Fostering Liars (to appear in an issue of Topoi)
This paper--like I-Languages
and T-sentences
Meanings via
Syntactic Structures (Syntactic Structures after
60 Years, edited by
This short essay was prompted by teaching Syntactic Structures, in an
undergraduate course, and paying attention to the (often ignored)
remarks about meaning.
Semantic Typology and
Composition (The Science
of Meaning, edited by B. Rabern and D. Ball).
It is often said that expressions of a human language include (i)
truth-evaluable sentences of a basic semantic type <t>, (ii)
entity designators of a basic semantic type <e>, and (iii)
unsaturated expressions whose semantic types are characterized by
the recursive principle "if <α> and <β> are types, so
is <α, β>." I think this hypothesis is wrong in three
respects.
Semantic Internalism (The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky,
edited by Jim McGilvray, CUP 2017)
This essay discusses some of Chomsky's views about meaning,
contrasting them with some of Putnam's claims in "The Meaning of
'Meaning' ".
I-Languages and T-sentences
This paper, about the relevance of Liar Paradoxes for truth
conditional semantics, and the paper below are companions. Bottom
line for this one: sentences of a human language don't have truth
conditions. No sentence of a human language is true. The previous
sentence isn't true, and neither is this one. Snow is white isn't true,
and neither is 'Snow is white.'
is true if and only if snow is white.
Framing Event Variables
Slides for the talk, at a conference in Erfurt, can be found here.
This paper is about the relevance of puzzles concerning event
individuation for semantics. Bottom line: event analyses of 'Alvin
chased Thedore' are good; truth-theoretic constuals of such
analyses are bad. Together with the paper above, and Meaning
Before Truth listed below, the larger conclusion is that
Davidsonian conceptions of meaning are in big trouble. Even
bracketing concerns about specific constructions, and focusing on
cases that are supposed to motivate truth conditional semantics,
foundational problems quickly emerge if you focus on truth,
predication, or reference.
Concepts, Meanings, and Truth: First Nature,
Second Nature, and Hard Work (Mind and Language 25: 247-78, 2010)
The idea is that lexical expressions of a human I-language let
children use available concepts to introduce formally distinct
"I-concepts," which can then be combined via operations
invoked by phrasal syntax. So while "prelexical" concepts may not
exhibit the kind of systematicity required for truth, I-concepts
do. But various empirical considerations suggest
that I-concepts are massively monadic, and that the relevant
"I-operations" are fundamentally conjunctive. This, I claim, makes
it implausible that I-concepts are true of language-independent
things. Meanings can be viewed as instructions to assemble
concepts that make it possible for humans to have truth-evaluable
thoughts. But forming such concepts requires independent cognitive
work, not just a language with a compositional semantics. This
paper, which abstracts from the technical details, forms a pair
with Minimal Semantic
Instructions (listed under Compositional Semantics)
Meaning Before Truth (Contextualism in
Philosophy, edited by G. Preyer and G. Peters, OUP 2005).
This paper extends the line of thought in "The Character of
Natural Language Semantics." A running theme is that Chomsky
offers a conception of semantics that lets us preserve what is
right about truth-conditional semantics--and this has less to do
with truth than the usual rhetoric suggests--while also preserving
late-Wittgensteinian/Austinian insights about the relation between
truth, meaning, and context. There are three main sections: one
about the relevance of negative facts (and nativism) for
semantics, and why this tells against both "deflationary"
conceptions of meaning and Quine-Davidson "interpretability"
conceptions; one that reviews some familiar reasons for rejecting
the hypothesis that names denote things in the environment; and
one that concedes externalism about truth, while noting that
externalism about linguistic meaning does not follow. The paper
ends with a brief tour of some alternatives, and some familiar
reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that predicates are satisfied
by things in the environment. A handout
elaborates this line of thought (in a handouty way).
Minimal Semantic Instructions (in the Oxford Handbook of Linguistic
Minimalism, edited by Cedric Boeckx, 2011).
