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Abstract

This study investigates how negotiators' interaction goals influence their own and their counterparts' negotiation tactics and outcomes across two cultures using a simulated employment contract negotiation. Results show that when negotiators placed greater importance on competitive goals, they used more distributive persuasion and fewer priority information exchange tactics, which reduced their counterparts' profit; negotiators' competitive goals also caused their counterparts to use fewer priority information exchange tactics, which in turn hurt their own profit. Dyad members' competitive goals have an indirect, negative impact on joint profit. In addition, Chinese negotiators placed greater importance on competitive goals and used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than Americans, but the associations between goals and tactics did not differ across cultures. Nevertheless, members of the two cultures took different paths to improve joint profit; as a result, Chinese dyads achieved no less joint profit than American dyads. The study sheds light on culture's effect on the interactive processes by which goals impact negotiation performance.

Keywords

goals, negotiation, culture, message production, interdependence, social motivation

Negotiation is broadly defined as an interpersonal decision-making process that involves give-and-take interactions between two or more parties who hold incompatible interests but cannot achieve objectives single-handedly (Thompson, 2005). The ways in which negotiation unfolds are largely determined by the extent to which negotiators define the issues, understand their own and their counterpart's goals, and formulate courses of action

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to accomplish (or thwart) these goals. Goals have been commonly defined as what an individual aims to accomplish (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). Although substantial evidence suggests a direct relationship between strategic goal-setting and negotiation outcomes, negotiation scholars typically treat goals as monetary target or resistance points set for the entire negotiation or even multiple negotiations (for reviews, see Wilson & Putnam, 1990; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002).

Communication theories focused on “message production” commonly assume that individuals often attempt to pursue and coordinate multiple goals during social interaction (e.g., Dillard, 1989; O’Keefe & Shepherd, 1987), that goals are fluid and dynamic (Keck & Samp, 2007), and that a communicator’s ability to pursue particular goals depends on the responses of others (Berger, 2007). These assumptions are inherent in the conceptualization of *interaction goals*, which are defined as future states of affairs that individuals desire to attain or maintain through communication and coordination with others (Wilson, 2002). As negotiation is a dynamic social interaction between interdependent individuals who have conflicting interests, negotiators tend to pursue interaction goals that are both competitive (to defend and promote one’s own interests) and cooperative (to foster a settlement or a long-term relationship), both tangible (to obtain profits, services, or information) and intangible (to manage face, emotion, and relationships). Although substantial evidence indicates that negotiators with cooperative social motives are less contentious, engage in more problem solving, and achieve greater joint outcomes than those with competitive social motives (for a review, see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), we have limited understanding of how negotiators pursue multiple interaction goals that emerge from interaction (rather than externally assigned prior to interaction) and how conflicting goals shape negotiators’ own and their partners’ bargaining tactics and outcomes. As is widely recognized, the complexity of negotiation dynamics is exacerbated when negotiators come from different cultural backgrounds (Brett, 2000). However, research has rarely investigated the sequential links between goals, behaviors, and outcomes at multiple levels (individual vs. dyad) across cultures. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to provide such assessments. The following section first explains a theoretical framework of interaction goals in negotiation. Next, we draw on existing research to formulate hypotheses. Finally, we report an experimental study that assessed these hypotheses and discuss its findings and implications.

Interaction Goals in Negotiation

Negotiation is commonly considered a strategic, motivated, and purposive interaction. A meta-analysis of 22 studies that assessed the effect of goals on negotiation performance suggests that the negotiators who hold specific and challenging goals consistently achieve higher profits than those with suboptimal or no goals, although the effect is stronger when negotiations are not face-to-face and when the opponents do not have a strong goal (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). Although these studies focus exclusively on task-oriented goals, their findings suggest that the link between goals and negotiation outcomes is more complicated when negotiators need to manage their identity and relational concerns simultaneously in face-to-face meetings. This is consistent with message production theorists’ belief

that as interaction unfolds individuals frequently pursue additional objectives that may constrain the way they seek to accomplish task-oriented goals (e.g., O'Keefe & Delia, 1982). These additional objectives, whether conceptualized as secondary goals (e.g., Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989), cognitive editing standards (Hample & Dallinger, 1990), or conversational constraints (Kim, 1994), vary significantly across individuals, situations, relationships, and cultures, yet have a strong impact on people's behavior (for a review, see Wilson, 2002).

Wilson and Putnam (1990) proposed a theoretical framework that organizes a broad range of interaction goals in negotiation within a scheme that varies in two respects: type (instrumental, relational, and identity) and level of abstraction (global, regional, local). Specifically, *instrumental* goals are task-oriented goals, such as obtaining money, goods, services, or information; *relational* goals have to do with gaining power, avoiding subjection to the other's power, and building a level of trust; and *identity* goals involve the maintenance of a negotiator's own identity while dealing with the identity of the counterpart. *Global*, *regional*, and *local* goals have to do with the extent to which negotiators focus on a series of negotiation sessions, or a single session, or a small segment or individual tasks (see Cai, 1998). Although this framework has been widely cited since it was proposed two decades ago, little research has empirically investigated the dynamic and conflictual nature of negotiators' interaction goals and how they predict behaviors and outcomes. The current study aims to fill the void by examining how negotiators' pursuit of multiple goals predicts their own and their counterparts' use of bargaining tactics and outcomes in an employment contract negotiation across two cultures.

The Influence of Interaction Goals on Negotiation Tactics and Outcomes

Negotiation is often thought to occur in mixed-motive relationships where persons have both competitive and cooperative interests (Tjosvold, 1998). Negotiators enter the bargaining process because they believe they hold incompatible goals; however, both parties must cooperate to attain a mutually acceptable settlement. The mixed-motive nature of negotiation creates an inherent tension in the negotiators to balance opposing incentives to compete and to cooperate. As such, on a cognitive level, negotiation often places participants in the position of pursuing contradictory goals concomitantly (Wilson & Putnam, 1990). For example, a negotiator may simultaneously want to increase joint profit so both parties can "win" (a cooperative instrumental goal) and appear assertive so he or she will not be easily taken advantage of (a competitive identity goal). The competitive or cooperative nature of these interaction goals is often referred to as the negotiator's social motivation.¹

On a behavioral level, the importance that negotiators place on multiple goals facilitates the activation of concepts from memory that structure tactics necessary to achieve the goals (e.g., Berger, 2007; Keck & Samp, 2007). Prior research has identified two primary negotiation strategies: an integrative strategy consisting of tactics that serve to maximize the amount of resources available so that both parties can win (e.g., exchanging information and formulating mutually beneficial tradeoffs) and a distributive strategy consisting of

tactics that serve to divide resources among the parties and maximize one's own share (e.g., value claiming and persuasion; Pruitt, 1983; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Empirical research generally confirms the theoretical distinction between integrative and distributive strategies (Olekalns & Smith, 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Putnam & Wilson, 1989; Thompson, 1991; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990) with the caveats that some behaviors may serve both integrative and distributive functions depending on how they are employed (Putnam & Wilson, 1989; Weingart et al., 1990) and that the same negotiators may use both integrative and distributive strategies in the same negotiation (e.g., Putnam, 1990).

Research has consistently shown that social motives drive strategic behavior (De Dreu et al., 2000; Deutsch, 1973). Social motives can be influenced by situational cues (e.g., rewards, instructions, expectations of future cooperative interaction, see De Dreu et al., 2000), individual differences (e.g., social value orientations, see McClintock & Liebrand, 1988), or culture (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism, see Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000). However, regardless of the source of social motives, their effects on strategic behavior are largely consistent (De Dreu et al., 2000). For example, Deutsch's (1973) theory of competition and cooperation suggests that a cooperative motivation leads to constructive mutual exchange (e.g., problem solving), whereas a competitive motivation results in oppositional interaction (e.g., tit-for-tat; Tjosvold, 1998). Hundreds of studies support the basic propositions of this theory (for a review, see Johnson & Johnson, 1989). It is not surprising that when both negotiators in a dyad are cooperative they tend to rely on integrative strategies, whereas when both negotiators in a dyad are competitive they tend to rely on distributive strategies (De Dreu et al., 2000).

