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(updated: December 10, 2020)

EMPLOYMENT

Current Position:

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy (since July 2017)

Other Affiliations:

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Executive Committee Member, Center for Cognitive Science
Graduate Faculty Member, Department of Linguistics

University of Maryland

Distinguished University Professor Emeritus (since June 2018)

Previous Positions:

University of Maryland, Department of Linguistics and Department of Philosophy, 1998-2017
Awarded title of Distinguished Scholar-Teacher in 2007;
Promoted to Full Professor in 2003;
Hired as Associate Professor (joint appointment) with tenure in 1998.

McGill University, Department of Philosophy, 1990-1998

Associate Professor with tenure, 1995-1998;
Assistant Professor, 1990-1995.

Other Appointments:

École Normale Supérieure, One Month Professorship in Cognitive Science, July 2013.

Harvard University,

Faculty Fellow in the *Mind, Brain, Behavior Program*, 2007-2008.

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Spring 2008.

Carleton University (Ottawa),

Adjunct Research Professor, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, 1996-1998.

University of Maryland, Visiting Associate Professor in Linguistics and Philosophy, Spring 1997.

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, with minor in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990.

B.A. (highest honors), Rutgers College, 1986.

PUBLICATIONS

Books

- Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values*. Oxford University Press (2018, pp. 393).
Events and Semantic Architecture. Oxford University Press (2005, pp. 267), paperback (2006).
Causing Actions. Oxford University Press (2000, pp. 274), paperback (2002).

Articles (jointly authored papers indicated as such)

67. N. Hornstein and P. Pietroski. Universal Grammar. In *Current Controversies in Cognitive Science* (S. Cullen and S. Leslie, eds.) Routledge: New York (2020).
66. Fostering Liars. *Topoi* Published online (March 2020).
65. Semantic Types: Two is Better than Too Many. In *New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence* (M. Sakamoto et. al., eds.) Springer LNCS/LNAI 12331 (2020).
LENLS-16 conference proceedings: <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-58790-1>.
64. Limiting Semantic Types. In *Language, Syntax, and the Natural Sciences* (R. Martin and A. Gallego, eds.), 192-211, Cambridge University Press (2018).
63. Semantic Typology and Composition. In *The Science of Meaning* (B. Rabern and D. Ball, eds.), 306-333, Oxford University Press (2018).
62. D. Odic, P. Pietroski, T. Hunter, J. Lidz, & J. Halberda. Individuals and Non-Individuals in Cognition and Semantics: the Mass/Count Distinction and Quantity Representation. *Glossa* 3:1-20 (2018).
61. Semantic Internalism. In *The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky* (J. McGilvray, ed.), 196-216, Cambridge University Press (2017).
60. Meanings via Syntactic Structures. In *Syntactic Structures after 60 Years* (N. Hornstein, H. Lasnik, C. Yang, and P. Patel, eds.) De Gruyter: Mouton (2017).
59. I-Languages and T-sentences. In *Reflections on the Liar* (B. Armour-Garb, ed.), Oxford University Press (2017).
58. Vocabulary Matters. *50 Years Later: Reflections on Chomsky's Aspects*. In *MIT Working Papers in Linguistics* #77 (A. Gallego and D. Ott, eds.), 199-210, Cambridge: MIT (2015).
57. Framing Event Variables. *Erkenntnis* 80:31-60 (2015).
56. Lexicalizing and Combining. In *Verb Concepts: Cognitive Science Perspectives on Verb Representation and Processing* (R. de Almeida and C. Manouilidou, eds.), 43-65, Springer (2014).
55. Describing I-Junction. In *Language and Value* (J. Yi and E. Lepore, eds.), *ProtoSociology* 31: 121-137 (2014).
54. D. Odic, P. Pietroski, T. Hunter, J. Lidz, & J. Halberda. Children's understanding of "more" and discrimination of number and surface area. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 39: 451-461 (2013).
53. Language and Conceptual Reanalysis. In *Towards a Biolinguistic Understanding of Grammar: Essays on Interfaces* (A. DiSciullo, ed.), 57-86, John Benjamin (2012).
52. Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual Polyadicity. In the *Oxford Handbook of Compositionality* (M. Werning, W. Hinzen, and E. Machery, eds.), 129-48, Oxford University Press (2012).
51. R. Berwick, P. Pietroski, B. Yankama, and N. Chomsky. Poverty of the Stimulus Revisited. *Cognitive Science* 35: 1207-42 (2011).
50. P. Pietroski and S. Crain. The Language Faculty. In *The Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science* (E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich, eds.), 361-81, Oxford University Press (2011).
49. P. Pietroski, J. Lidz, T. Hunter, D. Odic, and J. Halberda. Seeing What You Mean, Mostly. *Syntax and Semantics* (Experiments at the Interfaces, edited by J. Runner) 37:187-224 (2011).
48. T. Lohndal and P. Pietroski. Interrogatives, Instructions, and I-languages: An I-Semantics for Questions. *Linguistic Analysis* 37:459-510 (2011).
47. J. Lidz, T. Hunter, P. Pietroski, and J. Halberda. Interface Transparency and the Psychosemantics of 'Most'. *Natural Language Semantics* 19: 227-56 (2011).
46. Minimal Semantic Instructions, in the *Oxford Handbook on Linguistic Minimalism*, 472-498 (C. Boeckx, ed.), Oxford University Press (2011).

