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Hunger, Capability and Agency-oriented Development∗

In this chapter I focus on the scourge of hunger. Whether due to emergences caused by natural calamities, such as tsunamis, drought, or locust infestation, or due to chronic lack of food, world hunger shocks the moral conscience. "Hunger continues to be," asserts the Hunger Task Force of the Millennium Development Project, "a global tragedy."[1] What are the facts about food and global hunger?

More than enough food exists world wide for everyone to have enough to eat. Food aid scholars Christopher B. Barrett and Danel G. Maxwell state the relatively undisputed facts at the outset of their important volume *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its Role:*

> Enough food is produced globally to meet every person's dietary requirements adequately. In 2000, the world enjoyed a daily per capita supply of more than 2,800 kilocalories and 75 grams of protein, more than enough to keep every man, woman, and child well nourished.[2]

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Food availability, however, does not result in nutritional well-being for all. Although estimates depend on definitions of hunger and nutritional adequacy, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations estimated in 2004 that in 2000-2002 approximately 852 million, or one sixth of the world's people, did not have enough to eat.[3] Although most of world's hungry people live in Asia (Bangladesh, China, India, and Indonesia), fully 30 of the world's 190 or so countries—two thirds in sub-Saharan Africa—have insufficient food to provide their inhabitants with 2,100 calories per person per day. Sixty nations in the world have insufficient food supplies to afford their citizens the widely accepted standard of 2,350 calories per person per day.[4] According to the Millennium Development Project's task force on hunger, 5.5 million children die each year from malnutrition-related causes, and 134 million children are underweight, 34 million of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa.[5]

These figures, of course, are only averages; many persons in these food-deficit countries get much less to eat per day, and a few enjoy much more. At least half the people in 10 countries, seven in sub-Saharan Africa, are malnourished. In four of these sub-Saharan African countries, two-thirds or more of the population lack adequate food. Even high-food consumption countries, such as the US, in which people consume on average 3, 772 per day, have 38 million people who don't get enough to eat, many of them in minority populations. However, the overwhelming majority of hungry people (815 million) live in poor or developing countries rather than in transition countries (28

million) or "developed" countries (9 million). Although the world made progress in the period from 1990-1992 to 1995-1997 in reducing by 27 million the numbers of hungry people, two-thirds of this gain was wiped out from 1995-1997 to 2000-2002. It is all too clear that the world is not on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving the world's hungry by 2015.[6]

How have philosophers and other development ethicists responded to these and earlier facts of global hunger? In Chapter 1, I argued that throughout the seventies and early eighties, often in response to Garret Hardin's "lifeboat ethics," initially Peter Singer and subsequently other analytically-trained philosophers addressed the issue of world hunger and moral obligation of the rich to help the hungry.[7] They argued that affluent nations and individuals do have a positive obligation to send food aid (food stuffs and money) to distant and hungry people, and they spent the bulk of their efforts in exploring the nature, basis, and limits of this obligation. These thinkers paid scant attention to food aid policies of rich countries or development policies in poor countries. And they woefully neglected the efforts of poor countries to feed and develop their own people. If these philosophers had scrutinized critically food aid policies of the 1970s, they would have found that the form food aid had taken since its inception a quarter of a century earlier increasingly was—as food policy scholars and practitioners at the time were beginning to argue—problematic morally and in desperate need of reform. It was becoming all too clear that sending surplus US grain and other food commodities, while

only a negligible help to US farmers, maritime, and commercial interests, often failed to get to the hungry. Even worse, when recipient governments sold ("monetized") the so-called "program food aid" in local markets, these markets became glutted, prices for locally-grown food precipitously declined, and small farmers stopped producing and themselves went hungry.[8] Moreover, government officials often "appropriated" the food or the money it yielded for their own purposes. In short, scholars and activists were coming to recognize that merely sending food or money to the distant hungry failed to bring about—and even undermined—long-term and sustainable development (however defined).

One such scholar-activist was the late Denis Goulet, the pioneer (at least in English-speaking countries) of development ethics. Influenced by the French development thinker and planner, Louis Joseph Lebret, Goulet began his career in the late 50s and early 60s as a grassroots activist and researcher among "communities of struggle" in Lebanon, Algeria, Brazil, and several other developing countries. His ethical concerns about development originated in his own direct engagement with human misery as well as with some of the early critics of what Goulet called "assistentialism," the post World War Two idea that "rich nations could help war-damaged and, later, poor nations industrialize by transferring investment capital, food and other supplies to them."[9]

It may have been a blessing that Goulet lacked familiarity at that time with analytic philosophy and with Singer's challenge to philosophers. Influenced instead by

the fairly progressive social teachings of the Catholic Church, the (more radical) theology of liberation, and the ethically-infused existentialism of the Algerian-French philosopher Albert Camus, Goulet was relatively immune to analytic philosophy's fixation on abstract arguments that rich countries had obligations to provide food aid. Likewise, he was able to recognize that the much of the popular and professional debate in the early seventies about hunger and food aid ran the risk "of seeing world development simply as a matter of food aid to starving nations or of compensatory financial assistance to offset inflationary price rises."[10] In a 1975 article, aptly titled "World Hunger: Putting Development Ethics to the Test," Goulet clearly and presciently saw that hunger was but a symptom of deeper causes, including bad development, and that food aid by itself was always in danger of being a soothing palliative that failed to address root causes:

> Hunger is merely one dramatic symptom of a deeper ill: the persistence of national and international orders that foster distorted development. Consequently, the problem is not met *solely* by boosting food aid or by cutting births, but, ultimately, by creating new ground rules governing access to the world's productive resources.
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> Societies now powerless must gain such access *upstream*—at the production end—and not merely *downstream*—at the distribution end—if an equitable, dynamic and liberating form of world development is to

appear.[11]

Amartya Sen was another development thinker whose approach transformed the Hardin-Singer debate from that of food aid to (good) development. Building on his work since the late 1950s in economics, evaluation, and development, in 1981 Sen published his seminal *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*.[12] In this volume, which decisively broke with the view that the (main) cause of famine was lack of food (and food aid), Sen argued that eliminating famines and reducing chronic malnutrition require not merely food aid but a deep and broad approach to national and global development. Although he did not address Singer's challenge, Sen—in contrast to Goulet—critically engaged and employed the tools of analytic moral and sociopolitical philosophy as well as those of political economy.

Catching up with this recasting of food aid, a few analytically-trained philosophers in the mid-80s began to reframe the ethics of famine relief —"Do rich countries have a moral duty to aid the global hungry?"—and insert it in a more comprehensive ethics of and for development. Just as Sen and others reframed and enlarged food aid to become only one tool in promoting development, so philosophers, sometimes under Sen' influence, incorporated an ethics of famine relief into a more comprehensive ethics of development

My main claim in this chapter is that many philosophical and policy discussions

of acute hunger and chronic malnutrition committed and still commit what Whitehead called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness."[13] Philosophers, policy makers, and citizens still abstract one part—food aid—from the whole complex of hunger, poverty, and bad development, and proceed to consider that part in isolation from other dimensions.[14] Just as cutting-edge food aid and development scholars, policy makers and practitioners have done, philosophers should refocus and then broaden their attention with respect to the complex causes, conditions, and cures of hunger. Otherwise, we will have an incomplete and distorted picture of both the facts and the values involved. Instead of continuing virtually exclusive preoccupation with the moral basis for aid from rich countries to famine victims in poor countries, development ethicists should join the most progressive food-aid scholars, development economists, and policymakers and shift their emphasis (1) from moral foundations to interpretative and strategic concepts, (2) from famine to persistent malnutrition, (3) from remedy to prevention, (4) from food availability to food entitlements, (5) from food and entitlements to capability and agency, (6) from capability and agency to development as freedom. This last progression will take us beyond even the best recent work on world hunger and development aid. My intent is not to reject the first terms in each pair but to subordinate them to the more fundamental and comprehensive second terms. Overall, the progression I favor conceives an ethics of food aid as a part of a more basic and inclusive ethics for development.

From Moral Foundations to Interpretative and Strategic Concepts

Are affluent states and their citizens morally obligated to send food or money for food to the hungry and starving in other countries? Is such aid morally required, permissible, or impermissible? This was the question that philosophers and many others asked in the 1970s. The answers ranged from the extreme claim that such aid was morally required, even if it impoverished the donors; to the contrary extreme that such aid was morally reprehensible (and stupidly imprudent), because it did more harm than good; to middle-of-the-road views that held that it was permissible and even admirable to give aid, but not wrong to refrain from so doing.

A few in the 1980s and many more in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, however, perceive the problem of "world hunger and moral obligation" differently. When we see pictures—whether in the media or on the cover of ethics anthologies—of an emaciated child crouching on desiccated or water-saturated soil, the question "Do we have a duty to help?" seems beside the point. Of course we should help. The moral imperative, once we know the facts, is clear and compelling. The Food and Agricultural Organization's (FAO) 2004 report on global food insecurity is unusual only in its succinctness:

> In moral terms, just stating the fact that one child dies every five seconds

as a result of hunger and malnutrition should be enough to prove that we cannot afford to allow the scourge of hunger to continue. Case closed.[15]

We should not take seriously those philosophers and others who insist that we refrain from assisting until a (conclusive) theoretical or moral argument is found to justify the view that the rich in the North and West should help the poor in the South or East. To be sure, in light of our concomitant obligations to aid our families, friends, and compatriots, a place for moral debate exists with respect to *how much* assistance morality or enlightened prudence requires us to give distant people.[16] And in some contexts it can be valuable to consider whether the rich have *any* moral obligations to the distant poor.

Among such contexts are university seminar rooms or public forums in which it is argued that foreign aid is unjustified, since it is not in the donor country's national interest and national interest is the only legitimate basis for aid. This argument's first premise, of course, can often be shown to be false. Sometimes, perhaps often, prudential arguments lead to the same conclusion as the best moral arguments. When such convergence occurs, the moral argument may be important in bolstering the prudential argument. It is when prudential and moral considerations fail to converge that the moral arguments for or against aid may become not only theoretically but also practically important.

