

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Anger on Negotiation Strategies: A Cross-Cultural Investigation

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This study assessed the effects of negotiators' anger on their own and their counterparts' use of negotiation strategies and whether such effects were moderated by national culture. Participants (N = 130) were 66 sojourning Chinese and 64 Americans who performed an intracultural negotiation simulation. Findings indicated that (a) anger caused negotiators to use more positional statements and propose fewer integrative offers, (b) anger caused the counterparts to use fewer positional statements but also exchange less information about priorities, (c) Chinese negotiators used more persuasive arguments as their counterparts' anger increased, whereas Americans did not, and (d) Chinese negotiators used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than American negotiators. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed in this article.

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Negotiation is a process whereby two or more parties who hold or believe they hold incompatible goals engage in a give-and-take interaction to reach a mutually acceptable solution (Putnam & Roloff, 1992). Over the past two decades, the idea that emotion is potentially central to understanding how individuals respond to bargaining situations has gained currency (Barry, 1999). Contrary to a traditional perspective that characterizes the parties in negotiation as strategic actors who rationally aim to achieve their goals, researchers have noted that negotiators always feel *some* emotions, and negotiation dynamics can be significantly influenced by the affective components (Kumar, 1997).

Research on emotion in negotiation can be roughly divided into two categories: studies of *intrapersonal* effects (i.e., the influence of a negotiator's *felt* emotions on his or her own negotiation behavior) and studies of *interpersonal* effects (i.e., the influence of a negotiator's *expressed* emotions on his or her counterpart's behavior;

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Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). Although the two lines of research have contributed to our understanding in significant ways, they focus on distinct processes of emotion and provide largely inconsistent prescriptive maxims regarding the use of emotion in negotiation. For example, on one hand, negotiators were advised to avoid or suppress anger because angry feelings were found to be a cause of increased retaliatory strategies, smaller joint gains, and premature impasses (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). On the other hand, negotiators were encouraged to “get mad and get more than even” because expressed anger was found to increase the counterpart’s concession making (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). This inconsistency suggests that emotion needs to be examined as a *multilevel* phenomenon that simultaneously takes into account both intrapersonal (individual) and interpersonal (dyadic) processes in order to obtain a complete picture about the role of emotion in negotiation and reconcile competing prescriptive maxims (Butt, Choi, & Jaeger, 2005).

There is also a methodological impetus to a multilevel investigation. Negotiation studies involving negotiation simulations typically analyze responses from dyad members at the individual level assuming independent observations. It has been noted that ignoring the nonindependent nature of dyadic data may pose threats to the accuracy of predictions (for a detailed discussion, see Kashy & Kenny, 2000). The “Actor–Partner Independence Model” (APIM) has been introduced as a most promising model for tackling the issue of interdependence in dyadic and group research (Kenny & Cook, 1999). It allows researchers to estimate the impact of a person’s independent variables (IV) not only on his or her own dependent variable (DV; called an *actor* effect) but also on his or her partner’s DV (called a *partner* effect). In this study, the multilevel modeling (MLM) procedures explicated by Kenny, Kashy, and Cook (2006) are used to assess the actor (intrapersonal) and partner (interpersonal) effects of emotion in negotiation.

To date, most empirical studies of emotion in negotiation were conducted using Western samples from predominantly White, middle-class backgrounds. The extent to which their findings can be generalized to a different culture remains questionable. Given the increasing volume of intercultural negotiation at individual, organizational, and national levels, it is important to understand how culture interacts with emotion in shaping negotiation dynamics. To address these questions, this article presents a multilevel, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of anger, an other-directed, discrete emotion that is believed to most frequently arise from and have a disruptive influence on conflict and negotiation processes (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).

Emotion in negotiation

Emotion as a “black box” in negotiation research was not opened until the 1980s. Earlier emotion in negotiation research has been largely informed by cognitive theories of emotion (Allred et al., 1997). The cognitive approach assumes that emotions are generated by the judgments people make about events in their

environment, and once emotions occur, people often think in a somewhat altered manner and act accordingly (Parrot, 2004). Thus, emotion is treated as primarily an individual phenomenon. Until very recently, emotion in negotiation research has focused on *intrapersonal* effects of emotions.

As an other-directed, differentiated emotion, anger is largely defined in terms of characteristic appraisals and action tendencies. An appraisal is a relatively complex evaluation of the current or impending transaction between a person and the environment (Lazarus, 1991). Research shows that anger is a goal-incongruent emotion associated with appraisals that the situation is unpleasant (e.g., failing to get what is desired) and another person should be blamed for it (Weiner, 1995). Action tendencies are biologically based behavioral responses that allow people to cope adaptively with emotion-arousing events (Burlison & Planalp, 2000). Emotion theorists commonly agree that the innate action tendency in anger is “*attack* on the agent held to be blameworthy for the offense” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 226). Substantial research has supported this proposition: The experience of anger has been found to be associated with more contentious behavior (Olekalns & Smith, 2003), less helping behavior (Weiner, 1995), less concern about the consequences of one’s aggressive actions (Berkowitz, 1988), and a greater likelihood of pursuing recriminatory goals (Allred, 1999; MacGeorge, 2001).

In the past few years, researchers have paid increasing attention to the *interpersonal* functions of emotions: Negotiators’ emotions influence not only themselves but also their counterparts (Van Kleef et al., 2006). From a social functions perspective, emotions communicate important information to observing individuals about one’s feelings, social intentions, and behavioral orientations (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). In negotiation, emotions may signal the value one attaches to different issues and provide critical feedback about one’s willingness to agree (Putnam, 1994). This information in turn can influence the counterpart’s interpretation of the situation and consequently his or her behavior (Van Kleef et al., 2004).

