually had to be discussed and confirmed by their organizational boards or even their general assemblies.[6] As a result, project preparation took

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6. In most indigenous organizations important decisions are taken by the general assembly of members and often after they have reached a consensus. Majority rule is applied but on an exceptional basis.

almost three years (see Annex 1), which is longer than most Bank projects. This possibility was explicitly discussed and accepted by Bank management at the project identification stage. The bottom line was that things would be done right, and that as long as the project was moving forward the exact time required for each step in the project cycle was not important. However, the result is that high-quality participatory projects do not come cheap; total Bank-financed costs over the entire preparation period were about $350,000 in this case.

The pilot project helped keep participants committed to this quality-first principle because the preparation process resulted in some tangible benefits for the target population rather than just generating paper and reports. Most importantly, adjusting the pace to the capacity of the indigenous organizations—both in social terms (consultation and consensus building) and technical terms—yielded enormous gains in establishing project ownership. While it is difficult to quantify these gains, the relatively long preparation time definitely paid off by smoothing the transition to implementation once the project was approved.

Continuity of Task Team

Although preparation took almost three years, the Bank task team never changed substantially. This continuity paid off in several ways. First, given the sensitivity of the relationship between the indigenous organizations and the government, especially in the early stages, the task team played an important intermediary role that required a fair amount of trust that could only be built up over time. Second, the various indigenous organizations in the *Comité del Decenio* did not necessarily have a common strategy, and on occasion pursued their own separate agendas. Continuity allowed the task team to understand and appreciate these different agendas, and to move project preparation forward while taking these agendas into account. Third, continuity enabled the team to build a track record as an objective mediator that consistently proposed solutions based on two basic principles: a) inclusiveness, or ensuring that the solution to a certain problem allowed all stakeholders to continue to participate, and b) technical orientation, or keeping political issues from interfering at the operational level.

4. ESSENTIAL PROJECT DESIGN FEATURES

This chapter presents essential design features for projects that seek to put into practice the vision of ethnodevelopment. They include a) an objective beneficiary targeting mechanism, b) a focus on mobilizing social capital, and c) inclusion of concrete cultural dimensions.

Objective Beneficiary Targeting Mechanism

One of the first challenges of the project was to identify the indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans who were the intended beneficiaries. The two principal questions were a) whether the mestizo population living in the same areas would be part of the project's target population, and b) how to settle the politically contentious issue of defining who is indigenous. The largest indigenous organization in Ecuador, CONAIE, claims that 40 percent of the country's population is indigenous, while some census estimates put the figure at only 4 percent. The actual proportion is probably somewhere between these two figures, but the question is where.

To tackle this issue an approach was adopted that combined quantitative methods and geographic location with the notion of self-identification and community affiliation with second-tier organizations. Census information on indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population at the parroquia level was crossed with data on poverty (an index of unsatisfied basic needs), to obtain figures on level of poverty by ethnicity. Additional information was gathered in the field, particularly self-identification of communities as either indigenous or Afro-Ecuadoran, and membership in a second-tier indigenous organization. This information was then represented in an indigenous poverty map.

The quantitative analysis gave an idea of which parroquias had a majority indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population and which ones had a significant minority presence of those groups. Once the parroquias were known, second-tier indigenous organizations could be identified that were operating in them. The project would then form an alliance with these organizations for implementation purposes, and in so doing would accept the membership eligibility criteria of the organization as the basis for targeting the intended beneficiary population in that particular parroquia. Depending on these locally defined criteria, the project would include the mestizo population to the extent that they are members of the second-tier organizations.

Through this analysis the project targeted about 815,000 people who were members of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities in rural areas. Being identified as "indigenous" was based on self-identification, membership in a specific indigenous community or grassroots organization, and recognition as indigenous by other members of that sociocultural unit. Being considered "Afro-Ecuadoran" was based on self-identification and membership in a black community.

The indigenous and black population of rural Ecuador is concentrated in 48 cantons, which comprise 288 rural parroquias (230 indigenous and 58 black). This is 29 percent of the country's total rural parroquias. However, in nearly all cases indigenous and black people live in areas where there is also a mestizo population. In fact, only 150 parroquias have a majority indigenous or black population (of which 111 are indigenous and 39 are black). In the remaining 138 parroquias the percentage of the indigenous and black population varies from 10 to 50 percent. Thus there is ample opportunity to put the principle of interculturalism into practice.

There are about 180 second-tier organizations operating in the 288 parroquias included in the project area. It is through these organizations (generally grouping contiguous communities) that the project defines its annual operational plans and implements agreed activities.