Usually, however, we see no good reason to doubt that we owe *something* to the

distant poor and hungry, if we can be reasonably sure that our help will alleviate—or help the hungry themselves alleviate—their immediate misery and improve their long-term prospects. For most citizens and many philosophers, the obstacle in the way of supporting aid to distant peoples is not so much skepticism about the existence of a convincing moral argument as it is pessimism about practical results. It could be, of course, that aid skeptics cast their argument in prudential or effectiveness terms because they are uncomfortable with publicly arguing that their country has no moral duty to help (or had a moral duty not to help). One reason for this discomfort may be that the skeptic knows he is out of step with the widely-held commitment that affluent states and citizens should help those in dire straits.[17]

Unfortunately, preoccupied as they were with the task of establishing a moral basis for aid to distant people, most analytically-trained philosophers in the seventies and early eighties evinced negligible interest in institutional and practical issues. They seemed to believe that if they could resolve the foundational questions, the rest would be easy; the rational—on its own—would become real. It is true that Will Aiken and Hugh La Follette in their 1977 anthology, *World Hunger and Moral Obligation,* did challenge their readers to consider "If one ought to help the hungry, how should one help?"[18] However, the volume's essays almost completely failed to address the best ways to diagnose and remedy the problem of world hunger.

As we saw in Chapter 1, one partial exception to the prevailing disinterest in

practical issues was Peter Singer, the philosopher who initiated the debate. Although Singer seems to advocate individual donations of food or money as the best way to fulfill an affluent person's duty to combat the suffering of distant people, upon closer inspection Singer argues compellingly that potential donors are obligated to find the most effective way or ways to do their duty. He also goes so far as to list a few broad types of aid or other actions – from aid that promotes population control, economic security, and agricultural assistance to aid that supports voting, socially responsible consumption, land reform, and volunteerism. And we must look beyond saving of a life now and see if there is reason to believe that such rescue will "do more than perpetuate the cycle of poverty, misery, and high infant mortality."[19] However, what Singer has never done, other than express an occasional preference for one possible means over another, is to assess the advantages and disadvantages – moral and otherwise – of the various options for aid and development. Nor has he adequately investigated – by himself or in collaboration with others – the national and global causes of hunger and other deprivations.

It might be objected that analysis of the causes and cures of world hunger is a purely factual, empirical, or technical matter to which philosophers and other ethicists cannot contribute. Yet I would argue that facts and values cannot be separated so easily. Let us distinguish two ways that facts and values are entangled.[20]

First, as Dewey was well aware, different descriptive, interpretative, and explanatory concepts and categories have different practical consequences for

investigators and public actors alike. And among those consequences are some that we should morally applaud and others that we should morally condemn. For example, a widely-held concept of famine includes the idea that famine amounts to excessive mortality due to—principally if not exclusively—food shortages. One reason to reject this concept is that it has had morally disastrous effects. On the one hand, this notion has delayed interventions until people started dying in large numbers, when earlier interventions might have saved many. Such was the case, for example, in Niger in the summer of 2005.[21] On the other hand, this definition of famine implied that the cure was always and only more food, when in fact the problem—arguably, one of justice—was often a hungry household's *access* to food.[22]

A second way in which values are linked to facts is that we discern ethically salient features of facts on the basis of our moral values.[23] Ethical reflection, whether the work of philosophers or non-philosophers, plays not only a critical role in assessing consequences and a guiding role in prescribing actions but also an *interpretive* role in relation to social reality and change. An ethic, of course, does propose norms for assessing present social institutions, envisaging future alternatives, and assigning obligations for getting from the present to the future. An ethic, finally, provides a basis for deciding how agents should act individually or collectively in particular circumstances. What is equally important and frequently neglected, however, is that a normative vision also informs the ways we discern, describe, explain, and forecast social

phenomena. How we "read" the situation, as well as how we describe and classify it, will be, to some extent, a function of our value commitments and even our moral sensitivities.[24] For instance, if we ask, "How is India doing?" we are seeking an empirical analysis of what is going on in that country. Alternative ethical perspectives will focus on distinct, though sometimes overlapping, facts: hedonistic utilitarians attend to pleasures and pains; preference utilitarians select preference satisfactions and dissatisfactions (or per capita productivity and consumption); human rights advocates emphasize human rights compliances and violations; and Rawlsians investigate the distributions of "social primary goods" such as income, wealth, liberties, and opportunities. In each case the ethic provides a lens to pick out what counts as morally relevant information. One value of intellectual dialogue between different ethical perspectives and democratic deliberation among diverse citizens is that in "give-and-take" we learn to see the world in new and different ways. Moreover, as Sherman says, "how to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry *(zetêsis*) as what to do."[25]

Amartya Sen, Jean Drèze, Martha Nussbaum, and others offer, I showed in Part II above, the capability perspective as an important part of the effort to understand and combat world hunger and other deprivations. Capability theorists employ their ethical concepts and commitments to appraise social institutions and guide policy-formation and actions.[26] To accomplish this task they defend explicit ethical principles and have begun to assign moral responsibilities.[27] The capability perspective, however, also yields

distinctive ways of perceiving world hunger and understanding its empirical causes and attempted cures. With its emphasis on "the commodity commands [entitlements] and basic capabilities that people enjoy,"[28] the capability approach interprets and supplies a rationale for broadening the investigative focus from food aid for famine victims to the most important (and modifiable) causes, conditions, consequences, and remedies of endemic hunger and other privations.[29] As Drèze and Sen argue, "seeing hunger as entitlement failure points to possible remedies as well as helping us to understand the forces that generate hunger and sustain it."[30] In this chapter I emphasize the interpretative contribution of Drèze and Sen's capability approach—or, better, "the agency-oriented capability approach"—and argue that this normative perspective helps justify both a broader and a more focused perspective on world hunger.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, philosophical reflection on world hunger remains important. After Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda in the eighties and nineties, and Niger, North Korea, Sudan, and South Asia in the present or recent past, however, increasing numbers of philosophers are appropriately less concerned with morally justifying aid to the distant hungry and more concerned with the conceptual and ethical dimensions of understanding hunger as well as local, national, and global policies for successfully combating it.

From Famine to Persistent Malnutrition

Philosophers, like policy makers and the public, typically have paid excessive attention to famine and insufficient attention to impending famine, acute hunger following natural or human disasters, or persistent malnutrition.[31] Both acute hunger, including famine, and endemic malnutrition are forms of hunger in the sense of "an inadequacy in dietary intake relative to the kind and quantity of food required for growth, for activity, and for maintenance of good health."[32] Famine, other forms of acute hunger, and chronic hunger, however, differ in character, cause, consequence, and cure. Although some acute hunger, such as that following a tsunami, is an event largely caused by a specific natural or human disaster, a famine is a "slow-onset disaster"[33] and as much a process as an event. Although its outbreak may be abrupt and dramatic, "involving acute starvation and sharp increase in mortality,"[34] the complex causes reach back in time. During famines, some people avoid starvation and death by selling valuable assets, such as their cattle. To take this response to impending starvation into account, perhaps, the best working definition of famine is that of famine and food scholar Peter Walker: "Famine is a socio-economic process which causes the accelerated destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in a community, to a point where they can not longer, as a group, maintain a sustainable livelihood."[35]

Like epidemics and natural disasters, such as earthquakes, droughts, pestilence, and hurricanes, famine makes a sensational topic for the evening news or fund-raising

rock concerts and often stimulates an outpouring of governmental and private donations. Yet famine and other forms of acute hunger, although more dramatic, account for only about ten percent of global hunger.[36] Chronic hunger, which governments and people more easily ignore, accounts for the rest.[37]

Chronic hunger, persistent nutritional deprivation, has somewhat different and deeper causes than famine (and other forms of transitory hunger) and is harder to eradicate. The consequences of persistent hunger—severe incapacitation, chronic illness, and humiliation—may be worse than death. And chronic hunger is itself a killer, since hunger-weakened persons are especially prone to deadly diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia. If we are concerned about the misery and mortality caused by famine and other kinds of acute hunger, we should be even more exercised by the harms caused by persistent malnutrition. Drèze and Sen recognize that strategies to combat famine and persistent malnutrition also differ:

> To take one example [of diverse strategies in responding to transitory and endemic hunger], in the context of famine prevention the crucial need for speedy intervention and the scarcity of resources often call for a calculated reliance on existing distributional mechanisms (e.g. the operation of private trade stimulated by cash support to famine victims) to supplement the logistic capability of relief agencies. In the context of

> combating chronic hunger, on the other hand, there is much greater scope for slower but none the less powerful avenues of action such as institution building, legal reforms, asset redistribution or provisioning in kind.[38]

Famine and chronic malnutrition do not always go together. Nations—for instance, India since independence and Haiti in 1994—have been free of famine and yet beset by endemic malnutrition, including micronutritional deficiencies. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, China achieved a reasonably high level of nutritional well-being and yet in 1959-62 was stricken by calamitous famines. To be exclusively preoccupied with famine, afflicting only ten percent of the hungry, is to ignore the chronically hungry and the food insecurity in countries not prone to famine. To be focused on chronic hunger, on the other hand, may blind a country to impending famine. Food security requires concern with combating these two types of hunger.

As important as is the distinction between these two varieties of food deprivation, we must neither exaggerate the differences nor fail to recognize certain linkages in both causes and cures. Not only are famine and chronic malnutrition both forms of hunger, but they have certain common causes and inter-linked remedies. Both can be understood as what Drèze and Sen call “entitlement failures” and “capability failures” (of which more presently).