Studies have shown that negotiators may respond to their counterparts’ expressed anger in two ways: Negotiators may either demonstrate similar emotions and behavior, known as the *reciprocal* response (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992), or they may demonstrate *complementary* behavior that is viewed as necessary to maintain the interaction (Butt et al., 2005). For example, Friedman et al. (2004) found that expressions of anger lowered online dispute resolution rates in part because expressing anger generated an angry response in the counterpart and hence reduced both parties’ motivation to cooperate. Conversely, Van Kleef et al. (2004) found through computer-mediated simulations that negotiators with an angry counterpart made more concessions than did those with a nonemotional counterpart. Although the two types of response patterns seem inconsistent, they may coexist: Although anger may convey the impression of a hard-to-get, tough negotiator who will not settle for a suboptimal outcome, thus pressing the counterpart to be less committed to original positions, the counterpart may also lose motivation to explore creative options for optimal mutual gains. When a bargaining

situation has potential for “win–win” outcomes, these tendencies suggest a less productive bargaining dynamic where parties end up with smaller joint gains and less desire to work with each other in the future (Allred et al., 1997). On the other hand, in highly competitive situations, they may either increase the chance of premature impasses (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) or allow angry negotiators to gain an upper hand (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Undoubtedly, important insights can be gained from examining how these differing effects of anger operate together in the bargaining process.

Recently, Butt et al. (2005) compared individual-level and dyad-level effects of various emotions, including anger, on negotiating parties' behavior and outcomes. Participants' anger was found to increase their own dominating behavior but had no significant effect on their counterparts' behavior; nevertheless, there was a positive association between participants' dominating behavior and their counterparts' yielding behavior (a complementary response). Butt et al. were among the first to initiate a dialogue between the two separate (intrapersonal vs. interpersonal) lines of research. Like many emotion-in-negotiation researchers, they measured negotiation behavior by asking participants to rate their *perceived* use of negotiation strategies using a self-report questionnaire at the end of the simulation, which may diverge from their *actual* use of negotiation strategies during the bargaining process. Perhaps for this reason, their study found no significant effect for counterparts' anger on participants' behavior. The current study seeks to extend existing research by measuring negotiation strategies via behavioral coding based on what negotiators actually say and do (i.e., content analyzing the transcripts of video-recorded negotiation simulations; e.g., Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988). Such an approach allows for a relatively objective evaluation of negotiators' bargaining strategies and may provide additional insight into the dynamic negotiation process.

Negotiation tactics have been roughly classified into two categories: distributive and integrative strategies. Strategies are considered *distributive* when negotiators adopt a competitive approach and focus on claiming more value for themselves; they are *integrative* when negotiators use a cooperative approach and focus on creating more value for both parties (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006). Substantial evidence indicates that distributive strategies, such as threats, positional commitments, and persuasive arguments, tend to yield win–lose outcomes and smaller joint profit, whereas integrative strategies, such as priority information exchange, multiple-item offers, and relationship building, tend to yield win–win outcomes, higher joint profit, and greater desire to work with each other in the future (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson, 1991). Based on existing theory and research, the study hypothesized:

H1: Participants' anger will be positively associated with their use of distributive strategies and will be negatively associated with their use of integrative strategies.

H2: Participants' anger will be negatively associated with their partner's use of distributive strategies (a complementary response) and will be negatively associated with their partner's use of integrative strategies (a reciprocal response).

Culture's influence on emotion in negotiation

To date, emotion-in-negotiation research has rarely been extended to non-Western cultures. With a growing trend of globalization, the past few decades have witnessed a rapid proliferation of theory and research on culture and negotiation. However, the element of emotion, despite its pervasiveness, has been largely excluded from cross-cultural negotiation research. On the other hand, scholarly discussions of culture and emotion outside of the negotiation literature are abundant (Mesquita, 2001), yet little research has assessed how culture interacts with emotion in shaping individuals' behavioral choices in conflict and negotiation situations. At a theoretical level, this gap gives rise to an important question: Does emotion function in similar or different ways when negotiation involves members of a non-Western culture?

Culture has been commonly defined as the distinguishing features of a social group with regard to behaviors, institutions, values, norms, and assumptions (Brett, 2000). In individualistic cultures, such as the United States, the self is generally construed as separate and independent, and individuals focus on their own preferences, abilities, and traits as key aspects of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The cultural ideal is to develop and affirm one's attributes and to feel positively about oneself. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, such as China, the self is generally construed as fundamentally connected to the larger social context; individuals focus on adjusting their preferences, interests, and behaviors in order to fit in (Gelfand et al., 2002). Collectivism views the self-group relationship as both compatible (for in-groups) and incompatible (for out-groups). The cultural ideal is to maintain relatedness with in-groups (i.e., "groups of people about whose welfare [we are] concerned, with whom [we are] willing to cooperate without demanding equitable returns, and separation from whom leads to discomfort or even pain," such as families and friends; Triandis, 1988, p. 75) and to be separate from and independent of out-groups (i.e., groups of people about whose welfare we are not concerned and for which individuals will not make sacrifices, such as strangers; Gudykunst, Yoon, & Nishida, 1987). The relative importance of in-groups has been considered one of the major factors that differentiate collectivistic and individualistic cultures (Triandis, 1995). In this article, a cross-cultural comparison is made to assess whether negotiators from two distinct cultures (i.e., the United States and China) have similar or distinct patterns in the ways in which emotion influences their behavior at both intrapersonal and interpersonal levels.

Substantial research has compared how Chinese and Americans negotiate. One line of research maintains that people from collectivistic cultures are more cooperative than individualists because they place more importance on relational harmony than personal interests (Brett & Kopelman, 2004). For example, Hemesath and Pomponio (1998) reported that Chinese decision makers cooperated more than American decision makers in social dilemmas where self-interests in how much resource to take collide with collective interests. In contrast, a second line of research suggests that Chinese are more competitive than Americans in bargaining situations.

Schmidt (1979) noted that in buyer–seller negotiations, Chinese were very competitive, asked for higher opening offers, and took longer to reach a deal. Adair et al. (2004) found that Hong Kong Chinese engaged in less information sharing and used more distributive tactics as compared with American negotiators. A close examination of the two lines of research reveals that Chinese negotiators are more likely to take a distributive approach *unless* they are dealing with in-groups, when a long-term relationship is more important than short-term personal interests (see B. Koch & P. Koch, 2007).