This is an attempt work out, for a range of basic constructions,
the idea of meanings as "instructions to assemble conjunctive
concepts." This paper, mainly devoted to technical details and
minimalist reasoning, forms a pair with Concepts,
Meanings, and Truth: First Nature, Second Nature, and Hard Work
(listed under Semantic
Internalism). And with regard to the syntactic details, I
draw on the paper below.
Interrogatives, Instructions, and
I-languages: an I-Semantics for Questions, coauthored with
Terje Lohndal (Linguistic
Analysis 37:459-510, 2011).
The basic idea is simple: an "instructionist" conception of
meaning, along lines developed in the paper above, can easily
accommodate an attractive internalist version of the old
force/content distinction; and there are interesting implications
for the syntax/semantics of relative clauses and "sentential"
expressions. I never intended to have views about--much less write
a paper about--interrogatives. But my co-author was persuasive.
Describing I-junction
(In
Language and Value,
edited by J. Yi and E. Lepore,
The meaning of a noun phrase like ‘brown cow’, or ‘cow that ate
grass’, is somehow conjunctive. But conjunctive in what sense? Are
the meanings of other phrases—e.g, ‘ate quickly’, ‘ate grass’, and
‘at noon’—similarly conjunctive? I suggest a possible answer, in
the context of a broader conception of natural language semantics.
Small
Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity without Synonymy
(in Chomsky and His Critics, edited [heroically] by Louise
Antony and Norbert Hornstein, Blackwell 2003)
You may need to "Rotate View, Clockwise" to get the .pdf file to
appear properly.
This paper was written in 1998, and so may be past
its use-by date. Updated versions of various bits of the
paper appear elsewhere; see note 1.
More Truth in Advertising: I'm not criticizing Chomsky; though I
am being critical, and Chomsky does figure prominently.
The idea, as the subtitle suggests, is that there are analytic
truths--even if the notion of synonymy is suspect. The trick
involves (can you guess?) combining, in the right way, a
neo-Davidsonian event semantics with a Minimalist syntax. Blatant
Advertising: get hold of the entire book if only for Chomsky's
replies; for anyone interested Chomsky's conception of meaning
(and his semantic
internalism), see especially his replies to Egan, Rey,
Ludlow, Horwich, and Pietroski.
On
Explaining That (Journal of Philosophy 97: 665-62,
2000)
How can a speaker can explain that P without explaining the fact
that P, or explain the fact that P without explaining that P, even
when it is true (and so a fact) that P? Or in formal mode: what is
the semantic contribution of 'explain' such that 'She explained
that P' can be true, while 'She explained the fact that P' is
false (or vice versa),
even when 'P' is true? The proposed answer is that 'explained' is
a semantically monadic predicate, satisfied by events of
explaining. But 'the fact that P' (a determiner phrase) and 'that
P' (a complementizer phrase) get associated with different
thematic roles, corresponding to the distinction between a thing
explained and the content of a speech act.
Does
Every
Sentence Like This Exhibit A Scope Ambiguity? coauthored
with Norbert Hornstein
(In Belief and Meaning, edited by W. Hinzen and H. Rott,
Hansel-Hohenhausen 2002)
The answer is 'no'. Instances of 'every F likes some G' may not,
after all, be examples of scope ambiguity.
Figuring out whether a given expression with multiple quantifiers
is semantically ambiguous is hard.
Quantification
and
Second-Order Monadicity (Philosophical
Perspectives 17: 259-298, 2003).
The first part of this paper reviews some developments regarding
the apparent mismatch between the logical and grammatical forms of
quantificational constructions like 'Pat kicked every bottle'. I
suggest that (even given quantifier-raising) many current theories
still posit an undesirable mismatch. But all is well if we can treat determiners
(words like 'every', 'no', and 'most') as second-order monadic
predicates without
treating them as predicates satisfied by ordered pairs of sets. Drawing on George
Boolos's construal of second-order quantification as plural
quantification, I argue that we can and should view determiners as
predicates satisfied (plurally) by ordered pairs each of which
associates an entity with a truth-value (t or f).