Although social motives provide insights into negotiators' general behavioral intentions (e.g., to compete or to cooperate), they do not capture the multiplicity of goals and concerns that negotiators have to manage during the complex bargaining process. Communication research has provided evidence that different types of interaction goals predict different types of conflict management behavior: Whereas the importance placed on instrumental goals was associated with the use of distributive tactics, the importance of other-oriented identity and relational goals was associated with the use of integrative tactics (Canary, Cunningham, & Cody, 1988; Keck & Samp, 2007). It should be noted that the goals examined in conflict interactions tend to be unidimensional: Instrumental goals tend to bear a competitive orientation, whereas relational goals are assumed to be cooperative in nature (e.g., Canary et al., 1988; Keck & Samp, 2007). Wilson and Putnam (1990) suggested that each type of interaction goal can reflect both competitive and cooperative orientations (e.g., "to gain more power" and "to build trust" are two relational goals of opposite orientations). Goals of the same type may have different effects on bargaining tactics as they vary in motivational orientation. Crossing the two dimensions would produce a sizable list of goals that negotiators might pursue. Given the contextual features of a job contract negotiation, the current study measures eight goals (see Table 1).

Thus far, message production scholars have focused attention on how goals direct communication behavior, yet little research has examined whether and how goals predict interaction outcomes. Substantial negotiation research indicates that distributive strategies,

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Interaction Goals in Negotiation

Goal Type	All (N = 134)		American (n = 64)		Chinese (n = 70)	
	α	M (SD)	α	M (SD)	α	M (SD)
Cooperatively oriented						
Maximize both parties' profit (four items)	.84	5.38 (1.27)	.83	5.35 (1.29)	.85	5.41 (1.26)
Understand the other's concerns (four items)	.86	5.63 (1.15)	.84	5.50 (1.19)	.88	5.74 (1.11)
Appear cooperative and considerate (four items)	.75	5.73 (0.91)	.72	5.75 (0.75)	.80	5.71 (1.04)
Create trust and promote future relationship (five items)	.84	5.67 (0.98)	.84	5.71 (0.87)	.85	5.62 (1.07)
Competitively oriented						
Maximize one's own profit (three items) ^a	.69	6.13 (0.84)	.78	6.06 (0.88)	.60	6.19 (0.79)
Minimize the other's profit (three items)	.73	4.09 (1.51)	.72	3.84 (1.50)	.72	4.31 (1.49)
Appear forceful and assertive (three items)	.76	5.31 (1.25)	.82	5.32 (1.11)	.74	5.30 (1.37)
Gain power over the other (four items)	.84	5.36 (1.32)	.89	4.87 (1.48)	.72	5.80 (0.97)
Second-order factors ^a						
Cooperative goals (four items)	.73	5.60 (0.81)	.72	5.58 (0.77)	.74	5.62 (0.84)
Competitive goals (three items)	.73	4.92 (1.09)	.75	4.68 (1.12)	.72	5.14 (1.04)

a. "Maximize one's own profit" was excluded from competitive goals due to cross loadings.

such as threats, positional commitments, and persuasive arguments, tend to yield win-lose outcomes and smaller joint profit for the dyad, whereas integrative strategies, such as priority information exchange and multiple-item offers, tend to yield higher joint profit (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson, 1991). The established links between bargaining tactics and outcomes, therefore, provide reasons to believe that interaction goals, through their influence on behavior, can also predict negotiation outcomes. This is consistent with prior research showing that competitively motivated negotiation dyads achieve smaller pies of resources than those that are cooperatively oriented (Brett, 2001). Thus, we hypothesize that

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The effects of negotiators' interaction goals on joint profit will be mediated by their use of bargaining tactics.

Specifically, negotiation dyads will use integrative tactics more frequently when the two parties place greater importance on cooperative goals and less importance on competitive goals (H1a), whereas they will use distributive tactics more frequently when they place greater importance on competitive goals and less importance on cooperative goals

(H1b); joint profit will be positively predicted by integrative tactics and negatively predicted by distributive tactics (H1c).

Interaction Matters: An Actor-Partner Interdependence Analysis

One of the key characteristics of negotiation is that parties are interdependent (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006). Although negotiators' cognitions and decisions can be significantly influenced by those of their counterpart, only a few studies have empirically assessed the interpersonal influence in explaining conflict and negotiation dynamics (e.g., Butt, Choi, & Jaeger; 2005; Keck & Samp, 2007; Liu, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Studies have shown that individuals may respond to their counterpart's influence in two ways: They may either demonstrate similar or reciprocal patterns (e.g., Friedman et al., 2004) or respond in opposite or complementary patterns (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004), or a combination of both (Butt et al., 2005; Liu, 2009). For example, Liu (2009) found in a recent study that negotiators' anger—which often is associated with an egoistic, competitive orientation—caused their counterparts both to decrease their use of integrative tactics (a reciprocal response) and to decrease their use of distributive tactics (a complementary response). Keck and Samp's (2007) study examined the sequential associations between conflict tactics and goal pursuit within and across conflict partners. Their study found that one partner's integrative behavior was positively associated with the other partner's relational (cooperative) goals and negatively associated with his or her instrumental (competitive) goals. These findings suggest that the links between goals and behaviors need to be examined at both individual (intrapersonal) and dyadic (interpersonal) levels to best explicate the interactive bargaining process.

There is also a methodological impetus toward an interdependence analysis of interaction goals in negotiation. When studies involve individuals interacting with one another for a reasonable amount of time, their responses often are correlated. If individual negotiators are treated as the unit of analysis and traditional statistical methods (e.g., ANOVA, regression analysis) that assume independent observations are used, depending on the direction of interdependence (positive or negative), the estimates for variance and population means will become either too liberal or too conservative (Kashy & Kenny, 2000). Alternatively, when the dyad is treated as the unit of analysis (as is the case with H1), one can explore how two parties' goals or tactics taken together influence joint gain but not how each negotiator's goals might influence their partner's tactics and outcomes. The actor-partner interdependence model (APIM) has been introduced as a promising model for tackling the issue of interdependence in dyadic research (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). It allows researchers to estimate the impact of a person's independent variable (IV) not only on his or her own dependent variable (DV; called an actor effect) but also on his or her partner's DV (called a partner effect). In this study, multilevel modeling (MLM) procedures as explicated by Kenny et al. (2006) are used to assess the actor and partner effects of goals on tactics and outcomes.

Although we are methodologically equipped to assess the actor and partner effects of goals on behaviors, how one party's interaction goals cause behavioral change in the counterpart requires further theorizing. Existing research suggests at least one possible route, namely, interpersonal perception—the beliefs that people have about another individual's goals—which in return shape people's behavior toward that individual (Jones & Thibaut, 1958; Kenny, 1994). When one's goal attainment is contingent on another's actions, it is vital that one has the capacity to make inferences about the other's goals (Bogdan, 1997). Research on goal detection provides evidence that individuals can detect others' goals through eye contact (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1992), previous social-interaction episodes (Berger, 2000), and the structural feature of other's tactics in relation to the interaction context (Palomares, 2008). The beliefs that individuals have about others' goals and behavioral tendencies can in turn influence their own behavior (Horowitz et al., 2006). For example, if Party B perceives Party A to be oriented toward a "win-win" outcome and a cooperative future relationship, Party B is likely to follow the norm of reciprocity and use more integrative tactics unless he or she is considerably more powerful than Party A (Gouldner, 1960). Drawing on the interpersonal perception literature, the current article assumes that Party A's interaction goals can be detected by Party B; therefore, we focus on assessing the direct link between Party A's goals and Party B's bargaining tactics.