Research that examines culture's effect on emotions has found both similarities and differences. On a cognitive level, in a cross-cultural comparison of cognitive appraisals and behavioral tendencies associated with various emotions, including anger, Lin (1993) found that the responses from Chinese college students displayed highly similar patterns as those from U.S. college students. This study supports the claim that there are pan-cultural mechanisms underlying basic emotions, such as anger (Weiner, 1995). On a social level, according to Markus and Kitayama (1991), anger is an *ego-focused* emotion, which has the individual's internal attributes (his or her own needs, goals, or desires) as the primary referent; hence, it fosters and creates independence. Their study suggests that anger may be more frequently experienced and expressed by individualists. In a similar vein, Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer, and Wallbott (1988) found that collectivists (i.e., Japanese) reported feeling anger primarily in the presence of strangers (out-groups) and they tended to avert anger within an interdependent structure of relationship.

A synthesis of theory and research on culture, emotion, and negotiation suggests that when negotiation occurs between strangers, or non-in-group members, people from collectivistic (e.g., China) and individualistic (e.g., U.S.) cultures are not likely to differ in their emotional responses to a goal-incongruent situation where the other party is blameworthy for perceived harmful behavior. As an ego-focused emotion, the experience and expression of anger is a viable way to assert and affirm the status of the self as independent from the other party's power and influence. Therefore, the intrapersonal effects of anger on negotiation behavior (i.e., more competitive and less cooperative behavioral tendencies) are not likely to differ by culture either unless negotiation involves in-groups. Thus, the current study, which focuses on negotiation between strangers, hypothesized:

H3: National culture will not moderate the intrapersonal influence of anger on negotiation strategies.

At an interpersonal level, cross-cultural negotiation research has yielded equivocal results regarding the reciprocal use of integrative strategies across cultures (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). For example, Adler, Brahm, and Graham (1992) found that both American and Chinese negotiators reciprocated their counterparts' problem-solving strategies. This is consistent with the social exchange theory, which posits that receiving benefits incurs an obligation to reciprocate (Larson, 1998). Little research has assessed whether negotiators also reciprocate distributive strategies across cultures. Cross-cultural researchers suggest that collectivists tend to expect interactions

with out-group members to be exploitative and manipulative and in return become more self-oriented and defensive in their actions (Triandis, 1988; see Parks & Komorita, 1998). However, research showed that American negotiators did not exhibit such a reciprocal tendency; instead, they reduced their contentiousness (a complementary response) when their counterpart was angry (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004). Social exchange scholars have attributed such concessionary acts to an intuitive sense of fairness (Druckman & Harris, 1990). Given existing theory and research, this study continued to hypothesize:

H4: National culture will not moderate the interpersonal influence of anger on the use of integrative strategies (4a). However, whereas Americans will reduce their use of distributive strategies in response to partner's anger, Chinese will increase it (4b).

H5: Chinese participants will use more distributive and fewer integrative strategies than American participants.

Methods

Participants and recruitment procedures

Over a period of 3 months, 70 mainland Chinese students (34 men and 36 women) and 64 U.S. students (32 men and 32 women) were recruited at both undergraduate and graduate levels in a university in the Midwestern United States ($N = 134$). Ninety-three percent ($N = 65$) of the Chinese participants reported having resided in the United States for less than 5 years. The majority of them were graduate students ($N = 62$, 88.6%) above 25 years of age ($N = 61$, 87.1%). Over half of the American participants were undergraduate students ($N = 36$, 56.3%) between 19 and 24 years of age ($N = 41$, 64.1%). Preliminary analyses indicated that culture's effects on the dependent variables did not change after age (measured on an ordinal scale) was statistically controlled.

Participants were recruited from various academic departments through in-class announcements, word of mouth, campus flyers, postings in university newsgroups, and postings in student organization listservs. Upon arrival to the interaction research laboratory, students were instructed to read and sign a consent form before they completed a series of tasks. Each participant was compensated \$7 upon completion of the entire experiment.

Experimental procedures and hypothetical scenarios

Participants were randomly paired up to form same-sex, intracultural negotiation dyads (see Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). The majority of participants ($N = 112$, 83.6%) reported that they did not know the other person prior to the study. Those who reported knowing each other ($N = 22$, 16.4%) reported a low level of knowledge ($M = 1.83$, $SD = 0.99$) on a 7-point polar scale. Two of the 67 negotiation dyads reported a higher level of knowledge (≥ 4.00). Their data were thus discarded. Dyad members were randomly assigned to two bargaining roles

(employer vs. employee) to perform a job contract negotiation that consisted of two negotiation tasks. The first task was intended to elicit feelings of anger so as to examine their causal effects on negotiation behavior in a subsequent negotiation. Participants reported their emotions on a questionnaire after completing the first task. They were then given a maximum of 25 minutes to complete the second task, after which they reported the outcomes and demographic information. Finally, the author debriefed the simulation, particularly with regard to inducement of emotions.

Hypothetical scenarios from Allred et al.'s (1997) study were borrowed and slightly modified to ensure they fit the purpose of this study. The negotiation involved discussing the terms of employment in a large consulting firm between a recruiting manager and a prospective employee. Participants were told that their objective was to get as good a deal as they could for their company or for themselves, measured by the total number of points they could earn from two negotiation tasks. The first task was a single-issue, zero-sum game concerning the kind of laptop computer the employee would receive from the company. Three options were available for discussion, the basic, advanced, and elite option computers, which were respectively worth 0, 20, and 100 points for the employee and 100, 20, and 0 points for the manager. The middle option, which allowed parties to compromise, was worth sufficiently less than each party's optimum to be clearly unattractive; thus, both parties must compete with each other in order to win. Moreover, instructions for this task resulted in contrasting expectations: "employees" were told that the laptop computer was an important symbol of status and respect at the firm and aggressive pursuit of the elite option was typically perceived as an indicator of their requisite confidence to succeed at the firm, whereas "managers" were told that the consulting firm frowned upon ostentatious fringe benefits, and most new recruits had been happy with a basic option computer. Therefore, the first task was intended to elicit behaviors in both parties that would be perceived by the counterpart as unpleasant and blameworthy, potentially causing anger.