As with many other problems, institutions matter. A nation with the right sort of basic political, economic, and social institutions—for instance, stable families, adequate infrastructure, certain kinds of markets, public provisions, a democratic government, a free press, and nongovernmental organizations—more readily can prevent and remedy both sorts of hunger than can a society without the right set of interlocking institutions. The appropriate response to both forms of hunger usually includes some kind of governmental action. Moreover, some of the best short- and long-term approaches to famine prevention—remunerated public employment and, more generally, sustainable development—build on and often intensify effective ways of addressing persistent malnutrition.[39] By contrast, the most common emergency action to combat famine, the herding of people into relief camps in order to dole out free food, jeopardizes long-term solutions by disrupting normal economic activities, upsetting family life, and creating breeding grounds for infectious diseases. Relief camps, in contrast to what Sen calls "the employment route," also undermine people's agency and, thus, are at odds with the capability approach's moral commitments. Later in this chapter, we return to the norm of agency and its policy implications.

From Remedy to Prevention

Whether concerned with abrupt, transitory, or chronic hunger, philosophical ethicists

typically emphasized—and often continue to do so—the moral response to *existing* hunger problems rather than the prevention of *future* ones.[40] An important early exception was Onora O'Neill, who clearly addressed the question of pre-famine as well as famine policies.[41] On the basis of an expanded conception of the duty not to kill others, O'Neill argued that we have a duty to adopt pre-famine policies that ensure that famine is postponed as long as possible and is minimized in severity. Such pre-famine policies, O'Neill argued, must include both a population policy and a resources policy, for "a duty to try to postpone the advent and minimize the severity of famine is a duty on the one hand to minimize the number of persons there will be and on the other to maximize the means of subsistence."[42]

O'Neill's approach, however, unfortunately assumes that famines cannot be prevented altogether, only postponed and minimized. This supposition flies in the face of recent historical experience. Drèze and Sen summarize their findings on this point when they observe, "There is no real evidence to doubt that all famines in the modern world are preventable by human action; . . . many countries—even some very poor ones—manage consistently to prevent them."[43] More positively and perhaps too optimistically Sen asserts: "Famines are, in fact, so easy to prevent that it is amazing that they are allowed to occur at all."[44] Nations that have successfully prevented impending famines (sometimes without outside help) include India (after independence), Cape Verde, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Botswana.[45] Often effective is the regeneration of "the lost purchasing

power of hard-hit groups" through "the creation of emergency employment in short-term public projects."[46]

It is also possible to prevent much, if not eliminate entirely, all chronic hunger. We must combat that pessimism—a close cousin of complacency—that assures us that the hungry will always be with us—at least in the same absolute and proportionate numbers.[47] One of the great achievements of Drèze and Sen is to document, through detailed case studies of successes in fighting hunger, that "there is, in fact, little reason for presuming that the terrible problems of hunger and starvation in the world cannot be changed by human action"[48] What is needed, among other things such as political will, is a forward-looking perspective for short-term, middle-term, and long-term prevention of both types of hunger.

Unfortunately, efforts to *remedy* world hunger—especially acute hunger—far outweigh those long-term development approaches that would *prevent* future hunger. The authors of *Halving Hunger* observe that in Ethiopia's 2003 famine USAID spent $500 million on emergency food aid "compared with $50 million for development programming in agriculture, health, nutrition, water, and sanitation put together."[49] As we shall see, what is called for is a better balance between remedy and prevention as well as responses to food emergencies that at least do not undermine long term development and, if possible, promote it.

From Food Availability to Food Entitlements

Moral reflection on the prevention and relief of world hunger must be expanded from food productivity, availability, and distribution to what Sen calls food "entitlements." Popular images of famine relief emphasize policies that, in Garrett Hardin's words, "move food to the people" or "move people to food."[50] In either case, the assumption is that lack of food is the sole or principal cause of hunger. For more than fifty years the conventional wisdom has been that it is greater agricultural productivity (and population controls) that will reduce if not eliminate hunger, and that famine "relief" is a technical problem of getting food and starving people together in the same place at the same time. It is obviously true that lack of food is one cause of hunger. Much hunger, however, occurs even when people and ample food—even peak supplies—are in close proximity. A starving person may have no access to or command over the food that is in the shop down the street. Force or custom may exclude a Dalit (untouchable) from the queue of people waiting for food handouts.

When famine strikes a country, region, and even a village, often enough food exists in that locale for everyone to be adequately fed. Recent research makes it evident that since 1960 there has been sufficient food to feed the world's people on a "near-vegetarian diet" and that "we are approaching a second threshold of improved diet sufficiency (enough to provide 10 percent animal products)."[51] Accordingly, it is

often said that the problem is one of *distribution*. This term, however, is ambiguous. Purely spatial redistribution is insufficient and may not be necessary. Sen reminds us that "people have perished in famines in sight of much food in shops."[52] What good distribution of food should mean is that people have *effective* access to or can acquire food (whether presently nearby or far away). Hence, it is better to say that the problem of hunger, whether transitory or persistent, involves an "entitlement failure" in the sense that the hungry person is not able to gain access to food or lacks command over food. What is important is not just the food itself but also whether particular households and individuals have operative "entitlements" over food. The distinction between households and individuals is important, for households as units may have sufficient food for the nourishment of each family member, yet some members—usually women or girls—may starve or be chronically malnourished due to entitlement failures.

We must be careful here, for Sen's use of the term "entitlement" has caused much confusion and controversy. Unlike Robert Nozick's explicitly normative or prescriptive use of the term,[53] Sen employs "entitlement" in a predominantly descriptive way, one relatively free of moral endorsement or criticism, to refer to a person's actual or operative command, permitted by law (backed by state power) or custom, over certain commodities.[54] A person's entitlements will be a function of (i) that person's *endowments*, for example, what income, wealth (including land), goods or services (including labor) she has to exchange for food; (ii) *production possibilities*, related to

available technology and knowledge; (ii) *exchange opportunities*, for instance, the going rate of exchange of work or money for food, (iii) *legal claims* against the state, for instance, rights to work, food stamps, or welfare, (iv) and nonlegal but *socially approved and operative rules*, for example, the household "social discipline" that mandates that women eat after and eat less than men.[55] A person with little more than labor power and unable—due to primitive technology and know-how (either to produce food or something else to exchange for food)—may have insufficient money to buy food at famine-induced prices and no claim on government employment or welfare programs.

Generally speaking, an entitlement to food would be the actual ability, whether *morally* justified or not, to acquire food by some legally or socially approved means—whether by producing it, trading for it, buying it, or receiving it in a government feeding program. A Hutu child separated from his family may be morally justified in stealing a meal from a Tutsi food supply center, but he has no legal claim or other social basis for *effective* access to the food. In Sen's sense, then, the child lacks an entitlement to that food.

To view hunger as an entitlement failure neither commits one to the position that hunger is *never* due to food scarcity nor that the same set of causes *always* explains hunger. Sometimes a fall in food production, due perhaps to natural disaster or civil conflict, is a factor contributing to acute or chronic hunger. Rather, the entitlement theory of hunger directs one to examine the various links in a society's "food chain"—

production-acquisition-consumption or availability-access-utilization—any or all of which can be dysfunctional and contribute to an entitlement failure.[56] A production failure, due to wars, earthquakes, drought or pests, will result in an entitlement failure for those small farmers "whose means of survival depend on food that they grow themselves."[57] When food is abundant and even increasing in an area, landless laborers may starve because they have insufficient money to buy food, no job to get money, nothing of worth to trade for food, or no effective claim on their government or other group.

Conceiving hunger as an entitlement failure also may help us see ways of preventing impending famines and ways of remedying actual famines—ways we might miss with other ethical lenses. What is needed is not only food but institutions in which people can "enjoy" entitlements, that is, institutions that protect against entitlement failures and restore lost entitlements. Moving food to hungry people may *not* always be necessary, for the needed food already may be physically present. The problem, in this case, is that some people cannot gain access to it. Even worse, increasing food availability in a given area may increase the hunger problem. Direct delivery of free food, for instance, can send market food prices plummeting, thereby causing a disincentive for farmers to grow food. The result is a decline not only in their productivity but also in their own food entitlements.

Moreover, even though necessary, food by itself is not sufficient to prevent or

cure famine if people never had entitlements to food or lost what they had previously. And it may be that the best way to ensure that people have the ability to command food is not to give them food itself, but rather to provide cash relief or cash for work. Such cash "may provide the ability to command food without directly giving the food."[58] Moreover, such cash may have the effect of increasing food availability, for the cash may "pull" private food traders into the area in order to meet the demand.

One deficiency of the "food availability" approach to hunger is that it is purely aggregative, that is, concerned solely with the amount of food in a given area summed over the number of people. Thus, this view has inspired a simplistic and inconclusive debate between, on the one hand, "Malthusian optimists," those who think that *the* answer to the "world food problem" is more food; and, on the other hand, "Malthusian pessimists," those who think the only answer is fewer people.[59] Another—more deadly—consequence is that data concerning food output and availability often lull government officials and others into a false sense of food security and thereby prevent them from taking measures to prevent or mitigate famine. As Sen observes, "The focus on food per head and Malthusian optimism have literally killed millions,"[60] and "the Malthusian perspective of food-to-population ratio has much blood on its hands."[61]

Sen's approach, in contrast, focuses on the command over food on the part of vulnerable occupation groups, households, and, most importantly, individuals.[62] It recognizes that although food and food productivity is indispensable for famine

prevention and remedy, much more than food is needed. According to Sen, an approach to hunger that attended exclusively to food and even entitlements to food would stop short of the fundamental goal—to reduce human deprivation and contribute to human well-being and agency.

