Empathy versus Pride: The Influence of Emotional Appeals across Cultures

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This research examines the persuasive effect of emotional appeals on members of collectivist versus individualist cultures. The results of two experiments demonstrate that ego-focused (e.g., pride, happiness) versus other-focused (e.g., empathy, peacefulness) emotional appeals lead to more favorable attitudes for members of a collectivist culture, while other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals lead to more favorable attitudes for members of an individualist culture. Experiment 2 was conducted to examine the psychological mechanism underlying these effects. The results indicated that the generation of and elaboration on a relatively novel type of thought (individual thoughts for members of a collectivist culture, collective thoughts for members of an individualist culture) account for the persuasive effects found in this research. These results are interpreted within an ability-motivation framework, and theoretical implications involving cross-cultural persuasion effects are discussed.

A considerable amount of research in consumer behavior has examined how emotions are used in persuasion appeals. Researchers have focused on how emotions influence affective responses (Batra and Ray 1986), attention to the advertisement (Olney, Holbrook, and Batra 1991), brand and advertisement memories (Friestad and Thorson 1993), and attitudes (Edell and Burke 1987). However, while recent research in cultural psychology suggests that cultural orientation has a significant effect on processes of persuasion (Aaker and Maheswaran 1997; Triandis 1989) as well as patterns of emotions (Markus and Kitayama 1994; Matsumoto 1989), very little work has examined the differential effect of emotional appeals on persuasion across cultures. A growing interest in the globalization of marketing activities and the cross-cultural use of advertisements in particular makes this gap in the literature even more significant (see Han and Shavitt 1994). This research attempts to bridge the research on cultural orientation and emotion to examine how emotional appeals operate differently across cultures.

In addition, we explore the psychological mechanism underlying the persuasion effects of emotional appeals across cultures. In experiment 1, we demonstrate that the effect of emotions on attitudes is related to perceptions of self and other, which tend to vary systematically across cultures. In experiment 2, we examine the moderating effect of reference type on the persuasive effect of emotional appeals for members of individualist versus collectivist cultures and show that the persuasive effects of emotional appeals are mediated by the different type of thoughts generated and elaborated on by members of the two cultures.

EMOTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE SELF

Emotions have been viewed as a universal set of internal processes that are largely hardwired, arising when an event that is relevant to the concerns of an individual occurs (Darwin 1896). Since many concerns are shared across cultures, emotional experiences tend to be cross-culturally similar. In fact, research on emotions has documented universal consensus in evaluations of basic emotions such as evaluation, activity, and potency (e.g., Osgood, May, and Miron 1975), as well as specific emotions such as anger, fear, empathy, and surprise (e.g., Matsumoto 1989). However, although the recognition and experience of many emotions appears to be cross-culturally robust, significant differences exist as well.

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These differences tend to be attributed to systematic cultural variations in the concerns of individuals, which arise from distinct self-construal patterns (Triandis 1993).

**Differences in Self-Construal in Individualist versus Collectivist Cultures**

Individualism-collectivism is a cultural-level variable referring to the extent to which members of a culture tend to have an independent versus interdependent construal of the self (e.g., Hofstede 1980). In individualist cultures (e.g., the United States, Australia, and Canada), an independent self-construal, which refers to the self as comprising a unique set of internal attributes including motivations, traits, and values, tends to be fostered. In contrast, in collectivist cultures (e.g., China, Japan, and Taiwan) an interdependent self-construal, which refers to the self as inseparable from others and social context, tends to be fostered.

As a result of these distinct self-construals, the concerns of members of individualist versus collectivist cultures often vary. Individualists tend to be concerned with separating one’s self from others, displaying qualities of uniqueness and not being influenced by others. Consequently, the personal and subjective part of one’s emotional experience, to the exclusion of others, is salient. Collectivists tend to be concerned with affiliating with close others, maintaining connectedness, and blending the self/other boundary (Singelis 1994). Consequently, the interpersonal and intersubjective aspects of emotional experience are salient. In this light, “the self-structure functions as an individualized orienting, mediating, interpretive framework giving shape to what people notice and think about, to what they are motivated to do and to how they feel and their ways of feeling” (Markus and Kitayama 1994, p. 92).

**Persuasion Appeals and the Distinction between Ego-Focused and Other-Focused Emotions**

A growing amount of research has examined the role of emotions in consumer behavior (cf. Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). This work has primarily distinguished between emotions based on their content, valence, and levels of arousal, flow, or integration (e.g., Batra and Ray 1986; Edell and Burke 1987; Holbrook and Batra 1987; Kamp and MacInnis 1995; Stout, Homer, and Liu 1990). Despite this increased interest in the effect of emotions on persuasion, however, differences in emotions based on their primary referent of focus have not been examined in consumer behavior research. The recognition of this distinction in cultural psychology has led to the terms “ego-focused” and “other-focused,” which refer to the degree to which specific emotions systematically vary in the extent to which they follow from, and also foster or reinforce, an independent versus interdependent self (Markus and Kitayama 1991, p. 235). Ego-focused emotions (e.g., pride, happiness, frustration, anger) tend to be associated with an individual’s internal state or attributes, to the exclusion of others, and are consistent with the need for individual awareness, experience, and expression. In contrast, other-focused emotions (e.g., empathy, peacefulness, indebtedness, shame) tend to be associated with others in a social context or close others (i.e., family, friends, coworkers, political or religious groups, social class, or an ideological or national entity that is centrally important to the individual’s self-definition [Triandis 1994]) and are consistent with the need for unity, harmony, and the alignment of one’s actions with those of another.

Importantly, cultural orientation appears to influence the ability to recognize these two emotion types due to different levels of accessibility of ego-focused versus other-focused emotions across cultures. More specifically, acknowledging certain emotions is discouraged in some cultures, resulting in lowered levels of accuracy in their identification (Matsumoto 1989). Similarly, research on the self demonstrates that culturally self-relevant versus self-irrelevant emotions tend to be easier to recognize since there is a greater presence of cognitive categories with which to appraise and process them (Markus, Moreland, and Smith 1985). Lazarus (1982) argues that this cognitively based appraisal process, which tends to occur automatically, involves the recognition of certain aspects of a stimulus situation as emotionally relevant to an individual. Thus, culturally derived knowledge structures can be utilized in the appraisal process, driving the recognition of which aspects in a situation are self-relevant and consequently likely to be emotionally significant for the individual. As a result, having an interdependent versus independent self emphasizes particular domains of concern, leading to different levels of accessibility of ego-focused versus other-focused emotions, and thereby in-

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1 Individualism-collectivism has been treated as a dichotomous cultural level variable by many researchers and as an individual difference variable (e.g., idiocentrism-allocentrism, independent-interdependent) by others. In this research, we focus on individualism-collectivism as a cultural variable rather than an individual difference variable for two reasons. First, the cultural level conceptualization is consistent with Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1989), which provide the basis for theory development. Second, the within-culture variance of these constructs tends to be small relative to the between-culture variance (Triandis 1993). Thus, the theoretical predictions can be better tested by treating individualism-collectivism as a dichotomous cultural level variable.

2 It should be noted that the ego-focused versus other-focused emotion variable differentiates between emotions that otherwise may be perceived as similar if one were considering only valence or arousal. For example, although anger and shame are similarly negative and arousing, anger tends to be less interpersonally engaged than shame. Similarly, while happiness and empathy are both positive and moderately arousing, empathy tends to be more interpersonally engaged than happiness (Kitayama and Markus 1995).
fluencing the accessibility patterns of both emotional appraisal and arousal (Frijda and Mesquita 1994).

To clarify the distinction between ego-focused and other-focused emotions, consider the following story: A graduate student lost an award competition, unsuccessfully appealed it, and subsequently failed to get an academic job. Soon after, he entered his graduate program office and shot his advisor, the person who handled the appeal, several bystanders and himself (as cited in Morris and Peng [1994]). What emotions will a reader of this story feel most intensely? In individualist cultures, the personality traits or internal attributes of the student tend to be highlighted (e.g., “very bad temper,” “darkly disturbed man”; Morris and Peng 1994, p. 958), which may result in relatively more intense feelings of anger or disgust than in collectivist cultures. In collectivist cultures, others in the social context or the situation in which the student found himself tend to be highlighted (e.g., “did not get along with his advisor,” “isolation from Chinese community”; Morris and Peng 1994, p. 958), which may result in relatively more intense feelings of understanding or empathy than in individualist cultures.

Similarly, consider a scenario in which an individual wins a prize in a competitive contest. Ellsworth (1994) suggests that more intense feelings of pride for excelling may be experienced if the winner is from an individualist versus collectivist culture, while more intense feelings of guilt for having been helped by others and gaining the focus of attention may be experienced if the winner is from a collectivist versus individualist culture.