The target population exhibits great cultural diversity, especially among indigenous peoples. The most numerous of the indigenous people are the Quichua speakers (or Runa) in the *Sierra*. They may be further subdivided by area of ethnic predominance, including the Otavalo, Carangui, Cayambi, and Quito in the northern region, and the Panzaleo, Puruha, Cañari, Salasaca, and Saraguro in the south-central region. The next largest group are the peoples of the Amazon region, including the Shuar, Achuar, and Runa or Quichua speakers of the lowlands, and the Huaorani, Cofán, and Siona-Secoya. In the coastal region are found the Awá, Emberá, Tsachila, and Chachi, and other peoples such as the Huancavilca, Manteño, and Puna who have lost their language but retain strong indigenous cultural features. Afro-Ecuadorans live in both coastal and highland areas, though there is not as much diversity between subgroups as there is between the indigenous subgroups. (See Annex 3 for details and population sizes.)

Mobilizing Social Capital

Social exclusion, economic deprivation, and political marginalization are sometimes perceived as the predominant characteristics of Ecuador's indigenous peoples. But as they often remind outsiders, indigenous peoples are also characterized by strong positive attributes, particularly their high level of social capital. Besides language and their own sense of ethnic identity, the distinctive features of indigenous peoples include solidarity and social unity (reflected in strong social organizations), a well-defined geographical concentration and attachment to ancestral lands, a rich cultural patrimony, and other customs and practices distinct from those of Ecuador's national society, which bears a strong western influence. The project aims to mobilize this social capital, based on these characteristics, as a platform for ethnodevelopment. The main strategies to establish this platform include a) self-management as a basic principle for project implementation, b) local capacity building, and c) participatory planning to ensure that activities are demand-driven.

Self-Management

Project beneficiaries and their organizations are empowered to manage the project at the strategic level through the National Council for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Development (CONPLADE-IN), an official government body that includes a representative from the Presidency, and delegates from the main indigenous organizations. Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran representatives on the council review and approve the project's Annual Operational Plans, and discuss progress reports submitted by the Project Technical Unit.[7]

The Project Technical Unit is responsible for coordinating implementation of the Annual Operational Plans approved by the National Council. The unit is headed by a three-person management team: an executive director, a technical coordinator, and a financial–administrative coordinator. The composition of the Project Technical Unit mirrors the project's design and areas of operation. Hiring of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran professionals is encouraged by having the selection criteria include knowledge of indigenous languages and experience working with indigenous or Afro-Ecuadoran organizations. This approach has worked well, creating a unit staffed by qualified and culturally diverse professionals, including *mestizos*.

Because the project's success will largely be measured in terms of concrete results at the community level, the vast majority of professionals in the Technical Unit work in regional offices. This enables them to be closer to the second-tier indigenous organizations through which most project activities are implemented. Over time, the project aims to work in close partnership with about 180 of these indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran membership organizations. As a first step second-tier organizations agree with their members communities a local development plan that provides an overall perspective and tool to prioritize project activities in a particular area. Once defined, they prepare and implement small-scale investments, not exceeding $90,000 per subproject, that benefit their member communities. Second-tier organizations also provide input in the elaboration of the Annual Operational Plan of the project in a particular region, thereby further contributing to the demand-driven nature of the project. An additional benefit of operating

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7. In December 1999 CONPLADE-IN was changed to the *Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador* (CODENPE) to better reflect concepts agreed in Ecuador's new Constitution.

in a decentralized fashion in which most of the operational decisionmaking authority is shifted to the regional level is that, once the Annual Operational Plan is approved, the project operates relatively independently from the political arena. This relatively independent mode of operation of the project is further enhanced by the fact that small-scale investments are financed with loan funds and counterpart contributions from the communities only. Counterpart funds problems that tend to be notorious in Ecuador therefore do not directly affect the project's investment program in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities.

Local Capacity Building

Despite the strong desire for self-management in order to take the process of development in their own hands, not all second-tier organizations necessarily have the technical and financial management capacity to assume their role as project implementing agents. In fact, there is a very wide range in available institutional capacity in these organizations, with some of them having a long history of providing services to their member communities, while others even lack the basic knowledge of managing their own finances. Recognizing this large variation in institutional capacity, it became clear that the project could not use a blue-print approach to enter into partnerships with these organizations as project implementing agents. A standard level of supervision might be interpreted by one organization as the absolute minimum level of operational support to effectively assume its responsibilities, while others might consider it as excessive micro-management.

In order to tailor the relationship between second-tier organization and the project at a mutually acceptable level, the project is investing heavily in the development of an index of social capital.[8] This index combines indicators in the categories of management capacity, organizational culture, human capital, and financial capital. Following criteria outlined in Annex 4 an index of social capital is calculated. This index then determines the nature of partnership with the project in terms of operational responsibilities and local capacity-building support activities. Three categories of partnerships are distinguished. The first category includes second-tier organizations that according to the social capital index have ample institutional capacity to be effective partners on the full range of activities supported by the project. Most support provided by the project for this type of organizations is demand-driven, while controls tend to be of an ex-post nature. In case of noncompliance with the agreed rules of game the project can reassess its relationship with a second-tier organization and base it on the rules of the game that apply to the second category. This category includes organizations with limited institutional capacity. The project enters into agreements with these organizations for the design and implementation of subprojects if there is a willingness on their part to participate in training programs supported by the project. The project also maintains a ceiling of $25,000 instead of the usual $90,000 for subprojects implemented by organizations in this category. Project personnel maintain close relations with these organizations to provide support on a regular basis. Controls exercised by the project tend to have a more ex-ante nature. Once an organization has successfully implemented a number of subprojects, the relationship can be redefined based on the rules of the game that apply to organizations that have ample institutional capacity. The third category of second-tier organizations include those that have no apparent institutional capacity whatsoever. The project enters into agreements with these