The second task, which involved negotiating core terms of employment, included multiple issues: salary, medical coverage, vacation, and start date, which contained integrative potential (i.e., both parties could "win" by trading off issues of differential importance; see Pruitt, 1981). Salary and medical coverage were integrative issues (i.e., salary was worth more points for employees, whereas medical coverage was worth more points for managers). Vacation was a distributive issue (i.e., a higher point value for managers resulted in a lower point value for employees). Start date was a compatible issue in that employees and managers got the same point value for each given option. The tasks, which have been used widely in previous research (e.g., Thompson & Hastie, 1990), provide the context for testing a series of behavioral measures.

The negotiation scenarios demonstrated validity in Allred et al.'s (1997) study. To ensure that Chinese participants would fully understand the simulation material, all scenarios and questionnaires were translated into Chinese and then back translated into English by Chinese graduate students who were experienced in bilingual

translation. Problem areas were identified and resolved through discussion. A pilot study was conducted to assess the realism of the negotiation scenarios among 43 sojourning Chinese and 53 domestic Americans using six items (e.g., “The scenario is applicable to real-life job-offer negotiations”) on 7-point Likert scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .89$). Results showed that sojourning Chinese ($M = 5.12$, $SD = 1.37$) did not differ from domestic Americans ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 0.95$) in their realism ratings, $t(94) = .77$, $p = .44$, and the realism scores were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (4.00) for each cultural group, $p < .01$. To ensure that Chinese participants communicate effectively during negotiation, they were encouraged to speak Chinese.

Instrumentation: Measuring emotions

After completing the first negotiation task, participants reported on a questionnaire the degree to which they were experiencing a variety of emotions (e.g., sadness, disappointment). Four items on 7-point Likert scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*) assessed participants’ feelings of anger (i.e., anger, annoyance, madness, and irritation; see Weiner, 1986). Descriptive statistics indicated that the assumption of normality was violated. Transformation procedures were performed to improve normality. Principal component analysis showed that the four anger items clearly loaded on one single factor, with factor loadings ranging from .86 to .88. Cronbach’s alpha was .89. The factor score was used as a composite measure of anger for subsequent statistical analyses. On average, participants reported a low level of anger ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 1.29$), with individual scores ranging from 1.00 to 5.75 on a 7-point scale. The effects of anger on DVs reported in this study did not change significantly when other emotions were controlled.

Coding negotiation strategies

All the negotiation simulations were both videotaped and audiotaped. Because American participants negotiated in English and Chinese participants negotiated in Chinese, college students from the two cultural groups were recruited to transcribe the second negotiation—the core issues negotiation—in their native language. Transcripts captured the words that were spoken but not nonverbal features, pauses, or overlaps. There was substantial variation in the amount of time it took participants to finish this negotiation, with American participants ranging from 3.5 to 24.5 minutes and Chinese participants ranging from 5.0 to 29.5 minutes. The Chinese spent significantly more time ($M = 19.06$, $SD = 5.97$) to reach an agreement than did the Americans ($M = 11.80$, $SD = 5.79$), $t = -5.05$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.23$.

To develop a coding manual for content analysis of negotiation strategies, five randomly selected transcripts in each language were compared against existing coding manuals (i.e., Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000; Pruitt, 1981). Attention was particularly given to tactics that conveyed a distributive (competitive) or integrative (cooperative) orientation. The final version of the coding manual includes five major

strategy categories: Integrative prioritizing, integrative issue linking, distributive positioning, distributive persuasion, and integrative relation building (see Table 1 for their definitions and examples).

Two American and two Chinese coders were trained to perform content analysis of the transcripts. Over a period of 2 months, training sessions were arranged on a weekly basis in which the author explained the coding manual to the coders, assigned homework for them to practice coding, identified areas that caused confusion, and resolved disagreements through discussion. These coders then independently coded five new transcripts in their native language. Coding was completed in two steps: (a) Coders identified the number of tactics of any type that were present in each transcript (i.e., unitizing) and then (b) coders placed each tactic identified in Step 1 into one (and only one) of the strategy categories (i.e., categorizing). Guetzkow's (1950) *U*, an index of disagreement in unitizing, was .04 for American coders and .06 for Chinese coders. In addition, one of the Chinese coders also coded the five transcripts in English to ensure good intercoder reliability across cultures.

Table 1 Definitions and Examples of Negotiation Strategies

Strategy Categories	Definitions and Examples
Integrative prioritizing	A group of tactics that involves exploring each other's priorities of the issues.
Examples	Asking for details regarding how the counterpart prioritizes multiple issues; providing details regarding one's own priorities.
Integrative issue linking	A group of tactics that involves proposing linkages between multiple issues, often in an attempt to find outcomes that benefit both parties.
Examples	Proposing multi-item offers, typically the value of one item depending on the value of the other item(s).
Distributive positioning	A group of tactics designed to (a) propose a position, (b) refuse to move from the proposed position, or (c) refuse to take the counterpart's proposed position.
Examples	Proposing single-item offers; demanding the counterpart to make concessions; rejecting the counterpart's offers.
Distributive persuasion	A group of tactics designed to reduce resistance and get the counterpart closer to one's own positions.
Examples	Persuasive arguments justifying one's positions; threats; showing BATNAs (i.e., Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement); attacking the counterpart's BATNAs.
Integrative relation building	A group of tactics that has the purpose of establishing positive bonds with the counterpart.
Examples	Compliments; building rapport; showing concerns for the counterpart's needs and concerns; expressing desire for a future work relationship.

Guetzkow's *U* between this Chinese coder and the two American coders was respectively .04 and .05. Folger, Hewes, and Poole (1984) describe scores below .10 on this index as "quite low," indicating acceptable unitizing reliability. Disagreements about unitizing were resolved through further discussion.

Categorizing reliability was then assessed for the same set of transcripts. Cohen's kappa was .85 between the two American coders, .82 between the two Chinese coders, and .79 and .80 between the Chinese coder who also coded the English transcripts and the two American coders. Disagreements on these transcripts were resolved through further discussion. The rest of the transcripts were then equally divided among the coders.