From Food and Food Entitlements to Capability and Agency

Different moral theories understand human well-being and the good human life in diverse ways. Capability theorists, for reasons that I examined and evaluated in Chapters 4-6, choose the moral space of two kinds of freedom and achievement: (i) agency freedom and achievement, and (ii) those well-being freedoms (capabilities) and achievements ("functionings") that people have reason to value. Capability proponents argue that these moral categories are superior to other candidates for *fundamental* concepts such as resources or commodities, utilities, needs, or rights. Although they do have a role in a complete moral theory and approach to world hunger, these latter concepts refer to "moral furniture" that is in some sense secondary. Commodities are at best *means* to the end of valuable functions and freedoms to so function. Access to—or command over—these commodities fail to address the problem that what benefits one person may harm or have a trivial impact on another person. Utilities are only one among several good functionings and may "muffle" and "mute" deprivations. Moral or human rights,

arguably, are not free-standing but are best defined in relation to valued freedoms and achievements.[63]

Recall what capability theorists mean by the term "functioning": A person's functionings consist of his or her physical and mental states ("beings") and activities ("doings"). The most important of these functionings, the failure of which constitutes poverty and the occurrence of which constitutes well-being,

> Vary from such elementary physical ones as being well-nourished, being adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, etc., to more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on.[64]

A person's capability, I argued in Chapter 6, is that set of functionings *open* to the person, given the person's personal characteristics ("endowment") as well as economic and social opportunities. An alternative formulation is that the general idea of capability refers "to the extent of freedom that people have in pursuing valuable activities or functionings."[65] From the capability perspective, to have well-being, to be and do well, is *to function* and *to be capable of functioning* in ways people have reason to value.

Given the plethora of capabilities and functionings open to individuals and groups, who is to decide which ones are valued and which ones are disvalued? As we

saw in Part II, especially in Chapter 6, Sen employs the concept of agency precisely at this point to affirm that *people themselves*—rather than philosophical, scientific, or political guardians—should make their *own* decisions about their individual and communal well-being. To exercise agency is to deliberate, decide, act (rather than being acted upon by others), and make a difference in the world—sometimes enhancing one's own well-being and sometimes not. Although always more or less constrained by conditioning factors, individuals and groups are self-determining when their behavior is are not merely the result of internal or external causes, when they do not enact a script set by someone or something else, but, rather, are the authors of their own individual or collective life. As individual and collective agents we decide how to respond to inner urges, external forces, and constraining circumstances, and whether or not to enhance or sacrifice our well-being to some higher cause. If we choose our own individual or communal well-being, we still must deliberate and decide which valued capabilities are most urgent and how they should be weighted and sequenced in relation to each other and to other normative considerations. As agents we also act more or less effectively in the world, making it different than it was before. Although agents may get assistance from others without their agency being compromised, this aid must respect and promote agency or autonomy. As development ethicist David Ellerman reminds us, ethical assistance "helps people help themselves."[66] Let us apply these normative conceptions of well-being (capability and functioning) and agency to further understand, assess, and

combat world hunger.

Sen and Drèze give four reasons for moving beyond *actual* food entitlements to a perspective on hunger that includes both well-being (capability and functioning) and agency: (i) individual variability; (ii) social variability; (iii) diverse means to nourishment; (iv) nourishment as a means to other good goals. Let us briefly consider each.

Individual Variability

The capability approach recommends itself in the debate on hunger and food security because it makes sense of and insists on the distinction between, on the one hand, food accessibility and even food intake and, on the other hand, being nourished or free to be nourished. The focus is not merely on food in itself, legal or customary command over food, or even on food as ingested. Rather the capability approach emphasizes food and the access to food as *means* to be well-nourished and to have the freedom to be well-nourished. Exclusive attention to food, food entitlement, and food intake, neglects importantly diverse impacts that the same food can have on different human beings and on the same individual at different times.[67] A particular woman at various stages of her life "requires" different amounts and types of food, depending on her age, her reproductive status, and her state of health. More generally, higher food intake at one

time may compensate for lower or no intake at other times without it being true that the person is ever suffering from nutritional distress or malfunctioning. In the hours leading up to and during a marathon, a marathoner undergoes nutritional deprivation but that same runner may "load up" on carbohydrates the day before the race and enjoy a celebratory repast afterwards.

Instead of identifying hungry people simply by a lack of food intake and mechanically monitoring individuals or dispensing food to them according to nutritional requirements, the focus should be on nutritional *functioning* and those "nutrition-related capabilities that are crucial to human well-being."[68] A person's energy level, strength, weight and height (within average parameters that permit exceptions), the ability to be productive and capacities to avoid morbidity and mortality—all valuable functionings or capabilities to function—should supplement and may be more significant with respect to nutritional well-being than the mere quantity of food or types of nutrients.[69]

Various measurements of the human body, especially of children, are particularly good ways of measuring degrees of deficient nutritional functioning. "Wasting," which occurs when a child's weight is low for its height, indicates an acute condition due to recent starvation or disease. "Stunting," which takes place when a child's height is low for its age, is a chronic condition due to sustained under-nutrition and—although not immediately life-threatening—indicates poor prospects for long-term physical and cognitive growth. In Ethiopia's Anhara region, for example, 56 per cent of the children

under five are either stunted or severely stunted.[70] Finally, being "underweight," having a low weight-for-age, is intermediate between wasting and stunting and may be due to recent inadequate food intake, past under-nutrition, or poor health.[71]

Social Variability

In addition to differences in individual bodily activities and physical characteristics, the capability approach is sensitive to differences in socially acquired tastes and beliefs with respect to foods.[72] That is, the capability perspective recognizes that these tastes and beliefs can also block the conversion of food to nutritional functioning. Attempts to relieve hunger sometimes fail because hungry people are unable, for some reason, to eat nutritious food. For example, the taste of an available grain may be too different from that to which they are accustomed. Evidence exists that people who receive extra cash for food sometimes fail to improve their nutritional status, apparently because they choose to consume nutritionally deficient foods. If food is to make a difference in people's nutritional and wider well-being, it must be food that the individuals in question are generally willing and able to convert into nutritional functioning. This is not to say that food habits cannot be changed. Rather, it underscores the importance of nutrition education and social criticism of certain food consumption patterns. If people find food distasteful or unacceptable for other reasons, even nutritious food to which people are

entitled will not by itself protect or restore nutritional well-being.

Diverse Means to Being Well Nourished

If one goal of public action is to protect, restore, and promote nutritional well-being, we must realize that food is only one means of reaching this goal.[73] A preoccupation with food transfers as the way to address impending or actual hunger ignores the many other means that can serve and may even be necessary for achieving the end of being (able to be) well-nourished. These include "access to health care, medical facilities, elementary education, drinking water, and sanitary facilities."[74] To sharpen the point it is not just that food is necessary but insufficient for nutritional well-being. Rather, if *food* is to make its contribution (to nourishing people) other factors are needed as well. To achieve nutritional well-being, a hungry parasite-stricken person needs not only food but also medicine to kill the parasites that cause the malabsorption of consumed food. A disease-enfeebled person who is too weak to eat requires medical care as well as food. An Achean youngster orphaned by the tsunami disaster and wandering in the hills may be ignorant of what to eat and what not to eat. Without clean water, basic sanitation, and health education, recipients of nutritious food aid may succumb to malaria, cholera, dysentery, and typhoid before having the chance to be adequately nourished. Such was the fate of many, especially the very young and very old, in the weeks and months

following the South Asian tsunami of December 26, 2004. Barrett and Maxwell, leading scholars on food aid, put this often neglected point well: "food aid often has the desired nutritional and health effects only when it is part of a complete package of assistance."[75]

In particular situations, the best way to combat famine may not be to dispense food at all but to supply remunerated jobs for those who can work and cash for those who cannot.[76] The evidence is impressive and should be congenial to free market liberals, that an increase in hungry people's purchasing power, often pulls food into a famine area, as private traders find ways of meeting the increased demand.[77] Committed to the ideal of agency, donors—except in extreme emergencies—will eschew rescue camps and food hand-outs and find ways to enable people to stay in their familiar surroundings and feed themselves or earn the income to do so. As Sen remarks:

> The employment route also happens to encourage the processes of trade and commerce, and does not disrupt economic, social and family lives. The people helped can mostly stay on in their own homes, close to their economic activities (like farming), so that these economic operations are not disrupted. The family life too can continue in a normal way, rather than people being herded into emergency camps. There is also more social continuity, and furthermore, less danger of the spread of infectious diseases, which tend to break out in the overcrowded camps. In general,

> the approach of relief through employment also allows the potential famine victims to be treated as active agents, rather than as passive recipients of government handouts.[78]

Although Sen should qualify his argument, his point does *not* imply that food aid is never justified. As Barrett and Maxwell argue, food aid is appropriate when a humanitarian emergency exists, local food is scarce, markets fail (people have no money or private food suppliers fail to respond to demand), and government provisions (of money or jobs) are inadequate.[79] Under these extreme circumstances, distributing food to needy but passive recipients may be indispensable (not sufficient) to avert massive and severe capability failure. Such would seem to have been the case with respect to at least 35, 000 children in Niger in August, 2005.[80]

In sum, famine and chronic hunger are prevented and reduced through strategies that protect and promote entitlements, valuable capabilities, and citizen agency. In the next section, we will return to the hunger-fighting role of national development strategies and international development initiatives. At this juncture, the crucial point is that direct food delivery is only one means and often not the best means for fighting world hunger. The capability approach helpfully interprets and underscores this point when it insists that public and private action can and should employ an array of complementary strategies to achieve the end of nutritional well-being for all. Committed

to agency as well as valuable capabilities, the capability approach insists that local and national communities have "default" responsibility for selecting and implementing hunger-reducing strategies as well as prioritizing them in relation to each other and to other development goals. Help from other nations and global institutions should play a supplementary or backup role—when local and national institutions are unable or unwilling to attack hunger effectively.