We know of little research about how multiple types of competitive and cooperative interaction goals are linked to negotiators' and counterparts' individual gains through the bargaining tactics they use. There is evidence that agreeable or cooperatively oriented negotiators are more likely to do worse for themselves, whereas individuals with an egoistic or competitive orientation tend to do better in distributive bargaining (Barry & Friedman, 1998). At the interpersonal level, Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that angry (competitively oriented) negotiators were able to claim more value in distributive bargaining because anger pressed their counterparts to make more concessions in order to maintain interaction.

In bargaining situations that contain integrative potential, however, the amount of resources a negotiator claims for himself or herself is jointly determined by the use of both integrative (value-creating) and distributive (value-claiming) tactics, used by both himself or herself and the counterpart. Although distributive tactics help negotiators to claim a bigger portion of the pie, they may also prevent negotiators and their counterparts from expanding the pie and therefore lead to smaller individual gains, unless they are balanced with the use of integrative tactics by either party. Research conducted by Olekalns and Smith (2000, 2003a, 2003b) suggested that members of negotiation dyads may differ in their social motivation and the degree to which they reciprocate or complement the type of bargaining tactics used by their counterpart. Although their research assessed how joint gains are predicted by different types (reciprocal or nonreciprocal) of strategy sequences, indicating that mixed orientation dyads negotiate differently from same orientation dyads, neither is it clear how mixed orientations influence the strategic direction of behavioral change nor did they assess individual gains as an outcome variable. The current article examines the cognitive and behavioral processes within and across dyad members that lead to both joint and individual gains. We hypothesize that

Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effects of individual negotiators' interaction goals on their and their counterpart's individual gains will be mediated by their and their counterpart's use of bargaining tactics.

Specifically, consistent with H1a, an individual negotiator will use integrative tactics more frequently when the negotiator and/or his or her partner place greater importance on cooperative goals and less importance on competitive goals (H2a), whereas a negotiator will use distributive tactics more frequently when the negotiator and/or his or her partner place greater importance on competitive goals and less importance on cooperative goals (H2b). Furthermore, a negotiator's individual gain in a simulation with integrative potential will be negatively predicted by the number of distributive tactics used by both himself or herself and the counterpart (H2c), whereas it will be positively predicted by the number of integrative tactics used by both parties (H2d).

Assessing Culture's Effect: A Cross-Cultural Analysis

Negotiation becomes a much more complicated process when it occurs across cultural boundaries. *Culture* can be defined as a set of socially transmitted behavior patterns, norms, beliefs, and values of a given community that its members use to interpret their surroundings and guide their interactions with others (Triandis, 1993). Individualism and collectivism are commonly used as examples of cultural syndromes: Individualistic cultures, such as the United States, emphasize autonomy and independence, self-determination, and concern for one's own interests, whereas collectivistic cultures, such as China, emphasize interconnectedness, relational harmony, and concern for in-group interests. In addition, collectivistic cultures distinguish more clearly between in-groups and out-groups (Gudykunst et al., 1992). For instance, in collectivistic cultures, out-group members are treated in a more individualistic manner than in-group members (Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996).

As widely shared sets of beliefs and values, cultural syndromes have a significant influence on individuals' goal pursuit and negotiation behavior. Prior research suggests that negotiators in Eastern cultures are more likely to think about negotiation in terms of relationships, whereas negotiators in Western cultures are more oriented toward a competitive (win-lose), outcome frame (Adair & Brett, 2004; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). These cultural differences, however, are relative rather than absolute because the opposite patterns have been reported as well. Schmidt (1979) noted that in buyer-seller negotiations, Chinese negotiators are very competitive, ask for higher opening offers, and take longer to reach a deal. Adair et al. (2004) found that Hong Kong Chinese engage in less information sharing, use more distributive persuasion tactics, and have greater difficulty identifying integrative potential as compared with American negotiators. These seemingly inconsistent findings suggest that culture's influence on motivation and behavior needs to be contextualized. Situational factors, such as bargaining context, power difference, role, in-group/out-group relationship, and so on, can moderate culture's main effect. For example, research suggests that Chinese negotiators are more likely to take a distributive approach in bargaining situations unless they are dealing with in-groups,

when a long-term relationship is more important than short-term personal interests (Liu, 2009). Cai et al.'s (2000) study found that the effects of collectivism on negotiation behavior and joint profit are larger for sellers than buyers, perhaps because sellers possess more power than buyers.

Although considerable research has documented culture's effects on negotiators' cognition and behavior, there is a tendency to focus almost exclusively on cultural differences and ignore potential cross-cultural similarities in the bargaining process. Do theories of negotiation and message production require basic modification to incorporate diverse cultures? Scholars of emotion and motivation have noted that although attribution content is culture specific, the structure of the attributional theory of emotion and motivation is general and transcends specific instances (Weiner, 2006). This proposition has received empirical support. Liu's (2009) study reported that despite considerable cultural differences in negotiation behavior, the ways in which emotions (e.g., anger) influence negotiators' bargaining tactics are largely similar across cultures. Should similar findings be obtained from cross-cultural research on interaction goals in negotiation, we would be more confident in generalizing theories of interaction goals across cultures.

The current study aims to assess not only culture's main effect on goal pursuit and bargaining tactics but also whether theoretical linkages between goals and tactics hold true for negotiators from two distinct cultures (United States and China). Culture's main and moderating effects will be assessed within a context in which the two negotiators, who are strangers to each other, also have differential power (employer vs. employee). The Chinese culture has been characterized by hierarchy and role relationships where superiors expect subordinates to show respect and conformity, whereas the U.S. culture has been identified as a low power distance group where subordinates expect to be respected and valued based more on personal attributes than on their positions or titles (Gao & Ting-Toomey, 1998). Such a context allows us to assess the extent to which culture's effect on goal pursuit is moderated by role. We hypothesize that

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Chinese negotiators will place greater importance on competitive goals than American negotiators.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The difference between Chinese and American employers in perceived importance of competitive goals will be more pronounced than that between Chinese and American employees.

Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Culture will not moderate the influence of goals on negotiation strategies.

Hypothesis 4b (H4b): As such, Chinese negotiators will use more distributive tactics and fewer integrative tactics than American negotiators.

With regard to culture's effect on negotiation outcomes, empirical research has produced mixed results. For example, Arunachalam, Wall, and Chan's (1998) study found that Hong Kong Chinese obtained higher joint outcomes than did their U.S. counterparts, whereas Brett et al.'s (1998) study found just the opposite. Further research suggests that negotiators in different cultures may achieve high joint gains using different bargaining tactics due to different

cultural norms and preferred communication styles (Adair & Brett, 2004). The traditional model of linking information-sharing behaviors to joint gains was mainly supported by the U.S. negotiators who are known as a low-context communication culture and rely on direct, explicit messages to obtain information (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001). Negotiators from high-context communication cultures (e.g., Japan) were found to identify integrative potential through implicit information or heuristic trial-and-error search, such as using offer proposals as a highly sophisticated inferential search engine (Adair & Brett, 2005). Thus, the influence behaviors that lead to distributive outcomes in low-context cultures (e.g., single-item offers, persuasive arguments) may motivate a search for information that facilitates integrative outcomes in high-context cultures. This article focuses on the type and frequency, rather than the sequence, of bargaining tactics. We hypothesize that

Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The negative association between distributive tactics and joint gains will be stronger for Americans than for Chinese.

Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The positive association between direct integrative tactics (i.e., priority information exchange) and joint gains will be stronger for Americans than for Chinese.

Hypothesis 5c (H5c): The positive association between indirect integrative tactics (i.e., integrative issue-linking) and joint gains will be stronger for Chinese than for Americans.

Given the above hypothesized moderations, we ask the following research question:

Research Question 1 (RQ1): How will Chinese and American negotiators differ in the amount of joint gains?