In both scenarios, the relative felt intensity of these emotions differs across cultures due to a varying focus of attention typically held by members of individualist cultures (where the primary referent tends to be the distinct self) versus collectivist cultures (where the primary referent tends to be close others and the social situation; cf. Smith et al. 1993). For example, when the referent of focus is a blocked individual goal or an abridged individual right, thereby highlighting the disengagement of the self from others, anger tends to be felt. In contrast, when the referent of focus is others in a situation or a collective goal that has been aided, thereby highlighting the synchrony between the self and others, empathy tends to be felt.

However, although this research suggests that cultural differences in the relative accessibility of the two emotion types exist, two points should be noted. First, there is considerable overlap concerning cross-cultural perceptions of what emotions are self-focused and other-focused (Matsumoto et al. 1988). Second, the differential levels of accessibility of the emotion types not only lead to cultural differences in felt intensity, they lead to variation in the relative frequency with which the two emotion types are experienced across cultures. To illustrate, Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (1991) gave college students in the United States and Japan a number of labels for emotions, some indigenous to America and others indigenous to Japan, and asked the participants to rate the frequency with which they felt the emotions in everyday life. American participants reported greater frequency of experiencing socially disengaged emotions (e.g., pride, anger), while Japanese participants reported greater frequency of experiencing socially engaged emotions (e.g., friendly feelings, feelings of indebtedness).

Finally, the literature on emotions and persuasion discriminates between the recognition of emotions depicted in advertisements and the felt emotional responses that such depictions can evoke. The recognition of the emotion depicted in an appeal tends to represent a cognitively based appraisal process and does not necessarily lead to arousal or the actual experience of emotion (Arnold 1960). However, emotional appeals tend to be created to evoke emotional reactions in consumers that, in turn, influence attitudes (Holbrook and Batra 1987). In the present set of experiments, we examine the cultural differences in the ability to appraise certain types of emotional appeals as culturally relevant. As a result, we focus on the types of emotions depicted in advertising appeals rather than the emotional responses evoked in response to those appeals.

Cultural Differences in Ability: Differential Effectiveness of Ego-Focused and Other-Focused Emotional Appeals

In this research, we posit that the cultural differences in accessibility of emotion types may lead to differential levels in the ability to recognize and experience these emotions, thereby affecting their effectiveness in persuasion contexts. Specifically, the heightened accessibility of ego-focused emotions in individualist cultures, or other-focused emotions in collectivist cultures, should increase the ability of members of such cultures to process incoming appeals relying on those emotions. Thus, we predict that ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals should have greater influence on attitudes for members of individualist cultures, and other-focused (vs. ego-focused) emotional appeals should have greater influence on attitudes for members of collectivist cultures.

Further, we suggest that the psychological mechanism underlying these effects is the difference in self-construal patterns, which should be reflected in the types of thoughts generated by members of the two cultures in persuasion contexts. Specifically, because members of individualist versus collectivist cultures tend to differ in their perceptions of the self, and because certain emotions vary in the extent to which they access these perceptions, the nature of thoughts evoked by the two emotional appeal types should vary systematically for members of the two cultures. Persuasive appeals relying on ego-focused, as opposed to other-focused, emotions should lead to more favorable attitudes for members of individualist cultures because they access the independent self (self-as-distinct-from-others), which can be measured by the number of generated individual thoughts (i.e., thoughts relating to
the self as a distinct individual). In contrast, appeals relying on other-focused, as opposed to ego-focused, emotions should lead to more favorable attitudes for members of collectivist cultures because they access the interdependent self (self-in-relation-to-others) and thus can be measured by the number of generated collective thoughts (i.e., thoughts relating to close others). Therefore, we suggest that the attitudes toward an appeal relying on an ego-focused or other-focused emotion are mediated by the nature of cognitive responses. Specifically,

**H1a:** Members of individualist cultures will have more favorable attitudes when exposed to ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals.

**H1b:** Members of collectivist cultures will have more favorable attitudes when exposed to other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals.

**H2a:** For members of individualist cultures, the relationship between ego-focused appeals and attitudes will be mediated by individual thoughts.

**H2b:** For members of collectivist cultures, the relationship between other-focused appeals and attitudes will be mediated by collective thoughts.

### EXPERIMENT 1

#### Overview

The objective of experiment 1 is to examine whether different types of emotional appeals produce asymmetric persuasion effects for members of collectivist versus individualist cultures and to determine the extent to which attitudes toward ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals are mediated by individual versus collective thoughts. To achieve these objectives, we use two positively valenced emotions (which varied across conditions) to create advertising appeals with positively valenced content (which remained constant across conditions). In experiment 1, the two appeals evoked pride (ego-focused emotion) or empathy (other-focused emotion), which were selected for two reasons. First, the research on emotion and culture suggests that they are strong examples of ego-focused and other-focused emotions (Markus and Kitayama 1994). Pride tends to involve one’s internal attributes as the primary referent and fosters independent feelings, separation from others, and distinctiveness. In contrast, empathy tends to involve others’ feelings or attributes as a primary referent, fostering friendly feelings, feelings of affiliation, and connectedness. Second, both pride and empathy are used in advertising appeals in collectivist as well as individualist cultures (Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty 1986; Mueller 1987). The influence that these two types of emotional appeals have on attitudes and thoughts is examined. Thus, experiment 1 relies on a 2 (emotional appeal type: ego-focused vs. other-focused) × 2 (cultural orientation: individualism vs. collectivism) between-subjects design.

#### Method

Participants were undergraduates recruited from an American university (n = 60; mean age = 21.52, female = 75 percent, all were born and raised in the United States, 87 percent were Caucasian) and a Chinese university (n = 90; mean age = 19.12, female = 63 percent, all were born and raised in Shanghai, 100 percent were native Chinese) to participate in a new brand study for $5 and 10 rmb, respectively. The beer product category, which is relevant for participants in both cultures, was selected because both ego-focused and other-focused emotional advertisements could be created. In the cover story, participants read the following excerpt:

A large-scale beer manufacturer is planning to introduce a new brand of beer to the U.S. (China) market—named Ohio Flag. We would like to know what you think about it before it is introduced. In the last month, the manufacturer has asked consumers to taste the beer and list the attributes that make this new brand of beer unique from other beers they have tried. You will be asked to read some of their statements to give you a feel about what Ohio Flag beer is like. Then, we will give you an example of the potential print advertising message created for Ohio Flag. We want to know both your feelings and thoughts about the beer as well as the advertisement.

To enhance the realism of the cover story, participants were given consumer excerpts that included five one-sentence quotes, all of which favorably described the beer on an attribute pretested to be important across cultures (bottle design, taste of beer, number of calories, aroma, and level of carbonation). For example, participants read that one consumer felt that “the carbonation is just right—not too fizzy, but it has zip.” We created positively valenced appeals, both in terms of emotion and content, for two reasons. First, since most advertisements are created with the goal of approach versus avoidance, external validity is heightened. Second, the reliance on positively valenced emotions in particular reduces the potential of a confound between cultural accessibility and valence. To illustrate, Markus and Kitayama (1994) note that anger is a negative emotion for collectivists, not only because of its valence but because of a feeling of perceived disengagement from others—which may be an emotion that is less accessible for collectivists versus individualists.

Next, participants were given the print advertisement in which the positively valenced emotional appeal was manipulated, followed by a series of questions regarding participants’ thoughts and attitudes toward the advertisement and brand. Participants were then given an unrelated five-to-seven-minute filler task (in which they were asked to list likable and unlikable celebrities who were highly
relevant to the product categories of automobiles and dental care products), followed by demographic questions. Then, participants were asked if they drank beer (1 = yes, 2 = no); if yes, how frequently (1 = more than once a week, 2 = once a week, 3 = once a month, 4 = once a year, 5 = less than once a year); and to rate their knowledge of beer (1 = extremely limited, 5 = extensive).\(^3\) Finally, participants completed a set of manipulation checks and Singelis’s (1994) Independent-Interdependent Scale.

Independent Variables

**Cultural Orientation.** Past research on cultural orientation suggests that the United States tends to be highly individualistic and China tends to be highly collectivistic (Hofstede 1980). Therefore, university subjects in the United States and China, matched in demographic profile, were recruited to participate in this experiment. The original questionnaire was drafted in English, then translated into Chinese. Accuracy of the Chinese version was verified via a back-translation procedure using external translators (Hui and Triandis 1985).

**Emotional Appeal Type.** To manipulate emotional appeal type, two print advertisements were created. They were made to be as similar as possible, varying only in the target emotion. In the pride appeal, participants read, “Acing the last exam. Winning the big race. Receiving deserved recognition. Ohio Flag Beer. Celebrating life’s accomplishments.” In the empathy appeal, participants read, “Reminiscing with old friends. Enjoying time together with family during the holidays. Relaxing near the fire with best friends. Ohio Flag beer. Celebrating the relationships that matter most.”

