Black's essay attempts to account for the resonance of the sentimental style in the 19th century, and for its current disfavor. Halloran's explanation of the legitimating function of the public proceeding may account for the existence of the public proceeding. Carpenter's notion that an audience which regards itself as the chosen people is susceptible to the jeremiad suggests that that form will have currency at certain points in history. Bormann's analysis of communication styles in Part One notes changes in audience susceptibility to fear appeal. These critical thrusts suggest directions for future research and also indicate that a focus on genre and form does not terminate in the classificatory act.

A focus on form and genre facilitates awareness of the critical constraints imposed and the creative options opened by classification. Critical expectations are a function of the classification imposed on a rhetorical act. A critic whose repertoire of classificatory options is complex minimizes the likelihood of misclassification and misjudgment and maximizes the opportunity deliberately to overlay alternative classificatory approaches on a rhetorical act to achieve fresh perspectives and insight. That is the least we can expect of a focus on form and genre in criticism. In addition, the critic may, with Black, analyze those constancies of consciousness which manifest themselves formally; with Gronbeck, examine the impact of culture on form and genre; with Halloran and Carpenter, explore the interaction of genre and audience; with Measell, probe the relationship between situation and form or genre; with Simons, anticipate a form of a discourse yet unwritten; with Bormann, "chart the boundaries of various (rhetorical) visions, estimate their saliency, their motivational force, emotional intensity, and the direction and speed of their movement." The byproduct of these diverse approaches to the recurrent will ultimately be a developmental history explaining the intricate and complex processes which shape rhetorical acts.

THE SENTIMENTAL STYLE AS ESCAPISM, OR THE DEVIL WITH DAN'L WEBSTER

EDWIN BLACK

In a section of *A Grammar of Motives* called "The Temporizing of Essence," Kenneth Burke noted the tendency of some writers to express essences in terms of origins and *vice versa*.[1] Burke attributed this "double vocabulary" to the pun in the word "priority," which can be used either in a temporal or logical sense.

There are a couple of other terms that, even more clearly than "priority," are at the semantic nexus of the origin-essence interchangeability, and they are worth noting here because, as it happens, they are the key terms of this Conference. The words, of course, are "form" and "genre."

The word "form," used nominally, refers to the shape, the structure, the *essence* of a thing. And used verbally, as in "to form," the sense of the word is to constitute, to shape or mold, to *originate* a thing. We find a corresponding distinction between the nominal "genre" and the verbal "to generate," the noun again referring to essence and the verb to origin.

Adjectivally, our common usage observes a distinction between "formal," which refers to essence, and "formative," which refers to origin, although the roots of the two adjectives are obviously in the word "form." The same distinction applies to the adjectives "generic" and "generative," with their roots in "genre."

To a striking extent, then, the key terms of this Conference are functional mirrors of one another. They exhibit the same nominal, verbal and adjectival variants. They possess corresponding bipartite usages. They parse concomitantly.

Clearly the words "form" and "genre" are not synonyms. They signify differently. But even in their lexical distinctiveness, the two terms still bear a remarkable relationship to one another, and that relationship is one of dialectical complementarity.

You will recall that in Plato, dialectical inquiry concerning the nature of a Form led, when it was successful, to a definition composed of a Collec-

tion and a Division.[2] The terms "genre" and "form" have the same relationship to one another as do the Collection and Division of Platonic dialectic. That is, the genre of a thing is its class—a statement of its relationship to all other commensurable things. The form of that thing is its inherent structure—a statement of its constituents and their relationships to one another. Genre refers to the place of the thing in the universe and to its generation as an adaptive and relational entity. Form refers to the constitution and individuality of the thing and to its formation as an entity sufficiently autonomous to be identifiable. Taken together, the words "genre" and "form" are complementary in that "genre" refers to external relationships and "form" refers to internal relationships.