The idea is 'every' is satisfied by some pairs iff every one of
them associates its entity with t.
It turns out that this provides a kind of explanation for the
"conservativity" of determiners. And it lets us say that
concatenation signifies predicate-conjunction even in phrases like
'every bottle' and 'no brown dog'.
To Be a
Value of a Plural Variable, You Don't Have to Be Plural
(You Just Have to Be)
This is something between a handout and a paper. It focusses on an
idea, acquired from George Boolos, discussed in the papers
immediately above and below. For purposes of giving a
compositional semantic theory for a natural language, we can and
should allow for genuinely plural variables; where a genuinely
plural variable is one that has more than one value relative to
each assignment of values to variables.
Induction
and
Comparison (Maryland
Working Papers in Linguistics, 15: 157-90, 2006)
This speculative paper is an attempt to say why Frege's Theorem
might bear, in interesting ways, on several issues in linguistics.
Function
and
Concatenation (in Logical Form, edited by G. Preyer
and G. Peters, OUP 2002).
Explores the idea that concatenating natural language expressions
corresponds to predicate-conjunction, as opposed to
function-application. The proposal is developed in more detail in
Events and Semantic Architecture (OUP 2005). But the paper
gives the main idea, in the context of questions about how natural
language syntax is related to Logical Form.
Interpreting
Concatenation
and Concatenates (Philosophical
Issues 16:221-45, 2006).
This paper presents a slightly modified version of the
compositional semantics proposed in Events and Semantic Architecture.
Some readers may find this shorter version, which ignores issues
about vagueness and causal constructions, easier to digest. The
emphasis is on the treatments of plurality and quantification, and
I assume at least some familiarity with more standard approaches.
Space constraints caused the final document to be considerably
shorter than drafts with homophonous titles. The paper above (Systematicity
via Monadicity) is a kind of companion piece, showing how to
locate the proposed conception of semantic composition in the
context of more general attempts to simplify (or "minimize")
theories of linguistic competence, with the aim of isolating the
distinctively human aspects of the human language faculty. There
are points of contact with recent suggestions by Elizabeth Spelke
and her colleagues; see also the BBS
paper
by Peter Carruthers, my colleague in philosophy at Maryland.
Systematicity
via Monadicity (Croatian
Journal of Philosophy 7:343-374, 2007)
This is the written version of a conference presentation in
Dubrovnik (Fall 2006). I argue that a "Conjunctivist" conception
of semantic composition, of the sort articulated in some of the
papers above, helps explain many otherwise puzzling features of
natural language. More speculatively, a Conjunctivist language
faculty might also help explain why human thought is as systematic
as it is.
Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual
Polyadicity (In the Oxford
Handbook of Compositionality, M. Werning, W. Hinzen, and
E. Machery, eds., 2012).
Another paper in the same vein.
Language and Conceptual Reanalysis (In Towards a Biolinguistic
Understanding of Grammar: Essays on Interfaces, edited by A. DiSciullo,
John Benjamin 2012).
Like the paper above, but more detailed, and drawing some
connections to Frege's notion of fruitful definitions.
Here is a video of a recent talk (June 2014) in the Defining Cognitive Science series at Simon
Fraser University.
My thanks to my hosts, especially Endre Begby. In the talk, I discuss some of
the findings reported in the papers below. There are also pictures
of my collaborators.
The Meaning of 'Most': semantics, numerosity,
and psychology, coauthored with: Jeff Lidz, Justin Halberda,
and Tim Hunter
(Mind and Language,
24:554-85, 2009). The title is descriptive. We offer experimental
evidence in support of a certain view about how the meaning of the
English determiner 'most' is related to various psychological
capacities potentially relevant to human capacities for counting
and quantifying. In this first installment of an ongoing project,
we offer experimental evidence that adult speakers of English
do indeed understand sentences like 'Most of the dots are
blue' in terms of cardinality comparison (as opposed to, say,
one-to-one correspondence). We also make some tentative
suggestions about how the meaning of 'most' is related to
potential verification procedures and the "analog magnitude
system" that humans share with other animals.