To ensure that these appeals were perceived as depicting the target emotion in both cultures, a pretest was conducted whereby American (n = 10) and Chinese (n = 10) participants were asked to “please indicate how much the following emotions describe the advertisement for Ohio Flag beer, by circling one number for each word below” for each appeal (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). Drawing on Frijda (1986) and Edell and Burke (1987), this list included three pride-related emotions (proud, confident, excited; Cronbach’s α = .90) and three empathy-related emotions (warmhearted, emotional, moving; Cronbach’s α = .93), as well as 37 filler emotions. Each message depicted the intended emotion (F( empathy) = 12.02, p < .01; F( pride) = 3.02, p < .05), and no differences across cultural orientation were found (F < 1). In addition, when American and Chinese participants rated the brand name, Ohio Flag, on the pride-related and empathy-related emotions, no significant effects involving the depicted emotions and culture were found (F( s) < 1).

Dependent Variables

**Attitudes.** Participants completed three attitude questions involving the advertisement (1 = bad, not at all likable, unfavorable; 7 = good, likable, favorable) and brand (1 = bad, not at all likable, unfavorable; 7 = good, likable, favorable). In addition, participants were asked how much they liked the brand of beer (1 = extremely dislike, 7 = extremely like), would they try this brand of beer (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes), and would they buy this brand of beer the next time they saw it in a store (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes). An average of these responses led to a three-item advertisement attitude index (Cronbach’s α = .95) and a six-item brand attitude index (Cronbach’s α = .86).

**Cognitive Responses.** Two sets of independent raters, two American raters for the individualist participants’ thoughts and two Chinese raters for the collectivist participants’ thoughts, categorized cognitive responses. American raters coded the thoughts in English, while Chinese raters, both of whom were bilingual but born and raised in Shanghai, coded the thoughts in Chinese. To ensure that both sets of raters coded the thoughts similarly, all were trained in cognitive response analysis and given a series of examples of each thought type. Both sets of raters coded the common set of examples similarly and were encouraged to ask the authors any questions of clarification when they coded subsequent thoughts (Brislin 1980).

Adapted from Meyers-Levy and Peracchio (1996) and Sujan, Bettman, and Baumgartner (1993), cognitive responses were coded in terms of individual thoughts (thoughts relating to the self as a distinct individual; any thought that included the use of “me” or “I” as the primary subject; e.g., “I could really imagine myself trying this beer”) and collective thoughts (thoughts relating to just close others; any thought that included family members or friends as the primary subject; e.g., “My mom could appreciate this brand”). In cases where both individual and collective thoughts were included in a sentence (e.g., “My family and I would love this beer”), coders double coded the thoughts as individual and collective.\(^4\) Finally, product-related thoughts (e.g., “The beer

\(^3\) Although the drinking age differs in the United States and China (the drinking age in the United States is 21; no drinking age exists in China), no differences in product category knowledge or relevance between the two samples was found. Approximately 65 percent of the Chinese participants and 80 percent of the American participants drink beer; both drink it approximately once a week (modal response). In addition, Chinese participants’ self-reported knowledge of the beer category is similar to that of American participants (X\(^2\) knowsubject = 2.74; F < 1). Finally, an additional set of analyses was run excluding American participants under the age of 21. The pattern of results with this subset mirrored that found with the overall American sample.

\(^4\) Lin (1981) notes that the Chinese (vs. English) language relies on a fewer number of pronouns because of the ability to create sentences that consist of only the predicate, rather than the subject and predicate. The subject (e.g., a pronoun) may not be mentioned because it is either impossible or unnecessary (e.g., if the pronoun “she” was used in a
seemed of high quality”), advertising-related thoughts (e.g., “The images in the ad were really nice”), and irrelevant thoughts (thoughts that were theoretically meaningless; e.g., “Where would I buy the beer?”) were also coded. However, since they were not involved in the hypotheses, they are not mentioned further. Interrater agreement was high (95 percent agreement for Chinese coders, 91 percent for American coders). When discrepancies existed, coders were instructed to discuss them until a consensus was formed, a process that typically took less than a minute.

Results

The hypotheses were tested based on a 2 (emotional appeal type) \(\times\) 2 (cultural orientation) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). Three covariates were used (separately) in each analysis reported below: product category usage, frequency of usage, and self-rated category knowledge. None of the covariates was significant in the analyses, so they will not be discussed below. Unless otherwise specified, \(df = 1, 147\).

Manipulation Checks. The results of a two-way ANOVA indicated that the emotional-appeal-type manipulation worked as expected. When asked to indicate the extent to which the emotions describe the Ohio Flag beer advertisement, participants rated the empathy appeal (\(\bar{X} = 4.93\)) higher than the pride appeal (\(\bar{X} = 4.26\)) on empathy-related emotions (Cronbach’s \(\alpha = .87\); \(F = 3.64, p < .05\)). Similarly, participants rated the pride appeal (\(\bar{X} = 5.39\)) higher than the empathy appeal (\(\bar{X} = 4.48\)) on pride-related emotions (Cronbach’s \(\alpha = .93\); \(F = 5.12, p < .05\)). Moreover, the advertising appeals were generally perceived as being either ego-focused or other-focused as intended. As expected, the pride appeal evoked more individual thoughts (\(\bar{X} = .64\)) than did the empathy appeal (\(\bar{X} = .46\); \(F = 2.77, p < .05\)). The empathy appeal evoked marginally more collective thoughts (\(\bar{X} = .35\)) than the pride appeal (\(\bar{X} = .24\); \(F = 1.60, p < .10\)). No other significant effects were found.

To ensure that the individualism-collectivism cultural variable was tapped through the use of American versus Chinese participants, an interdependence-independence index was created by averaging the 31 items of the Singelis (1994) scale (e.g., “I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person,” “It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group,” “My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me”; Cronbach’s \(\alpha = .90\)). Consistent with Hofstede (1980), American participants (\(\bar{X} = 4.1\)) received higher independent scores than did Chinese participants (\(\bar{X} = -.22\); \(F = 6.36, p < .01\)).5 No other significant effects were found.

Attitudes. An ANOVA on attitude toward the advertisement yielded no significant main effects. Hypothesis 1a, which suggested that members of individualist cultures have more favorable attitudes when exposed to appeals relying on ego-focused versus other-focused emotions, was not supported. Further, Hypothesis 1b, which suggested that members of collectivist cultures have more favorable attitudes when exposed to appeals relying on other-focused versus ego-focused emotions, was not supported.

However, a significant interaction was found on both attitudes toward the advertisement (\(F = 17.20, p < .001\)) and brand (\(F = 12.13, p < .001\)), which yielded results in the opposite direction of what was predicted. Members of the individualist culture had more favorable advertisement attitudes when exposed to appeals relying on the other-focused emotion (\(\bar{X} = 5.08\)) than ego-focused emotion (\(\bar{X} = 3.87\); \(F = 16.73, p < .001\)). Further, members of the collectivist culture had more favorable advertisement attitudes when exposed to advertising appeals relying on the ego-focused emotion (\(\bar{X} = 4.83\)) than the other-focused emotion (\(\bar{X} = 4.10\); \(F = 4.08, p < .05\)).

Analysis of brand attitudes revealed the same pattern of results, with members of the individualist culture reporting more favorable brand attitudes when they viewed the advertising appeal featuring the other-focused versus ego-focused emotion (\(F = 11.97, p < .01\)), and members of the collectivist culture exhibiting marginally more favorable brand attitudes when viewing the advertising appeal featuring the ego-focused versus other-focused emotion (\(F = 2.81, p < .09\)). This unexpected pattern of results is discussed below (see Fig. 1).

Cognitive Responses. To examine the extent to which the relationship between ego-focused appeals and attitudes is mediated by the number of individual thoughts for members of individualist cultures, four analyses were conducted (for both \(A_{\text{AD}}\) and \(A_{\text{AB}}\)): (a) individualist participants have more favorable attitudes when exposed to an ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeal; (b) ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals lead to more individual thoughts; (c) individual thoughts lead to more favorable attitudes; and (d) ego-focused versus other-focused emotions are not a significant predictor of attitudes in a model that includes both emotional appeal type and thought type (Baron and Kenny 1986).

A conceptually similar set of analyses was conducted to determine if the relationship between ego-focused appeals

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5 Note that Singelis (1994) conceptualizes independence and interdependence as two individual-level dimensions. However, in this research, a factor analysis of the 31 items yielded only one factor, which may have been due to limited sample size or insufficient situational variability in the items to reflect distinct independent and interdependent dimensions.
and attitudes is mediated by the number of collective thoughts for members of collectivist cultures.

As highlighted above in the failed support for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b, the first criterion was not supported; rather it was reversed. Further, the remaining criteria (b–d) received no support (p’s > .10). Therefore, the predicted mediation process was not supported.