In Platonic dialectic, the Collection and the Division together constituted the most exhaustive attainable description of whatever reality was their subject. There is simply nothing excluded from the categories of analysis and synthesis. So too it would seem that genre and form together constitute exhaustive topics for the description of whatever artifact is their subject. And considering the remarkable complementarity of the terms "form" and "genre," it is reasonable to suppose that the elucidation of either aspect of an artifact would stand to elucidate the other. That is, any information one may acquire about the form of an artifact may be heuristic for its genre, and *vice versa.*

This last consideration—the heuristic reciprocity of form and genre—is one that can be tested only in criticism. And since I believe that it is only by doing criticism that we can illumine criticism, I turn now to the subject of the sentimental style, and continue my inquiry into form and genre through the medium of a critical paradigm.

To study the sentimental style, we must move backwards in time to the century before our own. Whether the sentimental style is now an archaism or has survived in some form into our day is a question to be reserved for later. But there is no question that in the nineteenth century, at least, in America and in England, at least, there flourished something that can properly be called the sentimental style, and if we want to be sure of observing that style *in situ,* it is to that century we must turn.

II

During the nineteenth century in America, the Oneida Community was surpassed only by Brook Farm in its celebrity as an experiment in communal living, and in at least one technique, the Oneida Community was preeminent. The Oneidist guru, John Humphrey Noyes, believed in free love and the exaltation of sexuality, but he realized that the Community required some method of birth control that would comport with its unorthodox sexual and social doctrines. Noyes preached and the Oneidists practiced as best they could a method of withholding sperm during copulation simply by the couple's not moving. And the technique by which the couple did not move was to think very, very hard of something spiritual.[3]

The image of a man and women, coupled, motionless, racking their minds with supernal fantasies, is a potential subject for ribaldry, but nonetheless the image will serve nicely as a master trope for the nineteenth century. The sort of strainedly bifurcated mentality that was carried in the Oneida Community to what surely must be its ultimate development is exhibited in varying degrees throughout the nineteenth century—the inclination, when pressed from all sides of the consciousness by an insistent demand whose presence one wants not to acknowledge, to think very, very hard of something spiritual.

Such frantic indifference—the calm in the eye of an emotional storm—did not begin with the nineteenth century any more than it ended with it, but that century displays so assiduous and pervasive a cultivation of this willed distraction that the characteristic becomes a key to the time. The public life of the century both here and in England was marked by this characteristic, and it is my thesis that the sentimental style—so admired in the nineteenth century—was not only an apposite expression of willed distraction, but also an ingenious instrument for its realization.

I should not proceed further without some effort at definition, and I can think of no better way of clarifying the sentimental style than by example. The example I submit is from an epideictic address by Daniel Webster, and it is Webster's epideictic that can serve as the paradigm for the sentimental style. Attend, if you please, this passage from "The Bunker Hill Monument Address" of 1825. Webster is commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill, and he turns to address the aged veterans of the Revolution who are seated in a section near the speaker:

> But the scene amidst which we stand does not permit us to confine our thoughts or our sympathies to those fearless spirits who hazarded or lost their lives on this consecrated spot. We have the happiness to rejoice here in the presence of a most worthy representation of the survivors of the whole Revolutionary army.
>
> Veterans! you are the remnant of many a well-fought field. You bring with you marks of honor from Trenton and Monmouth, from Yorktown, Camden, Bennington, and Saratoga. Veterans of half a century! when in your youthful days you put everything at hazard in your country's cause, good as that cause was, and sanguine as youth is, still your fondest hopes did not stretch onward to an hour like this! At a period to which you could not reasonably have expected to arrive, at a moment of national prosperity such as you could never have foreseen, you are now met here to enjoy the fellowship of old soldiers, and to receive the overflowings of a universal gratitude.
>
> But your agitated countenances and your heaving breasts inform me that even this is not an unmixed joy. I perceive that a tumult of contending feelings rushes upon you. The images of the dead, as well as the persons of the living, present themselves to you. The scene overwhelms you, and I turn from it. May the Father of all mercies

smile upon your declining years, and bless them! And when you shall here have exchanged your embraces, when you shall once more have pressed the hands which have been so often extended to give succor in adversity, or grasped in the exultation of victory, then look abroad upon this lovely land which your young valor defended, and mark the happiness with which it is filled; yea, look abroad upon the whole earth, and see what a name you have contributed to give to your country, and what a praise you have added to freedom, and then rejoice in the sympathy and gratitude which beam upon your last days from the improved condition of mankind![4]