Due to the varied length of negotiations, there was substantial variation in the total number of tactics used by participants (ranging from 12 to 70 for the Chinese and from 4 to 69 for the Americans). As a result, the raw number of tactics in each strategy category is no longer meaningful unless the total number of tactics is taken into account. In addition, most strategy scores were highly positively skewed (four out of five strategies were above 1.00 in skewness values). Due to these two issues, transformation procedures were performed for each negotiation strategy by log transforming a proportion score between the number of tactics in each category and the total number of tactics used by each participant. After transformation, the normality of the distributions was much improved (skewness values ranged from .02 to $-.47$). The transformed scores (ranging from $-.05$ to -1.35) were used for all subsequent statistical analyses.

Analysis and results

Given that data were collected from dyad members who interacted with each other during the bargaining process, it is likely that their responses are correlated. As standard statistical methods such as analysis of variance and multiple regressions require independent observations, it is important that this assumption be tested before these methods are considered for analyzing data.

Assessing the degree of nonindependence

In this study, dyad members are distinguished by their bargaining role. According to Kashy and Kenny (2000), the degree of nonindependence for distinguishable dyads can be assessed using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between dyad members' scores, referred to as intraclass correlations. The data set was structured in a pairwise fashion so that each individual's scores could be associated with his or her partner's scores. Table 2 summarizes the intraclass correlations for all the measures used in this study. Results indicated that (a) dyad members' perceptions of anger were not associated, (b) dyad members' integrative tactics were strongly associated (a reciprocal response), and (c) Chinese dyad members' distributive positioning (but not distributive persuasion) tactics were associated, but Americans did not reciprocate any distributive tactics. The presence of statistically

Table 2 Intraclass Correlations of Independent and Dependent Measures

Independent and Dependent Measures	All (<i>N</i> = 130)	American (<i>N</i> = 64)	Chinese (<i>N</i> = 66)
Anger	.02	.03	.01
Integrative prioritizing	.64**	.46**	.65**
Integrative issue linking	.60**	.47**	.55**
Distributive positioning	.27*	.16	.41*
Distributive persuasion	.23	.25	.11
Integrative relation building	.52**	.35*	.58**

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

significant correlations between dyad members' scores warrants the assumption of nonindependence for analyzing dyadic data.

Multilevel modeling

MLM was recommended as an effective method for estimating the APIM when dyad members are distinguishable (Kenny et al., 2006). Bargaining role, which distinguishes dyad members, was included in the analyses in order to control the amount of variance in the DVs explained by role. Within MLM, there are two levels: Level 1 is *person* and Level 2 is *group*. In the APIM, MLM treats data from dyad members as individual scores nested within a group that has an $n = 2$. One of the primary differences between MLM and ordinary regression analysis is the ability to estimate one or more "effects" in the model as either fixed or random (Hayes, 2006). A *fixed* effect reveals the effect of an IV on a DV for each Level 1 unit (i.e., person) that does not vary across the Level 2 unit (i.e., group) under which a case is nested. A *random* effect, in contrast, is allowed to vary between Level 2 units. In ordinary regression, the intercept and coefficients are both fixed effects, whereas in MLM, there can be several intercepts and several coefficients for each predictor, some of which can be set as random. Given that there are only two persons within each Level 2 unit in the APIM, there is an insufficient number of degrees of freedom to estimate a separate model for each dyad. Thus, the only parameter that can vary is the intercept (Kenny & Cook, 1999), which takes on the role of a dyad (random) effect. In this article, therefore, the reported effects of the IVs are fixed effects.

Culture, anger, and negotiation strategies

H1 through H5 assessed (a) intrapersonal (H1) and (b) interpersonal (H2) effects of anger on negotiation strategies, (c) culture's effects on negotiation strategies (H5), and (d) whether culture moderated the intrapersonal (H3) and interpersonal (H4) effects of anger. Five MLM analyses were performed with each type of negotiation strategies as the DV, and actor's anger (Aanger), partner's anger (Panger), culture, role, the product terms between actor's and partner's anger and culture and role (Aanger \times Culture, Panger \times Culture, Aanger \times Role, Panger \times Role) as IVs.

Culture and role were contrast coded, with Americans coded as -1 and Chinese 1 , employees coded as -1 and employers 1 . Centering (Aiken & West, 1991) was performed before product terms were computed. The following is an example of the syntax used in the analyses:

MIXED

IntegrativePrioritizing WITH Anger Panger culture role

/FIXED = Anger Panger culture role Anger*culture Panger*culture Anger*role
Panger*role | SSTYPE(3)

/PRINT = SOLUTION TESTCOV

/REPEATED = person | SUBJECT(dyad) COVTYPE(CS).

In multilevel equations form, this model is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Level1 : } Y_{ij} = & \beta_{0i} + \beta_1 \text{AANGER}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{PANGER}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{CULTURE}_{ij} \\ & + \beta_4 \text{ROLE}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{AANGER} * \text{CULTURE}_{ij} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{PANGER} * \text{CULTURE}_{ij} + \beta_7 \text{AANGER} \\ & * \text{ROLE}_{ij} + \beta_8 \text{PANGER} * \text{ROLE}_{ij} + r_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Level2 : } \beta_{0i} = \beta_0 + e_i$$

where Y_{ij} is the amount of integrative prioritizing the j th negotiator in the i th dyad used during the bargaining process. In the Level 1 model, β_{0i} is the average number of integrative prioritizing used by dyad i members, $\beta_1 \dots \beta_8$ represent the coefficients of the IVs on the DV, and r_{ij} is the measurement error. In the Level 2 model, β_0 is the grand mean—the average number of integrative prioritizing tactics used by all negotiators across dyads. Finally, e_i is the difference between dyad i 's average and this grand mean. Results from the five MLM analyses are summarized in Table 3. b represents the unstandardized parameter estimate of an IV when the other IVs in the model are controlled, and r indicates the effect size of the IV computed from the t value and degrees of freedom of the parameter estimate (Rosenthal, 1991).

H1 predicted that anger would be positively associated with the number of distributive tactics and negatively associated with the number of integrative tactics used by the negotiator himself or herself. As Table 3 shows, anger had a significant, positive *actor effect* (i.e., intrapersonal influence) on *distributive positioning* and a significant, negative actor effect on *integrative issue linking*. However, anger did not have a significant actor effect on the other three strategies. Thus, H1 was partially supported.