45. N. Hornstein and P. Pietroski. Control and Local Reflexives: Copies as Vehicles for *De Se* Readings. In *Movement Theory of Control* (N. Hornstein and M. Polinsky, eds.), 67-88, John Benjamin (2010).
44. Concepts, Meanings, and Truth: First Nature, Second Nature and Hard Work. *Mind and Language* 25: 247-78 (2010). Invited essay for 25th anniversary volume.
43. P. Pietroski, J. Lidz, T. Hunter, and J. Halberda. The Meaning of ‘Most’: semantics, numerosity, and psychology. *Mind and Language* 24:554-85 (2009).
42. N. Hornstein and P. Pietroski. Basic Operations. In *Spelling out Universal Grammar* (J. Fortuny and A. Gallego, eds.), *Catalan Journal of Linguistics* 8: 113-39 (2009).
41. T. Hunter, J. Halberda, J. Lidz, and P. Pietroski. Beyond Truth Conditions: the semantics of ‘most’. In SALT 18, Proceedings of the Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference (2009).
40. Minimalist Meaning, Internalist Interpretation. *Biolinguistics* 4:317-41 (2008).
39. Think of the Children: Comments on *Ignorance of Language*, by Michael Devitt. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86: 657-69 (2008).
38. Systematicity via Monadicity. *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 7:343-374 (2007).
37. Interpreting Concatenation and Concatenates. *Philosophical Issues* 16:221-45 (2006).
36. Character Before Content. In *Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker* (J. Thomson and A. Byrne, eds.), 34-60, Oxford University Press (2006).
35. Induction and Comparison. *University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics* 15:157-90 (2006) <http://www.ling.umd.edu/publications/volume15/Pietroski.pdf>
34. Meaning Before Truth. In *Contextualism in Philosophy* (G. Preyer and G. Peters, eds.), 253-300, Oxford University Press (2005).
33. S. Crain, P. Pietroski, and A. Gualmini. Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory. In *The Innate Mind: structure and contents* (S. Laurence, P. Carruthers, and S. Stich, eds.), 175-197, Oxford University Press (2005).
32. P. Pietroski and S. Crain Innate Ideas. In *The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky* (J. McGilvray, ed.), 164-180, Cambridge University Press (2005).
31. Quantification and Second-Order Monadicity. *Philosophical Perspectives* 17: 259-298 (2003).
30. The Character of Natural Language Semantics. In *Epistemology of Language* (A. Barber, ed.), 217-256, Oxford University Press (2003).
29. Semantics and Metaphysics of Events. In *Contemporary Philosophy in Focus: on Davidson* (K. Ludwig, ed.), 137-162, Cambridge University Press (2003).
28. Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity without Synonymy. In *Chomsky and his Critics* (L. Antony and N. Hornstein, eds.), 179-214, Blackwell (2003).
27. P. Pietroski and N. Hornstein. Does every Sentence Like This Contain a Scope Ambiguity. In *Belief in Meaning: Essays at the Interface* (W. Hinzen and H. Rott, eds.), 43-72, Hansel-Hohenhausen (2002).
26. Function and Concatenation. In *Logical Form and Language* (G. Preyer and G. Peters, eds.), 91-117, Oxford University Press (2002).
25. S. Crain and P. Pietroski. Why Language Acquisition is a Snap: reply to Pullum and Scholz. *The Linguistic Review* 19: 163-183 (2002).
24. J. Uriagereka and P. Pietroski. Dimensions of Natural Language coauthored. *University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics*, 192-219 (2001); reprinted in Juan Uriagereka, *Derivations: Exploring the Dynamics of Syntax* (Routledge 2002).
23. S. Crain and P. Pietroski. Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 24:139-186 (2001).
22. On Explaining That. *Journal of Philosophy* 97: 655-62 (2000).
21. The Undeclared Domain of Semantics. *Sats: The Nordic Journal of Philosophy* 1:161-76 (2000). Reprinted in *Reading Philosophy of Language* (J. Hornsby & G. Longworth, eds.), Blackwell (2005).
20. Compositional Quotation without Parataxis. In *Philosophy and Linguistics* (K. Murasugi & R. Stainton, eds.), Westview Press, 245-258 (1999).
19. Plural Descriptions as Existential Quantifiers in an Event Analysis. *University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics* (1999).
18. Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency. *Mind* 107: 73-111 (1998).
17. Specifying Senses Innocently. *The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics* (D. Jutronic, ed.), Pedagoška fakulteta Maribor, Slovenia, 318-333 (1998).