Such examples of the sentimental style could, of course, be multiplied from discourses of the time;[5] Webster is only an acutely sonorous representative of the type—one who knew how to keep his metaphors unmixed and who had a voice like a pipe organ.

What I want most to note about this style is the detail with which it shapes one's responses. No scintilla of reaction is left for the auditor's own creation. Every nuance of his response is suggested by the speech. In the passage I have quoted, there is not a degree of heat nor a single drop of moisture that is left to the option of the auditor. What this sort of style seeks is a total control over the consciousness, and this, I submit, is what distinguishes the sentimental style. The sentimental style is notable not so much for its stately movement or its piling on of adjectives or its tendency to tear passions to tatters—though all of these symptoms are often present. It is the *function* of these symptoms that I want to emphasize—what they combine to *do* to people. Their function is didactic. It is to instruct the auditor in how he is to respond to the speech—to regulate every shade of the auditor's feelings as the speech unfolds.

Webster in "Bunker Hill" shuttles back and forth between images that could be painted on the ceiling of a chapel and descriptions of internal states and emotional seizures. The thrust was to associate the two—to instruct the audience in how they were to respond and what sensations they were to experience in the presence of certain images. There seemed an assumption behind this sort of procedure that, without the instructions, the audience might not know what to feel, or they might feel improperly—that one could not trust their spontaneous reactions.

It is also the case that in a milieu in which emotional expression is severely regulated, there will be a special caution exercised in circumstances in which emotional expression is allowed. The sentimental style is a superb instrument for such a situation. It not only elicits affective experiences, but also defines and delimits them. It enables the emotions to be given a recreation under sanctioned auspices.

One can see in the epideictic efforts of Lincoln later in the century a striking contrast to Webster's epideictic. Lincoln was disposed to place more reliance than Webster on the uninstructed propensities of his auditors. Lincoln, understanding better than Webster the puissant symbols of popular religion, confidently cast political propositions in that idiom and trusted that the audience could generate for itself the reverence associated with the religious symbol in the presence of the political symbol.

We today find Lincoln's style less archaic than Webster's because Lincoln tries less overtly to manipulate us. He provokes and constrains our responses, but he compels us to make them ourselves. Webster is more fastidious and detailed. He wants to control not simply the response but also the exact manner of its expression, and in this piling on of instructional detail, Webster finally leaves us with nothing at all to do except to be completely malleable. Leaving nothing to the auditor, demanding of the auditor that he pay strict attention to the speech for every nuance of his own experience in hearing the speech, the auditor can in the end have no consciousness of anything else except the speech as a speech, and so his tendency would be to view it as display. And if, as would be the case with a modern auditor, he is the least inclined to withhold part of himself from the absolute surrender that Webster demands, he will notice that the speech is implicitly making claims about itself that he is not granting, and the term that may occur to him will be "pompous."

The quality in Lincoln that is missing from Webster is ambiguity, but ambiguity of a special kind. It is not ambiguity in the sense that the claims made are inexact or that they necessarily mean several things at once. It is rather that the auditor's experience is left unstructured. Lincoln gives the auditor the boundaries of experience, but the generation of it is left to the auditor himself.

In so leaving room for this participation, Lincoln left it open for people of other, later times, such as we, to play their own variations on his themes. But Webster, leaving nothing to be created by the auditor, restricted his speeches to those auditors whose emotions would work and be expressed exactly as he required, and the subtlest change in sensibility, consequently, stood to make his speeches obsolete.

