

PAUL M. PIETROSKI

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EMPLOYMENT

Current Position:

Professor, University of Maryland,
Department of Philosophy and Department of Linguistics (joint appointment).
hired as Associate Professor with tenure, 1998;
promoted to Full Professor, 2003;
named as Distinguished Scholar-Teacher, 2007.

Previous Position:

McGill University, Department of Philosophy.
Assistant Professor, 1990-1995;
Associate Professor with tenure, 1995-1998.

Visiting and Adjunct Appointments:

Faculty Fellow in the *Mind, Brain, Behavior Program*, Harvard University, 2007-2008.
Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, Spring 2008.
Adjunct Research Professor, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, 1996-1998.
Visiting Associate Professor, in Linguistics and Philosophy, University of Maryland, Spring 1997.

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, with minor in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990.
B.A. (highest honors), Rutgers College, 1986.

PUBLICATIONS

Books:

Events and Semantic Architecture. Oxford University Press (2005, pp. 267), paperback (2006);
to be included in *Oxford Scholarship Online* (www.oxfordscholarship.com).

Causing Actions. Oxford University Press (2000, pp. 274), paperback edition (2002);
included in *Oxford Scholarship Online* (www.oxfordscholarship.com).

Book Under Contract:

Semantics without Truth Values. Oxford University Press.

Articles

46. Concepts, Meanings, and Truth: First Nature, Second Nature, and Hard Work. Forthcoming in *Mind and Language*, 25th Anniversary Issue.
45. Lexicalizing and Combining. To appear in *Verb Concepts: Cognitive Science Perspectives on Verb Representation and Processing* (R. de Almeida and C. Manouilidou, eds.).
44. Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual Polyadicity. To appear in the *Oxford Handbook of Compositionality* (M. Werning, W. Hinzen, and E. Machery, eds.), Oxford University Press.
43. Minimalist Meaning, Internalist Interpretation. *Biolinguistics* 4:317-41 (2008).
42. Think of the Children: Comments on *Ignorance of Language*, by Michael Devitt. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86: 657-69 (2008).
41. Basic Operations, coauthored with Norbert Hornstein. To appear in *Spelling out Universal Grammar* (J. Fortuny and A. Gallego, eds.), special issue of the *Catalan Journal of Linguistics*.
40. Control and Local Reflexives: Copies as Vehicles for *De Se* Readings, coauthored with Norbert Hornstein. Forthcoming.
39. The Language Faculty, coauthored with Stephen Crain. To appear in *The Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science* (E. Margolis, S. Laurence, and S. Stich, eds.), Oxford University Press.
38. Systematicity via Monadicity. *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 7:343-374 (2007).
37. Interpreting Concatenation and Concatenates. *Philosophical Issues* 16:221-45 (2006).
36. Character Before Content. In *Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker* (J. Thomson and A. Byrne, eds.), 34-60, Oxford University Press (2006).
35. Induction and Comparison. *University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics* 15:157-90 (2006) <http://www.ling.umd.edu/publications/volume15/Pietroski.pdf>
34. Meaning Before Truth. In *Contextualism in Philosophy* (G. Preyer and G. Peters, eds.), 253-300, Oxford University Press (2005).
33. Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory, coauthored with Stephen Crain and Andrea Gualmini. In *The Innate Mind: structure and contents* (S. Laurence, P. Carruthers, and S. Stich, eds.), 175-197, Oxford University Press (2005).
32. Innate Ideas, coauthored with Stephen Crain. In *The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky* (J. McGilvray, ed.), 164-180, Cambridge University Press (2005).
31. Quantification and Second-Order Monadicity. *Philosophical Perspectives* 17: 259-298 (2003).
30. The Character of Natural Language Semantics. In *Epistemology of Language* (A. Barber, ed.), 217-256, Oxford University Press (2003).
29. Semantics and Metaphysics of Events. In *Contemporary Philosophy in Focus: on Davidson* (K. Ludwig, ed.), 137-162, Cambridge University Press (2003).
28. Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity without Synonymy. In *Chomsky and his Critics* (L. Antony and N. Hornstein, eds.), 179-214, Blackwell (2003).
27. Does every Sentence Like This Contain a Scope Ambiguity, coauthored with Norbert Hornstein. In *Belief in Meaning: Essays at the Interface* (W. Hinzen and H. Rott, eds.), 43-72, Hansel-Hohenhausen (2002).
26. Function and Concatenation. In *Logical Form and Language* (G. Preyer and G. Peters, eds.), 91-117, Oxford University Press (2002).
25. Why Language Acquisition is a Snap: reply to Pullum and Scholz, coauthored with Stephen Crain. *The Linguistic Review* 19: 163-183 (2002).
24. Dimensions of Natural Language coauthored with Juan Uriagereka. *University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics*, 192-219 (2001); reprinted in Juan Uriagereka, *Derivations: Exploring the Dynamics of Syntax* (Routledge 2002).
23. Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar, coauthored with Stephen Crain. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 24:139-186 (2001).
22. On Explaining That. *Journal of Philosophy* 97: 655-62 (2000).
21. The Undeclared Domain of Semantics. *Sats: The Nordic Journal of Philosophy* 1:161-76 (2000). Reprinted in *Reading Philosophy of Language* (J. Hornsby & G. Longworth, eds.), Blackwell (2005).
20. Compositional Quotation without Parataxis. In *Philosophy and Linguistics* (K. Murasugi & R. Stainton, eds.), Westview Press, 245-258 (1999).