16. Moral Causation. *A Question of Values* (S. Brennan, et al., eds.), 39-61, Rodopi Press (1997).
15. Fregean Innocence. *Mind and Language* 11: 331-362 (1996).
14. Experiencing the Facts: critical notice of John McDowell's *Mind and World*.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 613-636 (1996).
13. S. Dwyer and P. Pietroski. Believing in Language. *Philosophy of Science* 63: 338-73 (1996).
12. What can Linguistics Teach us about Belief? *Penser L'esprit* (V. Rialle and D. Fiset, eds.),
113-124, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble (1996).
11. P. Pietroski and G. Rey. When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from
Vacuity. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 46: 81-110 (1995).
10. Other Things Equal, The Chances Improve. *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science:
Québec Studies vol. I* (M. Marion and R. Cohen, eds.), 259-273, Kluwer (1995).
9. Mental Causation for Dualists. *Mind and Language* 9: 336-366 (1994).
8. Executing the Second Best Option. *Analysis* 54: 201-207 (1994).
7. A Defense of Derangement. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 24: 95-118 (1994).
6. Un dérangement modulaire de la compétence linguistique
(A Modular Derangement of Linguistic Competence). *Lekton* 4:163-198 (1994).
5. Similarity and Innocent Semantics. *McGill Papers in Cognitive Science* (1994).
4. Between Humpty Dumpty and Stanley Fish.
Cahiers d'épistémologie, Université du Québec à Montréal (1993).
3. Possible Worlds, Syntax, and Opacity. *Analysis* 53: 270-280 (competition essay, 1993).
2. Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory. *Ethics* 103: 489-515 (1993).
1. Intentionality and Teleological Error. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 73: 267-282 (1992).

Encyclopedia Entries, Reviews, Commentaries, and Other Publications

25. Donald Davidson, "The logical form of action sentences." To appear in
Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 30th Anniversary Issue.
24. Précis of *Conjoining Meanings*. *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* (in press).
23. Chomsky on Reference and Meaning. In *A Companion to Chomsky*
(N. Alcott, G. Rey, and T. Lohndal, eds.) Wiley-Blackwell (2021).
22. A Narrow Path from Meanings to Contents. Comment on *Narrow Content*,
by J. Yli-Vakkuri and J. Hawthorne. *Philosophical Studies* (published online September, 2020)
21. Responses to Comments on *Conjoining Meanings*. *Mind and Language* 35:266-73 (2020).
For a symposium on *Conjoining Meanings*.
20. Davidson on Event Variables and Their Values. In *Wiley:
A Companion to Davidson* (K. Ludwig and E. Lepore, eds.), 93-125, Wiley-Blackwell (2013).
19. Review of *The Biolinguistic Enterprise: New Perspectives on the Evolution and Nature of the
Human Language Faculty*, edited by A. DiSciullo and C. Boeckx. *Language* 88:637-40 (2012).
18. Review of *LOT 2: Language of Thought Revisited*, by Jerry Fodor.
Journal of Philosophy 107:653-8 (2010).
17. P. Pietroski and J. Lidz. No Derivation without Formalization.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31: 666-7 (2008).
16. Logical Form and LF. In *The Handbook of Philosophy of Language*
(E. Lepore and B. Smith, eds.), Oxford University Press (2006).
15. Events in Semantic Theory. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition (D. Borchert, ed.)
Detroit: Macmillan (2006).
14. Logical Form. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition (D. Borchert, ed.)
Detroit: Macmillan (2006).
13. S. Crain and P. Pietroski. Reply to Bouchard. *Lingua* 116:64-68 (2006).
12. S. Crain and P. Pietroski. Innateness and Universal Grammar.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan (2003).
11. Review of *Matters of Mind*, by Scott Sturgeon. *Mind* 111: 488-491 (2002).
10. Précis of *Causing Actions* and Replies to Commentators.
E-symposium on *Causing Actions: A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*
<http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/pietroskisymp.htm> (2001).
9. Review of *Knowledge of Meaning*, by Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal. *Mind* 109: 960-4 (2000).