Webster is excessively didactic. He over instructs. Permitting no chance response, he prohibits spontaneity. To be the people he wants us to be, to honor the claims he makes on his auditors, we must totally surrender ourselves to his speech; we must feel only what he wants us to feel. And since we cannot bring ourselves to so total a surrender, we stand to some extent outside the speech. We understand what it asks. Hence, we understand that we are not its auditors; we are merely spectators. We are standing apart from a rhetorical transaction, observing it. This orientation enlists our spectatorial responses. We become connoisseurs, and the function of the speech becomes for us display.

The oratory of display, then, is such functionally. A piece functions as display when, intentionally or not, it promotes a disparity between its actual audience and its implied audience. We, its actual audience, sensing this disparity, are predisposed to view the speech as a collection of technical virtuosities. We are overhearing it; eavesdropping. We may, for various reasons, be sympathetic to the speech; we may hope for the success

of the rhetorical transaction; but the difference between that condition and the condition of being the auditor to the speech is the difference between passivity and involvement.

The question remains, why were Webster's epideictic efforts so popular with his contemporaries? Even granting that we today stand outside the speeches, it still is the case that the nineteenth century public admired them. Why? Why did the public of that time so admire discourses that left them with so little freedom to form their own responses?

One is tempted to account for this popularity in terms of emergent but not yet emerged conventions of response—to attribute it to the very inchoateness of the system of responses that by the end of that century was to be much more definite to people. But the temptation must be resisted because, in fact, there were already old traditions of rhetorical response in this country, reaching back into the seventeenth century, responses at which Americans, according to deTocqueville's testimony, seemed indeed notably adept.[6] The reason, I think, is rather to be found in the *evasiveness* of this style. It was popular because it provided the audience with unambiguous cues which, in their very definiteness, excluded alternatives, and thus induced the audience to be unconscious of incipient stimuli that might have uncomfortably solicited their attention. This didactic quality, then, and especially its popularity, should be taken as a symptom of disquiet and unease, of a subtly gnawing conscience and a tacit agreement to repress.

Perhaps in the case of Webster and his audience, it was the presence of slavery that had to be repressed. For what are still not fully understood reasons, the West was not able to assimilate the institution of slavery. The nineteenth century experienced a moral revulsion to slavery that was sufficiently strong to effect its abolition. It was on the wane in Britain and in South America, and it never really gained a foothold on the continent. Well before the overturn of so old and well entrenched an institution, there must be at first dormant, and then stirring with a long crescendo of activity, a set of attitudes that, when fully expressed, will be totally incompatible with the institution. The way in which most people will want to deal with such disquieting attitudes in their yet incipient state will be to let them sleep, and it may have been Webster's particular contribution to the comfort of his contemporaries that he devised themes and a style which combined to lull the stirring conscience of his country. It is significant that Emerson despised him, for Emerson stood for conscience above all else, and against slavery.

Slavery, of course, was a focal issue in nineteenth century American public address, but it was not an autokinetic issue. A process of industrialization and technological development was under way in America and in England, a process that some historians believe put slavery in the course of economic extinction.[7] More important for our analysis, it was a process that, in both countries, created social disruption and human suffering. The god of Progress reigned, and the salient tenet of its theology was to invest one's faith in the momentum of change. Faith in Progress required that one not be inhibited by social remorse. The accumulating detritus of the process—the ugliness, the exploitation, the social insecurities—all had to be accepted as an inevitable means to a higher good. What precisely the good was, was not clear, but the movement toward it required allegiance, and that allegiance in turn required that one's progress not be retarded by the suffering of others.

A form of consciousness emerged which was adapted to such demands, a form that was characterized by the subordination of moral to aesthetic considerations—by the achievement of psychic comfort and subcutaneous harmony through the refusal to apprehend the jarring, the unwholesome, the corrupt.