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8. This work ties in with initiatives in this area launched by the Social Development Family of the World Bank.

organizations if they associate themselves with an NGO in a formal alliance. The underlying idea is that the NGO has a local presence and is in a position to provide support on an almost continuous basis; something the project cannot do. Most of the capacity building efforts supported by the project focus on the second category of organizations as described above. Hence, by using the index as a tool to focus and tailor local capacity building activities it also contributes to better cost effectiveness in this area.

Recognizing the critical nature of local capacity building to achieve genuine self-management, the project supports a wide range of training activities. To increase the available pool of indigenous professionals both in quantitative and qualitative terms in the long run, the project has entered into agreements with universities and colleges that provide formal education at the high school and college level to indigenous students supported by the project. Potential candidates for project support are proposed by second-tier organizations and subsequently selected by the project based on previous educational achievements. The project supports students in disciplines that are particularly relevant for the modus operandi of the second-tier organizations, including e.g. community development, anthropology, and communications. In addition to the formal training programs, the project supports short courses for professionals who are actually working in second-tier organizations. Courses include a wide range of topics with most of them closely related to participatory planning, project administration and management, procurement, and technical issues. Learning by doing is a key element of these courses and for this reason they are organized in close relation with the program of small-scale investments financed by the project. The project also offers a limited number of internships in its regional offices. These internships provide an opportunity for young indigenous professionals to obtain a fair degree of exposure to the operational aspects of the project's rural investment program that could be of use for their work in the second-tier organizations the project is associated with.

Participatory Planning for Demand-Driven Focus

Recognizing self-management as a crucial element of ethnodevelopment implies that project activities by definition should be demand-driven. The project relies on participatory planning as an underlying process to obtain a genuine demand-driven focus of its activities. The process is designed to facilitate community and grassroots organizations to be effective players in their own development. More specifically, participatory planning as used in the context of the project: a) contributes to the decentralization of decisionmaking, b) stimulates grassroots participation in local planning and demand generation, c) helps rural communities formulate development strategies and investment plans, and d) increases investment sustainability by intensifying stakeholders' commitment in the execution and supervision of rural investments.

The participatory planning process used by the project draws heavily on the experience of the Inter-American Foundation in Andean countries, particularly on its methodology for participatory community planning. It also builds on the practical experiences in the Nicaraguan Rural Municipalities Project, the Bolivian Rural Communities Development Project, and the GTZ's Goal-Oriented Project Planning (GOPP). The methodology consists of the organization of community and district workshops over the course of several weeks. At the workshops, project field promoters and second-tier organizations help the communities to carry out a participatory diagnostic and to formulate a development strategy, by applying methods of groups dynamics. Workshop participants are community delegates, representatives from development

organizations, and interested individuals. After each workshop, time is allotted for the community delegates to return and inform the community of the workshops proceedings, and receive community feedback. As some communities decisions are taken by consensus, this process can be lengthy.

In the project the participatory planning process is carried out in the area of influence of a particular second-tier organization. The process includes six stages:

Preparatory phase. Staff of the Project Technical Unit explains the programs and procedures detailed in the Operational Manual to the second-tier organization or NGO.

Promotion. Second-tier organizations or NGOs disseminate the project's purposes and methodology and in particular: a) the eligibility criteria for subprojects, b) the processing steps for eligible subprojects identified in their corresponding Local Development Plans, including sample documentation and approximate times of processing, and c) execution and supervision mechanisms.

Self-diagnostic. To help the communities better perceive their economic and social strengths and weaknesses a self-diagnostic is conducted with a view to formulating achievable socioeconomic goals. Participatory rural appraisal techniques—such as participatory mapping and seasonal calendars—are used to assist the community in the identification of constraints, causes, and solutions.

Preparation of a Local Development Plan (LDP). An LDP is a ranked list of subproject ideas screened according to development strategy, requirements, technical feasibility, and funds availability or potential suitability for funding (from this project or other sources).

Subproject formulation. Subprojects ideas are transformed into financiable proposals according to an agreed format. This is the preinvestment stage of the subproject cycle that follows the participatory planning process.

Concrete Cultural Dimensions

In an attempt to put the concept of development with identity into practice, the project also incorporates a series of concrete activities designed to rescue and strengthen the rich cultural patrimony of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples of Ecuador. They include the identification and promotion of archeological and ritual sites, support for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples festivities, the preparation of audiovisual documents with ethnographic materials, contests to strengthen living heritage and traditions (including traditional arts, handicrafts, cooking, games, etc.) events to discuss the topic of development with identity, intercultural fairs; and publications of works produced by indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran authors. The project collaborates with governmental organizations such as the National Institute of Cultural Patrimony, the *Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana*, key provincial and municipal governments as well as NGOs and the private sector to implement its cultural agenda.