However, in line with the results involving attitudes, a systematic pattern did occur with individual and collective thoughts, but in the opposite direction of what was expected. The number of individual thoughts did not differ in the two emotional appeal type conditions for members of the individualist culture (F < 1) but was higher for members of the collectivist culture when exposed to the appeal evoking the ego-focused emotion (X = .80) versus the other-focused emotion (X = .33; F = 3.27, p < .05). Further, the number of collective thoughts did not differ for the two emotional appeal types for members of the collectivist culture (F < 1) but was higher for members of the individualist culture when exposed to the appeal evoking the other-focused (X = .39) versus ego-focused emotion (X = .07; F = 4.98, p < .05).

To further examine this pattern of results, an ad hoc mediation test was conducted on the reverse relationship predicted in Hypotheses 2a and 2b. First, we examined the extent to which the relationship between ego-focused appeals and attitudes is mediated by the number of individual thoughts for members of collectivist cultures. Consistent with analysis a, collectivist participants had more favorable attitudes when exposed to an ego-focused ver-
sus other-focused emotional appeal ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .60, p < .01; \beta_{A{\text{AB}}} = .41, p < .01$). Consistent with analysis $b$, ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals led to more individual thoughts for collectivists ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .92, p < .01; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .52, p < .01$). Consistent with analysis $c$, individual thoughts led to more favorable attitudes for collectivists ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .16, p = .01; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .16, p < .01$). Finally, in partial support of analysis $d$, individual thoughts was a marginally significant predictor of attitudes ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .72, p < .01; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .37, p < .07$), and ego-focused emotional appeal was a significant predictor of attitudes ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .48, p < .01; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .34, p < .01$).

Next, we examined the extent to which the relationship between other-focused appeals and attitudes is mediated by the number of collective thoughts for members of individualist cultures. Consistent with analysis $a$, individualist participants had marginally more favorable attitudes when exposed to an other-focused versus ego-focused advertising appeal ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .73, p < .05; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .49, p < .07$). Consistent with analysis $b$, other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals led to marginally more collective thoughts for individualists ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .46, p < .06; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .47, p < .06$). Consistent with analysis $c$, collective thoughts led to significantly more favorable attitudes for individualists ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .39, p < .04; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .36, p < .01$). Finally, in support of analysis $d$, collective thoughts were marginally significant ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .32, p < .09; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .37, p < .03$), but other-focused emotional appeal was not significant ($\beta_{A{\text{AD}}} = .59, p < .12; \beta_{A{\text{BA}}} = .34, p < .21$) when predicting attitudes.

Together, these results provide some support for the notion that the relationship between ego-focused emotional appeals and attitudes may be partially mediated by individual thoughts for collectivists, while the relationship between other-focused emotional appeals and attitudes may be mediated by collective thoughts for individualists.

**Discussion**

Previous research has focused on differences in the relative accessibility of cognitive categories for ego-focused and other-focused emotions across cultures due to differences in self-construal. This variation in accessibility implies a differential ability to recognize and experience one type of emotional appeal as opposed to the other, suggesting that individuals are experts at processing emotions that are relevant to their self-construal, doing so in a relatively automatic manner (Grunert 1996). Based on this premise, experiment 1 was conducted to determine the differential levels of effectiveness of ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals on attitudes of members of individualist versus collectivist cultures. In contrast to the expected results that would follow from cultural differences in ability, however, appeals relying on ego-focused versus other-focused emotions were more persuasive for members of collectivist cultures, while appeals relying on other-focused versus ego-focused emotions were more persuasive for members of individualist cultures. In addition, the predicted mediation process did not occur. Instead, attitudes toward other-focused emotional appeals appear to be mediated in part by collective thoughts for individualists, while attitudes toward ego-focused emotional appeals appear to be mediated by individual thoughts for collectivists.

Thus, although the predicted differences in ability may exist across cultures, another mechanism appears to drive the results observed in experiment 1. In particular, other antecedents that affect the processing of appeals may be more important. One such antecedent is motivation to process persuasive messages (MacInnis and Jaworski 1989; MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991).

**Motivation versus Ability: Cultural Differences in the Effectiveness of Emotional Appeals**

Previous research suggests that the emotions pride and empathy are used in advertising appeals in both cultures. However, the relative frequency with which they are used in the two cultures may vary. If so, relative differences in the levels of novelty of these appeals may exist across cultures. Appeals involving other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals may be relatively more novel in individualist cultures, while appeals involving ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals may be relatively more novel in collectivist cultures. Encountering either cosmetically or substantively novel stimuli can increase motivation to process messages (Goodstein 1993). Novel stimuli, which are often operationalized via the use of unique executional elements within an advertisement (e.g., unusual cinematography; Alsop 1988), automatically capture attention (Berlyne 1960), thereby increasing the likelihood that individuals will switch from relatively automatic modes of processing to more strategic modes in an attempt to resolve any ambiguity of the stimulus or to understand its novel properties (Grunert 1996).

Perhaps more important, novel stimuli have a secondary effect: beyond increasing elaboration at an absolute level, novel stimuli change the nature of elaboration. For example, Oliver, Robertson, and Mitchell (1993) show that novel stimuli provoke a different kind of elaboration (e.g., imaginal rather than analytical). In this light, there are two components of the novel stimulus that are critical to the process underlying the results found in experiment 1: (1) the amount of elaboration and (2) the nature of the elaboration. That is, the novel stimulus (other-focused emotional appeals for individualists, ego-focused emotional appeals for collectivists) may lead to an increased motivation to elaborate on the appeal. However, the increased elaboration is specific in nature; the thoughts elaborated on are novel (collective thoughts for individualists, individual thoughts for collectivists) and positively valenced (because the appeal contained positively valenced content and emotions). Thus, an increased amount of...
elaboration on a positively valenced stimulus generates positively valenced thoughts, leading to more favorable attitudes (Haugtvedt and Petty 1992). In contrast, when individuals encounter a more common or typical advertising appeal, they may be less likely to spontaneously elaborate (Goodestein 1993), reducing the likelihood that novel, positively valenced thoughts would arise and more favorable attitudes would result.

In sum, although members of individualist cultures may have a differential ability to process ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals, they may process the appeals in a relatively automatic manner due to higher levels of familiarity with such stimuli. In contrast, when they encounter a positively valenced appeal that is novel (e.g., based on other-focused emotions), they may become motivated to engage in a particular type of elaborative processing, thereby generating novel (i.e., collective) and positively valenced thoughts and more favorable attitudes. Similarly, for members of collectivist cultures, the presentation of a positively valenced appeal that is novel may capture attention and result in the activation of relatively inaccessible but available knowledge structures representing the self-as-distinct-from-others (i.e., individual thoughts). Increased elaboration on this novel, positively valenced stimulus should lead to more favorable attitudes. Experiment 2 was conducted to determine if this mechanism underlies the results of experiment 1.

Examining the Psychological Mechanism: Self- versus Other-Referencing

To examine the extent to which elaboration on novel thoughts explains the results found in experiment 1, we introduce the variable, referencing type (self- vs. other-referencing), and examine its moderating effect on thought type. Self-referencing refers to the process of relating incoming information to aspects of the self-structure stored in memory, such as internal traits or personal experiences (Burnkrant and Unnava 1995; Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1996). Manipulations such as the use of second-person verbal information (“You”) in advertising copy is enough to prompt significant self-referencing (Debevec and Romeo 1992). This manipulation makes the self-structure salient, increasing the likelihood that individuals will relate the persuasion information to their self, and leads to increased elaboration and recall of the stimulus (Bower and Gilligan 1979).

Results of experiment 1 indicate that the persuasive effect of ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals on members of collectivist cultures is accompanied by an increase in individual thoughts. If elaboration on these individual thoughts accounts for the increase in favorable attitudes of collectivist cultures when exposed to ego-focused emotional appeals (which are positively valenced), directly encouraging them to consider themselves as unique individuals, via self-referencing, should further prime these relatively inaccessible knowledge structures and enhance the effects found in experiment 1. In contrast, self-referencing should not enhance the persuasive effect of other-focused emotional appeals for members of individualist cultures, which was accompanied by an increased number of collective thoughts in experiment 1. Rather, inducing members of individualist cultures to think of relationships with close others should enhance the persuasive effect of other-focused emotions. We call this manipulation “other-referencing,” which refers to the process by which an individual is explicitly encouraged to consider significant others (operationalized as close friends or family members) when processing the information. Previous research has shown that the referencing of a close other, about whom a well-articulated memory structure has been developed, results in outcome patterns similar to those found with self-referencing (Bower and Gilligan 1979). Thus, other-referencing should lead to an increase in collective thoughts for members of individualist cultures and an enhanced persuasive effect of other-focused emotions.

In sum, if members of collectivist cultures elaborate on individual thoughts when exposed to ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals, explicitly encouraging self-referencing should enhance the effects found in experiment 1. Collectivists should have more favorable attitudes when viewing ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing (as opposed to other-referencing), while no such effect should result for members of individualist cultures who should automatically self-reference across conditions. Similarly, members of individualist cultures should have more favorable attitudes when viewing other-focused emotional appeals that induce other-referencing versus self-referencing, while no such effect should result for members of collectivist cultures who are likely to automatically other-reference across conditions.