H2 predicted that participants' anger would be negatively associated with both their partner's use of integrative strategies (a reciprocal response) and their partner's use of distributive strategies (a complementary response). As Table 3 shows, anger had a significant negative *partner effect* (i.e., interpersonal influence) on *integrative prioritizing* and a marginally significant, negative partner effect on *distributive*

Table 3 Parameter Estimates of Multilevel Modeling Analyses Examining the Actor and Partner Effects of Anger on Negotiation Strategies from a Cross-Cultural Perspective ($N = 130$)

Fixed Components	Integrative Prioritizing			Integrative Issue Linking			Distributive Positioning			Distributive Persuasion			Integrative Relation Building		
	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>r</i>
Intercept	-.85***	-37.10	.98	-.69***	-28.94	.97	-.44***	-29.52	.97	-.35***	-31.88	.97	-.65***	-35.86	.98
Actor anger	-.03	-1.42	.14	-.04*	-2.04	.20	.03*	2.09	.20	.01	0.66	.06	.00	-0.25	.03
Partner anger	-.03*	-1.93	.19	-.03	-1.58	.16	-.02†	-1.84	.17	.01	0.76	.07	-.01	-0.85	.08
Culture	-.13***	-5.42	.57	-.10***	-4.05	.46	-.01	-0.53	.07	.03**	2.96	.36	-.05**	-2.79	.34
Role	-.05***	-3.98	.45	.01	1.12	.14	-.01	-1.23	.16	-.03***	-3.85	.44	.03**	2.77	.33
Actor anger × Culture	-.00	-0.04	.00	.00	0.03	.00	.01	0.68	.06	-.01	-1.43	.13	.00	-0.08	.01
Partner anger × Culture	-.01	-0.50	.05	-.02	-0.98	.10	-.01	-0.40	.04	.02*	2.16	.19	-.02	-1.04	.10
Actor anger × Role	.03	1.47	.15	-.01	-0.44	.05	.03*	2.36	.23	.00	0.001	.00	.01	0.45	.05
Partner anger × Role	.00	-0.24	.03	-.01	-0.60	.06	.01	0.78	.08	.00	0.40	.04	-.02	-1.03	.11

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

positioning. Anger did not have a significant partner effect on the other three strategies. Thus, H2 was partially supported.

H3 and H4 predicted that (a) culture would not moderate anger's intrapersonal effects on negotiation strategies (H3), (b) culture would not moderate anger's interpersonal effects on *integrative* strategies (H4a), and (c) although anger would cause American counterparts to use fewer *distributive* tactics, it would cause Chinese counterparts to use more (H4b). As Table 3 shows, there was no significant interaction effect between culture and actor's anger on any negotiation strategy nor was there any significant interaction effect between culture and partner's anger on the three integrative strategies. Thus, H3 and H4a were supported. There was a significant interaction between culture and partner's anger on *distributive persuasion*. Decomposition of this interaction showed that anger's *interpersonal* effect on distributive persuasion was negative (but nonsignificant) for Americans, $b = -.02$, $t = -1.56$, $p = .12$, $r = .15$, but was positive (and significant) for Chinese, $b = .03$, $t = 2.35$, $p < .05$, $r = .21$. Although Chinese participants responded to the counterpart's anger with more distributive persuasion, Americans refrained from such a tendency, if not acted otherwise. There was no significant interaction between culture and partner's anger on distributive positioning. H4b was partially supported.

H5 predicted that Chinese would use more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than Americans. As Table 3 shows, culture had a significant effect on four out of five types of negotiation strategies: (a) Integrative prioritizing, (b) integrative issue linking, (c) distributive persuasion, and (d) integrative relation building, with Americans proportionally using more integrative tactics and Chinese using more distributive tactics. Culture did not have a significant effect on distributive positioning. H5 was largely supported.

Discussions

This article examined the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of anger on negotiation strategies and whether such effects were qualified by culture. This section reviews major findings of the study, followed by a discussion of its theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and directions for future research.

At an *intrapersonal* level, consistent with substantial research from the cognitive tradition that found anger to be a cause of more contentious behavior and less helping behavior, in this study, felt anger was found to (a) increase participants' use of distributive positioning that often yields win-lose outcomes (Pruitt, 1981) and (b) decrease their use of integrative issue linking that often yields win-win outcomes (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Simply put, negotiators who felt angry engaged in more competitive and less cooperative behavior. If examined independently, this seems to suggest that anger as a negative emotion is detrimental to negotiation because it initiates a competitive bargaining process. Indeed, negotiation scholars have advised practitioners to avoid or suppress negative emotions for this reason (for a review of

prescriptive maxims on emotion in negotiation, see Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001).

In addition, consistent with emotion research that found the cognitive appraisals and behavioral tendencies of anger to be largely similar across cultures, the study did not find national culture to significantly moderate the intrapersonal effects of anger. This may suggest that anger as a self-focused emotion can drive individuals to assert their independence over the others. For individualists who view themselves as separate from and independent of others, anger can “push” them toward the more competitive end of the interdependence continuum. For collectivists who view themselves as interconnected with the larger social context, the same tendency is likely to occur unless there are mitigating circumstances that can “pull” them back. The current study focused on negotiation between strangers. Although speaking the same language might have invoked some in-group salience among sojourning Chinese, they were unlikely to restrain themselves from pursuing personal goals for someone with whom they might never interact again. Therefore, the same tendency was observed in both cultures.

At an *interpersonal* level, anger was found to have differing effects on the counterpart's use of integrative versus distributive tactics. On one hand, the study revealed a *reciprocal* response pattern: Across cultures, participants' anger was found to reduce both their own use of integrative issue linking and their counterpart's use of integrative prioritizing, both of which have been consistently found to yield win-win outcomes (e.g., Thompson, 1991). Simply put, anger “pulled” both parties back from searching for creative “win-win” options. This is consistent with Allred et al.'s (1997) finding that anger resulted in smaller joint gains. On the other hand, the study also revealed a *complementary* response pattern: Anger increased negotiators' own use of, but decreased their counterpart's use of, distributive positioning in both cultures. This is consistent with Van Kleef et al.'s (2004) finding that anger caused the counterparts to make more concessions, thus helping negotiators to claim more value for themselves. The coexistence of these differing effects suggests that feeling (and expressing) anger can be a desirable strategy only in zero-sum, distributive bargaining situations. It may still hurt the negotiator in situations where there is great integrative potential for achieving “a bigger pie” and where future relationship with the counterpart is important.