As far as the project's support to the handicraft and tourism sectors is concerned, the activities are subject to an agreed strategy that consists of the following elements. First, diagnostic

activities financed by the project aim to come up with a clear idea through what products, services, or activities a particular indigenous group identifies itself with most. Second, concourses financed by the project are tools to get a concrete handle on what exactly the quality standards are that are underlying the identified products and services. Third, intercultural fairs and other events sponsored by the project are thought to be spaces where products and services can be displayed and promoted in order to increase recognition and awareness of indigenous heritage and traditions. Fourth, products and services thus identified and that meet agreed quality standards could be registered and protected through a particular trademark, protected label, or certificate of origin. This would provide greater transparency in those markets where indigenous communities and their organizations are offering handicraft products and tourist services. At the same time, the information provided about the products and services, including the underlying quality standards and the role they play in indigenous cultures, in themselves add value that could benefit indigenous communities and organizations in these markets.

The project also includes features that aim to sustain and strengthen indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran cultures in a more indirect manner. As part of the institutional strengthening efforts that are geared toward the *Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos (CODENPE)*, the project supports a team of professionals which, among other, review and assess the potential impact of new legislation on the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population and propose changes in case of expected adverse impacts. As part of the land tenure regularization efforts supported by the project, an attempt is made to clarify the concept of ancestral rights in more concrete terms with the aim to improve land ownership of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities in forestry and protected areas. Finally, in the rural investments program supported by the project, the criteria for matching grant financing of community infrastructure takes into account indigenous notions of communal and private property rather than relying on definitions from outsiders. For instance, the project finances capital investments for indigenous community enterprises on a matching grant basis. These enterprises are owned by indigenous communities and they invest part of their profits in social infrastructure, e.g. schools and health clinics.

5. CONCLUSION

What makes indigenous peoples development projects different from other World Bank operations? What are their main characteristics? This paper has described how one project team applied the concept of ethnodevelopment or development with cultural identity in an operational context, and the lessons we learned from this process.

The project is unique because it is the Bank's first stand-alone operation that exclusively targets indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples, and also because of its highly participatory nature—from inception, through preparation, and into the implementation phase. But the operation's most unique feature is its approach of strengthening the project by building on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies, such as their sense of ethnic identity, cultural values, solidarity and social cohesion, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources to attain shared goals.

The many lessons learned in the course of preparing the operation fall into three main categories: important conditions at entry, key factors in project preparation, and specific design features.

While all the lessons are important, we believe that the design features are the most critical for other operations of this kind. To successfully incorporate culture in development, projects must formulate adequate and objective targeting mechanisms, include concrete cultural dimensions, and apply resources to poverty alleviation in a way that recognizes the tremendous capacity of many indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities to mobilize social capital.

Annex 1. Timeline of Key Events

1992   Formation of the *Coordinadora Agraria* by the six national indigenous organizations with the objective to defend their interests in the preparation of the new *Ley de Desarrollo Agrario*.

1993   UN Declaration of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People.

1994   Formation of the *Comité del Decenio* by the six national indigenous organizations.

May 1994   Creation of the National Secretariat of Indigenous and Ethnic Minorities (*Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y Minorías Etnicas*, SENAIME). Presidential Decree No. 1679, April 22, 1994. First contacts made with the World Bank.

Sep. 1994   Distribution of draft Poverty Assessment quantifying the marginal position of indigenous peoples in Ecuador.

Nov. 1994   Meetings between SENAIME and the World Bank to explore the possibility of an Indigenous Development Project. Aide-Memoire of November 21, 1994; email dated November 28, 1994.

Dec. 1994   Request from the Ministry of Finance to the World Bank for the financing of a project for the specific benefit of Ecuador's indigenous population. Letter No. 6528, dated December 9, 1994.

Jan. 1995   Response from the World Bank to the Ministry of Finance indicating the importance of the issue and its interest to analyze the request through an identification mission. Letter dated January 19, 1995.

Feb. 1995   Informal discussion in the Bank about Initial Project Concept Summary on February 3, 1995. Agreement that "project concept and design must be originated by project's potential beneficiaries" and that project preparation should start immediately. A set of principles is adopted that guide the design of the project (email dated February 6). Identification mission in Ecuador from February 21-25 to prepare a government–civil society workshop that lays the groundwork for project preparation arrangements. Efforts started to put in place a project preparation facility (PPF).

March 1995   PPF advance of $350,000 and Japanese Grant of $520,000 prepared on March 10 and March 27, respectively. Initial Project Concept Meeting held on March 28 that gives the green light to "prepare a project with specific focus on indigenous peoples development and would aim for close collaboration with GOE and other stakeholders from the very beginning of project preparation" (Minutes of IPC Meeting, March 31).