Food as a Means to Other Good Goals

The capability approach helps widen our vision to see that the food that hungry people command and consume can accomplish much more than give them nutritional well-being. Nutritional well-being is only one element in human well-being; the overcoming of transitory or chronic hunger also enables people and their governments to protect and promote other ingredients of well-being. Being adequately nourished, for instance, contributes to healthy functioning that is both good in itself and indispensable to the freedom to avoid premature death and fight off or recover from disease. Having nutritional well-being and good health, in turn, are crucial to acquiring and exercising other capabilities that people have reason to value, such as being able to learn, think, deliberate, and choose as well as be a good pupil, friend, householder, parent, worker, or citizen. A recent report on malnutrition in Ethiopia observes that those who survive

malnutrition face bleak prospects, as do their countries who depend on their productivity:

> Almost half of Ethiopia's children are malnourished , and most do not die. Some suffer a different fate. Robbed of vital nutrients as children, they grow up stunted and sickly, weaklings in a land that still runs on manual labor. Some become intellectually stunted adults, shorn of as many as 15 I.Q. points, unable to learn or even to concentrate, inclined to drop out of school early.[81]

Similarly, as I argued in the last chapters, an agency-focused capability approach reinforces the common sense point that too much food or an unbalanced diet—for example, a surplus of calories or deficit in proteins, vitamins, and mineral—limit what persons can do and be. Obesity, due to an excess of junk food consumption and a lack of exercise, besets children in New Delhi[82] as well as New Rochelle.

Because good food and food entitlements can have so many beneficial consequences in people's lives, creative development programs and projects find ways in which people can link, on the one hand, food assistance, distribution, access, and utilization, to, on the other hand, the generation or protection of other valuable activities and freedoms.[83] Because nutritional deficiencies affect fetal and infant development, pregnant and lactating women (and their infants) acquire food supplements in health

clinics. Since hungry children do not learn well and certain nutritional and micronutrient deficiencies result in visual and cognitive impairment, school children eat nutritionally balanced and micronutrient-fortified school meals. In addition to these measures, the Millennium Project appropriately recommends that schools "provide take-home rations as an incentive for school attendance."[84] "Food for work" programs establish close links between nutritional well-being and socially productive activity. Just as work can be paid for in either food or cash—with which food can be purchased—so entitlements to and consumption of food can result in greater productivity. Similarly, while nutritional deficits force people to struggle to survive, leaving them scant time or energy to be politically active, adequate nourishment makes possible sustained political involvement—both a component of well-being and an exercise of agency. Moreover, the provision of meals in communal projects and political activity can function as incentive for participation in those activities. The food dispensed in these ways—whether in health clinics, schools, work projects, or political activities—additionally can promote long-term development in so far as the food is grown and locally or regionally rather than in developed countries.[85]

A word of caution, however, is in order. Just as ethics and ethical codes sometimes functions to promote or be a cover for corruption and other morally problematic practices, so much food aid may cause or camouflage human ill-being. Ballyhooed food drops in Afghanistan and Iraq have harmed houses and people and

diverted attention from the civilian casualties ("collateral damage") resulting from US military intervention. Food aid may result in and cover up human ill-being as well as be a means to various dimensions of human well-being. Such risks make it all the more important to keep our eyes on development ends as well as means.

From Capability and Agency to Development as Freedom

Nutritional well-being, then, is both constitutive of and a means to human development conceived as both well-being and agency, both freedoms and achievements. And human development is or should be the ultimate purpose of socioeconomic development. Hence, a more comprehensive approach to world hunger will explicitly aim for good development. The dichotomy of famine relief or food aid, on the one hand, and long-term development, on the other, does more harm than good. As Drèze and Sen observe:

> The nature of the problem of hunger—both famines and endemic deprivation—calls for a broader political economic analysis taking note of the variety of influences that have a bearing on the commodity commands and basic capabilities that people enjoy.[86]

The alleged dilemma between 'relief' and 'development' is a much exaggerated one, and

greater attention should be paid to the positive links between the best sort of famine prevention and emergency relief, on the one hand, and development ends and means, on the other.[87]

One of the ends (as well as means) of development should be to eliminate hunger. Among the Millennium Development Goals, to which 191 countries agreed in 2002, is that of halving global hunger by 2015.[88] The overwhelming majority of US citizens not only embrace these goals but "support the idea that the US should not only try to help alleviate hunger, but should also address the long-term goal of helping poor countries develop their economies," especially through educational programs and improved opportunities for women and girls.[89] Moreover, impressive evidence exists that genuine socioeconomic development in fact is the best prevention and long-term cure for hunger.[90] If such is the case, then attempts to understand and eradicate hunger must also be included in the effort to explain and achieve development. As noted in the last section, this is not to say that emergency food aid should cease or take a back seat to rehabilitation and development. Rather, action taken to relieve both short-term and long-term hunger should be executed from a "developmental perspective."

Although defensible development strategies may differ in diverse contexts, comprehensive empirical investigations of development successes and failures reveal some common—although quite general—features in developmentally-structured food strategy. Drèze and Sen observe:

> It is not hard to see what is needed for the elimination of endemic undernutrition and deprivation. People earn their means of living through employment and production, and they use these means to achieve certain functionings which make up their living. Entitlements and the corresponding capabilities can be promoted by the expansion of private incomes on a widespread basis, including all the deprived sections of the population. They can also be promoted by extensive public provisioning of the basic essentials for good living such as health care, education and food. Indeed, participatory growth and public provision are among the chief architects of the elimination of endemic deprivation—illustrated amply by historical experiences across the world. The basic challenge of 'social security' (in the broad sense in which we have used this term) is to combine these instruments of action to guarantee adequate living standards to all.[91]

Development goals, means, and obstacles must be viewed as political and social as well as economic. A country should not be called fully developed, no matter how high are its rates of economic growth, if it lacks good governance and fails to be reasonably democratic. China should not be said to be more developed now than twenty years ago simply because it has increased its economic productivity. At best China could be said to

exhibit developmental improvement along only some variables. A society has not realized its highest potential if it makes economic progress but does not progress in political freedoms and rights. Moreover, political and cultural factors can promote the achievement of more narrowly construed economic goals, such as the guarantee of "adequate living standards to all."

Even when the proximate causes of famine lie outside the country, one of the deepest causes of famine, Sen persuasively argues, is "the alienation of the rulers from those ruled." The starkest examples are authoritarian China in the 1959-62 and Sudan since 1985. Moreover, citizen agency and participation, political pluralism and democratization often have beneficial effects on preventing and combating hunger and achieving other economically related goals. One of Drèze and Sen's greatest contributions is to point out the role of democratic openness, political pluralism, adversarial politics, and a free press in preventing famine and overcoming chronic hunger. As Sen has famously noted, "no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy—be it economically rich (as in contemporary Europe or North America) or relatively poor (as in post-independence India, or Botswana, or Zimbabwe)."[92]

It is not sufficient to note a correlation between democracy and famine prevention. One must also supply a plausible causal story for *how* democracy prevents famines. Sen offers two such causal factors. First, in a multiparty democracy with

contested elections, governmental leaders—if they want to be re-elected—have a political incentive to avert famine. If they fail to prevent famine by acts of omission or commission, the "accusing finger"[93] of public criticism can result in an early departure from the public stage. In contrast, in a nondemocracy, especially an authoritarian state, famine is unlikely to dislodge or undermine a government or its leaders: "if there are no elections, no opposition parties, no scope for uncensored public criticisms, then those in authority don't have to suffer the political consequences of their failure to prevent famines."[94] Reinforcing these political disincentives are personal disincentives. Why should the governmental and military authorities in an authoritarian state worry about famines? In addition to being protected from electoral change, they will never *themselves* suffer from this lack of food or well-being.

A second explanation for democracy's important role in preventing famine concerns information. Opposition parties, a free and investigative press, and public discussion contribute to riveting governmental attention on impending famines, revealing the scope of the problem, and communicating effective solutions. In contrast, hunger intensifies and famine erupts due to press censorship, bureaucratic filtering out of bad news from below, and a government being misled by its own its own optimistic propaganda. Sen drives the point home: "I would argue that a free press and an active political opposition constitute the best early-warning system a country threatened by famines can have."[95] More and better information, however, is not sufficient. Also

important are the broad-based commitments of national, bilateral, and multilateral organizations to give voices to the hungry or, better, enable such voices to be included and heard. The World Food Programme summarizes the evidence from many South Asian countries:

> Giving the disadvantaged hungry poor a voice requires more explicit public action [than merely international financial institutions sharing knowledge]. This is especially true for women, children, and minorities, who are not able to sufficiently express their needs and views in public and in the political arena. Advocacy for the food insecure in a democratic society means raising awareness amongst decisions makers, publishing important findings, raising funds for financing interventions, building networks of concerned individuals and organizations, creating consensus on objectives and means of food assistance, and also establishing a vision for the future.[96]

If we keep the language of development as short-hand for beneficial change, it has become evident, as I examine in more detail in later chapters, that good national and subnational development requires certain sorts of regional and global institutions and is undermined by other types. Although the nation state remains an important unit of

development—and sometimes the most important unit—regional and global institutions also have significant roles to play in combating hunger and enabling development. National development and the relations among various countries should be considered in the context of global forces and institutions, such as transnational corporations, bilateral trading pacts, the Bretton Woods financial institutions, and the United Nations system. The UN World Food Programme has been an especially important global player in promoting food aid for development as well as development for "food security."[97] Overcoming both acute and chronic hunger is both an end and means of good global development. Local and national development can contribute to and benefit from global development.

Understanding and sustainably reducing hunger require a developmental perspective in which national and global development is understood as the solution to human deprivation and powerlessness. This perspective should include invariant but general goals and context-specific economic and non-economic strategies. Development, as beneficial societal change, applies to the structure and interaction of subnational, national, and global institutions.