8. Euthyphro and the Semantic: review-essay of Jerry Fodor, *Concepts*. *Mind and Language* 15:341-349 (2000).
7. Logical Form. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-form> (1999), revised (2002, 2004, 2009, 2015).
6. S. Dwyer and P. Pietroski. Keeping Grammar in Mind. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 22:781 (1999).
5. Prima Facie Obligation. *The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia* (C.Gray, ed.), 685-686, Garland Press (1999).
4. A 'Should' Too Many (Commentary). *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 17:26-27 (1994).
3. First Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations (Commentary). *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16:67-69 (1993).
2. Fodor Unscathed (Commentary). *Psychology* 93.4.10.fodor-representation.2.pietroski (1993).
1. Meaning and Evolution: review-essay of Ruth Millikan's *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*. *Annals of Scholarship* 6:318-330 (1990).

PRESENTATIONS

Mini-Courses

Meaning Internalism, Concept Pluralism

Four lectures (6 hours), Norwegian Summer Institute in Language and Mind, University of Oslo: Center for the Study of Mind in Nature, June 2016.

Meaning and Psychology, co-taught with Tim Hunter

One-week course, NASSLLI at Rutgers University, July 2016.

Meaning First

Four Lectures (8 hours), Context and Content Lectures, Institut Jean Nicod, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, June 2013.

Meanings and I-languages

Eight lectures (16 hours), Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre (Brazil), October 2012.

Meanings as Instructions to Build Concepts

Five Lectures (8 hours), Beihang University (Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics), August 2011.

Semantics without Truth Values

Four Lectures (12 hours), Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Linguistics (CASTL), University of Tromsø, October 2009.

Semantics as Psychology

Four lectures (6 hours), international summer school, Beijing Normal University, July 2006.

From Davidson to Minimalism

Five lectures (15 hours), Federal University of Santa Catarina (Brazil), August 2005.

Some Things Philosophers Should Know About Linguistics (but might not have known to ask about)

Six lectures (18 hours), Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, Spring 2002.

Conference Presentations and Invited Lectures (pp. 5-9)

One Word, One Meaning, Many Concepts: an Externalist Argument for Semantic Internalism.

Online talk "at" Keele University, Philosophy of Linguistics Series (February 2021)

TBA. Online talk "at" Oslo University, [Super Linguistics Group](#) (March 2021)

Subjects, Predicates, and Minimal Relations ([abstract](#), slides soon)

Online talk "at" Bochum University, 2020.

One Meaning, Many Concepts, No Extension: Polysemy as Valuable Equivocality.

New York Philosophy of Language Workshop, 2020.

Meanings, Concepts, and Composition.

Philosophy of Language workshop, Nanzan University (Nagoya, Japan), 2019.

Meanings, Homophony, and Polysemy.

Philosophy of Language workshop, University of Tokyo;

University of Southern California, 2019.

Types of Meanings: Two is Better than Too Many.
 Invited talk at [LENLS 16](#), Keio University (Yokohama, Japan)
 Institute of Philosophy, London, 2019.

Conjoining Meanings: sneaking up on truth.
 Philosophy of Linguistics Conference, Dubrovnik, 2019.
 Part of a 2-day session on *Conjoining Meanings*.

Author Meets Critics session on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, *Narrow Content*,
 American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2019.

Meanings as Composable Scores. Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, 2019.

Human Languages: what are they?
 “Break it down” Series, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 2019.

Revisiting *Events and Semantic Architecture*.
 Winter Storm. Language Science Center, Univ. of Maryland, 2019.

Syntactic Structures and Semantic Internalism.
 Workshop: Generative Grammar at the Speed of 90. University of Arizona, 2018.

Confronting Existential Angst.
 Institute for Logic Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, 2018.
 NYU Semantics Group, 2018.