April 1995   PPF approved on April 7. Secretary of SENAIME visits the Bank on April 12. Draft project preparation plan elaborated. Initial Project Brief distributed among stakeholders in Ecuador. It proposes a project that focuses on institutional strengthening of indigenous organizations, support to the implementation of subprojects that benefit indigenous communities and improving land property rights.

May 1995   Identification mission discusses Initial Project Brief with a wide range of stakeholders from May 2-12. Indigenous organizations indicate the need to study the proposals in more detail. Agreement with SENAIME to set up a project coordination committee with representation of indigenous organizations and to establish a technical unit to implement activities at the operational level. It is decided that the project will also focus on Ecuador's Afro Ecuadoran population. Aide Memoire, May 12, 1995. The International Fund for Agricultural Development is invited to join project preparation as a cofinancing partner given its involvement in two rural development projects (Cañar and Zaraguro). Letter dated May 22, 1995.

June 1995   CONAIE, the largest indigenous organization in Ecuador, writes that it wants to develop a project directly with the Bank, without involvement of the Government of Ecuador through SENAIME. The organization in principle agrees with the proposed focus on project activities, but stresses that indigenous organizations should be in charge. Letter dated June 1, 1995. Japanese Grant in the amount of $520,000 approved; memo dated June 30, 1995.

July 1995   Further discussions with indigenous organizations about the project concept during a mission from July 2-6, 1995. Agreements reached are confirmed in a letter from the Bank to all indigenous organizations (July 17, 1995). The letter also proposes detailed rules of the game for the functioning of a joint government–indigenous project coordination committee (*Comité de Gestión*) after the Bank makes it clear that because of its statutes has to work through the Government. Indigenous organizations subsequently accept this explanation why a direct relationship with the Bank without Government involvement is not feasible.

Aug. 1995   TORs are elaborated for a series of design studies based on the agreed initial project design during a mission from August 28-31. These studies include: a) land and water rights, b) inventory of ongoing projects to obtain lessons learned, c) beneficiary assessment; and d) rural enterprises. Aide Memoire dated August 31, 1995. Mr. Duchicela, *Secretario Ejecutivo* of SENAIME leaves and is succeeded by Mrs. Graciela Ortega.

Sep. 1995   National indigenous organizations organized in the *Comité Nacional del Decenio* respond to the letter of July 17 sent by the Bank. Letter dated September 20, 1995. They officially agree to participate in the project through the proposed *Comité de Gestión*. However, instead of equal government–indigenous representation they propose three indigenous delegates, one of the Government and one of the Bank. The letter sent by the indigenous organizations signifies "a landmark decision

because indigenous organizations in Ecuador have usually taken a confrontational posture against the government and have also been very critical of the World Bank and other indigenous organizations in the past" (Bank internal memorandum, September 28, 1995).

Oct. 1995   In a letter to the *Comité del Decenio* (October 23), the Bank indicates the importance of a joint government-indigenous decisionmaking process in the *Comité de Gestión* in order to facilitate ownership of all parties involved. With the Japanese Grant available, the Bank also proposes to launch a pilot project that will allow the *Comité de Gestión* to take charge of the project preparation process; it also responds to doubts raised by the indigenous organizations to use project preparation funds for studies only. The Bank receives a copy of the PPF Agreement Letter, countersigned by the Minister of Finance, on October 30, 1995. It signifies that for the first time in history, Ecuador is willing to borrow money that will exclusively benefit its indigenous and Afro Ecuadoran population.

Nov. 1995   First joint Bank–IFAD preparation mission in Ecuador from October 30 to November 10. Official agreement to establish a joint government–indigenous project preparation committee, *Comité de Gestión*, consisting of three government and three indigenous representatives. Letter of *Comité Nacional del Decenio* signed on November 7, 1995. The *Comité de Gestión* would appoint a Technical Unit that would be responsible for project preparation at the operational level. Hence, there is a clear separation of political aspects (*Comité de Gestión*) and technical aspects of project preparation (*Unidad Técnica*). TORs of studies further clarified; new study about indigenous policy is added to the four already agreed previously. Japanese Grant Agreement signed by Government of Ecuador on November 15, 1995. By now, the key elements for project preparation have fallen into place: there is agreement about: a) an institutional structure that allows for joint government–indigenous decisionmaking, b) an initial project design that takes into account feedback from a wide range of stakeholders, c) a project preparation plan consisting of studies and a pilot project, and d) a PPF and a Japanese Grant, totaling $850,000, to finance project preparation. The challenge now is to successfully implement what has been agreed.