Method

Participants and Recruitment Procedures

Over a period of 3 months, 70 mainland Chinese students (34 men and 36 women) and 64 American students (32 men and 32 women) were recruited at both undergraduate and graduate levels in a midwestern university ($N = 134$). Ninety-three percent ($n = 65$) of the Chinese participants reported having resided in the United States for less than 5 years. The majority of them were graduate students ($n = 62$, 88.6%) above 25 years of age ($n = 61$, 87.1%). Over half of the American participants were undergraduate students ($n = 36$, 56.3%) between 19 and 24 years of age ($n = 41$, 64.1%).²

Participants were recruited from various academic departments through in-class announcements, word of mouth, campus flyers, postings in university newsgroups, and postings in student organization list-serves. On arrival at the interaction research laboratory, students were instructed to read and sign a consent form before they completed a series of tasks. Each participant was compensated US\$7 on completion of the entire experiment.

Experimental Design and Hypothetical Scenarios

Participants were randomly paired to form same-sex, same-culture negotiation dyads. The majority of participants ($n = 112$, 83.6%) reported that they did not know the other person prior to the study. Those who reported knowing each other ($n = 22$, 16.4%) reported a low level of knowledge ($M = 1.83$, $SD = 0.99$) on a 7-point bipolar scale. Dyad members were randomly assigned to one of two bargaining roles (employer vs. employee) to perform a job contract negotiation that consisted of two tasks. The first task was a single-issue, zero-sum game concerning the kind of laptop computer the employee would receive from the company. The first task functioned simply as a "warm up" task in the sense of (a) allowing participants to interact with their partner briefly before they formed interaction goals for the main negotiation task and (b) highlighting the competitive elements of negotiation to discourage participants from reporting only what might be viewed as socially appropriate (cooperative) goals. Participants were then given a scenario of the second task, which involved negotiating core terms of employment, including multiple issues (salary, medical coverage, vacation, and start date) that contained integrative potential (i.e., both parties could win by trading off issues of differential importance; see Pruitt, 1981). Before beginning the second task, participants read a description of the issues to be negotiated and responded to a 37-item questionnaire regarding the perceived importance of the eight goals they might pursue in the second simulation. Participants were separated into different rooms when reading the scenarios and responding to the questionnaires so that they could ask questions without the presence of the other party. After responding to the goals questionnaire, participants met again to complete the second simulation and then were debriefed.

Participants were told in the scenarios for both tasks that their objective was to get as good a deal as they could for their company or for themselves, measured by the total number of points they could earn from the negotiation, and that they should avoid reaching an impasse as it would result in zero points. The payoff schedule for the four issues discussed in the second session was designed in ways that reflected three types of negotiation: integrative, distributive, and compatible. Salary and medical coverage were integrative issues (i.e., salary was worth more points for employees while medical coverage was worth more points for managers, creating the potential for logrolling issues of differential importance in a way that benefited both parties more than a straight compromise on each issue). Vacation was a distributive issue (i.e., higher point values for managers resulted in lower point values for employees and the issue was equally important for both parties, creating a zero-sum situation). Start date was a compatible issue in that employees and managers got the same point value for each given option (i.e., there was no conflict in terms of what was the most desirable outcome for both parties on this issue, though participants, blind to each other's payoff schedule, had to figure out for themselves that they both wanted the same thing). The tasks, which have been used widely in previous research, provide the context for testing a series of behavioral measures.

Previous studies have shown that the negotiation scenarios were perceived as realistic by both Americans and Chinese (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Liu, 2009). To ensure that Chinese participants would fully understand the simulation material, all

scenarios and questionnaires were translated into Chinese and then back translated into English by Chinese graduate students who were experienced in bilingual translation. The English names were replaced by Chinese names to enhance Chinese participants' role identification. To ensure that Chinese participants communicate effectively during negotiation, they were encouraged to speak Chinese.

Instrumentation

Measuring interaction goals. Based on Wilson and Putnam's (1990) framework, an Interaction Goals Questionnaire (IGQ) was developed that assessed eight goals. The IGQ includes 37 items with 4 to 5 items measuring each of the eight goals (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Sample items include the following: "I want to maximize the total number of points I can earn in the negotiation" (maximizing one's own profit), "I want to make sure that Mr. Hale will not achieve his goals by the end of the negotiation" (minimizing the other party's profit), "I want to find a solution that meets both parties' needs and concerns" (maximizing both parties' profit), "I want to understand what Mr. Hale's concerns are in the negotiation" (understanding the other's concerns), "I want to appear forceful so that Mr. Hale knows I can't be easily taken advantage of" (appearing forceful and assertive), "I want to appear polite and respectful during the negotiation" (appearing considerate and cooperative), "I want to make Mr. Hale aware that I have opportunities with other companies" (gaining power), and "I want Mr. Hale to know that I care about our relationship" (promoting a positive relationship). Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were performed to assess the factor structure of the eight goals, which confirmed a good fit of the measurement models with the data; 30 out of 37 items loaded significantly on their respective factors and were retained (factor loadings ranging from .45 to .97). Cronbach's alpha was above .70 for all goals except "to maximize one's own profit" (see Table 1). For each goal, a mean score of the items was calculated to retain the original 1-to-7-point scale.

A second-order CFA was then performed on scores for the eight individual interaction goals to further reduce the IGQ to two scales: cooperative versus competitive goals. The Chi-square value for the overall model fit was significant, $\chi^2(19) = 67.8, p < .01$, suggesting a bad fit between the model and the data. Modification indices showed that the goal of "maximizing one's own profit" correlated positively with goals of both competitive and cooperative orientations. As theoretically it captures an individualistic rather than competitive social motivation, it was dropped from subsequent analysis. The CFA produced a good model fit after some theoretically justifiable modifications,³ $\chi^2(11) = 16.67, p = .12$. All the goals loaded significantly on their respective factors (loadings ranged from .53 to .85 for the competitive scale and from .40 to .89 for the cooperative scale). Although the two factors were hypothesized as independent, they were allowed to correlate. The correlation between the two factors was moderate, $r = .47$, suggesting that viewing cooperative goals as important did not preclude also viewing competitive goals as important. The two second-order factors (see Table 1 for their descriptive statistics) were used for subsequent statistical analyses.

Measuring negotiation outcomes. Joint gain was the total number of points that each pair of participants jointly earned; it was a same score for both dyad members. Individual gain was the number of points each individual earned. Three out of the 67 negotiation dyads did not reach an agreement within the allotted time limit. The total number of points that participants could earn by reaching a straight compromise (i.e., agreeing on the middle option for each issue) was assigned to each individual in the three dyads, as has been the practice in many previous studies (e.g., Cai et al., 2000; Jordan & Roloff, 1997; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

Coding negotiation strategies. All of the negotiation simulations were both videotaped and audiotaped. Negotiation over the second task (i.e., the core-issues negotiation) was transcribed in the language participants used. A coding manual was developed by comparing five randomly selected transcripts in each language against existing coding manuals (e.g., Cai et al., 2000; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Two American and two Chinese coders were trained to perform content analysis of the transcripts in their native language using the coding manual (for details concerning the coding procedures, see Liu, 2009). Four categories of negotiation tactics were identified that conveyed an integrative (cooperative) or distributive (competitive) orientation: priority information exchange (e.g., requesting or providing information regarding the relative priority of multiple issues), integrative issue-linking (e.g., proposing multi-item offers or linkages between multiple issues), distributive positioning (e.g., proposing or rejecting single-item offers, demanding concessions on single issues, or making positional commitments), and distributive persuasion (e.g., making arguments to reduce the counterpart's resistance or threatening to walk away from the table). Coders began by bracketing the presence of any tactic (regardless of type) used during a simulation. Guetzkow's *U*, an index of disagreement in unitizing, was .04 for the two American coders and .06 for the two Chinese coders (based on five transcripts). In addition, one of the Chinese coders also coded the five transcripts in English to ensure good intercoder reliability across cultures. Guetzkow's *U* between this Chinese coder and the two American coders was .04 and .05, respectively. Folger, Hewes, and Poole (1984) described scores below .10 on this index as "quite low," indicating acceptable unitizing reliability. After resolving disagreements through discussion, coders independently placed each of the bracketed tactics into one of the four categories. Cohen's kappa was .85 between the two American coders, .82 between the two Chinese coders, and .79 and .80 between the Chinese coder and the two American coders. Disagreements were resolved through further discussion. The rest of the transcripts were then equally divided among the coders.