Meanings and Minds: Most, Mass, and maybe More.
 Institute for Logic Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, 2018.
 Cognitive Science Colloquium, Northwestern University, 2018.

Fostering Liars. Topoi Conference, Turin;
 Rutgers-Bochum Mind and Language Workshop, Rutgers University, 2018.

Semantic Typology and Composition. NYU Mind and Language Seminar, 2018.

Meaning Internalism and Natural History.
 Weinberg Institute for Cognitive Science, Univ. of Michigan, 2017.

Meanings, Concepts, and Natural Kinds: What Were People Thinking?
 Rutgers University, part of Rutgers’ 250th Anniversary Activities: November 10th, 2016.

Semantic Internalism. University of Arizona, 2015.

Locating Human Meanings: Less Typology, More Constraint.
 Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, 2015.

Semantic Typology and Composition, Johns Hopkins, 2015.

Values of Event Variables, Johns Hopkins, 2015.

Form and Composition.
 Higginbotham Lecture (inaugural), University of Southern California, 2014.
 Princeton University, 2015.

Conjoining Meanings, two 2-hour discussion sessions;
 Foundations of Semantics Group, University of Konstanz, 2014.

Semantic Framing: the Meaning of *Most*.
 Cognitive Science Colloquium, Simon Frasier University, 2014;
 University of Konstanz, 2014.

Introducing Concepts. Symposium on Origins of Propositional Thought,
 Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2014.

Lexical Neutrality and Composite Meanings. Conference on Word Meaning,
 Cumberland Lodge, England, 2014.

Conjunction, Subtraction, and Comparison. Workshop on the Semantics of Cardinals,
 Ohio State University, 2014.

Mostly Framing. Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, 2014.

Framing Event Variables. University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2014.

Human i-Languages and Semantic Typology. University of Delaware, 2013;
 Rutgers University, Philosophy Seminar Feb. 2014.

What is a Theory of Human (Linguistic) Understanding? Conference on Investigating Semantics:
 Empirical and Philosophical Approaches, Bochum (Germany), 2013.

Two Kinds of Concept Introduction.
 Conference on Concepts, North Carolina State, 2013.

Church to Chomsky, Marr to Most. Keynote talk at “Semantics: Mathematics or Psychology.”
 Conference at Princeton University, 2013.

Framing Event Variables. Philosophy of Language Workshop, Norwich (England);
 Univ. of Maryland; Univ. of North Carolina; Conference on Internalism, Montreal, 2013.

Procedure Matters. Yale Cognitive Science Colloquium, 2013.
 Rutgers University, Philosophy Department 30th Anniversary, 2012.

Unbounded and Constrained. New Mexico State University at Las Cruces, 2012.

Author Meets Critics session on Peter Ludlow, *The Philosophy of Generative Grammar*,
 American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2012.

Event Variables and Framing Effects. Phling Conference, University of Maryland, 2012;
 Conference on Language: Limits of Representation and Understanding, Erfurt, 2012.

‘I’ before ‘E’ in Semantics. University of Arizona, 2012.

I-junctions. Conference on Language and Value. Beijing Normal University, 2011.

‘I’ before ‘E’: Church, Chomsky, and Constrained Composition.
 Conference on Contexts, Perspectives and Relative Truth, Bonn, 2011.

Semantics Without Truth Values. Language Research Group, Durham University, 2011.

Discovering What's A Priori: Meaning, Logical Form, and Verification.
 Durham University, Conference on Epistemology of Philosophy, Cologne, 2011.

Lexical Instructions and Atomic Concepts. Workshop on Verb Meaning, Event Semantics and
 Argument Structure (keynote paper). Center for Linguistic Theory, Barcelona, 2010.

Constructing Conjunctive Concepts: Meanings as Human Begriffsplans. Workshop on Word
 Meaning (keynote paper). Center for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo, 2010.

Language and Conceptual Reanalysis. Conference on Language Design, Montreal, 2010.

I-Languages and Conceptual Reanalysis.
 Society for Exact Philosophy (keynote paper), Kansas City, 2010.

Unsingular Variables. Conference on Language and Adjoining Systems,
 Vidya Bhavana Society, Udaipur, 2010. Paper delivered in my absence.

Intuitions, Intuiteds, and I-languages: Data and Explananda. Conference on Linguistic Intuitions,
 Center for the Study of Mind and Language, University of Oslo, 2009.

Commentary at Semantics and Motor Control Conference. SUNY, Stony Brook, 2009.

Meanings as Internalist Instructions. Seminar at Birkbeck College, University of London, 2009.