Dec. 1995–   Indigenous organizations are divided who should represent them in the *Comité de*
Feb. 1996   *Gestión* and who should be appointed as the *Director Ejecutivo* of the *Unidad Técnica*. Proposals for a new *Ley de Aguas*, that call for a considerable degree of privatization, are complicating matters in the sense that indigenous organizations invest considerable time and efforts in the ongoing debate about this issue. With the focus of project preparation moving to the implementation of activities at the operational level, SENAIME's weak institutional capacity is also clearly exposed at this stage of the project preparation process. The president of FENOC-IN, the second largest indigenous organization, assumes the rotating presidency of the *Comité Nacional del Decenio* after the president of CONAIE held this position for one year. The new president turns out to be an effective player in fostering consensus among indigenous organizations on project-related matters. The Bank organizes an internal review meeting on January 17, 1996 in which the proposed

project design is endorsed. Two decisions are important: a) the project will be an investment rather than a technical assistance operation, allowing indigenous organizations to take the process of development fully in their own hands, and b) given the complexity of the issue, the project will stay away from structural changes in the legal and institutional framework related to land and water rights, but would respond to support mechanism for local land and water rights conflict resolution. Bank internal memorandum dated January 26, 1996.

March–
April 1996

Another joint Bank–IFAD preparation mission visits Ecuador from March 18 to April 3. In meetings with the indigenous organizations, the mission stresses the importance that the members of the *Comité de Gestión* and the *Director Ejecutivo* of the Technical Unit are finally appointed. SENAIME invites proposals for the implementation of studies based on the agreed TORs. The selection process to hire other professionals in the Technical Unit is also initiated at this point. Finally, it is agreed that the pilot project would focus on participatory planning activities, preparation of subprojects and institutional strengthening activities of second-tier indigenous organizations (organizaciones de segundo grado, OSGs). Aide Memoire, April 1, 1996. As a result of the mission, the *Comité Nacional del Decenio* informs the Bank in a letter on April 12, 1996 that there is agreement among the indigenous organizations about the persons who will represent them on the *Comité de Gestión* and who will be the *Director Ejecutivo* of the Technical Unit. Because of its long involvement and experience in working with indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) is asked to accompany project preparation as a peer reviewer. Letter dated April 15, 1996.

May–July
1996

The *Comité de Gestión* is officially formed following a *Resolución Administrativa* of SENAIME published in the *Registro Oficial* on July 3, 1996. The discussion starts focusing under what rules it should operate, who will be the President, and where its office would be. The Bank steps in with another mission from June 3-11 to facilitate discussions among all parties involved. An agreement is negotiated and signed on June 11. It is agreed that: a) there will be a separate project office to allow for some independence from SENAIME, b) the presidency of the *Comité de Gestión* will be done on a rotating basis, c) decisions will be taken by consensus, d) steps already taken in the selection process of executing agencies for the implementation of project design studies will be respected, and e) the *Director Ejecutivo* will get an authorized signature for withdrawal applications for the PPF and Japanese Grant. Subsequently, personnel in the *Unidad Técnica* are appointed. Once appointed, the question arises what the exact division of responsibilities between the *Comité de Gestión* and the *Unidad Técnica* should be in order to ensure a clear separation between political and technical issues. Executing agencies to implement studies are identified and selected. In the light of upcoming election, Mrs. Graciela Ortega resigns as *Secretario Ejecutivo* of SENAIME; Mr. Oscar Salazar takes over for a brief period until the new Government is formed.

Aug. 1996

The Bucaram Administration takes office. Mr. Mariano Morocho becomes the new *Secretario Ejecutivo* of SENAIME. A mission is in Ecuador from August 26-30 to clarify internal working relationships between the *Comité de Gestión* and the

Unidad Técnica. A code of conduct is agreed as well (Aide Memoire August 30, 1996). Arrangements are made to contract OSGs for the implementation of the pilot project. The FAO is brought on board to provide technical assistance in the implementation of the pilot project and subsequently provides input in the detailed design of the rural investments component. The *Comité de Gestión* and the *Unidad Técnica* elaborate a detailed work plan covering project preparation aspects. It is agreed that a project design workshop would be organized with all relevant stakeholders in November in which the results of the studies would be presented.

Sep.–Dec. 1996	The institutional framework is complicated by the fact that the Bucaram Administration decides to establish a Ministry for Ethnic Development that coexists beside SENAIME. At this stage, the indigenous representatives are clearly committed to the *Comité de Gestión*; however the participation from the Government is erratic. The indigenous organizations in a memorandum signed on October 10, 1996, demand full participation from the Government in the *Comité de Gestión* following the structure that was published in the *Registro Oficial* of July 3. A full-fledged preparation mission is in the field from November 19 to December 5. Results of the studies are presented in a workshop with about 70 representatives from indigenous organizations. Based on the results of these studies and following the feedback from the workshop, a detailed project design is agreed that indicates for each component objectives, activities, institutional arrangements, dimension, and procedures. The project will have four components, including: a) land and water regularization, b) institutional strengthening of indigenous and black organizations, c) rural investments through matching grants and credit, and d) institutional strengthening of SENAIME. Aide-Memoire signed on December 4, 1996.
Jan.–March 1997	Pilot project launched after a long bidding process. Design studies are finalized following feedback received during the November 1996 workshop. The institutional framework is consolidated with the creation of the National Council for Indigenous and Afro Ecuadoran Development (Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo Indígena y Negro, CONPLADE-IN) on March 17, 1997 after the Bucaram Government is ousted from power. Mrs. Nina Pacari, formerly from CONAIE, is appointed as the new *Secretario Ejecutivo* of CONPLADE-IN. The institutional structure of CONPLADE-IN, with a joint government–indigenous *Consejo Surperior*, reflects institutional arrangements under which the *Comité de Gestión* has been operating.
April–June 1997	A joint Bank–IFAD mission visits Ecuador from April 14-25 to agree on a detailed project design. A second project design workshop is held to validate the detailed design with representatives of about 80 indigenous organizations. Based on an indigenous poverty map, the target population of the project is defined, consisting of about 815,000 peoples in 288 parroquías. Aide Memoire signed April 25, 1997. A second PPF of $1.1 million is put in place to finalize project preparation and kick off some project activities, particularly the implementation of some subprojects prepared under the pilot project. Letter dated June 11, 1997. Project Appraisal Document is written.