Further, given the novel thought type mechanism, attitudes toward the emotional appeal should be mediated by thought type. Therefore, the set of results involving cognitive responses found in experiment 1 should be replicated. In addition, referencing type should moderate this process such that attitudes toward an ego-focused emotional appeal that induce self-referencing should be mediated by individual thoughts for members of collectivist cultures. In contrast, attitudes toward an other-focused emotional appeal that induces other-referencing should be mediated by collective thoughts for members of individualist cultures.

H3a: Members of individualist cultures will have more favorable attitudes when exposed to other-focused emotional appeals that induce other-referencing, as opposed to self-referencing.

H3b: Members of collectivist cultures will have more favorable attitudes when exposed to ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing, as opposed to other-referencing.

H4a: For members of individualist cultures, the re-
relationships between other-focused emotional appeals, which induce other-referencing versus self-referencing, and attitudes will be mediated by collective thoughts.

**H4b:** For members of collectivist cultures, the relationship between ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing versus other-referencing and attitudes will be mediated by individual thoughts.

**EXPERIMENT 2**

**Overview**

The objective of experiment 2 is to assess the robustness of the results of experiment 1 and examine the psychological mechanism underlying the unexpected effects. Consequently, three changes were made from experiment 1. First, the moderating effect of referencing type on the persuasive effect of emotional appeal type on attitudes of members of the two cultures is examined. Thus, experiment 2 relies on a between-subjects design: 2 (emotional appeal type: ego-focused vs. other-focused) × 2 (cultural orientation: individualism vs. collectivism) × 2 (referencing type: self-referencing vs. other-referencing).

Second, to ensure generalizability, experiment 2 relies on another advertisement type (involving a visual picture in the appeal), another product category (film), and another set of ego-focused and other-focused emotions. Film was selected as the product category based on the similar criteria outlined in experiment 1. First, both ego-focused and other-focused emotional advertisements could be created for film. Second, film tends to be a relevant product for participants in both cultures. Third, the referencing type manipulation can be enhanced by highlighting photographs of an individual versus a collective group. Finally, film tends to be a relatively more utilitarian product category than beer (Ratchford 1987, app.). Since advertisements for self-expressive product categories (e.g., beer) may vary more than utilitarian product categories across cultures, noise accounted for by possible cultural variation in product category advertising appeals may be reduced.

Happiness and peacefulness were selected as the basis for the ego-focused emotion and other-focused emotional appeals, respectively, for two reasons. First, Markus and Kitayama (1994) suggest they are strong examples of the focal emotion types. Happiness tends to involve one’s (vs. others’) internal feelings of pleasure as a referent of focus (Chiasson, Dube, and Blondin 1996). In fact, based on data from 15 cultures, Matsumoto (1989) found that people with more independent versus interdependent selves were more likely to correctly identify emotional expressions of happiness. For people with interdependent selves, positive emotional expressions tend to be used as public actions in the service of maintaining interpersonal harmony and, therefore, are not regarded as particularly diagnostic of inner feelings of happiness. Peacefulness was chosen as the basis for the other-focused emotional appeal because it fosters relational, social emotions of modesty, harmony, and restraint (Triandis 1994). Further, collectivist participants report experiencing emotions related to peacefulness more frequently than individualist participants (Kitayama et al. 1991). Second, both happiness and peacefulness have been used in advertising appeals in collectivist as well as individualist cultures (Hong, Muderrisoglu, and Zinkhan 1987; Mueller 1987).

**Pilot Experiment**

**Overview.** The focus of experiment 2 is to examine the effect of self- and other-referencing on the elaborative effects found in response to the emotional advertising appeals used in experiment 1. However, implicit in experiment 2 is also an attempt to determine whether emotional appeal types can be made malleable by crossing emotional appeal type with referencing type. For example, while pride embedded in appeals has traditionally been treated as ego-focused, can an appeal that focuses on being proud of close others (e.g., family and friends) be characterized as other-focused? To address this question, a pilot experiment was conducted where experiment 1 was replicated with one important change: the referent of focus in the pride and empathy appeals was manipulated to be other-focused and ego-focused, respectively. If emotional appeal type varies with a change in the referent of focus, the pattern of results found in experiment 1 should be eliminated. Further, such results would provide justification for manipulating referencing type to alter the focus of the emotion depicted in experiment 2 stimuli.

**Method.** Participants were undergraduates recruited from an American university (n = 30; mean age = 20.12, female = 60 percent, all were born and raised in the United States, 87 percent were Caucasian) and from a Chinese university (n = 30; mean age = 19.73, female = 50 percent, all were born and raised in Shanghai, 100 percent were native Chinese) to participate in a new brand study for $5 and 10 rmb, respectively. All aspects of the procedure remained the same with the exception that the referent of focus in the pride versus empathy appeals changed. In the pride appeal, participants read, “Your friend just aced an exam. Your sister just won a race. They receive deserved recognition. Ohio Flag Beer. Celebrating their accomplishments.” In the empathy appeal, participants read, “Reminiscing with old pictures. Enjoying time alone conjuring up memories. Relaxing near the fire,
smiling. Ohio Flag beer. Celebrating you—who matters most."

Results. The pilot analysis involved a 2 (emotional appeal type) × 2 (cultural orientation) between-subjects ANOVA. Unless otherwise specified, df = 1, 57.

The results of a two-way ANOVA indicated that the emotional appeal manipulation worked as expected. Participants rated the empathy appeal (X = 5.08) higher than the pride appeal (X = 4.04) on empathy-related emotions (Cronbach’s α = .87; F = 5.00, p < .03). Similarly, participants rated the pride appeal (X = 5.92) higher than the empathy appeal (X = 4.83) on pride-related emotions (Cronbach’s α = .90; F = 3.85, p < .05). Moreover, the advertising appeals were generally perceived as being either ego-focused or other-focused as intended with the new manipulations. Specifically, when asked to rate the extent to which these photographs made them focus on themselves (translated into Chinese, and back-translated using external translators (Hui and Triandis 1985). Specifically, when asked to rate the extent to which the photographs made them focus on their own self ("Rate the extent to which the photograph made you think about yourself/your personal experiences’’; r = .86; Burnkrant and Uvnana 1995) or others ("Rate the extent to which the photograph made you think about family or friends/experiences with family or friends’’; r = .83), participants rated the empathy appeal (X = 4.60) higher than the pride appeal (X = 3.19; F = 8.36, p < .01) on the self-referencing measures. Further, they rated the pride appeal (X = 4.90) higher than the empathy appeal (X = 3.33; F = 9.44, p < .01) on the other-referencing measures. No other significant effects were found.

As predicted, an ANOVA on attitude toward the advertisement (Cronbach’s α = .95) yielded no significant effects. That is, in contrast to the results in experiment 1, members of the individualist culture did not have more favorable attitudes when exposed to the empathy appeal when it was self-referencing (X = 3.96) than when exposed to the pride appeal when it was other-referencing (X = 3.48; F < 1). Further, members of the collectivist culture did not have more favorable attitudes when exposed to the pride appeal when it was other-referencing (X = 3.65) than when exposed to the empathy appeal when it was self-referencing (X = 4.08; F < 1). The identical pattern occurred for attitude toward the brand.

In sum, these results suggest that emotional appeal type can be altered by varying the referent of focus and provide support for the use of the self-referencing and other-referencing manipulations in experiment 2.

Method

Undergraduate students were recruited from an American university (n = 72; mean age = 22.15, female = 50 percent, all were born and raised in the United States, 81 percent were Caucasian) and a Chinese university (n = 79; mean age = 19.82, female = 43 percent, all were born and raised in Shanghai, 100 percent were native Chinese) to take part in a study evaluating a new product and its advertisement for $5 and 10 rmb, respectively. First, participants read an advertisement for Watson Color Film that depicted happiness or peacefulness and contained three positively valenced attributes pretested to be important across cultures (high quality of color, sharp texture of photograph, inexpensive). Then, participants provided their thoughts and attitudes about the advertisement and the new brand. After a 15-minute unrelated filler task (same as in experiment 1), participants completed a set of questions that included demographic information, product usage information, manipulation checks, and Singelis’s (1994) independent-interdependent scale.

Independent Variables

Cultural Orientation. Collectivism-individualism was operationalized in the same way as in experiment 1. Similarly, the original questionnaire was drafted in English, translated into Chinese, and back-translated using external translators (Hui and Triandis 1985).

