An Emerging
Technology:
Radio
Frequency Identification
|
Advantages
and Disadvantages of Using RFID Technology in Libraries
RFID use can be a controversial topic when libraries choose to convert
their collections to be able to take advantage of the technology. There
is little doubt that RFID will become more ubiquitous in the future,
however, a library should weigh the advantages and disadvantages. Many
of the advantages of RFID revolve around the actual use in libraries
and using the technology to free up librarians for duties that involve
more interaction with the patrons. Many of the disadvantages revolve
around the technology also, but include issues surrounding security and
privacy.
Advantages
Reduction of staff duties
Use of RFID technology in a library can decrease the time needed
for circulation duties since more than one tag can be read at a time.
Patron checkout stations can additionally free up staff from these
duties. The time necessary to complete an inventory of the library
collection can be reduced since inventory can be accomplished with a
wand reader as the staff member walks through the stacks of the
collection. In addition to the inventory, this wand can also determine
if items have been shelved in the correct order. Conveyor belts and
sorting systems can reduce time that staff spend shelving returned
items because the items can be presorted. By reducing the staff duties
in these areas, staff may be used more efficiently in other areas
including increased face-to-face service and increased the number of
community programs.
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Reduction of staff injuries
Karen Schneider, director of Library’s Index to the Internet,
states that the repetitive motion required by bar code scanners,
including flipping an item and angling it correctly, cost libraries
millions of dollars a year in work place injuries. Some libraries,
including the San Francisco Public Libraries, look to RFID as a way to
reduce the repetitive stress injuries caused by sustained and
repetitive motion connected to circulation duties especially. Research
varies as to the amount of workman’s compensation claims that are
connected to repetitive stress injuries caused by circulation duties,
and to what level RFID technology will reduce these injuries and
claims. 6,
7, 8
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Reliability
Correctly operating readers and tags can have near 100%
detection rates. Since the tags and sensors communicate with the
Integrated Library System (ILS) it is possible to know exactly which
items are moving out of the library. The high reliability is especially
important when RFID is used in theft detection.
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Tag life and appearance
Vendors claim that the tag life can be at least 100,000 transactions or
at least 10 years. These tags do not interfere with the appearance of
the book, and can even be made to appear as a bookplate. 9
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Disadvantages
Reduction of staff duties
With the automation of many staff duties, it is possible that a
reduction in staff may follow.
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Cost
RFID is not an inexpensive technology. According to the report prepared
for the Public Library Association (PLA), the budget for a library with
40,000 items in its collection may cost as much as $70,000. A library
with 250,000 items may cost up to $333,500. This is based on the cost
of $0.85 per tag, readers at circulation stations and conversion
stations at $2,500 - $5,000 each. Patron self-checkout stations cost
between $18,000 - $22,000 each, which is about the same as similar
stations used for bar code technology. In larger libraries, it would be
necessary to have more than one of these stations. Readers at the exits
can cost $3,500 to $6,000, and of course would be needed at each
exit. Readers at the book to return the book to the collection
cost the same as the other circulation readers, about $2,500. However,
the price increases considerably when it is combined with conveyor
belts and sorting system. This level of sophistication will cost the
library between $45,000 and $200,000. Portable inventory wands cost at
least $2,500 and the docking station to read the information cost an
additional $2,000. If the information is to be transmitted wirelessly,
the library could incur another $3,000 in expenses. Finally, all of
these components need to be able to communicate with the ILS. To do
this, the communication gateway needs to get information from a number
of readers, exchange it with the circulation database, the automated
library system, and the transaction database. This costs at least
$15,000, two-thirds of which is the cost of the software. This total
cost does not include the cost of staff time to actually add the tags
to the books, the rental of the programmer for the tags, or carpentry
and electrical costs that arise from installation of the equipment. 10
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Susceptibility of tags
Since the RFID tags work because of radio waves, blocking these
radio waves stops the entire system from working efficiently.