July–Aug. 1997	Project Appraisal Document distributed on July 8 and discussed on July 21. The PAD Discussion/Decision Meeting endorses the project design, but stresses the need to more explicitly incorporate a cultural dimension. A joint Bank–IFAD mission appraises the project from August 4–28. Indigenous organizations are invited to present written feedback on a detailed project description that is distributed among them prior to the arrival of the appraisal mission in Ecuador. During the mission, a cultural heritage subcomponent that includes financing of concourses, cultural events, videos, book publishing etc. is added to the project. Detailed cost tables are finalized as well, indicating a total budget of $50 million of which $25 million is financed by the World Bank, $15 million by IFAD, and $10 million by the Government and beneficiaries. The mission also agrees detailed TORs and selection procedures for project personnel to be hired after Loan approval. Finally, conditions for negotiations are agreed, including: the preparation of draft operational manuals, draft interinstitutional arrangements for land regularization activities, draft interinstitutional arrangements concerning formal training activities, and presentation of final project monitoring indicators. AideMemoire signed August 28.
Sep.–Nov. 1997	Ongoing work in Ecuador to meet conditions for negotiations. At the Bank, preparation of legal documents and obtaining green lights to clear the way for negotiations. Negotiations are held from November 10-14, 1997. Negotiations include the IFAD cofinancing portion. Minutes issued on November 19. Mr. Arturo León represents CONPLADE-IN as acting *Secretario Ejecutivo*. The Quality Assessment Group of the Bank reviews the project design and issues a satisfactory rating.
Dec. 1997– Jan. 1998	Finalization of project documentation for Board presentation. Board approves Loan on January 29, 1998 after full discussion.
Feb.–June 1998	With the preparation of the project finalized, the *Comité de Gestión* is discontinued, its role being taking over by the *Consejo Superior* of CONPLADE-IN. The project management team is hired after the TORs and selection procedures are once again discussed and agreed with all parties involved during a mission from February 2–10. Aide Memoire is signed on February 10. The project management team subsequently hires project personnel for the Quito office and two regional offices (Ibarra and Riobamba) that are set up immediately and financed with PPF resources. An initial Operational Plan for 1998 is agreed as well. During this period considerable efforts are made to meet all the formal requirements for loan signing. Loan is finally signed on June 12, 1998.
July–Sep. 1998	Elections in Ecuador divert attention from project implementation. After having gone through several drafts, operational manuals are finalized in order to comply with the loan effectiveness conditions. Operational Manual is published in the Registro Oficial dated September 4, 1998. Project becomes effective on September 11, 1998. Implementation agreement between World Bank and IFAD finalized.

Oct.–Dec.
1998

After loan effectiveness, project personnel are hired in three additional regional offices. The project is launched on November 10–11 with the participation of all 160 OSGs involved in the project. During the launch mission, an Annual Operational Plan for 1999 is agreed. Aide Memoire signed November 13. Following constitutional changes that put more emphasis on the concept of *nacionalidades* and *pueblos*, the Government, after pressure from CONAIE, changes the orientation of CONPLADE-IN by creating *the Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador* (CODENPE) on December 11, 1998 following Presidential Decree No. 386. Mr. Luis Maldonado replaced Mr. Arturo Leon and becomes the first *Secretario Ejecutivo* of CODENPE.

Annex 2. Project Institutional Structure during Preparation Process

Secretariat for Indigenous Affairs and Ethnic Minorities	World Bank	Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Organizations organized in the *Comité del Decenio*

Project Coordinating Committee (*Comité de Gestión*)
3 representatives of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations;
3 representatives of the Government of Ecuador
Executive Coordinator

Project Technical Unit:

Executive Coordinator

Professional Staff

Private Sector Executing Agencies	Public Sector Agencies

Annex 3. Target Population

Ethnicity or Nationality	Region	Subgroup or location	Population
Afro-Ecuadoran	Costa and Sierra	Eloy Alfaro	23,256
		San Lorenzo	9,067
		Esmeraldas	86,653
		Chota-Mira	22,793
Runa	Amazonia	Sucumbios	8,463
		Napo	25,470
		Pastaza	15,866
	Sierra (North)	Otavalo-Carangue	63,726
		Cayambe-Quito	51,289
	Sierra (Center-South)	Cotopaxi	72,476
		Tungurahua	62,984
		Chimborazo	148,715
		Bolivar	35,086
		Cañar-Azuay	62,447
		Saraguro	11,936
Shuar	Amazonia	Upano	19,412
		Transcutucu	11,011
		Zamora	3,740
Huao, Siona, Secoya, Cofán	Amazonia		3,221
Huancavilcas, Manteños, Punaes	Costa Seca		65,997
Chachi, Epera, Tsáchilas, Awa	Costa (North)		9,892
		TOTAL	813,500

Annex 4. Social Capital Index Criteria

				POINTS
Judicial Framework	**Juridical Personality**		Accomplished	5
		In process	More than 5 years	1
			Between 1-5 years	2
			Less than 1 year	3
		Not yet initiated		0
	Status Executed	**Directives Reformed**	Accomplished on time (complied w/Statute)	5
			Overdue, accomplished but missed deadline	3
			Remain unchanged (as of 1993)	0
Management Capacity	**Accounting System**	**Computerized**	Yes	5
			Daily Bookkeeping	3
	Financial Management (Banking)		3 accounts (savings, checking & insurance)	5
			2 accounts (savings & checking)	3
			1 account	2
	Methodology Implementation		Organizational Structure in Second Tier Organization (including board of directors, local representatives)	5
			Basic Organizational Structure	3
			Organizational Structure Dependent on NGO or other organization	3
			Lacking Organizational Structure	0
	Project Experience	**Number of Projects**	3 or more	5
			Less than 3	3
	Cash Flow Management		Excellent (9 figures or greater)	5
			Very good (8 figures)	4
			Good (7 figures)	3
			Average	2
			Unsatisfactory	1
	Contributions by Partners	**Contributions in kind, collective labor and cash**	Contributions in kind, collective labor and cash	5
			Contributions in kind and collective labor	4
			Collective labor	3
			In kind	2
			Cash	1

				POINTS
Human Capital	**Technical Specialists**		In-house	5
			In- house and External	3
			External Only	1
			None	0
	Professional Accounts		One account	3
			None	0
	Accounting Assistants		More than one	3
			1	2
			None	0
	Administrative Support Staff		More than 1	3
			1	2
			None	0
	Community Contact		More than 1	5
			1	3
			None	0
Financial Capital	**Goods (inventory, status cost)**	Vehicles, Machinery, Office space, land	High (whole package, 100%)	5
			Medium high (at least 75%)	4
			Average (at least 50 %)	3
			Low (25% and below)	2
			None (0 %)	0
	Office Equipment (inventory, status, cost)	Typewriters, Computers, Desks, fax machines and other	High (100%)	5
			Average (75%)	4
			Low (50% and below)	3
			0%	0
	Communication Tools	Telephone, Radio station, frequency, sound equipment, amplifiers/ speakers	High (100%)	5
			Average (~75%)	4
			Low (50% and below)	3
			0%	0
	Basic Services	Potable water, Sewerage system, electricity	Excellent (100%)	5
			Very good (~75%)	4
			Good (~50%)	3
			None	0
	Sources of Funds		Own Enterprise	5
			Other Partner Organizations	5
			None	0

				POINTS
Organizational Culture	**Public Relations With other Organizations**	**NGO's Third Tier Organizations, Other**	High (3 or more)	5
			Average (2)	3
			Low (1)	1
			None	0
	Types of partner Initiatives with NGO's	**Legal, technical, capacity-building, credit or other field of expertise**	High (all)	5
			Average (2-3)	1
			Low (1)	2
			None	0
	Number of Affiliated First Tier Organizations		65 or more	5
			46-64	4
			31-45	3
			21-30	2
			1-20	1
	Services offered by the organizations to members	**Legal, credit, education, health and management expertise**	Excellent (all)	5
			Very good (1)	4
			Good (3)	3
			Low (1-2)	2
			None	0
	Participation by the partners in decision-making process		Participation and feedback	5
			Participation only	3
	Education level of management personnel (President, Vice-President, Secretary)		Specialized training, college or more	5
			High- School	3
			Elementary School	1

LCR Sustainable Development Working Papers

For back issues contact:

No.	Title	Date	Author
1	Environmental Guidelines for Social Funds	December 1998	Douglas J. Graham Kenneth M. Green Karla McEvoy
2	A Conceptual Framework for Violence Reduction *(available in Spanish)*	August 1999	Caroline Moser Elizabeth Shrader
3	Youth Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Costs, Causes, and Interventions	August 1999	Caroline Moser Bernice van Bronkhorst
4	Youth Gangs and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Literature Survey	August 1999	Dennis Rodgers
5	Violence and Social Capital: Proceedings of the LCSES Seminar Series, 1997-98	August 1999	Caroline Moser Sarah Lister
6	Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms: Lessons from the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project	January 2000	Martien van Nieuwkoop Jorge E. Uquillas