Lexicalizing and Combining. SUNY, Stony Brook, 2009.

Author Meets Critics session on Jeff King, *The Nature and Structure of Content*,
 American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2009.

Meaning Internalism. Lecture in Linguistics as Cognitive Science series, NYU, 2009.

Semantics and I-languages. Part of Symposium on Semantics and Number.
 Linguistics Society of America, 2009.

Meanings: what are they, and what are they good for?
 University of Buffalo, 2008; University of Toronto, 2009.

Constructing Human Concepts: what (I-)meanings are good for.
 Rutgers University, 2008; University of Maryland, Cognitive Science Series, 2009.

Lexicalizing and Combining. Verb Concepts Conference, Concordia University, 2008;
 Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University, 2008.

Semantic Composition and the Languages of Thought. Brown University, 2008.

On Language and Human Thought. Mind, Brain, Behavior “Conversation with Critical Friends,”
 Harvard University, 2008. Video at <http://mbb.harvard.edu/resources/pastnews.php>

Concepts, Words, and Concepts: how to make a mind systematic.
 University of Massachusetts, Princeton University, Concordia University, 2008.

Semantic Composition: Implementing and Lexicalizing. University of Chicago, 2008.

‘Most’ Matters. Philosophy of Linguistics Session, APA Convention (Eastern Division), 2007.

Semantics Without Truth Values. Three sessions of “Internalist Explorations of Meaning”
 (Reading Group, Harvard University), Fall Term, 2007.

Human Language: You Know More Than You Think.
 Distinguished Scholar-Teacher Lecture, University of Maryland, 2007.

Systematicity, Conceptual Adicity, and Semantic Monadicity.
 University of St Andrews (*Arché*), 2007.

Big Ants, Good Logicians, and SOM-PredCalc. Adjectives Conference, St Andrews (*Arché*), 2007.

Systematic Thought via Monadic Language. McGill University, 2007.

Making Thought (More) Systematic. Philosophy of Language Conference, Dubrovnik, 2006.

Comment on Ludlow: Ellipsis Workshop, University of Western Ontario, 2006.

Concatenation and Grammar: How to be Systematic. Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, 2006.

To Be the Value of a Plural Variable, You Don't Have to Be Plural (You Just Have to Be).
Harvard University, 2005.

Meanings Before Truth-Conditions. Master Seminar on the Foundations of Cognitive Science,
University of Arizona, 2005.

Concatenation and Thematic Relations. Cognitive Science Colloquium, Univ. of Arizona, 2005.

Why are Determiners Conservative? Semantics Conference, University of São Paulo, 2005.

You Can't Mean That (and You Didn't Learn That). Davidson Conference, Florianopolis, 2005;
Meaning and Communication Conference, Lisbon, 2005.

Comment on Heck. Semantics Workshop in honor of James Higginbotham, Rutgers, 2005.

Comment on Lepore and Ludwig. Author Meets Critics Session, Central APA, 2005.

Human Syntax. University of California at Irvine, 2005.

Linguistic Meanings as (Conjunctive, Second-Order) Concept-Instructions. MIT, 2004.

What Meanings Probably Are Not. Semantics Workshop, University of Michigan, 2004.

The Autonomy of Syntax (and why Philosophers Should Care). Univ. of Colorado at Boulder, 2004.

Strict Compositionality, Flexible Concepts. Conference on Compositionality, Paris, 2004.

Stimulus Poverty and Child Language. Semantics Workshop, University of Connecticut, 2004.

Quantification and Second-Order Monadicity. Georgetown University, 2003.

Comment on Hornsby: Philosophy of Language Workshop, Yale University, 2003.

Semantics and (Innocent) Second-Order Logic Forms.
Semantics Conference, Carleton University, 2003.

Comment on Bealer: Chapel Hill Colloquium, University of North Carolina, 2003.

Second Generation Poverty of Stimulus Arguments.
Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Part of Invited Symposium on Innateness), 2003.

Monadic Determiners and (Conjunctive) Neo-Davidsonian Semantics.
Logic and Language Conference, Birmingham (England), 2003.

Monadic Determiners. Semantics Workshop, University of Southern California, 2003.

Comment on Johnson on Semantics and Awareness. APA invited session, Philadelphia, 2002.

Comment on Higginbotham on Compositionality.
Semantics Workshop, University of Michigan, 2002.

What is a Theory of Action a Theory of?
Causation and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, Ghent 2002.