It is a step forward that the norm of agency protection and agency promotion is beginning to inform the choice of general strategies to promote nutritional well-being. Those food security strategies that have proven to be most effective include strong components of citizen participation. The World Food Programme, for example,

summarizes lessons learned from food security strategies in several South Asian countries: "Participatory approaches should be used in the selections and design of activities. The systematic involvement of beneficiaries is a precondition of sustainability."[98] Likewise, Barrett and Maxwell clearly recognize that the new rights-based approach to food aid and development requires that donors and governments take seriously the right of hungry people to participate in making decisions that affect them: "While participation has long been a 'good word' in development and humanitarian work, the emergent approach demands the right of people to participate in decisions and choices about meeting their food security requirements." [99] Agency freedoms and achievement are among the means as well as ends of ethically-based development. Even the Millennium Development Project, which overall has a top-down, economic-growth, and technocratic emphasis, recognizes that hunger alleviation projects fail if local communities do not participate in defining food security problems and implementing solutions. Adopting what they call "a people-centered approach," *Halving Hunger* unequivocally asserts: "Any strategy to reduce hunger must therefore have as a central tenet the empowerment of the poor through full participation in decision-making and implementation."[100] The report recommends that national experts train local citizens to be agricultural and nutrition paraprofessionals, field workers, and dialogue facilitators or animators.[101] It also recognizes that "consultation" is not enough and that ordinary citizens or their representatives must be involved through "dialogue" in defining food-

security needs and costs, determining priorities, and implementing decisions.[102]

Yet Millennium Development Project's occasional anti-elitist appeal to community dialogue and decision-making seems to be merely populist rhetoric in relation to its fundamentally technocratic and top down approach. The report rightly advocates dialogue and decision-making that includes all stakeholders, the rich and powerful as well as the poor and food-insecure. And the document correctly reflects the concern that various elites might capture or dominate national and local deliberations. Yet the report offers no institutional designs to mitigate, let alone eliminate, this danger of elite capture or to provide regular channels for citizen deliberation and choice. Except for a vague reference to "representatives of civil society," the report's list of stakeholders is tilted toward local, national, and global elites:

> Key stakeholders include ministries of agriculture, health, social services, environment, water, transport, commerce, planning, and finance and the government body responsible for food aid. They also include representatives of civil society, the private sector, banks, and other financial institutions, and the donor community, including multilateral and bilateral institutions.[103]

Moreover, while the document calls for "good governance," it defines this

fashionable buzzword largely in relation to transparency and the rule of law and refrains from any mention of the "D" word – "democracy." [104] If we take citizen agency seriously in relation to hunger and other capability failures, then public discussion and democratic decision-making must be institutionalized at national and global as well as local levels. I return to these issues in Part IV.

From the Ethics of Aid to an Ethics for Development

The implication of my argument thus far is that the ethics of food assistance should be incorporated within and subordinated to an ethics of and for development at all levels—local, national, and global. International development ethics evaluates the basic goals and appropriate strategies for morally desirable social change. No longer fixated on the stark options of earlier debates—food aid versus no food aid, aid as duty versus aid as charity—development ethics asks instead what kind of aid is morally defensible and, even more fundamentally, what sort of national and global development food assistance *should* foster.

As early as the mid-fifties, development economists have been examining the developmental impact of different kinds of food aid and trying to design famine relief and development assistance that would contribute to rather than undermine long-term development goals.[105] Yet in the 1970s, analytic philosophers such as Peter Singer, and

others, such as Garrett Hardin, failed to refer to the nuanced debate that had been going on for more than twenty years. Furthermore, as one expert on food aid remarks, "many of them did not feel it important to become more than superficially familiar with the technical or institutional aspects of food production, distribution, or policy."[106] As happens all too often, the owl of Minerva—Hegel's image for the philosopher—takes wing at dusk and "comes on the scene too late to give . . . instruction as to what the world ought to be."[107]

Moreover, when philosophers did try to analyze development, they usually emphasized development *aid* that rich countries provided to impoverished recipients (rather than the development *goals* that poor countries set and pursued *for themselves*) or how rich country policies caused food deficits in poor countries. ~~or how donor country aid could help recipient countries help themselves.~~ By the mid-eighties, however, ethicists—as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2—became increasingly aware that they could not talk about morally justified or unjustified development aid from the standpoint of outside donors without first talking about the "beneficiary's" own development philosophies, goals, strategies, leadership, and will. One marked advantage of the agency and capability ethic is that it puts its highest priority on a nation's intellectual and institutional capability for *self*-development without denying the role of outsider intellectual and practical help.

In earlier chapters I showed that a new field or cross-boundary discipline—

international development ethics—has emerged to evaluate existing development paths and identify better ones. This new field is practiced in ways that differ markedly from the earlier ethics of famine relief. Rather than being predominantly if not exclusively the work of white males from rich and English-speaking countries, as was the case in the initial ethics of famine relief, international development ethics is an inquiry that includes participants from a variety of nations, groups, and moral traditions, all of whom seek an international consensus about problems of international scope. It has become evident that policy analysts and ethicists—whether from "developing" countries or "developed" countries—should neither uncritically impose alien norms nor simply accept the operative or professed values implicit in a particular country's established development path. Rather, as I have argued elsewhere, cultural insiders, cultural outsiders, and insider-outsider hybrids should engage in an ongoing and critical dialogue that includes explicit ethical analysis, assessment, and construction with respect to the ends and means of national, regional, and global change.[108]

Moreover, development ethics, as I argued in ~~Chapters 2 and 3~~ Part I and have illustrated in this chapter, is interdisciplinary rather than exclusively philosophical. It eschews merely abstract ethical reflection and Olympian pronouncements and instead relates—in a variety of ways—values to relevant facts about hunger and other deprivations. Development ethicists, as we have seen in Goulet's, Sen's, and Drèze's, work on hunger, evaluate (i) the normative assumptions of different development models,

(ii) the empirical categories employed to interpret, explain and forecast the facts, and (iii) development programs, strategies, and institutions.

Development ethics straddles the theory/practice distinction. Its practitioners are informed by as well as engage in dialogue with policy makers and development activists. Instead of being an exclusively academic exercise, development ethics (in which theorists and practitioners cooperatively engage) assesses the moral costs and benefits of current development policies, programs, and projects as well as articulates alternative development visions.

In this chapter I have not only drawn on the work of development ethicists with respect to acute, hidden, and chronic hunger and ways of combating them, but I have also analyzed and evaluated more recent academic and policy work on hunger, food aid, and development. We have seen that the Millennium Development Project's *Halving Hunger* advocates a "people-centered approach" to eliminating global hunger and poverty but compromises this perspective with a predominantly technocratic and paternalistic strategy. The best scholars in the field of food aid, Barrett and Maxwell, freely acknowledge the pivotal role of Sen and their indebtedness to Drèze and Sen's approach to understanding and combating global hunger. Although they fail to grasp adequately the normative and human-rights dimensions of Drèze and Sen's work on hunger and development, Barrett and Maxwell themselves assume a normative rights-based approach to nutritional well-being and development. They affirm the right to food as a part of a

package of human rights and, as we saw above, acknowledge the importance of hungry people's right to participate in making those decisions that affect them. In future work I shall consider the relations between the agency-focused capability approach and various explicitly rights-based approaches to world hunger and others forms of poverty. Especially important will be investigating who has responsibility for reducing hunger and how strong this obligation is in the face of competing duties.

Barrett and Maxwell offer compelling evidence that various donor interests unrelated to combating hunger have dominated and distorted food aid for fifty years.[109] Among these non-developmental aims, which have resulted in less food aid getting to recipients than otherwise would have been the case, are those of supporting US farm prices, dumping farm surpluses, maintaining the US maritime industry, and advancing US geo-strategic interests. If the US Food for Peace program purchased food in food-impoverished countries or their nearby neighbors, US farmers, millers, and shippers would lose money, but food would arrive more quickly in hunger-stricken countries and the purchases would benefit the local economies.[110] When US food aid has failed to free itself from its many masters and combat hunger directly, US aid has been top-down, inefficient, and often not received by those that need it most.

I applaud Barrett and Maxwell's critique of US food aid, their emphasis on a right to food security and citizen participation, and their resultant recasting of food aid from an emphasis on donor interest to a "recipient-oriented food aid system."[111] I urge, however,

in keeping with their emphasis on participation rights, that Barrett and Maxwell join development ethicists in abandoning recipient and beneficiary language and replacing it with the language of agency and deliberative participation. Just as I argue that Sen has appropriately supplemented his earlier emphasis on capability and functioning with his more recent underscoring of agency and public discussion, so I encourage food aid scholars like Barrett and Maxwell to jettison the residue of beneficent paternalism and embrace the fuller implications of "agency-oriented human development"—the expansion of *both* agency and well-being freedom. One role of development philosophy is to identify the most promising conceptual, institutional, and strategic advances, criticize what limits these advances from flowering more fully, and articulate a vision of even more progressive ends and means.

Much, of course, remains to be done in applying development ethics to understanding and reducing world hunger. One task, already mentioned, is to consider the merits of a rights-based approach to hunger and the allocation of duties to fulfill the right not to be hungry. Another task is a *detailed* analysis and ethical assessment of the *specific* hunger-reducing strategies and tactics proposed by the World Food Programme, *Halving Hunger*, and Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years.* Such scrutiny and evaluation would draw on what I have offered in this chapter—a reframing, in the light of the capability and agency approach to development, of the philosophical and policy debates concerning world hunger and food aid.

Concluding Remarks

Famine, food aid, and the ethics of famine relief remain—as they were in the early and mid-seventies—pressing personal, national, and global challenges. Philosophers and other ethicists can play a role in meeting these challenges and thereby reducing world hunger. This goal is best achieved, however, when the questions of world hunger and moral obligation are reframed and widened. I have argued that development ethicists, policy-makers, and citizens must emphasize (1) interpretative and strategic concepts instead of moral foundations, (2) persistent malnutrition instead of famine, (3) prevention rather than treatment of hunger, (4) food entitlements instead of food availability, (5) and human capability and agency rather than food and entitlements, and (6) local and national self-development rather than external food aid and development assistance. My intent is not to reject the second terms in each pair but to subordinate them to the first terms—concepts at once more fundamental and comprehensive.

Overall, the refocusing I advocate has conceived an ethics of food aid as a part of a more basic and inclusive ethics for development. Since the best long-term cure for hunger is good national and global development, we must put emergency and project food aid in a developmental perspective and incorporate an ethics of famine relief into an ethics of and for national and global development. With the capability approach to

agency-oriented development, we can supplement a focus on food with an emphasis on agency and capability as the means and ends of development as freedom. To avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is not to eschew abstractions but to place them in their proper relation to each other and to the concrete world of facts and values.