Emotional Appeal Type. Appeals that depicted happiness and peacefulness were created by selecting photographs that were pretested to depict the emotions. In a pretest, 25 participants (n = 12 American participants, n = 13 Chinese participants) were asked to indicate how much the following emotions describe 20 photographs, by circling one number for each word (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly; 10 daytime photographs, 10 dusk-time photographs). Drawing from Frijda (1970) and Edell and Burke (1987), this list included three happiness-related emotions (happy, cheerful, delighted; Cronbach’s α = .89), three peacefulness-related emotions (calm, peaceful, serene; Cronbach’s α = .93), and 20 filler emotions. Of the 20 photographs, the four that most strongly depicted one emotion over the other were selected (all p’s < .05). In the happiness condition, the photograph featured a beach scene at midday (12:00 p.m.); in the peaceful condition, the photograph featured the same beach at sunset (5:30 p.m.). The photographs were equally well liked (F < 1), and no cultural differences were found (F < 1). Participants also rated the brand name “Watson” on the happiness-related and peacefulness-related emotions; it depicted equal levels of happiness and peacefulness, and no cultural differences were found (F’s < 1).

This visual manipulation of emotional appeal type was enhanced by two verbal manipulations. First, the banner at the top of each advertisement read “Capture the Happiness (Peacefulness).” Second, the advertising copy read, “The sound of the surf crashing on the beach, the happy cheers of children running in the water, and the bright light of the sun shining overhead,” or “The sound of waves gently lapping onto the shore, the soft cries of birds flying overhead, and the quiet beauty of the sun setting over the water.”

Referencing Type. To encourage self- or other-referencing, the photos featured an individual alone (see Fig. 2) versus several people together (who appeared to be
Remember the day by yourself at the beach...
The sound of the surf crashing on the beach,
The happy cheers of children running in the water,
The bright light of the sun shining overhead.

**Watson** has top color quality--indicating high innovation through technology.  
Plus the texture of the photo will always be sharp, never grainy.  
Just like in real life.  
And, **Watson** is less expensive than most leading brands of film, 
which makes it easy on your budget.

**Your Memories...and Watson’s New Color Film**

**Watson** Color Film  
**Capture Your Feelings.**
close friends or family; see Fig. 3). To avoid introducing confounds, the same photographs were used for both the Chinese and American participants. Therefore, the photographs were taken so that the faces of the individuals were not visible, making it impossible to determine their ethnicity. Finally, the self-referencing versus other-referencing manipulation was enhanced through two changes in the advertising copy: (1) at the beginning of the advertisement, the copy read, “Remember the day by yourself (with your family and friends) at the beach”; and (2) at the end of the advertisement, the tag line read, “Capture Your (The) Feelings (of Friendship).”
The pretest sample described above rated the extent to which these photographs inspired self-referencing \((r = .83)\) or other-referencing \((r = .87)\). The four photographs selected significantly prompted self- or other-referencing as intended \((all \ p’s < .05)\).

Results

The hypotheses were tested based on a 2 (emotional appeal type) \(\times\) 2 (cultural orientation) \(\times\) 2 (referencing type) between-subjects ANOVA. Three covariates were used (separately) in the analysis reported below: product category usage, frequency of usage, and self-rated category knowledge. Only product category usage was significant \((\text{for both } A_{sd} \text{ and } A_{bd})\) but did not interfere with the tests of the hypotheses and will not be discussed further. Unless otherwise specified, \(df = 1, 145\).

Manipulation Checks. The results of the three-way ANOVA indicated that the emotional appeal worked as expected. When asked to indicate how much the following emotions describe the appeal, participants rated the happiness appeal \((X = 4.75)\) higher than the happiness appeal \((X = 3.68)\) on the happiness-related emotions \((\text{Cronbach’s } \alpha = .93; F = 6.90, p < .01)\). Similarly, they rated the happiness appeal \((X = 5.16)\) higher than the happiness appeal \((X = 3.56)\) on happiness-related emotions \((\text{Cronbach’s } \alpha = .86; F = 30.58, p < .05)\). In addition, however, a marginally significant emotional appeal type \(\times\) cultural orientation effect occurred \((F = 3.64, p < .06)\), whereby collectivist participants \((X = 3.11)\) versus individualist participants \((X = 4.00)\) reported lower ratings on happiness-related emotions for the happiness appeal. However, since equally high ratings were found on the happiness-related emotions for the happiness appeal across the cultures, this significant difference should not affect the results of the experiment. No other significant effects were found.

Suggesting that the emotional appeals were perceived as ego-focused or other-focused as intended, a significant main effect of emotional appeal was found for both individual thoughts \((F = 5.72, p < .02)\) and collective thoughts \((F = 3.51, p = .05)\). The happiness appeal led to more individual thoughts \((X = .94)\) than did the happiness appeal \((X = .60)\), while the happiness appeal led to more collective thoughts \((X = .94)\) than did the happiness appeal \((X = .40)\).

Further, the manipulation check for referencing type worked as expected. Participants reported higher ratings on the self-referencing checks \((r = .87)\) when exposed to the self-referencing appeal \((X = 4.25)\) than the other-referencing appeal \((X = 3.59; F = 3.75, p < .05)\). Similarly, a marginally significant effect occurred for other-referencing, where participants reported higher ratings on the other-referencing checks \((r = .81)\) when exposed to the other-referencing appeal \((X = 4.26)\) versus the self-referencing appeal \((X = 3.71; F = 3.30, p < .07)\). The only other significant effect was a referencing type \(\times\) cultural orientation interaction involving the self-referencing check \((F = 3.56, p < .07)\); individualist participants \((X = 4.76)\) reported higher ratings on the self-referencing check than did collectivist participants \((X = 3.73)\), which is consistent with individualism-collectivism literature on self-construal differences \((\text{Triandis 1989})\).

Finally, the results of an ANOVA with cultural orientation as the dependent variable showed only a significant main effect: American participants \((X = .45)\) received higher independent scores than did Chinese participants \((X = -.02; F = 2.92, p < .05)\). No other significant effects were found.

Attitudes. An ANOVA on the advertisement attitude index yielded no significant main effects. However, a significant interaction between emotional appeal type and cultural orientation was found \((F = 11.83, p < .01)\). A planned comparison indicated that advertising appeals relying on ego-focused \((X = 5.06)\) versus other-focused \((X = 4.10)\) emotional appeals were more effective for collectivists \((F = 8.88, p < .01)\). Further, other-focused \((X = 5.00)\) versus ego-focused \((X = 4.34)\) emotional appeals were more effective for individualists \((F = 4.69, p < .05)\). This pattern of results suggests that the findings of experiment 1 relying on pride and empathy appeals generalize to other ego-focused and other-focused emotional appeals.

More important, the two-way interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction \((F = 5.33, p < .05)\). The pattern of results is consistent with Hypothesis 3a. Members of individualist cultures had more favorable attitudes when exposed to other-focused emotional appeals that induce other-referencing \((X = 5.77)\) than self-referencing \((X = 4.27; F = 11.49, p < .01)\). However, Hypothesis 3b was not supported. Members of collectivist cultures did not have more favorable attitudes when exposed to ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing \((X = 5.10)\) versus other-referencing \((X = 5.03; F < 1)\). This result will be discussed below.

In addition, members of the individualist culture had more favorable attitudes when exposed to an other-focused emotional appeal that encouraged other-referencing \((X = 5.77)\) than to an ego-focused emotional appeal that encouraged self-referencing \((X = 4.47; F = 9.30, p < .01)\). Further, members of the collectivist culture had more favorable attitudes when exposed to an ego-focused emotional appeal that induced other-referencing \((X = 5.10)\) than to an other-focused emotional advertisement that induced other-referencing \((X = 4.06; F = 5.43, p < .05)\).

As in experiment 1, the cultural orientation and emotional-appeal-type interaction on the brand attitude index was significant \((F = 6.84, p < .05)\), and the pattern of means paralleled those found with advertisement attitudes. This two-way interaction was qualified by a marginally significant three-way interaction \((F = 2.77, p < .10)\), again reflecting the same pattern of means as found in the advertisement attitude index (see Table 1).

Cognitive Responses. The same coding scheme used
in experiment 1 was used here. Interrater agreement was high (94 percent agreement by Chinese coders, 89 percent by American coders); discrepancies were resolved through discussion.

Collective Thoughts. To test the extent to which novel thoughts mediated attitudes by members of the two cultures, two sets of mediation tests were conducted. First, we examined the extent to which the relationship between other-focused emotional appeals and attitudes is mediated by collective thoughts for members of an individualist culture, as found in experiment 1. Consistent with analysis a, individualist participants had marginally more favorable attitudes when exposed to an other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeal ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .33$, $p < .07$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .25$, $p < .10$); consistent with analysis b, other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals led to marginally more collective thoughts for individualists ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .22$, $p < .06$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .22$, $p < .06$); consistent with analysis c, collective thoughts led to more favorable attitudes for individualists ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .54$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .46$, $p < .01$); and consistent with analysis d, collective thoughts were significant ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .49$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .43$, $p < .01$), but other-focused emotional appeals were not significant ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .22$, $p < .21$; $\beta_{B} = .16$, $p < .29$) in a model that included both emotional appeal type and thought type.