There was substantial variation in the amount of time it took participants to finish this negotiation, with American participants ranging from 3.5 to 24.5 minutes and Chinese participants ranging from 5.0 to 29.5 minutes. Correspondingly, there was also substantial variation in the total number of tactics used by participants, ranging from 4 to 69 for the Americans and from 12 to 70 for the Chinese. As a result, the raw number of tactics in each category is no longer meaningful unless the total number of tactics is taken into account. In addition, most tactic scores were highly positively skewed (three out of four categories were above 1.00 in skewness values). Due to these two issues, transformation procedures were performed for each type of negotiation tactic by log transforming a proportion score between the number of tactics of each type and the total number of tactics used by each

participant. After transformation, the normality of the distributions was much improved (skewness values ranged from .02 to $-.47$). The transformed scores were used for all subsequent statistical analyses.

Results

Given that data were collected from dyad members who interacted with each other during the bargaining process, it is likely that their responses are correlated. Therefore, it is important that the assumption of (non)independent observations be tested before appropriate statistical analysis techniques are selected. According to Kashy and Kenny (2000), the degree of (non)independence for distinguishable dyads can be assessed using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between dyad members' scores, referred to as intraclass correlations. Table 2 summarizes the intraclass correlations for all the measures used in this study. The presence of statistically significant intraclass correlations for most of the measures warrants the assumption of nonindependence for analyzing data at the dyad level in this study.

The Direct and Indirect Influence of Interaction Goals on Joint Gains

H1 assessed whether the association between interaction goals and joint gains at the dyad level would be mediated by the use of bargaining tactics. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable functions as a mediator when it meets the following conditions: (a) variations in levels of the IV significantly account for variations in the presumed mediator (goals \rightarrow tactics), (b) variations in the mediator significantly account for variations in the DV (tactics \rightarrow joint gains), and (c) when the mediator is controlled, the association between the IV and DV (goals \rightarrow joint gains) decreases (partial mediation), with the strongest demonstration of mediation occurring when the association becomes nonsignificant (full mediation). We thus followed the three steps for testing H1. Given that each negotiation dyad shares the same score for joint gain, dyadic scores for goals and bargaining tactics were computed for each dyad by summing actor's and partner's scores on these variables (see Allred et al., 1997).

H1a and H1b provide directional predictions for the first subpart. Specifically, H1a stated that a dyad's use of integrative tactics would be positively predicted by their perceived importance of cooperative goals and negatively predicted by their perceived importance of competitive goals, whereas H1b stated that their use of distributive tactics would be predicted by the two types of goals in the opposite direction. Multiple regression procedures were performed with each type of bargaining tactic as the DV, and cooperative and competitive goals as the IVs. Results showed that the use of priority information exchange was negatively predicted by the combined importance that the dyad placed on competitive goals, $\beta = -.28$, $t(64) = -2.30$, $p < .05$, and the use of distributive persuasion was positively predicted by competitive goals, $\beta = .32$, $t(61) = 2.61$, $p = .01$. The model R^2 was significantly greater than zero for both models. Cooperative goals did not have a significant influence on any type of bargaining tactic. H1a and H1b were both partially supported.

Table 2. Dyadic Intraclass Correlations of Independent and Dependent Measures

Independent and Dependent Measures	All (N = 67)	American (n = 32)	Chinese (n = 35)
Cooperative goals	-.28**	-.16	-.40***
Competitive goals	.03	-.01	.09
Priority information exchange	.64***	.46***	.65***
Integrative issue-linking	.60***	.47***	.55***
Distributive positioning	.27**	.16	.41**
Distributive persuasion	.23	.25	.11
Individual gains	.25**	.30	.22

** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

H1c, which provides a directional prediction for the second subpart, stated that joint profit would be positively predicted by a dyad's use of integrative tactics and negatively predicted by distributive tactics. To test H1c, a regression analysis was conducted with joint profit as the DV and the four bargaining tactics entered simultaneously as IVs. Results showed a positive association between integrative issue-linking and joint gain, $\beta = .36$, $t(62) = 2.02$, $p < .05$, and a negative association between distributive persuasion and joint gain, $\beta = -.32$, $t(62) = -2.32$, $p < .05$. The four predictor model accounted for 23% of the variance in joint gain, $F(4, 62) = 4.60$, $p < .01$. H1c was supported.

Finally, hierarchical regression procedures were performed to test the third subpart, in which cooperative and competitive goals were entered on the first step, followed by the four types of bargaining tactics. Results showed that neither competitive nor cooperative goals had a direct influence on joint gains at Step 1. Nevertheless, when bargaining tactics were entered in the model at Step 2, the beta for competitive goals dropped substantially in size from $\beta = -.13$, $t(64) = -1.02$, $p = .31$ to $\beta = -.03$, $t(60) = -0.25$, $p = .80$; integrative issue-linking and distributive persuasion remained significant predictors of joint gains at Step 2. The addition of the mediating variables resulted in a significant increase in R^2 , $F(4, 60) = 4.15$, $p < .01$. Because previous analysis found a positive association between competitive goals and distributive persuasion, we conducted a Sobel test to see whether distributive persuasion significantly mediated the association between competitive goals and joint profit (Sobel, 1982). The mediation was statistically significant, $z = -2.37$, $p < .05$. H1 was supported: Although a dyad's competitive goals did not directly impact the dyad's joint gain, they exerted an indirect effect through their impact on the dyad's use of distributive persuasion.

The Direct and Indirect Influence of Self's and Counterpart's Goals on Individual Gains

H2 predicted that the associations between negotiators' individual gains and their and their counterpart's interaction goals would be mediated by their and their counterparts' use of bargaining tactics. We first performed separate analyses to see whether the three conditions

suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) were met. The first subpart assessed whether a negotiator would use integrative tactics more frequently when the negotiator and/or the counterpart place greater importance on cooperative goals and less importance on competitive goals (H2a), and whether the negotiator's use of distributive tactics would be predicted in the opposite direction (H2b). MLM is an effective method for estimating the actor (intra-personal) and partner (interpersonal) effects of IVs on a DV (known as the APIM; Kenny et al., 2006). Four separate MLM analyses were performed with each type of negotiation tactic as the DV, and actor's competitive goals (Acompetitive), actor's cooperative goals (Acooperative), partner's competitive goals (Pcompetitive), and partner's cooperative goals (Pcooperative) as IVs. As dyad members are distinguishable by their bargaining role, "role" was added in the statement as a repeated measures variable even though it is never used in subsequent analyses (see Kenny et al., 2006, for details). Results from the four MLM analyses are summarized in Table 3, in which b represents the unstandardized parameter estimate of an IV when the other IVs in the model are controlled and r indicates the effect size of the IV computed from the t value and degrees of freedom of the parameter estimate.

As Table 3 shows, a negotiator's priority information exchange was negatively predicted by both actor's (self's) and partner's (counterpart's) competitive goals; distributive positioning was negatively predicted by actor's cooperative goals, whereas distributive persuasion was positively predicted by actor's competitive goals. These associations were all consistent with predictions made in H2a and H2b.

The second subpart of the mediation predicted that a negotiator's individual gain would be negatively predicted by the number of distributive tactics used by both himself or herself and the counterpart (H2c), whereas it would be positively predicted by the number of integrative tactics used by both parties (H2d). Four MLM analyses were performed with individual gain as the DV and actor's and partner's scores on each type of bargaining tactic as the IVs. Results showed that individual gain was negatively associated with both actor's and partner's distributive persuasion, and was positively predicted by partner's priority information exchange (see Table 3). These associations were consistent with the predictions in H2c and H2d.