19. Plural Descriptions as Existential Quantifiers in an Event Analysis.
University of Maryland Working Papers in Linguistics (1999).
18. Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency. *Mind* 107: 73-111 (1998).
17. Specifying Senses Innocently. *The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics* (D. Jutrovič, ed.), Pedagoška fakulteta Maribor, Slovenia, 318-333 (1998).
16. Moral Causation. *A Question of Values* (S. Brennan, et al., eds.), 39-61, Rodopi Press (1997).
15. Fregean Innocence. *Mind and Language* 11: 331-362 (1996).
14. Experiencing the Facts: critical notice of John McDowell's *Mind and World*.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 613-636 (1996).
13. Believing in Language, coauthored with Susan Dwyer. *Philosophy of Science* 63: 338-73 (1996).
12. What can Linguistics Teach us about Belief? *Penser L'esprit* (V. Rialle and D. Fisette, eds.), 113-124, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble (1996).
11. When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity,
coauthored with Georges Rey. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 46: 81-110 (1995).
10. Other Things Equal, The Chances Improve. *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Québec Studies vol. I* (M. Marion and R. Cohen, eds.), 259-273, Kluwer (1995).
9. Mental Causation for Dualists. *Mind and Language* 9: 336-366 (1994).
8. Executing the Second Best Option. *Analysis* 54: 201-207 (1994).
7. A Defense of Derangement. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 24: 95-118 (1994).
6. Un dérangement modulaire de la compétence linguistique
(A Modular Derangement of Linguistic Competence). *Lekton* 4:163-198 (1994).
5. Similarity and Innocent Semantics. *McGill Papers in Cognitive Science* (1994).
4. Between Humpty Dumpty and Stanley Fish.
Cahiers d'épistémologie, Université du Québec à Montréal (1993).
3. Possible Worlds, Syntax, and Opacity. *Analysis* 53: 270-280 (competition essay, 1993).
2. Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory. *Ethics* 103: 489-515 (1993).
1. Intentionality and Teleological Error. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 73: 267-282 (1992).