Unfortunately, this is easily accomplished by wrapping the tag in
aluminum foil. Metallic ink on book covers can also affect the
transmission of the radio waves. Tags can also be susceptible to
removal. Since most tags are fixed to the inside of the back cover,
those who desire, could remove the tag. Tags can be inserted into the
spines of the books, however not all tags are so flexible, and this
does not address the issue of tags on CDs or DVDs. Also, tags may cause
interference with each other when placed within 1/8th of an inch
proximity.
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Big brother and invasion of patron
privacy
Undoubtedly, this is the greatest disadvantage of RFID
technology use in libraries – is it possible to track patrons,
items, and information outside of the library? If it is possible, will
patrons stop using the library? What is the library’s role and
responsibility in protecting patron privacy?
According to Richard W. Boss, invasion of privacy at this level is not
possible, although he concedes that even misconceptions have
significant consequences. In his report to the PLA he address concerns
about invasion of privacy by pointing out that the tags on the books
contain no patron information, and the link between the patron and the
item is maintained only in the secure library system and that this link
is broken as soon as the book is returned. Boss also points out that
RFID tags used in libraries can only be read at a distance of a few
feet. 11
Others are not so optimistic about the security of RFID tags used in
libraries. Lee Tien of the Electronic Frontier Federation (EFF) and
Peter Warfield of the Library Users Association have been outspoken,
mainly through commentary in the Berkeley
Daily Planet, about privacy issues especially in Berkeley, CA
and San Francisco, CA libraries bringing into question the points that
the public libraries have used to rationalize the use of RFID tags. 12
David Molnar, an electrical engineering doctoral candidate at UC
Berkeley, and UC Berkeley professor, David Wagner, have studied RFID
devices and the architecture used to implement the technology at
libraries. In their October 2004 paper, Molnar and Wagner identify
security gaps in the currently used RFID systems in libraries as well
as identify how it would be possible for outside sources to track
patrons and hotlist books. They identify the focus on of the privacy
concerns on the bibliographic database, because this is where
information about patron’s past checkouts could be stored. This
is the greatest security risk. They identify four aspects of RFID tags
that are vulnerable, and how an adversary may take advantage of these
vulnerabilities to gain information about a person.
Even without access to the bibliographic database, Molnar and Wagner
contend that it is still possible that the patrons’ privacy can
be invaded because RFID tags contain static data that is never changed.
This could be information about the library that owns the book, and so
it is possible for a person with the ability to read the tag can find
out this information and determine the general origin of the person
carrying the book. It is also possible for adversaries, those with RFID
readers that use them for unauthorized data-collection, to create a
hotlisting of a book. In this case, the actual book is the item of
relevance. After the book’s bibliographic information, and tag
information, is included in a personal database, it is possible for an
adversary to identify when that book is in a public place, such as an
airport.
“An unauthorized reader [would be able] to determine the
tag’s identity merely through its collision-avoidance
behavior” because this protocol is globally unique and is hard
coded into the tag. (Molnar and Wagner) This information is embedded at
the time of manufacture and after learning the collision-avoidance
protocol, and adversary can possibly collect more data from the tag.
Even if there are other privacy methods installed onto the tag, because
the collision-avoidance protocol is embedded and unchangeable, there is
a “back door” to the tag.
Molnar and Wagner also identify the security bit on read/write tags as
vulnerable to vandalism. It is possible that a vandal could change this
bit to read not checked out, and lock the bit in this position. After
locking the bit, the vandal could protect it with a password of its
own. If this object were ever to enter into a library, the bit would
not be able to be modified because of the password, and the tag would
have to be replaced.
The final architecture that Molnar and Wagner identified as weak from a
security standpoint is the management of tag passwords. These passwords
are used in the library for the tag and reader to communicate, and can
be intercepted by an eavesdropper. 13
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Created by Sally Egloff for
LBSC
690 Information Technology at University
of Maryland