Analyticity *a la Chomsky*. University of Delaware, 2002.

How to Become a Nativist about Language Acquisition, joint presentation with Stephen Crain.
Innateness and the Mind Workshop, Sheffield, 2002.

Conjunction and Concatenation. University of Southern California, 2002.

Comments on Braun & Saul: Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations.
Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University, 2001.

Composition by Conjunction. From Signaling to Structured Communication Conference,
Cornell University, 2001.

Causing Actions. University of Maryland Baltimore County, 2001.

Actions and Adjuncts (Again). Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, 2000.

Two Conceptions of Semantics. Stanford University, 2000.

Why *Does* the Mental (and the Moral and ...) Supervene on the Physical? Howard University, 2000.

The Character of Natural Language Semantics.
Epistemology of Language Conference, Sheffield 2000.

Functions and Events. Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University, 2000; Univ. of Maryland, 1999.

Does every Sentence Like This Exhibit a Scope Ambiguity?
Interamerican Philosophy Conference, Puebla (Mexico), 1999.

Small Verbs, Complex Events. Carleton University, 1998; University of Maryland, 1997.

Agency, Adverbs, and Actions. University of North Carolina, University of Maryland,
Johns Hopkins University, 1997.

Fregean Innocence. Naturalistic Semantics symposium (Maribor, Slovenia), LOGICA, 1996.
 Substitutivity and 'Quote'-Clauses. Canadian Philosophical Association symposium, 1996.
 Semantic Theory and the Objects of Thought. Rutgers University;
 European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1995.
 Executing Options without Dilemma.
 Western Ontario conference on Canadian Morals and Politics, 1995.
 What can Linguistics Teach us about Belief? Conference on *Cognition: from computational models to philosophy of mind*, Centre Jacques Cartier (Lyon, France), 1994.
 Mental Causation. Drew University; Concordia University, 1994.
 Similarity in Semantics. Canadian Philosophical Association, 1994.
 Defending Derangement. CPA workshop on Convention and Communication, 1994.
 Moral Causation. Western Ontario conference on
New Canadian Perspectives in Moral and Political Philosophy, 1994.
 Conflict without Dilemmas. 22nd Conference on Value Inquiry; University of Maryland, 1994.
 Two Semantic Values for the Price of One. Philosophy and Cognitive Science Series,
 Concordia University, 1994.
 Believing in Language, joint presentation with Susan Dwyer. Cognitive Society for the
 Advancement of Interdisciplinary Learning (Hood River, Oregon); Simon Frasier Univ., 1994.
 Between Humpty Dumpty and Stanley Fish. Université du Québec à Montréal,
 Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie Comparée, 1994.
 Moral Conflict and Moral Generalizations. Canadian Philosophical Association, 1992.
 Narrow-Minded Causation, Canadian Philosophical Association;
 Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1992.
 When is a Reductionist not a Reductionist? University of Maryland, 1991.
 Intentionality and Evolutionary Error. Université de Montréal, 1991.
 Other Things Being Equal. McGill University, 1989; Ohio State, Wesleyan University, 1990.

Examples of Collaborative Experimental Work Presented by co-authors at Conferences

- Knowlton, T., Pietroski, P., Williams, A., Halberda, J., & Lidz, J.
Conservative meanings with only one set: evidence from verification.
33rd CUNY Conference, UMass (2020).
- Knowlton, T., Pietroski, P., Halberda, J., & Lidz, J.
The mental representation of universal quantifiers: evidence from verification.
32nd CUNY Conference, CU Boulder (2019).
- Knowlton, T., Halberda, J., Pietroski, P., & Lidz, J.
Acquiring the universal quantifiers: every part together or each part on its own?
BUCLD 43, Boston, MA (2018).
- Wellwood, A., D. Odic, J. Halberda, T. Hunter, P. Pietroski, & J. Lidz.
Meaning more or most: evidence from 3-and-a-half year-olds (2012).
Chicago Linguistic Society (CLS). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
- Halberda, J., Pietroski, P., Hunter, T., Odic, D., Wellwood, A., & Lidz, J.
More and Most: Spatial vision affects word understandings on an ipad.
Poster presented at the Vision Science Society conference in Naples, Florida (2012).
- Odic, D., Hunter, T., Pietroski, P., Lidz, J., & Halberda, J. Children's understanding of mass-noun 'more'. Poster at Society for Research in Child Development conference in Montreal (2011).
- Odic, D., Ly, R., Hunter, T., Pietroski, P., Lidz, J., & Halberda, J. Number and area discrimination engage similar representations: evidence from discrimination tasks. Poster presented at the Vision Science Society conference in Naples, Florida (2010).
- Halberda, J., Lidz, J., Merickel, J., Hunter, T. & Pietroski, P. (2009). Approximate number representations in the acquisition of 'most'. Talk presented at BUCLD, the Boston University Conference on Language Development, November 6-8 Boston, MA.
- Halberda, J., Lidz, J., Hunter, T., Pietroski, P., & Ekman, K. Development of "most" comprehension in 42-60 month olds. Society for Research in Child Development, Denver, CO (2009).
- Halberda, J., Lidz, J., Pietroski, P., & Hunter, T. Set based visual processing in the acquisition of 'most'. Linguistic Society of America, San Francisco (2009).
- Hunter, T., Halberda, J., Lidz, J. and Pietroski P.
Beyond truth conditions: The semantics of 'most'. *Semantics and Linguistic Theory* (2008);
Linguistic Society of America, San Francisco (2009).
- Halberda, J., Hunter, T., Pietroski, T., and Lidz, J. An interface between language and vision: quantifier words and set-based processing. Vision Science Society conference (2008).