The above results suggest that priority information exchange and distributive persuasion are the only two types of bargaining tactics that can potentially mediate the influence of goals on actor's and partner's individual gains. To test the overall mediation, an MLM analysis was first performed with individual gain as the DV, and actor's and partner's competitive and cooperative goals as IVs. Results showed that the importance the partner placed on competitive goals shared a significant inverse association with a negotiator's individual gains (see Table 3). A follow-up MLM analysis added actor's and partner's scores on priority information exchange and distributive persuasion into the model. Results showed that the effect of partner's competitive goals on a negotiator's individual gains dropped substantially to $b = -23.99$, $t(124) = -1.69$, $p = .09$, $r = .15$; the effects of distributive persuasion used by actors, $b = -316.30$, $t(125) = -2.64$, $p < .01$, $r = .23$, and partners, $b = -262.25$, $t(125) = -2.19$, $p < .05$, $r = .19$, remained significant, whereas the effect of partner's information exchange became marginally significant, $b = 118.06$, $t(103) = 1.76$,

Table 3. Parameter Estimates for the Actor and Partner Effects of Goals on Tactics and of Tactics on Individual Gains ($N = 134$)

Fixed Components	Mediating Variables												Dependent Measures		
	Priority Info Exchange			Integrative Issue-Linking			Distributive Positioning			Distributive Persuasion			Individual Gains		
	b	t	r	b	t	r	b	t	r	b	t	r	b	t	r
Model 1: Independent measures															
Actor's competitive	-.04*	-1.90	.18	-.03*	-1.65	.17	.01	0.51	.05	.04***	4.40	.36	14.14	1.02	.09
Partner's competitive	-.05**	-2.16	.21	-.02	-0.76	.08	.00	-0.18	.02	-.00	0.44	.04	-0.35***	-2.52	.22
Actor's cooperative	-.02	-0.77	.08	-.03	-1.16	.13	-.03**	-2.03	.20	-.01	-0.76	.07	-3.41	-0.23	.02
Partner's cooperative	.00	0.02	.00	-.00	-0.09	.01	-.01	-1.04	.10	.00	-0.09	.01	0.39	0.03	.00
Models 2-5: Mediating variables															
2. Actor's priority info exchange													-86.48	-1.29	.13
2. Partner's priority info exchange													161.21**	2.40	.23
3. Actor's integrative issue-linking													68.26	0.96	.10
3. Partner's integrative issue-linking													132.00*	1.85	.18
4. Actor's distributive positioning													-84.50	-0.86	.08
4. Partner's distributive positioning													128.72	1.30	.11
5. Actor's distributive persuasion													-239.62**	-2.17	.19
5. Partner's distributive persuasion													-294.50***	-2.67	

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

$p = .08$, $r = .17$. These findings suggest that the association between partner's competitive goals and individual gains may be mediated by the partner's distributive persuasion and possibly partner's priority information exchange as well.

To further assess the mediation process, we used the actor-partner mediator model (see Bodenmann, Ledermann, & Bradbury, 2007; Campbell, Simpson, Kashy, & Fletcher, 2001), which is an extended version of the actor-partner interdependence model. Unlike other recently developed techniques for testing mediation in multilevel models (e.g., Bauer, Preacher, & Gil, 2006; MacKinnon, 2008), the actor-partner mediator model is specifically designed for use with distinguishable dyads, which is the case in our study (i.e., participants were assigned the role of employer or employee). The AMOS structural equation modeling program was used to test two mediation models, one involving distributive persuasion and the second involving priority information exchange (see Figures 1 and 2). The significance of the test statistics was based on the number of dyads in the sample. Both models fit very well— $\chi^2(4, N = 67) = 4.76$, $p = .31$, *ns*, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98 for the model involving distributive persuasion and $\chi^2(4, N = 67) = 6.38$, $p = .17$, *ns*, CFI = .96 for the model involving priority information exchange. According to Sobel's tests, the path from partner's competitive goals through partner's distributive persuasion to negotiator's own individual gains was significant for employees, $z = -2.26$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 1 for a drop from $r = -.22$, $p < .05$ to $r = -.11$, *ns*), but not for employers, $z = -0.79$, $p = .43$. The path from partner's competitive goals through partner's priority information exchange to negotiator's own individual gains was not significant for either employees, $z = -1.42$, $p = .16$, or employers, $z = .25$, $p = .80$. Given the power difference between the roles of employees and employers, it is not surprising that employers' goals and tactics had a stronger influence on employees' individual gains than the other way around. In summary, H2 was partially supported: When employers placed greater importance on competitive goals, they used more distributive persuasion which in turn led employees to earn less individual profit.

Culture's Main and Moderating Effects on Interaction Goals, Bargaining Tactics, and Joint Gains

H3 and H4b as well as RQ1 assessed culture's main effects on interaction goals, bargaining tactics, and joint gains, and H4a and H5 assessed culture's moderating effects on the links between goals and tactics, and between tactics and joint gains. Specifically, H3a predicted that Chinese negotiators would place greater importance on competitive goals than American negotiators and H3b predicted that the cultural difference would be more pronounced for employers than for employees. A 2×2 mixed-model ANOVA was performed with competitive goals as the DV, culture as a between-group factor, and role as a repeated measure (to account for interdependence between the two parties). Culture and role were contrast coded, with Americans coded as -1 and Chinese as 1 , employees as -1 and employers as 1 . The ANOVA detected a significant main effect for culture, $F(1, 65) = 6.07$, $p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$: Chinese negotiators placed greater importance ($M = 5.14$, $SD = 1.04$) on competitive goals than did American negotiators ($M = 4.68$, $SD = 1.12$). H3a was




Figure 1. Actor-partner mediator model—1.

Note: Values are standardized AMOS coefficients. Coefficients in parentheses are the total effect values when the mediators are not controlled. “e” represents the error term for each variable. * $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.




Figure 2. Actor-partner mediator model—2.

Note: Values are standardized AMOS coefficients. Coefficients in parentheses are the total effect values when the mediators are not controlled. “e” represents the error term for each variable. * $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

supported. To further clarify this main effect, follow-up *t* tests comparing Chinese and American negotiators were conducted separately for each of the three competitive goals (for descriptive statistics, see Table 1). Results revealed that Chinese negotiators on average placed greater emphasis than did American negotiators on minimizing the other’s profit, $t(132) = -2.00, p < .05, d = .37$, as well as gaining power over the other party,

$t(132) = -4.39, p < .01, d = 1.87$, whereas participants from the two cultures did not differ significantly in terms of wanting to appear assertive or forceful, $t(132) = -.16, p = .87, d = .02$.

In addition to the culture main effect, the ANOVA also detected a significant Culture \times Role interaction effect, $F(1, 65) = 8.01, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$. Decomposition of this interaction indicated that Chinese employers ($M = 5.17, SD = 1.09$) placed greater importance on competitive goals than did American employers ($M = 4.22, SD = 1.14$), $t(65) = -3.47, p < .01, d = .85$, whereas there was no such difference between Chinese and American employees, $t(65) = .12, p = .91, d = .03$. H3b was supported. Follow-up 2×2 ANOVAs were conducted separately for each of the three competitive goals. Significant interaction effects were found for two of the three goals (i.e., minimizing the other's profit and gaining power over the other party).

H4b predicted that Chinese negotiators would use more distributive tactics and fewer integrative tactics than American negotiators, and RQ1 asked how Chinese and American negotiators would differ in the amount of joint gains. Results from t tests showed that Chinese negotiators used more distributive persuasion tactics, $t(132) = -2.76, p < .01, d = .47$; fewer priority information exchange tactics, $t(132) = 6.22, p < .01, d = 1.07$; and fewer integrative issue-linking tactics, $t(132) = 4.65, p < .01, d = .80$, than did American negotiators. H4b was supported. However, there was no significant difference in their joint gains, $t(65) = -.99, p = .33, d = .24$.