Encyclopedia Entries, Reviews, Commentaries, and Other Publications

17. No Derivation without Formalization, coauthored with Jeff Lidz.
To appear in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (2008).
16. Logical Form and LF. In *The Handbook of Philosophy of Language*
(E. Lepore and B. Smith, eds.), Oxford University Press (2006).
15. Events in Semantic Theory. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition (D. Borchert, ed.)
Detroit: Macmillan (2006).
14. Logical Form. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition (D. Borchert, ed.)
Detroit: Macmillan (2006).
13. Reply to Bouchard, coauthored with Stephen Crain. *Lingua* 116:64-68 (2006).
12. Innateness and Universal Grammar, coauthored with Stephen Crain.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan (2003).
11. Review: *Matters of Mind*, by Scott Sturgeon. *Mind* 111: 488-491 (2002).
10. Precis of *Causing Actions* and Replies to Commentators.
E-symposium on *Causing Actions: A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*
<http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/pietroskisymp.htm> (2001).
9. Review: *Knowledge of Meaning*, by Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal. *Mind* 109: 960-4 (2000).
8. Euthyphro and the Semantic: review-essay of Jerry Fodor, *Concepts*.
Mind and Language 15:341-349 (2000).
7. Logical Form. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-form> (1999), revised (2002), major revision (2004).
6. Keeping Grammar in Mind, coauthored with Susan Dwyer.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:781 (1999).
5. Prima Facie Obligation. *The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia* (C.Gray, ed.), 685-686,
Garland Press (1999).
4. A 'Should' Too Many (Commentary). *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 17:26-27 (1994).

3. First Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations (Commentary).
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:67-69 (1993).
2. Fodor Unscathed (Commentary). *Psychology* 93.4.10.fodor-representation.2.pietroski (1993).
1. Meaning and Evolution: review-essay of Ruth Millikan's *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*. *Annals of Scholarship* 6:318-330 (1990).

Multi-Author Papers

- T. Hunter, J. Halberda, J. Lidz, and P. Pietroski. Beyond Truth Conditions: the semantics of 'most'.
To appear in SALT 18, proceedings of the Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference.
- P. Pietroski, J. Lidz, T. Hunter, and J. Halberda.
The Meaning of 'Most': semantics, numerosity, and psychology.
To appear in *Mind and Language*.
- J. Lidz, T. Hunter, P. Pietroski, and J. Halberda.
Interface Transparency and the Psychosemantics of 'Most'. Under consideration.

Papers (in progress) to appear

Minimalism in Semantics. For the *Oxford Handbook on Linguistic Minimalism*.

PRESENTATIONS

Invited Mini-Courses

Semantics without Truth Values

Five lectures (15 hours), Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Linguistics (CASTL),
University of Tromsø, October 2009.

Semantics as Psychology

Four lectures (6 hours), international summer school, Beijing Normal University, July 2006.

From Davidson to Minimalism

Five lectures (15 hours), Federal University of Santa Catarina (Brazil), August 2005.

Some Things Philosophers Should Know About Linguistics (but might not have known to ask about)

Six lectures (18 hours), Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, Spring 2002.

Conference Presentations and Invited Lectures

TBA. Conference on Language Design (UQAM, Montreal, May 2010).

TBA. Society for Exact Philosophy (invited lecture, Kansas City, March 2010).

Second-Order Logic and Natural Language Semantics. Conference on Language and Adjoining
Systems, Vidya Bhavana Society (Udaipur, Rajasthan, February 2010).

Commentary at Semantics and Motor Control Conference. SUNY, Stony Brook (May 2009).

Meanings as Internalist Instructions. Seminar at Birkbeck College, University of London (May 2009).

Lexicalizing and Combining. SUNY, Stony Brook (April 2009).

Author Meets Critics session on Jeff King, *The Nature and Structure of Content*,
Americal Philosophical Association, Pacific Division (April 2009).

Meaning Internalism. Lecture in Linguistics as Cognitive Science series, NYU (March 2009).

Semantics and I-languages. Part of Symposium on Semantics and Number.

Linguistics Society of America (January 2009).

Meanings: what are they, and what are they good for?

University of Buffalo, 2008; University of Toronto (March 2009).

Constructing Human Concepts: what (I-)meanings are good for.

Rutgers University, 2008; University of Maryland, Cognitive Science Series (January 2009).

Lexicalizing and Combining. Verb Concepts Conference, Concordia University, 2008;

Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University, 2008.

Semantic Composition and the Languages of Thought. Brown University, 2008.

On Language and Human Thought. Mind, Brain, Behavior “Conversation with Critical Friends,”
 Harvard University, 2008. Video at <http://mbb.harvard.edu/resources/pastnews.php>

Concepts, Words, and Concepts: how to make a mind systematic.
 University of Massachusetts, Princeton University, Concordia University, 2008.