RECENT EXAMPLES OF UNIVERSITY and DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

at Rutgers

Advisory Board, Center for Cognitive Science, 2017-2020
New Brunswick Faculty Council, 2017-2019
Mellon Selection Committee, 2018-2021

at University of Maryland

Dean Review Committee: 2015.
Appointments Promotions and Tenure Committee, College of Arts and Humanities: 2013-14.
Academic Program Advisory Committee, College of Arts and Humanities: 2012-13, 08-10, 04-06.
Distinguished Dissertation Awards, University Committee: 2013, 2012, 2011.
Acting Chair, Department of Philosophy: Spring 2011.
Search Committee for Dean of Arts and Humanities: 2010-11.
Academic Program Advisory Committee, University of Maryland Campus: 2009-2011.
Graduate Director, Department of Philosophy, 2008-09.
Chair, Search Committee for joint position in Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.
Chair, Search Committee in Philosophy, 2006-07.
Chair, Search Committee in Linguistics: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07.
University Senate Executive Committee, 2006-2007.
Review of Undergraduate Degree Programs, McGill University, 2007.
Acting Graduate Director, Department of Linguistics, 2005-2006.

DISSERTATIONS SUPERVISED at the UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Masaaki Kamiya (Ph.D. in linguistics, 2005)
Scott Fults (Ph.D. in linguistics, 2006)
Utako Minai (Ph.D. in linguistics, 2006; co-supervisor with Jeff Lidz)
Heidi Tiedke (Ph.D. in philosophy, 2008)
Terje Lohndal (Ph.D. in linguistics, 2011)
Yu Izumi (Ph.D. in philosophy, 2012)
Kent Erickson (Ph.D. in philosophy, 2012)
Melissa Ebberts (Ph.D. in philosophy, 2013)
Chris Laterza (Ph.D. in linguistics, 2014)
Chris Vogel (Ph.D. in philosophy, 2015)
Tyler Knowlton (Ph.D. in linguistics expected 2021; co-supervisor with Jeff Lidz)

FELLOWSHIPS, PRIZES, HONORS, and AWARDS

McDonnell Foundation Research Network on “The Nature and Origins of the Human Capacity for Abstract Combinatorial Thought” (Susan Carey, PI, 2016-2020):
member of the Research Network; “axis head” for one of the three subgroups
Rutgers 250 Fellow (Nov. 10, 2016): awarded to 80 alumni who were invited to make presentations on the university’s 250th anniversary.
Context and Content Lectures, Institut Jean Nicod, École Normale Supérieure, 2013.
Faculty Fellow in the *Mind, Brain, Behavior* Program, Harvard University, 2007-2008.
Distinguished Scholar-Teacher, University of Maryland, 2007.
General Research Board, Semester Research Award; University of Maryland, Fall 2007, Fall 2000.
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC),
Individual Research Grant (April, 1993 - March, 1996), “Intentionality and Idealization.”
Québec Research Funds (FCAR), Team Grant member (September, 1992 - May, 1995),
“Scientific Status of a Theory of Meaning;” grant renewed (June 1995 - May 1998).
Prize (jointly awarded) in *Analysis* competition for authors 30 or under (1993).
Jacob Javits Fellow, 1986-90.

REFERENCES (upon request)