H4a predicted that culture would not moderate the associations between goals and tactics. This hypothesis was tested using both multiple regression (using dyadic scores) and MLM (using actor's and partner's individual scores). In both cases, product terms were created between culture and actor's as well as partner's competitive and cooperative goals to assess possible interaction effects. Both types of analyses showed that after the main effects of culture and goals were controlled, none of the product terms between culture and actor's and partner's competitive and cooperative goals had a significant effect on any type of the bargaining tactics. Statistical power for detecting a medium-size effect ($d = .50$ or $r = .24$) for these interactions assuming alpha = .05 ranged from .67 to .84 given their degrees of freedom. H4a was supported. Thus, there was no evidence that the link between goals and tactics differed across cultures.

H5 predicted that the effects of distributive tactics and direct integrative tactics (i.e., priority information exchange) on joint gains would be stronger for Americans than for Chinese, whereas the effect of indirect integrative tactics (i.e., integrative issue-linking) would be stronger for Chinese than for Americans. Once again, product terms between culture and bargaining tactics were created to test possible interactions. Results from regression analyses are summarized in the first column of Table 4. After the main effects of culture and bargaining tactics were controlled, there was a marginally significant interaction effect between culture and integrative issue-linking. Follow-up regression analyses then were performed separately on the two cultural groups (see columns 2 and 3 in Table 4). Integrative issue-linking had a significant effect on joint gains for Chinese but not for Americans. In contrast, distributive persuasion had a significant effect on joint gains for Americans (although the model R^2 was nonsignificant) but not for Chinese. H5 was partly supported. These findings help clarify how Chinese negotiators (especially employers)

Table 4. Regression Coefficients for the Effects of Culture and Bargaining Tactics on Joint Gains

	Dependent Measure: Joint Gains		
	All (<i>N</i> = 67)	American (<i>n</i> = 32)	Chinese (<i>n</i> = 35)
Independent measures			
Priority info exchange	-.09	-.07	-.08
Integrative issue-linking	.41**	.09	.61***
Distributive positioning	-.01	.09	-.11
Distributive persuasion	-.31**	-.45**	-.18
Culture	.34***		
Culture × Priority info exchange	-.01		
Culture × Integrative issue-linking	.30*		
Culture × Distributive positioning	-.10		
Culture × Distributive persuasion	.09		
Model fit			
<i>R</i> ²	.37	.24	.46
<i>F</i>	3.78***	2.12	6.38***

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. *****p* < .001.

could place greater importance on competitive goals and use more distributive tactics than American negotiators and yet still achieve comparable joint gains. In fact, it should be noted that after the effects of bargaining tactics were controlled, culture had a significant main effect on joint gains, with Chinese dyads ($M = 1,948.86$, $SD = 243.09$), on average, earning greater joint profit than American dyads ($M = 1,891.88$, $SD = 222.41$).

Discussion

Based on the assumption that negotiators attempt to pursue a variety of goals during negotiation interaction, this article examined the links between goals, tactics, and outcomes within and across negotiation partners. In addition, culture's main effect on goal pursuit, bargaining tactics, joint gains as well as its moderating effect on the links between goals, tactics, and outcomes was examined. We now turn to a review of findings of this study, followed by a discussion of directions for future research.

The Influence of Goals on Negotiation Tactics and Outcomes Within and Across Dyads

Given the contextual features of a job contract negotiation, the study measured eight interaction goals that varied in type (instrumental, identity, and relational) and motivational orientation (competitive vs. cooperative) after negotiators had some initial interaction with

their counterparts but before they negotiated the major issues with the same partners. Results of the study provide empirical support to existing assumptions that negotiators often pursue contradicting goals concomitantly (e.g., mean importance ratings for cooperative and competitive goals both were above 5.0 on a 7-point scale) and that goals often covary in importance (e.g., there were sets of cooperative and competitive goals). Our key hypotheses, therefore, concerned how the relative importance that negotiators placed on multiple, conflicting sets of interaction goals would account for not only their own but also their counterparts' use of bargaining tactics and negotiation outcomes.

With respect to the intrapersonal influence of goals on tactics, we found that the perceived importance of competitive goals, such as "minimizing the other party's profit" and "gaining power over the other party," was associated with decreased use of priority information exchange and increased use of distributive persuasion tactics, whereas the perceived importance of cooperative goals, such as "maximizing both parties' profit" and "establishing a positive relationship," was associated with decreased use of distributive positioning tactics. These findings are consistent not only with what the theory of competition and cooperation predicts but also with greater details concerning how the diversity of psychological concerns and goals that emerge during the bargaining process can shape negotiators' behavioral choice. Not surprisingly, we also found that the more distributive persuasion negotiation parties jointly used due to a competitive orientation, the smaller their joint profit; however, although perceived importance of cooperative goals caused dyad members to reduce the amount of distributive positioning (e.g., single-item offers, demands, and rejects), such tactics did not have a significant influence on their joint profit. In addition, integrative issue-linking, a strategy that was positively associated with joint profit, was not influenced by negotiators' interaction goals. Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that negotiation dyads who reciprocate each other's competitiveness and distributive persuasion will leave more value at the table, whereas cooperatively oriented dyads cannot obtain greater joint profit unless they also acquire integrative bargaining skills.

As negotiation is an interactive process involving two interdependent parties, the above associations, although important, can at best provide a partial account of the bargaining process. Our MLM analyses found that negotiators' individual profit was significantly influenced by their counterparts' competitive goals: The more competitively oriented their counterparts, the less profit negotiators gained for themselves. One of the contributions this study seeks to make, therefore, is to identify the underlying mechanisms through which negotiation outcomes are jointly shaped by both parties' goals and tactics. Our three-step mediational analyses revealed that one path that may link counterparts' goals with negotiators' individual profit is through the mediating effect of counterparts' distributive persuasion. Negotiators' individual profit was inversely predicted by their counterparts' distributive persuasion, which in turn was positively predicted by counterparts' own competitive goals. A Sobel test confirmed the significance of this mediation, but for employees not employers, probably because employees are more likely to be susceptible to employers' goals and tactics than the other way around due to the power difference between these roles.

Furthermore, existing research suggests that individuals with an egoistic or competitive orientation tend to do better in distributive bargaining, whereas in this study, negotiators' competitive goals did not yield a direct effect on their own individual gains. As a matter of fact, our findings may even suggest an opposite pattern in bargaining situations that contain integrative potential: When negotiators placed greater importance on competitive goals, their counterparts used fewer priority information exchange tactics, which in turn led to smaller individual gains on the negotiators' part. Combined together, these findings contribute to a fuller picture that describes how it is that when negotiators place more importance on competitive goals, not only will they hurt their counterparts' profit but also will hurt their own individual profit as well because their competitiveness (presumably communicated verbally or nonverbally) will cause their counterpart to withhold useful information concerning priorities.

To sum up, in the bargaining situation used in this study—which contained integrative potential—competitive goals caused both negotiators themselves and their counterparts to achieve smaller individual gains and, consequently, smaller joint profit⁴ because such competitiveness compelled negotiating parties to engage in more distributive persuasion and less priority information exchange. Cooperative goals, on the other hand, had no effect on dyad members' individual or joint gains; although they kept negotiators from using more distributive positioning, they were not associated with greater use of integrative bargaining tactics. The study provides empirical evidence that broad sets of interaction goals, and not just instrumental goals, predict negotiation processes and outcomes. Specifically, competitively oriented instrumental, identity, and relational goals—formed after participants finished an initial competitive task and before they continued to do a multiple-issue simulation with integrative potential—(re)directed negotiators' attention to increased use of distributive persuasion rather than information exchange. As a result, negotiators who prioritized such goals left more value at the negotiation table. Such a mechanism may help to explain why angry feelings are often found to be associated with smaller joint gains (e.g., Allred et al., 1997). Finally, the study also illustrates an important point missed by much of the communication literature on multiple goals—how people's behavior is responsive not only to their own goals but under some conditions also to the goals of their interaction partner, or conversely how people's goals may influence not only their own actions but also the actions of their partner in ways that may help or hinder achieving desired outcomes.