Semantic Composition: Implementing and Lexicalizing. University of Chicago, 2008.

‘Most’ Matters. Philosophy of Linguistics Session, APA Convention (Eastern Division), 2007.

Semantics Without Truth Values. Three sessions of “Internalist Explorations of Meaning”
 (Reading Group, Harvard University), Fall Term, 2007.

Human Language: You Know More Than You Think.
 Distinguished Scholar-Teacher Lecture, University of Maryland, 2007.

Systematicity, Conceptual Adicity, and Semantic Monadicity.
 University of St Andrews (*Arché*), 2007.

Big Ants, Good Logicians, and SOM-PredCalc. Adjectives Conference, St Andrews (*Arché*), 2007.

Systematic Thought via Monadic Language. McGill University, 2007.

Making Thought (More) Systematic. Philosophy of Language Conference, Dubrovnik, 2006.

Comment on Ludlow: Ellipsis Workshop, University of Western Ontario, 2006.

Concatenation and Grammar: How to be Systematic. Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, 2006.

To Be the Value of a Plural Variable, You Don’t Have to Be Plural (You Just Have to Be).
 Harvard University, 2005.

Meanings Before Truth-Conditions. Master Seminar on the Foundations of Cognitive Science,
 University of Arizona, 2005.

Concatenation and Thematic Relations. Cognitive Science Colloquium, University of Arizona, 2005.

Why are Determiners Conservative? Semantics Conference, University of São Paulo, 2005.

You Can’t Mean That (and You Didn’t Learn That). Davidson Conference, Florianopolis, 2005;
 Meaning and Communication Conference, Lisbon, 2005.

Comment on Heck. Semantics Workshop in honor of James Higginbotham, Rutgers, 2005.

Comment on Lepore and Ludwig. Author Meets Critics Session, Central APA, 2005.

Human Syntax. University of California at Irvine, 2005.

Linguistic Meanings as (Conjunctive, Second-Order) Concept-Instructions. MIT, 2004.

What Meanings Probably Are Not. Semantics Workshop, University of Michigan, 2004.

The Autonomy of Syntax (and why Philosophers Should Care). Univ. of Colorado at Boulder, 2004.

Strict Compositionality, Flexible Concepts. Conference on Compositionality, Paris, 2004.

Stimulus Poverty and Child Language. Semantics Workshop, University of Connecticut, 2004.

Quantification and Second-Order Monadicity. Georgetown University, 2003.

Comment on Hornsby: Philosophy of Language Workshop, Yale University, 2003.

Semantics and (Innocent) Second-Order Logic Forms.
 Semantics Conference, Carleton University, 2003.

Comment on Bealer: Chapel Hill Colloquium, University of North Carolina, 2003.

Second Generation Poverty of Stimulus Arguments.
 Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Part of Invited Symposium on Innateness), 2003.

Monadic Determiners and (Conjunctive) Neo-Davidsonian Semantics.
 Logic and Language Conference, Birmingham (England), 2003.

Monadic Determiners. Semantics Workshop, University of Southern California, 2003.

Comment on Johnson on Semantics and Awareness. APA invited session, Philadelphia, 2002.

Comment on Higginbotham on Compositionality.
 Semantics Workshop, University of Michigan, 2002.

What is a Theory of Action a Theory of?
 Causation and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, Ghent 2002.

Analyticity *a la Chomsky*. University of Delaware, 2002.

How to Become a Nativist about Language Acquisition, [joint presentation with Stephen Crain](#).
 Innateness and the Mind Workshop, Sheffield, 2002.

Conjunction and Concatenation. University of Southern California, 2002.

Comments on Braun & Saul: Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations.
 Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University, 2001.

Composition by Conjunction. From Signaling to Structured Communication Conference, Cornell University, 2001.

Causing Actions. University of Maryland Baltimore County, 2001.

Actions and Adjuncts (Again). Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, 2000.

Two Conceptions of Semantics. Stanford University, 2000.

Why *Does* the Mental (and the Moral and ...) Supervene on the Physical? Howard University, 2000.

The Character of Natural Language Semantics. Epistemology of Language Conference, Sheffield 2000.