Second, we tested Hypothesis 4a, which suggests that the relationship between other-focused emotional appeals that induce other-referencing and attitudes is mediated by collective thoughts for members of individualist cultures. In support of analysis a, individualist respondents had more favorable attitudes when exposed to an other-focused emotional appeal that induced other-referencing ($\beta_{A(AD)} = 1.50$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .83$, $p < .04$). Consistent with analysis b, other-focused emotional appeals that induce other-referencing led to more collective thoughts for individualists ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .96$, $p < .02$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .96$, $p < .02$). Consistent with analysis c, collective thoughts led to more favorable attitudes for individualists ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .54$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .46$, $p < .01$). Finally, in partial support of analysis d, collective thoughts were marginally significant ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .34$, $p < .07$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .39$, $p < .02$), while other-referencing was significant for $A_{AD}$ ($\beta_{A(AD)} = 1.18$, $p < .01$) but not for $A_{B}$ ($\beta_{A(B)} = .46$, $p = .26$) in a model that included both emotional appeal type and thought type. These results provide support for the premise that the relationship between other-focused emotional appeals that induce other-referencing and attitudes may be mediated by collective thoughts for members of individualist cultures.

Individual Thoughts. Two sets of mediation tests also were conducted with individual thoughts. First, we examined the extent to which the relationship between ego-focused emotional appeals and attitudes is mediated by individual thoughts by members of a collective culture, as found in experiment 1. In support of analysis a, collectivist respondents had marginally more favorable attitudes when exposed to an ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeal ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .96$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .61$, $p < .06$). Consistent with analysis b, ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals led to more individual thoughts for collectivists ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .64$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .64$, $p < .01$). Consistent with analysis c, individual thoughts led to more favorable attitudes for collectivists ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .62$, $p < .01$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .50$, $p < .02$). Finally, in partial support of analysis d, individual thoughts were marginally significant ($\beta_{A(AD)} = .43$, $p < .07$; $\beta_{A(B)} = .41$, $p < .08$), while ego-focused emotional appeals were marginally significant for $A_{AD}$ ($= .68$, $p < .07$) but not for $A_{B}$ ($= .35$, $p < .32$) in a model that included both emotional appeal type and thought type.

Second, we examined Hypothesis 4b, which suggests that the relationship between ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing and attitudes is mediated by individual thoughts for members of collectivist cultures. Counter to analysis a, collectivist respondents did not have more favorable attitudes when exposed to an ego-focused emotional appeal that induced self-refer-
Table 2

EXPERIMENT 2 TESTS OF THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF THOUGHT TYPE ON ATTITUDES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Individualist culture (collective thoughts) coefficient</th>
<th>Collectivist culture (individual thoughts) coefficient</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional appeals on A:</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Emotional appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Emotional appeal</td>
<td>.22 *</td>
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<td>Thoughts</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emotional appeals on B:</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Thoughts</td>
<td>.46 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
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<td>Referencing type on A:</td>
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<td>Thoughts</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<td>1.08 **, .34 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Thoughts</td>
<td>.46, .39 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. — A difference between means t-test was conducted to examine the decrease in beta coefficients in the tests of mediation (all p's < .01).
*p < .10.
**p < .01.

Table 2 provides further support for the finding that other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals are more persuasive for members of an individualist culture, while ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals are more persuasive for members of a collectivist culture. The mechanism driving these effects appears to be the generation of and elaboration on a novel thought type resulting from the stimulus: more favorable attitudes resulted for other-focused emotional appeals by members of individualist cultures when other-referencing (vs. self-referencing) and collective thoughts appeared to mediate the relationship between advertising appeals and attitudes. However, no support was found for Hypothesis 3b, which suggested that attitudes will be more favorable for ego-focused emotional appeals when members of collectivist cultures are induced to self-reference, or Hypothesis 4b, which suggested that the relationship between ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing and attitudes is mediated by individual thoughts for members of collectivist cultures when other-referencing (vs. self-referencing) and collective thoughts appeared to mediate the relationship between advertising appeals and attitudes.

Discussion

The objective of experiment 2 was to assess the robustness and generalizability of the results found in experiment 1 and to examine the mechanism underlying these effects. The pattern of results found in experiment 2 provides further support for the finding that other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals are more persuasive for members of an individualist culture, while ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals are more persuasive for members of a collectivist culture. The mechanism driving these effects appears to be the generation of and elaboration on a novel thought type resulting from the stimulus: more favorable attitudes resulted for other-focused emotional appeals by members of individualist cultures when other-referencing (vs. self-referencing) and collective thoughts appeared to mediate the relationship between advertising appeals and attitudes. However, no support was found for Hypothesis 3b, which suggested that attitudes will be more favorable for ego-focused emotional appeals when members of collectivist cultures are induced to self-reference, or Hypothesis 4b, which suggested that the relationship between ego-focused emotional appeals that induce self-referencing and attitudes is mediated by individual thoughts for members of collectivist cultures when other-referencing (vs. self-referencing) and collective thoughts appeared to mediate the relationship between advertising appeals and attitudes.

Although individualists consider the self to be who they are (i.e., their internal feelings and attitudes, distinct from those of others), collectivists are more likely to consider the self to include their family and close friends (i.e., in-group’s feelings and attitudes; Triandis 1989). Consequently, when induced to self-reference, individual-
ists may think of themselves as unique and distinct from others, while collectivists may think of themselves in relation to close others.

In support, when members of the two cultures were asked to free-associate to the word "me," the most frequent association for American participants was "I, person, individual," but for Korean participants it was "family, love" (Maday and Szalay 1976). Further, when asked to list important personal goals, Indian participants include their own good health and the good health of their families, while American participants are less likely to mention the latter (Roland 1984). Finally, Sampson (1988) argues that "although all cultures draw a line between a region defined as belonging intrinsically to the self and a region defined as extrinsic or outside the self and hence belonging to the 'nonself/other,' where that line is drawn varies extensively. There are cultures in which firmly drawn boundaries marking sharp self/nonself separations define the culture's indigenous psychology, and others in which such firm boundaries do not exist. According to the indigenous psychology currently dominant in the United States, for example, there exists a region intrinsic to the person and a region of 'other.' . . . At the other extreme, we find cultures in which the self/nonself boundary is less sharply drawn and more fluid" (p. 15).

This stream of research suggests that the self-structure is more organized around "we," "our," and "us" in collectivist versus individualist cultures. If true, self- and other-referencing manipulations may have similar effects for members of collectivist cultures, but different effects for members of individualist cultures. Indeed, this explanation is consistent with the asymmetric pattern of results whereby self- and other-referencing had similar effects on the attitudes and thoughts for members of collectivist cultures. For example, participants in the collectivist (but not individualist) culture increased their individual thoughts when they viewed ego-focused versus other-focused emotional advertisements, but the same pattern did not result when they were induced to self-reference, rather than other-reference. An additional reanalysis of the thought protocols was conducted to examine why this pattern of results may have occurred.

Examining the Distinction between Idiocentric and Allocentric Thoughts

The research reviewed above suggests that the emotional appeal type and referencing type manipulations do not tap the same underlying construct for collectivists. Although ego-focused emotional appeals may be a relatively pure way to highlight the self to the exclusion of others (self-as-distinct-from-others), self-referencing may tap the larger self-structure that for collectivists consists of elements linking the self to important others (self-in-relation-to-others). Thus, collectivists may generate individual thoughts organized around "me" and "I" when exposed to an ego-focused emotional appeal but generate thoughts organized around "we" and "us" when asked to self-reference.

To examine this possibility, we draw on Triandis (1989) who distinguishes among "allocentric" thoughts (those relating to the interaction or interrelationship of one's own self and close others), and "idiocentric" thoughts (those relating to only the self as an individual) and "group" thoughts (or collective thoughts; those relating to only close others). Then, we examine the possibility that ego-focused versus other-focused emotions evoke more allocentric thoughts for members of collectivist cultures (but not individualists), while self-referencing versus other-referencing evokes more idiocentric thoughts for members of collectivist cultures (but not individualist cultures).

The two sets of raters recategorized participants' thoughts based on the new coding scheme. Operationally, the distinction among the three codes was the subject of the thought (McGuire and McGuire 1986). If the subject was the self (i.e., any thought that mentioned only the distinct self or used "me" or "I"), the thought was coded "idiocentric." If the subject was close others (i.e., any thought that mentioned only family members or friends or used "they" or "them"), the thought was coded "collective." If the subject was both the self and others (i.e., any thought that mentioned family members or friends or used "us," "we," "ours"), the thought was coded "allocentric." See Table 3 for examples of thoughts. Interrater agreement was high (91 percent agreement by Chinese coders, 85 percent by American coders), and discrepancies were resolved through discussion.