Culture's Main and Moderating Effects on the Links Between Goals, Tactics, and Outcomes

Based on the assumption that cultural syndromes (e.g., collectivism vs. individualism) play an important role in defining individuals' interpretive frameworks regarding their surroundings and their interaction with others, we proposed that negotiators from two contrastive cultures (China and the United States) would differ in the importance they place on competitive and cooperative goals and the cultural difference would be more pronounced for employers than for employees. The results of the study supported this proposition: Given the relational context of the bargaining situation (i.e., two strangers assuming

bargaining roles that differ in power), Chinese participants placed greater importance on competitive goals than American participants; in addition, Chinese employers deemed it more important to pursue competitive goals than did American employers, whereas employees from the two cultures did not differ in this respect. Furthermore, the two cultures did not differ in the pursuit of cooperative goals.

Considerable cross-cultural negotiation research has documented cultural differences in negotiator behavior, but relatively few studies actually explained why such behavioral differences exist. Although conflict scholars have examined self-construals and face concerns as a viable framework for understanding culture's effect on conflict management styles (e.g., Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003), scholarship has called into question the validity of many popular self-construal measures (e.g., Levine et al., 2003). The current study shows that interaction goals may provide an alternative framework for understanding cultural differences in negotiation behavior, particularly during the dynamic interaction process. For example, we found that Chinese negotiators used more distributive persuasion tactics and fewer priority information exchange and integrative issue-linking tactics than did Americans. In addition, the ways in which bargaining tactics were predicted by negotiators' interaction goals were not moderated by national culture. We can conclude, therefore, that Chinese negotiators used more competitively oriented bargaining tactics because they defined the negotiation situation differently. For Chinese negotiators, especially when dealing with strangers who thwarted their goals in previous interaction, the desire to gain power over the other party was as strong as the desire to maximize their own profit, and the desire to minimize the other party's profit also was rated moderately important. Americans, in contrast, considered these desires as among their least important goals to pursue (see Table 1). The study provides empirical evidence that interaction goals offer a framework for explaining why negotiators bargain the way they do—a framework that appears to have utility in non-Western as well as Western cultures.

Despite a stronger focus on competitive goals and greater use of distributive bargaining tactics, in this study, Chinese negotiators actually achieved greater joint profit than their American counterparts, although the difference was not significant until the bargaining tactics were statistically controlled. At the surface level, this finding seems to contradict prior research showing that increased use of distributive tactics leads to smaller joint profit (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). A separate cultural analysis of the links between bargaining tactics and joint gains suggests that members of different cultures take different paths to achieve high joint gains. Although Chinese negotiators used more distributive persuasion tactics, these tactics had no direct effect on their joint gains; on the other hand, although they used fewer integrative issue-linking tactics, those that they used significantly improved joint gains.

These patterns are not inconsistent with cross-cultural research that describes Chinese people as a high-context culture who infer meaning (e.g., integrative potential) through indirect, contextual means (Hall, 1976). Adair, Weingart, and Brett's (2007) research, for example, suggested that high-context negotiation dyads (e.g., Japanese negotiators) use offers, rather than explicit statements about priorities and interests, to garner information and identify integrative potential. The current study suggests that high-context negotiation dyads (i.e., Chinese) may also garner information about priorities through persuasive

arguments. Perhaps for this reason, Chinese participants negotiated 7.26 minutes longer than American dyads on average (out of a maximum of 25 minutes). In any case, frequent persuasive arguments did not undermine joint profits for Chinese participants. However, for American negotiators who are typically considered a low-context culture, persuasive arguments (e.g., giving reasons why the other should make concessions) may distract them from, rather than inform them about, differential priorities, hence hindering them from achieving integrative agreements.

In addition, integrative issue-linking, which is a relatively indirect integrative strategy that requires holistic thinking, worked better for Chinese than for Americans. This is consistent with research on cross-cultural differences in thinking styles (see Nisbett, 2003). Possibly this finding also could reflect that most Chinese participants were sojourning graduate students who were competitively selected into an American university (and thus had greater inferential capacity), whereas most American participants were domestic undergraduate students in the same university (but the research findings did not change when age was statistically controlled, see Note 2). In general, these findings suggest that because negotiation theories were mostly developed in Western countries, we need to take caution (looking for similarities but also differences) when applying them to an Eastern culture due to extensive cultural differences in cultural norms and communication styles.

Future Directions and Limitations

This study examined links between goals and behaviors both within and across negotiation partners. Although integrative issue-linking had a significant influence on joint gains, it was influenced by neither negotiators' own nor their counterparts' competitive or cooperative goals. Future research should seek to solve the mystery. We should acknowledge that the external validity of this study is restricted because we observed students with limited bargaining experience enacting a simulated negotiation. Existing research has demonstrated that inexperienced negotiators are more likely than experienced negotiators to adopt a distributive, win-lose approach to negotiations (Neale & Northcraft, 1986). It is possible that a significant association between goals and the use of integrative issue-linking may be observed among more experienced negotiators. Interpersonally, the effect of counterparts' competitive goals on negotiators' use of priority information exchange tactics also merits future research. Direct evidence is needed to demonstrate how one negotiator's interaction goals are detected by the counterpart and in turn influence the counterpart's behavioral choice.

In addition, goals represent desires that arise in a particular context and are subject to change over time (Wilson, 2002). Future research should examine whether findings of this study can be replicated in a different bargaining context where negotiators pursue a set of contextually relevant goals that may differ from those examined in this study. Furthermore, alternative methods (e.g., stimulated recall) to assess goals should be used to capture the moment-by-moment change of goals as well as their influence on the bargaining process. As for culture's effect, we used Chinese sojourners in the United States rather than natives residing in China. Our study found that the impact of a negotiator's own and his/her partner's goals on the negotiator's bargaining tactics was very similar across culture, although culture influenced the

degree to which negotiators prioritized competitive goals and moderated the impact of some tactics on outcomes. It will be desirable for future research to replicate the study with a native sample that has received little exposure to the U.S. culture to further test when culture does and does not have a moderating impact on associations between goals, tactics, and outcomes.

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Notes

1. Research has identified many social motives—competitive, cooperative, individualistic, altruistic, and so on—all derived from the combined positive and negative valuation of one's own and the other's outcomes (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006; McClintock & Van Avermaet, 1982). Drawing on the theory of competition and cooperation, the current study focuses on a contrast between goals that are competitively and cooperatively oriented.
2. Correlations between age and all of the dependent variables were computed to see whether age might potentially confound the effect of national culture. Results indicated that across cultures, age was significantly correlated with (a) information exchange ($r = -.28, p < .001$) and (b) integrative issue-linking ($r = -.20, p < .02$). Neither association remained significant when examined separately within each culture. To minimize the confounding effect, age was used as a covariate in analyses involving these two types of negotiation strategies. There was no difference in the results when age was or was not controlled.
3. The error term of "understanding the other's concerns" was allowed to covary with those of "maximizing both parties' profit" ($r = .40$) and "minimizing the other party's profit" ($r = .30$) in order to improve the fit of the model.
4. It should be noted that although the study found evidence of mediation showing that competitive goals had an indirect effect on joint profit through increased distributive persuasion and reduced integrative issue-linking, their direct effect on joint profit was nonsignificant. This suggests that additional, unmeasured factors may have suppressed or moderated this effect, such as negotiators' cognitive complexity (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), detection of counterpart's goals or motives (Olekalns & Smith, 2003b), and the amount of information negotiators obtained about the counterpart's payoff charts (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2005).

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