Although members of different national cultures exhibited largely similar patterns in the ways in which anger influenced negotiation dynamics, the study did find important cultural variations. Consistent with cross-cultural research that compared Chinese and American negotiators in buyer-seller negotiations (e.g., Adair et al., 2004), this study found that Chinese participants used more distributive (i.e., distributive persuasion) and fewer integrative bargaining tactics (i.e., integrative prioritizing, integrative issue linking, and integrative relation building) than American participants, and it took them much longer to reach an agreement. In addition, although American participants reduced their use of distributive persuasion in response to the counterpart's anger, Chinese participants increased their use of this distributive strategy.

Theoretical and pragmatic implications

This study contributes to current literature in a few important ways. First, by examining the role of anger in negotiation as a multilevel phenomenon that simultaneously takes into account both individual-level and social-level processes, the study proposes a marriage between two theoretical approaches to the study of emotion: The cognitive approach that assumes “emotion is thinking” (Cornelius, 1996) and the social functions approach that assumes “emotion is communication” (Knutson, 1996). The integration of the two approaches suggests that a negotiator’s behavioral choices are simultaneously shaped by both one’s own and the counterpart’s cognitive and emotional responses to a bargaining situation. The mechanisms through which these effects take place, however, require further theory building. It is important to note that the interpersonal influence of anger is not simply an outcome of emotion contagion. In this study, dyad members’ feelings of anger were not associated, partly because anger was elicited through a win–lose, distributive negotiation where one party might have fulfilled his or her goals (and thus felt satisfied) and the other might not (and thus felt angry). Nor can the interpersonal influence of anger be simply attributed to behavioral reciprocity because there were weak, or nonsignificant, associations between dyad members’ use of distributive strategies. Given that emotion is believed to communicate important information about the counterpart’s goals, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies, an individual’s perception of the counterpart’s emotions may influence his or her (re)assessments of his or her own goals, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies. Therefore, future research should investigate the cognitive mechanisms by which both one’s own and the counterpart’s emotions interact to influence behavior.

In practice, regardless of negotiators’ cultural backgrounds, feelings of anger resulted in a relative disinterest in not only oneself but also the counterpart, to search for creative options that can “expand the pie.” Therefore, in bargaining situations where substantial integrative potential exists for both parties to “win,” it is important for negotiators to manage not only their own but also the counterpart’s emotions, so as to cultivate an anger-free, cooperative process. However, when negotiation involves little integrative potential and no need for future interaction, experiencing (and perhaps expressing) stronger anger than the counterpart may be advantageous because it may convey the impression of a hard-to-get, tough negotiator who will not settle for a suboptimal outcome and press the counterpart to be less positional.

Second, by conducting a cross-cultural investigation, this study promotes a dialogue among three lines of research: (a) emotion-in-negotiation research that has almost relied exclusively on Western samples, (b) cross-cultural negotiation research that has largely ignored the role of emotion, and (c) cross-cultural emotion research that has rarely been applied to a negotiation context. Members of the two cultures exhibited largely similar patterns in the ways in which anger influenced negotiation strategies. However, such convergence does not mean that culture’s influence on emotion in negotiation is trivial. Culture had a substantial influence on the use of negotiation strategies (i.e., Chinese exhibited a higher level of competitiveness than

Americans), which is consistent with how culture moderated the interpersonal effect of anger (i.e., Chinese responded to the counterpart's anger with increased distributive persuasion, whereas Americans did not). These findings provide insight into the relationship between culture and emotion: Feelings of anger can drive individuals to be more individualistic (i.e., to be more assertive of one's personal interests); unless there are competing contextual factors (e.g., in-group interaction where relational harmony weighs more than self-interests), its influence on behavior will be primarily identical across cultures. To further theorize the interacting roles of culture and emotion in negotiation, future research should investigate the influence of anger in different relational contexts across cultures. In practice, when negotiation crosses cultural boundaries, American negotiators should be prepared to work with apparently competitive Chinese counterparts and seek to cultivate a trusting relationship with them. Chinese negotiators, on the other hand, should be prepared to use a less time-consuming bargaining style and focus more on integrative bargaining than distributive persuasion.

A third contribution of this study lies in its methodological endeavors. By doing a multilevel analysis, the study provides a research exemplar for directly addressing, instead of ignoring, the nonindependent nature of dyadic data in social interaction research. In addition, through a careful content analysis of what negotiators said and did during the bargaining process, the study provided a more realistic account of how culture and emotion influenced negotiation strategies. Despite the large amount of time and resources it takes to conduct an interaction-based analysis, it generates important additional insight into the dynamic bargaining process in ways that traditional methods (e.g., one-time, self-reported questionnaires) are not capable of.

Limitations of the study and directions for future research

Despite the contributions, there are limitations in the study's sample and design that present a need for caution in its interpretation. First, participants in this study were university students with a limited amount of work experience or negotiation experience. Although the hypothetical scenario described a job-offer negotiation situation which college students commonly encounter as a prospective employee, a sample that consisted of working professionals would be more desirable to enact the role of the recruiting manager. In addition, the interpersonal relationships in the negotiation simulations were based on written role information rather than naturally formed. It would be very useful to replicate the present findings in real-life situations where negotiators accrue actual gains or losses from the negotiation.

Second, the Chinese sample in this study consisted of sojourners to the United States rather than natives residing in China. Sojourning Chinese have demonstrated cognitive and behavioral patterns that are more similar to those of domestic Americans as compared to resident Chinese due to exposure to the U.S. culture (Burleson, M. Liu, Y. Liu, & Mortenson, 2006). Therefore, the effects of anger on negotiation strategies that were found to be largely similar across cultures in this study may not be completely generalizable to resident Chinese. Nevertheless, given the increasing

number of Chinese immigrants in the United States who will inevitably engage in intercultural negotiation with Americans, the study provides important insight into the cross-cultural similarities and differences between members of the two communities.