NOTES

1. UN Millennium Project Task Force on Hunger, *Halving Hunger: It Can Be Done* (London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2005), 1.

2. Christopher B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role* (London: Routledge, 2005), 6. In n.10, p. 260, Barrett and Maxwell cite the Food Balance Sheets, available from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations through FAOSTAT (http://apps.fao.org/).

3. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *Food Insecurity in the World 2004* (Rome: FA0, 2004), 6. See also L. C. Smith, "Can FAO's Measure of Chronic Undernourishment Be Strengthened?" *Food Policy*, 23, 5 (1998), 425---45; Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 7---8; UN Millennium Project Task force on Hunger, *Halving Hunger*), 1.

4. Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 8.

5. UN Millennium Development Project, *Halving Hunger*, 18, and 35.

6. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *Food Insecurity in the World 2004*, 6.

7. For the most important essays and anthologies in the 1970s and 1980s addressing world hunger and moral obligation, see above, chap.1, n. 20, 22, and 23. Some of the seminal early papers as well as more recent studies appear in William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette, eds. *World Hunger and Morality*, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996).

8. See Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty*, especially ch. 2.

9. Denis Goulet, "World Hunger: Putting Development Ethics to the Test," 125.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 125---126.

12. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

13. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), 200.

14. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, the same claim could be made about other sorts of emergency assistance, such as medical supplies, clothing, housing materials, cattle, and agricultural inputs.

15. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2004* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations, 2004), 4. Two other recent studies of combating hunger and promoting food security—Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 111---18; and "Halving Hunger," chap. 1, 32-34—affirm that countries and citizens have moral obligations to alleviate hunger and poverty, but these same studies refrain from developing any moral arguments for this conclusion. The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland found in 2001, as it had in 1995 and 1999, that with respect to US citizens "overwhelming majorities"—almost 80 percent in all three polls—"are supportive of efforts to alleviate hunger and poverty—much more so than for foreign aid overall." Insofar as Americans have reservations about aid, it is not because they believe it lacks moral justification, but because they worry that US aid money ends up "in the pockets of corrupt officials programs overseas," that aid programs lack effectiveness" and help authoritarian regimes violate human rights, and that America gives too much unilateral aid rather than working through multilateral or private channels (PIPA, "Americans of Foreign Aid and World Hunger: A Study of US Policy Attitudes, 2 February 2001; see PIPA, "Americans on Addressing World Poverty," 30 June 2005. The PIPA reports are available online at www.pipa.org and were accessed on January 24, 2006).

16. See, for example, Catherine W. Wilson, "On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor," *Journal of Philosophy 90* (1993), 275---89 and Garrett Cullity, "International Aid and the Scope of Kindness," *Ethics 105* (1994), 99---127, and *The*

Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004; Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, 2nd ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), "Poverty, Facts, and Political Philosophies: Response to 'More than Charity'," *Ethics & International* Affairs 16, 1 (2002), 121---24, "Achieving the Best Outcome: Final Rejoinder," *Ethics & International* Affairs 16, 1 (2002), 127---28, and "What Should a Billionaire Give – and What Should You?" *New York Times Magazine*, December 17, 2006; Andrew Kuper, "More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the 'Singer Solution'," *Ethics & International Affairs* 16 (2002); Pablo Gilabert, "The Duty to Eradicate Global Poverty: Positive or Negative?" *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 7 (2004), 537---550; Dale Jamieson, "Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World," *Journal of Ethics* 9 (2005), 151---70; Mathias Risse, "What We Owe to the Global Poor," *Journal of Ethics* 9 (2005): 81---117; Judith Lichtenberg, "Famine, Affluence, and Psychology," in *Singer Under Fire*, ed. Jeffrey Schaler (Chicago: Open Court, forthcoming). The most important recent anthology on aid to the distant poor is Dean Chatterjee, ed., *The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). It is interesting but regrettable that the this volume abstracted so much from the question of "hunger" and "food aid" that neither term appears in its short index. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the best way to think about our general duty to assist others and the nature and weight of our particular duty to aid the foreign needy.

17. My views in the last two paragraphs are indebted to conversations with Hugh La Follette.

18. *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, eds. Aiken and La Follette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 10.

19. Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (2002), 189.

20. For a recent and nuanced treatment of the issues, one that draws fruitfully on some of Amartya Sen's early papers on value judgments, see Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002).

21. Isabel Teotonio, "When Children are Too Weak to Cry," *Toronto Star*, 6 August 2005, A 9.

22. See Stepahen Devereux, *Theories of Famine* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), chapters 2 and 13; Alex De Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (London: James Currey; Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997).

23. I owe the idea of perceiving or discerning "ethical salience," to Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 28---44. See also, Martha Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially chapters 2, 5.

24. For a discussion of how ethical principles constrain what counts as relevant and irrelevant factual information, see Amartya Sen, "Well-being, Agency, and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984." *Journal of Philosophy, 82* (1985): 169---84; *Inequality Reexamined*, 73---75; *Development as Freedom*, 54---62; 92---94. Sherman discusses the way in which the agent's "reading of the circumstances" may be influenced by his or her moral or immoral character; see *Fabric*, 29. To prevent misunderstanding, I am not claiming that one's ethical lenses structure the facts like cookie-cutters shape dough. Rather, different ethical lenses focus on different aspect or properties of the factual field. Just as switching ethical lenses can reveal hitherto neglected but important facts so deeper immersion in the facts of the matter, for instance, awareness of the "facts of famine," can help change our ethical judgments. We need both new and better ways of looking at the world, which ethics provides, as well as deeper and broader experience of human deprivation and achievements.

25. Sherman, *Fabric*, 30.

26. See especially Sen and Drèze's works on hunger and food aid in The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) series Studies in Development Economics: Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, *Hunger and Public Action* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, eds., *The Political Economy of Hunger: Entitlement and Well-Being, 3 volumes: Vol. 1, Entitlement and Well-being, Vol. 2, Famine and Prevention, Vol. 3, Endemic Hunger* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

27. See Amartya Sen, "The Right not to be Hungry," in *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, Vol. II* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 343---60.

28. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action,* 273.

29. Just as one's focus can be too narrow, it can also be so broad as to be disabling. Blaming or praising such large formations as capitalism, socialism, industrialism, globalization, or Northern and Western imperialism commits fallacies of hasty generalization and over-simplification that deter examination of the complex of causes that are both specific and alterable in the short, medium, and long run. I owe this point to discussions with James W. Nickel.

30. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action,* 24.

31. Although Aiken and LaFollette, the editors of the 1977 anthology *World Hunger and Moral Obligation,* did distinguish famine and chronic hunger (see p.1), they and the anthology's other contributors almost exclusively attended to famine victims rather than those chronically hungry or suffering malnutrition following natural disaster.

32. Sara Millman and Robert W. Kates, "Toward Understanding Hunger," in Lucile F. Newman, ed., *Hunger in History: Food Shortage, Poverty, and Deprivation* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 3. Notice that this definition of hunger is significantly different from one popular meaning of hunger, which the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Hunger characterizes as "the subjective feeling of discomfort that follows a period without eating" (*Halving Hunger,* 19). Millman and Kates's definition is

similar to the World Bank's (1986) and World Food Summit's (1996) definition of food insecurity as the absence of food security defined as "access by all people at all times to sufficient food for an active and healthy life. (See World Bank, *Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries* [Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1986]; Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, "Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action," 1996). The importance of "activity" and an "active and healthy life" fits well, we shall see, with the ideal of agency-oriented development.

33. John Osgood Field, "Understanding Famine," in John Osgood Field, ed., *The Challenge of Famine: Recent Experience, Lessons Learned* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1993), 20. See also Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 111.

34. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 7.

35. Peter Walker, *Famine Early Warning Systems: Victims and Destitution* (London: Earthscan, 1989); cited in Devereux, *Theories of Famine*, 16, 181.

36. Perhaps to focus more attention on chronic hunger, scholars and policy analysts increasingly replace the concept of famine with that of acute or transitory hunger, rather than subsuming the former into the latter. It is noteworthy that neither the Millennium Project Task Force on Hunger, "Halving Hunger" nor Barrett and Maxwell, *Recasting Food Aid*, have entries for "famine" in their glossaries. In 2005, reporters

increasingly use the "F" word to describe conditions in Niger in which 3.6 million people in 3,000 villages are at risk. Among those most needy are an estimated 192,000 children, 32,000 of whom are severely malnourished in the sense that they require "special feeding and medical assistance" (Teotonio, "When Children are Too Weak to Cry," 9). Teotonio reports that "Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Mali . . . are facing similar predicaments."

37. The authors of *Halving Hunger* helpfully distinguish "hidden hunger" from both the acute and chronic varieties. On this account, hidden hunger is due to a lack of essential micronutrients, such as vitamins A and B, and minerals and other nutrients, such as iron, iodine, and folic acid. If they consume adequate calories and protein, those suffering from such deficiencies may appear well-nourished. Hence, in contrast to famine and other forms of acute hunger, hidden hunger—even more than chronic hunger—is often off national and global radar screens. See Millennium Development Project Task Force on Hunger, *Halving Hunger*, 2; and Michael Wines, "Malnutrition is Cheating Its Survivors, and Africa's Future," *New York Times*, December 28, 2006, A1.

38. Drèze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action, 7---8. Of course, in extreme emergencies, such as the tsunami in December 2004 or Katrina's devastation of New Orleans in August 2005, "existing distributional mechanisms" may themselves be destroyed and speedy emergency and external relief, such as national or international distribution of rations, are called for.

39. Ibid., 158.

40. This failing, of course, is neither unique to philosophers nor to the issue of combating hunger. I owe this important point to Hugh LaFollette.

41. Onora O'Neill, "Lifeboat Earth," in *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, eds. Aiken and La Follette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 161---64.

42. Ibid., 163.

43. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 47.

44. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 175 (endnote omitted). See also, ibid, 179.

45. See Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public* Action, chap. 8; Field, "Understanding Famine," 21.

46. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 179.