The themes of Hellenism and Hebraism in Matthew Arnold's great nineteenth century essay were actual currents of his time, and it is by no means clear that Hellenism was not the dominant current in England and America, if by Hellenism we understand the impulse to subordinate moral to aesthetic claims. Now, there are at least two ways in which a society can express its preference for aesthetic values. One way is to beautify the environment, to adorn the civic life and the private domicile alike with the ornaments of great art. The other way is to develop a perceptual instrument of highly discriminating selectivity, one that will be blind to the ugly and sensitive only to the beautiful. This sort of perceptual instrument can operate with indifference to the environment, and can realize Apollonian values without regard for what Marxists call "the objective conditions of society." But such a perceptual instrument has all the defects of its virtures, and its principal efficacy is its selective imperceptiveness. The instrument is required to be closed to some facts, even as it records others. Its failure to perceive is as important as its perceiving. The development of such an instrument makes possible a Hellenism of the mind, an impulse to beautify that is never projected, a vision of the Good that is characteristically quiescent, an internal harmony in the midst of external squalor, an aesthetic anesthetic. At its crudest (and it was often crude in the nineteenth century) it is Pollyanna and all the other cloying sentimentalities that we associate with bourgoise culture of the time; but it was not always crude, and sometimes it was a very subtly expressed disposition that enabled the elite of that century to abide the most extravagant corruptions and yet to maintain their consciences intact and guiltless.

When Freud wrote of the conscious mind as receiving material that had first passed through a censor, his insight was timelessly valuable, but the insight was of his age. Freud, the discoverer of the unconscious, was also a child of the nineteenth century, and his genius lay in his capacity to generalize from the evidence given him by his patients who, during the foundational formulation of his theory, were creatures of the nineteenth century. And Freud saw in that procession of troubled souls the recurrent configuration of a consciousness that protects itself by a willed ignorance of the ugly facts of its own nature, but an ignorance that, in the case of Freud's patients, was incompletely realized: successful enough to disguise

the rot, but not successful enough to arrest the guilt. That Freud's therapeutic response was not to strengthen his patients' censors, but to throw open their psyches and bathe their guilt in light was what made Freud one of the prime adversaries of this nineteenth century sensibility.

More courageously perhaps than any previous writer, Freud pressed the inquiry into the price we pay for civilization. His good faith brought him to acknowledge—as Rousseau before him had not—that the inquiry itself was an essentially cultural epiphenomenon, and that to pursue it was a profoundly civilized act. Freud demonstrated anew that the construction and sustenance of a civilization depends on hard moral choices, and that one can be free of such choices only in a state of savagery.

That pattern of personal anguish that Freud observed in the simultaneous presence of contradictory impulses crystallized, in the course of the nineteenth century, into a social configuration. Our civilization in that time had given our forebears the power to rape the earth, but it had also given them the moral apprehension of what they were doing. It sustained at once their arrogance and their humility and, having defined the two characteristics as irreconcilable, it sanctioned their anxiety about them. Our fathers had, as we have still, a repertoire for coping with unendurable paradox, and one favorite technique of theirs was to obfuscate it, to befog it in sentimentality. They refined the uses of language as an instrument not of rendering reality, but of obscuring it. They projected their wishes; they propagated their dreams. In their fortunate moments, they found an inconsequential solace and resolution. When their luck failed them, they were entrapped within the moral autonomy of their own fictions and perhaps, in time, they, or we their heirs, recovered from it as from a nightmare, then to look unsentimentally, remorsefully, even loathingly on the cruel achievements of their self-absorption.

The career of Oscar Wilde, and especially its tragic finale, is a particularly instructive example of the apotheosis of aesthetic values. Wilde's comedies and his public persona both carried to parodic extremes the pattern of so exalting the agreeable and the beautiful that they become perceptual filters. In the case of his comic masterpiece, *The Importance of Being Earnest,* for example, the pattern pervades the play and not only controls its plot and characterization, but also suffuses virtually all the wit. And even the moral tale, "The Picture of Dorian Gray," is, you will recall, the story of a man whose corruption is disguised by an attractive appearance, and who might have flourished indefinitely but for a work of art—his portrait—that represented him too well. But it is Wilde's public persona even more strikingly than his writings—a public persona, let me remind you, that was as successfully entertaining in this country as in England—that evidences our argument. If that argument has merit, than it requires us to see Wilde's public persona not as a decadent deviation, but rather as an especially pure embodiment of his time. It was typical of the century that the guardians of British prestige refused to see in Wilde's aestheticism the fulfillment of their own attitudes, for their own equivocation, being yet another source of moral discomfort, had itself to be a prime object of imperception.