In conclusion, the study has investigated the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of anger on negotiation performance from a cross-cultural perspective. Despite its limitations, the current work has extended existing research on culture, emotion, and negotiation in important ways. In an increasingly globalized world, the more theoretically equipped we are to understand how cultures are similar and different in the dynamic, complex process of negotiation, particularly under the influence of emotions, the more capable we are of offering useful advice to global negotiation practitioners to negotiate effectively.

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Les effets intrapersonnels et interpersonnels de la colère sur les stratégies de négociation :

Une étude interculturelle

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Résumé

Cette étude a évalué les effets de la colère des négociateurs sur l'usage que leurs homologues et eux-mêmes font de stratégies de négociation. L'étude a également évalué la possible modération de tels effets par la culture nationale. Les participants ($N = 130$) étaient 66 Chinois séjournant aux États-Unis et 64 Américains qui ont pris part à une simulation de négociation interculturelle. Les résultats indiquent que a) la colère a mené les négociateurs à utiliser plus d'affirmations de position et à proposer moins d'offres intégratives, b) la colère a mené les homologues à faire usage de moins d'affirmations de position, mais aussi à transmettre moins d'informations à propos de leurs priorités, c) les négociateurs chinois ont utilisé plus d'arguments persuasifs au fur et à mesure que la colère de leurs homologues augmentait, ce qui n'était pas le cas des Américains, et d) les négociateurs chinois ont utilisé plus de tactiques distributives et moins de tactiques intégratives que ne l'ont fait les négociateurs américains. Les implications théoriques et pratiques de ces résultats sont commentées dans cet article.

Die intrapersonalen und interpersonalen Wirkungen von Wut auf Verhandlungsstrategien: Eine kulturvergleichende Untersuchung

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Die Studie untersucht die Wirkung von Wut eines Verhandelnden auf dessen Gebrauch von Verhandlungsstrategien und den Gebrauch von Verhandlungsstrategien durch das Gegenüber. Außerdem befasst sich die Studie mit der Frage, ob solche Effekte durch die nationale Kultur moderiert werden. Studienteilnehmer ($N = 130$) waren 66 Chinesen mit temporärer Aufenthaltsgenehmigung und 64 Amerikaner, die eine intrakulturelle Verhandlungssimulation durchführten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass (a) Wut die Verhandelnden dazu brachte, mehr Aussagen zu benutzen, die ihre Position unterstreichen und weniger Angebote zur Integration zu machen, (b) Wut dazu führte, dass der Gegenüber weniger positionierende Aussagen nutzte, aber auch weniger Informationen über Prioritäten austauschte, (c) chinesische Verhandelnde mehr persuasive Argumente nutzen, wenn ihre Gegenüber die Wut erhöhten, während Amerikaner das nicht taten, und (d) chinesische Verhandelnde mehr distributive und weniger integrative Taktiken nutzen als die Amerikaner. Theoretische und praktische Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse werden im Artikel diskutiert.

Los Efectos Intrapersonales e Interpersonales del Enojo sobre las Estrategias de Negociación:

Una Investigación a través de las Culturas

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Resumen

Este estudio evaluó los efectos del enojo de los negociadores sobre el uso propio y de su contraparte de estrategias de negociación y si esos efectos fueron moderados por la cultura nacional. Los participantes ($N = 130$) fueron 66 inmigrantes temporarios de China y 64 Estadounidenses los que representaron una simulación de negociación de la misma cultura. Los resultados indicaron que (a) el enojo causó a los negociadores el uso de afirmaciones más posicionales y la proposición de pocas ofertas integradoras, (b) el enojo causó que los contrapartes usaran menores afirmaciones posicionales, pero que también intercambiaran menos información sobre las prioridades, (c) los negociadores Chinos usaron argumentos más persuasivos a medida que el enojo de sus contrapartes se incrementaba, mientras que los Estadounidenses no lo hicieron, y (d) los negociadores Chinos usaron tácticas más distributivas y menos integradoras que los negociadores Estadounidenses. Las implicancias teóricas y prácticas de estos hallazgos fueron discutidas en este artículo.

愤怒对谈判策略所产生的个人内心效果及人际效果：一项跨文化调查

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本研究评估了谈判者之愤怒对他们自己的以及他们对手的谈判策略的影响，并检验了这种影响是否会受国家文化的中介。130 名参与者，包括 66 名旅美中国人和 64 名美国人进行了文化内的模拟谈判。结果显示：1) 愤怒导致谈判者使用更多的立场鲜明的措辞，而较少提出兼容性的建议；2) 愤怒导致谈判对手使用更少的立场鲜明的措辞，但交换更少的有关主要事项的信息；3) 当他们的谈判对手变得更加愤怒时，中国的谈判者使用更多的劝说性说辞，但美国人不会这样做；以及 4) 比之美国的谈判者，中国的谈判者使用更多的分散性的策略、更少的整合性的策略。本文讨论了上述发现的理论及实践涵义。

협상전략들에 대한 분노의 개인내 그리고 상호개인간 효과들: 교차문화연구

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요약

본연구는협상에 있어 협상 당사자들의 분노가 그들 자신과 상대방의 협상전략에 있어서 어떤 효과가 있는지, 그리고 이러한 효과들이 국가적 문화에 의해 가감되는지를 연구한 것이다. 66명의 체제중인 중국인들과 64명의 미국인들을 포함 130명이 개인내 협상 모의실험연구에 참여케 하였다. 연구 결과들은 1)분노는 협상당사자들이 보다 개인적인 입장을 전달하게 하는 한편 통합적 제안은 더 적게 하는 원인이 되었으며, 2) 분노는 상대방 당사자들이 보더 적은 정도로 자신들의 입장을 설명하게 하는 반면, 우선순위에 관해서도 더욱 적은 정도만의 정보를 교환하게 만들었다. 그리고 3) 중국 협상당사자들은 그들의 협상당사자들이 분노가 증가할수록 더욱 설득적 담화를 사용한 반면, 미국인들은 그렇지 않았다. 마지막으로 4) 중국 협상자들은 미국 협상자들에 비해 더욱 분산적이고 더욱 적은 정도의 통합적 전략을 사용하였다. 이러한 발견들의 이론적 그리고 실제적 함의들이 논의되었다.