Functions and Events. Semantics Workshop, Rutgers University, 2000; Univ. of Maryland, 1999.

Does every Sentence Like This Exhibit a Scope Ambiguity? (presentation of joint work) Interamerican Philosophy Conference, Puebla (Mexico), 1999.

Small Verbs, Complex Events. Carleton University, 1998; University of Maryland, 1997.

Agency, Adverbs, and Actions. University of North Carolina, University of Maryland, Johns Hopkins University, 1997.

Fregean Innocence. Naturalistic Semantics symposium (Maribor, Slovenia), LOGICA, 1996.

Substitutivity and 'Quote'-Clauses. Canadian Philosophical Association symposium, 1996.

Semantic Theory and the Objects of Thought. Rutgers University; European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1995.

Executing Options without Dilemma. Western Ontario conference on Canadian Morals and Politics, 1995.

What can Linguistics Teach us about Belief? Conference on *Cognition: from computational models to philosophy of mind*, Centre Jacques Cartier (Lyon, France), 1994.

Mental Causation. Drew University; Concordia University, 1994.

Similarity in Semantics. Canadian Philosophical Association, 1994.

Defending Derangement. CPA workshop on Convention and Communication, 1994.

Moral Causation. Western Ontario conference on *New Canadian Perspectives in Moral and Political Philosophy*, 1994.

Conflict without Dilemmas. 22nd Conference on Value Inquiry; University of Maryland, 1994.

Two Semantic Values for the Price of One. Philosophy and Cognitive Science Series, Concordia University, 1994.

Believing in Language, joint presentation with Susan Dwyer. Cognitive Society for the Advancement of Interdisciplinary Learning (Hood River, Oregon); Simon Frasier Univ., 1994.

Between Humpty Dumpty and Stanley Fish. Université du Québec à Montréal, Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie Comparée, 1994.

Moral Conflict and Moral Generalizations. Canadian Philosophical Association, 1992.

Narrow-Minded Causation, Canadian Philosophical Association; Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1992.

When is a Reductionist not a Reductionist? University of Maryland, 1991.

Intentionality and Evolutionary Error. Université de Montréal, 1991.

Other Things Being Equal. McGill University, 1989; Ohio State, Wesleyan University, 1990.

Collaborative Work Presented by Co-Authors at Refereed Conferences

Hunter, Halberda, Lidz, and Pietroski. Beyond truth conditions: The semantics of 'most'. Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 2008.

Halberda, Hunter, Pietroski, and Lidz. An interface between language and vision: quantifier words and set-based processing. The Vision Sciences Society (VSS), 2008.

Lidz, Halberda, Hunter, and Pietroski. Approximate and Exact Cardinality in the Acquisition of Most. Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD, biennial meeting), 2009.

RECENT EXAMPLES OF UNIVERSITY and DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

Chair, Search Committee in Linguistics: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07.
Chair, Search Committee in Philosophy, 2006-07.
Acting Graduate Director, Department of Linguistics, 2005-2006.
University Senate Executive Committee, 2006-2007.
Review of Undergraduate Degree Program, McGill University, 2007.
Graduate Director, Department of Philosophy, 2008-09.
Academic Program Advisory Committee, College of Arts and Humanities: 2004-06, 2008-10.
Chair, Search Committee for joint position in Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.
Academic Program Advisory Committee, University of Maryland: 2009-2010.

FELLOWSHIPS, PRIZES, and AWARDS

Faculty Fellow in the *Mind, Brain, Behavior* Program, Harvard University, 2007-2008.
Distinguished Scholar-Teacher, University of Maryland, 2007.
General Research Board, Semester Research Award; University of Maryland, Fall 2007.
General Research Board, Semester Research Award; University of Maryland, Fall 2000.
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC),
Individual Research Grant (April, 1993 - March, 1996), "Intentionality and Idealization."
Québec Research Funds (FCAR), Team Grant member (September, 1992 - May, 1995),
"Scientific Status of a Theory of Meaning;" grant renewed (June 1995 - May 1998).
Prize (jointly awarded) in *Analysis* competition for authors 30 or under (1993).
Jacob Javits Fellow, 1986-90.