Interface Transparency and the
Psychosemantics of most:
Jeff Lidz, Paul Pietroski, Tim Hunter, and Justin Halberda
(Natural Language Semantics,
in press, 2011). This paper extends the initial results obtained
in the paper above. Here, we offer experimental evidence that
adult speakers of English understand sentences like 'Most of the
dots are blue' in a quite specific way that involves representing
the cardinality of the blue dots, the cardinality of the dots, and
subtracting the former
from the latter--as opposed to, say, representing the
cardinalities of the blue dots and the nonblue dots (as such). We
also argue that this finding, together with independent studies of
the visual system, provides some empirical support for a more
general view about how meaningful expressions generated by the
language faculty interface with other cognitive systems.
Seeing What you Mean, Mostly,
coauthored with: Jeff Lidz, Justin Halberda, Tim Hunter, and Darko
Odic
(Syntax and Semantics:
Experiments at the Interfaces, edited by J. Runner,
37:187-224, 2011). Another paper in the same vein, stressing that
while our proposal is not a form of verificationism, meanings are
related to verification strategies in empirically testable
ways--at least with regard to "logical" vocabulary.
Young Children’s
Understanding of ‘more’ and Discrimination of Number and Surface
Area. Darko Odic, Paul Pietroski, Tim Hunter, Jeff Lidz, and
Justin Halberda (in press) Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition.
Poverty of
Stimulus Arguments
The Language Faculty coauthored with
Stephen Crain, in The Handbook for Philosophy of Cognitive
Science (edited by E.Margolis, S. Laurence, and S. Stich,
OUP 2011). An essay on the language faculty, in keeping with the
papers below, but also discussing some new material.
Think of the Children (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86:657-669, 2009). This was a critical notice of Michael Devitt's book, Ignorance of Language. Michael's reply, which you might want to look at, appeared in the same issue.
Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory
coauthored with Stephen Crain and Andrea Gualmini
(In The Innate Mind: structure
and contents, edited by S. Laurence, P. Carruthers, and
S. Stich, 175-197, Oxford University Press, 2005).
Yes, still arguing for innate constraints on linguistic meanings.
Here, we discuss in more detail some of the individual phenomena
addressed in other papers. And we're not replying to anyone in
particular.
Innate Ideas coauthored with
Stephen Crain, in The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky
(edited by James McGilvray, 164-180, Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
You may need to "Rotate View, Clockwise" to get the .pdf file to
appear properly.
A more general discussion of innateness and universal grammar, in
the context of Chomsky's version of rationalism.
Some of the examples mentioned here are discussed in more detail
in the other papers.
Why Language Acquisition is a Snap
coauthored with Stephen Crain (Linguistic Review, 19:
163-83, 2002).
Presents additional empirical arguments for universal grammar in
reply to a target article by Pullum and Scholz. The main arguments
concerns a cluster of semantic phenomenon concerning downward
entailment, negative polarity, and the "pragmatic" implicature
associated with disjunctive claims.
Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar
coauthored with Stephen Crain (Linguistics and Philosophy
24: 139-86, 2001).
Discusses the logic of "poverty of stimulus" arguments and some
specific empirical premises, concerning both adults and children,
in reply to recent empiricist conceptions of language
acquisition--with particular focus on Cowie's book What's
Within.
Twentieth
Century Papers
Actions, Adjuncts, and
Agency (Mind 107: 73-111, 1998)
Experiencing the Facts: critical notice of John McDowell's Mind and World (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 613-36, 1996)
A Defense of Derangement (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24: 95-118, 1994)
Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris
Paribus Laws in Moral Theory (Ethics 103: 489-515,
1993)
Intentionality and Teleological Error (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 267-82, 1992)