47. Since 1965, the proportion of hungry people in world has declined from 33 percent to 18 percent in 2005. See Millennium Development Project Task Force on Hunger, *Halving Hunger*, xv.

48. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 276.

49. *Halving the Hunger*, 97. This Millennium Project "Task Force on Hunger" cites two USAID studies, USAID, "Ethiopia—Drought. Fact Sheet #17. (FY 2003)" (Washington, D. C. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of US, Foreign Disaster Assistance, 2003); and USAID, "Ethiopia: Complex Health/Food Insecurity Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY 2004)" (Washington, D.C.:

USAID, 2004).

50. Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, 19.

51. Robert W. Kates and Sara Millman, "On Ending Hunger: The Lessons of History," in *Hunger in History*, 404. See also Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 6.

52. Amartya Sen, "The Food Problem: Theory and Practice," *Third World Quarterly*, 3 (July 1982), 454.

53. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), especially chap. 7.

54. It would be interesting to consider to what extent Sen's avowedly descriptive use of "entitlement" also has a prescriptive "charge" (suggested when Sen says that people "enjoy" entitlements), and whether, as LaFollette has contended in conversation, Sen should be more explicit about this prescriptivity. Sen states that "the entitlement of a person stands for the set of different alternative commodity bundles that the person can acquire through the use of the various legal channels of acquirement open to someone in his position" ("Food, Economics and Entitlements," in Drèze and Sen, *The Political Economy of Hunger, Vol. 1, Entitlement and Well-Being*). In *Development as Freedom*, 9, Sen says: "What we have to concentrate on is not the total food supply but the "entitlement" that each person enjoys: the commodities over which she can establish her

ownership and command." For an incisive clarification and defense of Sen's notion of entitlement and its application to famine, see Siddiq Osmani, "The Entitlement Approach to Famine: An Assessment," in Basu, Pattanaik, and Suzumura, eds., *Choice, Welfare, and Development*, 253---94, especially 254---60.

55. See Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 10---11; Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 149---50; Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 109. Charles Gore shows that Sen has gradually expanded his concept of entitlement to include nonlegal—primarily household—rules, but persuasively argues that Sen needs to go further in recognizing the ways in which "socially approved moral rules" may be extra-legal and even anti-legal. See Charles Gore, "Entitlement Relations and 'Unruly' Social Practices: A Comment on the Work of Amartya Sen," *Journal of Development Economics 29* (1993), 429---60.

56. Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 110.

57. Amartya Sen, "Food Entitlements and Economic Chains," in *Hunger in History*, 377.

58. Amartya Sen, "Food, Economics and Entitlements," in *The Political Economy of Hunger, Vol. 1, Entitlement and Well-Being*, 43.

59. Sen, "The Food Problem," 447---51. Cf. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 24---25 and Amartya Sen, "Food, Economics, and Entitlements," WIDER

Working Papers, WP1, 35---36.

60. Amartya Sen, "The Food Problem," 450. Cf. *Amartya Sen, Poverty and* Famines*: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) and *Resources, Values and Development*, ch. 18, 20.

61. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 209.

62. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public* Action, 30---31.

63. That the capability orientation is more basic than or superior to a sophisticated human rights approach—either in general or in relation to the challenge of world hunger—introduces questions beyond the scope of the present volume. Resources for answering these questions occur in Amartya Sen, "The Right not to be Hungry," "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32, 4 (2004), 315---56; "Human Rights and Capabilities," *Journal of Human Development*, 6, 2 (2005): 151---66; and Martha C. Nussbaum, "Capabilities and Human Rights," in *Global Justice: Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization,* ed. Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 117---49; "Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice," in *Feminist Economics*, 9, 2 and 3 (2003) 33---61. See also Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty* Years, chap. 6, and the essays by Xiaorong Li, James W. Nickel, and Henry Shue on human rights approaches to world hunger in *World Hunger and Morality*, 2nd ed. For an excellent treatment of the ways in which the capability approach and the international human rights regime support each other, see Polly Vizard, *Poverty and Human*

Rights: Sen's Capability Perspective Explored (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

64. Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, 110.

65. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 42.

66. David Ellerman, *Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

67. Some recent work on food security draws on Drèze and Sen and captures this point in distinguishing the *utilization* of food from the *availability of* and *access to* food. See, for example, World Food Programme, *Enabling Development*, chapter 1; and Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 109---111.

68. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 14.

69. See ibid., 41. For a more detailed and technical discussion of these issues by nutritionists who are sympathetic with the capability approach, see S.R. Osmani, ed., *Nutrition and Poverty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

70. Michael Wines, "Malnutrition is Cheating Its Survivors, and Africa's Future," *New York Times*, December 28, 2006, A1.

71. See World Food Programme, *Enabling Development*, 215.

72. In *The World of Consumption* (London: Routledge, 1993), especially, 148---93, Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold criticize theories that overemphasize either the physical characteristics or the "socially constructed" meanings of foods, thereby neglecting the

complex structure of food systems or chains as "systems of provision." In "The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey," *Journal of Human Development*, 6, 1 (2005): 93---114, Ingrid Robeyns insightfully emphasizes the social context (social institutions, social and legal norms, other people's behavior, environmental factors) in the conversion of goods and services into capabilities and in the choice of which capabilities to realize in functionings.

73. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 267.

74. Ibid., 13.

75. Christopher B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell, "Recasting Food Aid's Role," *Policy Brief*, August 2004, 6. See also the same authors *Food Aid After Fifty Years*..

76. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 121.

77. Ibid., 88---93.

78. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 177---78.

79. Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid after Fifty Years*, 123---24. Cf. Millennium Development Project, *Halving Hunger*, 148.

80. Teotonio, "When Children are Too Weak to Cry," A 9.

81. Wines, "Malnutrition is Cheating," A1.

82. Somini Sengupta, "India Prosperity Creates Paradox: Many Children are Fat, Even More are Famished," *New York Times*, December 31, 2006, A8.

83. See John Osgood Field and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, "Beyond

Humanitarianism: A Developmental Perspective on American Food Aid," in *Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices*, eds. Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (New York: Free Press, 1977), 234---58; Field, ed. *The Challenge of Famine*; World Food Programme, *Enabling Development: Food Assistance in South Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.)

84. Millennium Development Project, *Halving Hunger,* 142, 196-99.

85. For arguments that the emergency food aid should come from local or regional sources in order to stimulate local or developing-country agriculture and marketing systems, see Millennium Development Project, *Halving Hunger,* 142, 148 199-200; and Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid after Fifty Years*, 15---16.

86. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 273.

87. Ibid., 67; see also 119.

88. UN Millennium Development Goals Website: www.un.org/millenniumgoals.

89. PIPA, "Americans on Foreign Aid and World Hunger."

90. See Field, "Understanding Famine," 11, 19---22. Cf. Sen's claim that "there can be little dispute that economic and social development tends to reduce fertility rates" (Amartya Sen, "Population: Delusion and Reality," *New York Review of Books, 61*, No. 15 [September 22, 1994], 65).

91. Drèze and Sen, *Hunger and Public Action*, 267.

92. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 16. See also, ibid., 15, 51---53, 155---57, 178-

--86; and Sen and Drèze, *Hunger and Public Action*, 210-15, 263-64.

93. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 171.

94. Ibid., 180.

95. Ibid.

96. World Food Programme, *Enabling Development*, 183.

97. See D. John Shaw, *The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid* (Houndsmills, England and New York: Palgrave), especially 5 and 9.

98. World Food Programme, *Enabling Development*, 150; see also 182---83, 192.

99. Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years*, 117.

100. Millennium Development Project, *Halving Hunger*, 64. See also 90, 185---89.

101. Ibid., 17, 189, 191, and 194.

102. Ibid., 17, 64, 80, 85, 185---87.

103. Ibid., *Halving Hunger*, 187.

104. *Halving Hunger* cites approvingly but does not argue for two studies advocating participatory processes: Robert Chambers, A. Pacey, and Lori Ann Thrupp, *Farmer First: Farmer Innovation and Agricultural Research* (London: ITDG, 1989); and Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, C. Lopes, and K. Malik, *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems* (London: Earthscan and United Nations Development Programme, 2002). Although *Halving Hunger* does draw on some ideas in Barrett and Maxwell's

recent work, the Millennium Project's Task Force on Hunger completely ignores Barrett and Maxwell's strong stress on citizen participation to combat hunger and bad development. Moreover, conspicuous by absence are references to the extensive literature on "participatory development" or deepening democracy. Not surprisingly, the index to Jeffrey Sachs's predominantly top-down and technocratic *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin Press) has no entries for "participation" or "democracy" and only one entry for "democratization, Africa."

105. For a good account, with full references, of controversies in the fifties, sixties, and seventies concerning US food aid and development policy, see Anne O. Krueger, Constantine Michalopoulos, and Vernon W. Ruttan, *Aid and Development* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Vernon W. Ruttan, ed., *Why Food Aid?* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), especially 37---129; David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role,* especially chap. 2.

106. Ruttan, ed., *Why Food Aid?*, 66.

107. Georg W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 12---13.

108. "Insiders and Outsiders in International Development Ethics," *Ethics and International Affairs* 5 (1991): 149-73.

109. See Barrett and Maxwell, *Food Aid*, especially chap. 5.

110. Dan Charles, "New Plan Calls for Buying Aid Foods Outside U.S.," All Things Considered, National Public Radio, March 7, 2007. The 2007 US debate about food aid has split humanitarian groups. Some, such as Oxfam and Catholic Relief Services, favor purchasing food aid in hunger-stricken countries and their neighbors in order to save "time, money, and lives." Others, such as World Vision, are concerned about long term food availability, and have become unlikely bedfellows with US agricultural, milling, and maritime interests who stand to lose money in proportion to US purchases of local food. The latter position arguably overemphasizes food availability and underemphasizes aid that makes a difference in lives of people who are hungry.

111. In *Food Aid*, Barrett and Maxwell entitle chapter 6, their most explicitly normative chapter, "Edging Towards a Recipient-Oriented Food Aid System."