The results of an ANOVA on idiocentric thoughts yielded a significant main effect for cultural orientation ($F = 14.80, p < .01$), where more idiocentric thoughts were generated by members of individualist ($\bar{X} = .79$) than collectivist cultures ($\bar{X} = .34$). In addition, a significant emotional appeal type × cultural orientation interaction was found ($F = 9.59, p < .01$), where appeals that were ego-focused ($\bar{X} = .58$) versus other-focused ($\bar{X} = .10$) generated more idiocentric thoughts for members of collectivist cultures but not for members of individualist cultures ($F < 1$). No other effects were significant.

The results of an ANOVA on allocentric thoughts also yielded a significant main effect for cultural orientation ($F = 14.31, p < .01$), whereby more allocentric thoughts were generated by members of collectivist ($\bar{X} = .79$) than individualist cultures ($\bar{X} = .34$). This main effect was qualified by a significant referencing type × cultural orientation interaction ($F = 4.35, p < .05$), whereby self-referencing ($\bar{X} = .59$) versus other-referencing ($\bar{X} = .35$)

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*Conceptually, the main difference between (1) individual and idiocentric thoughts and (2) collective and group thoughts is that idiocentric and group thoughts are mutually exclusive. In this research, thoughts that pertained to the interrelationship between the self and close others were coded as both individual and collective. In the new coding scheme, such thoughts are coded as allocentric. To avoid confusion, we rely on Triandis's terminology, now calling individual thoughts "idiocentric" and add the new thought type "allocentric."*
Table 3
Examples of Thought-Coding Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual/idiocentric thoughts</th>
<th>Collective/group thoughts</th>
<th>Allocentric thoughts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualist respondents</td>
<td>&quot;I remembered how much I love the ocean and how I am always saying I’ll go more often but never do.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The pictures of the families and kids playing in the water were great.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;I imagined the sound of waves, birds, and the smell of the ocean and wished I was there right now.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;I think of memories with old friends at the beach.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivist respondents</td>
<td>&quot;There is very beautiful scenery, I hope I can have a chance to be at a spot like this.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Contemplating the cheers of children, how much fun they were having.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The picture reminds me of some very memorable scenes in my life.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;I wonder when we are going to play volleyball again—at the beach.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

generated more allocentric thoughts for members of collectivist but not for individualist cultures (F < 1). Only one other effect was significant: emotional appeal type × referencing type (F = 6.42, p < .01), whereby ego-focused (vs. other-focused) emotional appeals generated more allocentric thoughts in conditions of self-referencing but not other-referencing. Though this effect was not predicted, it is consistent with the pattern found above, driven by collectivist participants.

In sum, although the original cognitive response results suggest that the referencing type manipulations had identical effects for members of collectivist cultures, this recoding of the thoughts indicates otherwise. Though members of collectivist cultures do not generate purely individual thoughts in response to the self-referencing manipulation, self-referencing does encourage them to generate more thoughts of which they are the subject. However, these thoughts are allocentric rather than individual in nature. Thus, self-referencing may affect collectivists in the intended direction but not in the same way it affects individualists. In hindsight, this finding may not be surprising. Triandis (1993) suggests the most important cognitions are sentences that include "I," "me," and "mine" for those with an independent self, but sentences that include "us," "we," and "ours" for those with an interdependent self. What is surprising, however, is that ego-focused emotional appeals lead to the production of more individual thoughts for members of the collectivist culture, even though self-referencing did not. What is the difference between these two manipulations for collectivist participants?

One difference may lie in the primary referent of focus involved in self-referencing relative to ego-focused emotional appeals. Although the self-referencing manipulation highlights the larger self-structure because the referent of focus is self-in-relation-to-others, ego-focused emotional appeals highlight the limited self-structure because the referent of focus is self-as-distinct-from-others. Consistent with this interpretation, Kitayama et al. (1991) suggest that across cultures, ego-focused emotions tend to highlight those unique aspects of the self not contingent on others, such as one’s individual desires, motives, abilities, rights, or internal attributes (e.g., individual accomplishment, which invokes pride, or the abridgment of an individual right, which invokes anger). In this light, self-referencing may keep the self/nonself boundary blurred for members of collectivist cultures, while ego-focused emotional appeals may sharpen it.

### GENERAL DISCUSSION

The objective of this research was to examine the persuasive effect of emotional appeal types across cultures and explore why such appeals vary in their effectiveness across cultures. In a set of experiments, we found that appeals relying on other-focused emotions (e.g., empathy, peacefulness) versus ego-focused emotions (e.g., pride, happiness) led to more favorable attitudes for members of the individualist culture (United States), while appeals relying on ego-focused emotions, as opposed to other-focused emotions, led to more favorable attitudes for members of the collectivist culture (China). Further, collective thoughts mediated attitudes toward other-focused versus ego-focused emotional appeals for individualists, while individual thoughts mediated attitudes toward ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals for collectivists. In experiment 2, we investigated why these effects occur and found support for the notion that the novel types of thoughts generated by the persuasion appeals mediated attitudes, thereby driving the attitudinal and cognitive responses results.
Motivation versus Ability to Process Emotional Advertising Appeals

Previous research has focused on differential levels of accessibility of ego-focused versus other-focused emotions for members of collectivist versus individualist cultures. Although the original premise of this research was that the differences in accessibility should lead to relative differences in the ability to recognize, experience, and thus be persuaded by ego-focused versus other-focused emotional appeals in the two cultures, instead the pattern of results for both experiments suggest that a motivation process was operating. That is, the relative novelty of the appeals in the two cultures induced higher levels of motivation to process the message.

Might the current experimental situation be responsible for the motivationally driven results observed? The self-structure has been conceptualized as a dynamic entity, such that different aspects of the self will be salient in different situations. Thus, while the interdependent self tends to be most dominant in collectivist cultures, members of such cultures can and do sample aspects of the independent self under certain situations (Triandis 1989). Encountering an ego-focused emotional appeal may be one way to prompt members of a collectivist culture to access aspects of the independent self. Importantly, however, such appeals may be most relevant to them when viewed in private rather than in the presence of others, when elements of the self-as-distinct-from-others may be accessed without social risk. Similarly, other-focused appeals may be most effective when experienced privately for members of an individualist culture, when elements of the self-in-relation-to-others may be accessed without any public diminishment of the self as a unique individual. This possibility suggests that the effectiveness of such appeals may vary by media type. The appeals in the current research were print-based and viewed individually, which may have heightened the degree to which these less dominant aspects of the self were sampled. Future research may examine the effects of media type or viewing situations that are more public.

Distinction between Felt and Depicted Emotions

Throughout this research, we focused on the recognition of emotions depicted in advertisements and the differential effects such emotional depictions have on members of individualist versus collectivist cultures. Since depicted and felt emotions are not always identical and the recognition of an emotion depicted in an appeal does not necessarily lead to the experience of an emotion (Stout, Homer, and Liu 1990), one limitation of the current work is the absence of measured felt emotional responses to the different advertising appeals. As a result, we offer little insight into the possible motivational effect of felt emotional responses on the target advertisement, nor the link between recognition of an emotional appeal and the feeling of specific emotions as it relates to processing and attitude formation. Previous research has suggested that emotional responses, compared to the recognition of emotion, result in more positive attitudes toward advertisements, as well as higher levels of advertisement and brand recall (Stout and Leckenby 1986). However, future research addressing the felt versus depicted emotion distinction and measuring both variables is needed to gain a more complete understanding of the role of emotions in persuasion across cultures.

Further, the antecedents of these emotion types may be examined. For example, the frequency of specific emotions may vary across cultures; because of the extent to which they are socially embedded and therefore reinforced in a given culture, some may be repressed while others are encouraged. Alternatively, the frequency of specific emotions may vary because some are biologically diminished, stemming from more basic, hardwired differences across cultures. Insight into the antecedents of emotions would allow researchers to understand the extent to which certain types of emotional appeals may become more prevalent over time—and perhaps less persuasive—as cultural norms change.

Broadening the View of Emotional Advertising Appeals

The role of emotion in persuasion appeals has received growing interest in consumer behavior research. Much of this work has focused on developing a typology of emotional responses that varies in valence and arousal. For example, one emotional response is characterized by highly arousing positive emotions, another represents milder positive emotions, and the third represents negative emotions (termed “warm,” “upbeat,” and “negative”) in Edell and Burke [1987]; Burke and Edell [1989]; see also Batra and Ray [1986] for a related typology). In this article, we suggest another important dimension that typifies emotional appeals: referent of focus. Importantly this dimension broadens the dominant Western view of emotions beyond the typical three-factor structure and a focus on valence and arousal to examine how self-construal can affect the persuasive effect of emotional appeals. However, future research is still needed to examine the extent to which referent of focus can be applied to the basic three-factor structure of emotions found in persuasion appeals and, more broadly, the extent to which the three-factor structure of emotional appeals is generalizable across cultures in order to better understand the extent to which persuasion appeals are differentially effective across cultures, and the specific role of emotion in appeals across cultures.

[Received February 1997. Revised May 1998. Robert E. Burnkrant served as editor, and Deborah MacInnis served as associate editor for this article.]
REFERENCES


EMOTION AND CULTURE