The fury with which Wilde was pursued, hounded and ruined has always been something of a perplexity to Wilde's biographers. They often end by holding Wilde himself responsible for his enduring conviction and imprisonment, as if a refusal to flee can account for the enmity that makes fleeing imperative in the first place.[8] Yet, for all the suggestions of a deathwish in Wilde, driving him to impudence, neither Wilde's tactical paralysis nor his career of fashionable impertinence quite constitutes an Objective Correlative to the relentless persecution that destroyed him. We can begin to see the dynamism of that fury when we see Wilde as having made overt in his art and his life the chronic disposition of the English elite to exalt their tastes to a moral preeminence, and when we guess that they had a secret terror of that exposure. They were, then, moved to outrage because, inadvertently perhaps, Wilde threatened the delicate organization of their consciousness. Had they seriously questioned the moral adequacy of aestheticism, it would have been their own moral adequacy that, in the end, would have been undermined, and they would have been compelled to admit to the formal parlor of their consciousness an ugly rabble of unacknowledged obligations.

It is not enough to say that Wilde's sexual inclinations repelled his countrymen, for the dark world in which he moved flourished in his time as it had before and does now. Wilde's link to that world was unbearable only because Wilde was a special case. He was the epigone of his country's consciousness, and his corruption signified their own to his countrymen. The choice they sensed was between destroying Wilde and shattering their own identity. And history provides recurrent confirmation that men will kill before they will risk the torment of psychic disorder.

However unprepossessing a form of consciousness may be, however disreputable may be its stylistic symptoms, to attribute to it an epistemic function is to judge it as decisive and fateful in the lives of its adherents. Perceptual filters shape not simply the distinction between the real and unreal, but indeed, prior to that distinction, the very determination of what may or may not qualify as a subject for it.

I hope by now to have made my principal initial claims clear. I believe it useful to view the sentimental style as the manifestation of a disposition to subordinate all values to aesthetic values in order, essentially, to escape a burden of moral responsibility. It is in the nineteenth century, I believe that we find the sentimental style achieving its apogee, at least in England and America. Since then, of course, the style has fallen into disfavor, and on those rare occasions when we encounter it, it is likely to seem archaic and contrived.[9]

What has happened to the impulses behind this style? Surely our century has experienced no diminution of repugnant stimuli, and we have no obvious reason to suppose that the self-protectiveness of an aestheticized sensibility is any less useful now than it was a hundred years ago. One may

suspect that the sentimental style has been replaced, that something else now exercises the close regulation of our responses in the way that the sentimental style once did. And the question is, what is that something else?

First, I think we must look to television for some of the answer. In its reportage and documentaries no less than in its soap operas and adventure stories, television subordinates its raw material to the demands of dramatic form. Unlike the sentimental style, television reportage and documentary do not seem to me to be shielding us from ugliness. On the contrary, they tend, if anything, to wallow in it. Television news presents a veritable plethora of moral concern, and we viewers are invited to live lives of unremitting social guilt. But even when it has horrors to convey, television orders, edits, and comments upon its photography with strict attention to the dramaturgic expectations of its audience. Thus, television reportage works, as the sentimental style did, to render public issues aesthetically palatable.

More directly, we find a compressed version of the sentimental style in some television advertising: in the Kodak commercials that show joyous weddings and family reunions and irresistible children, and in the Standard Oil commercials that show beautiful scenes of nature and water birds in flight amidst the benign presence of refineries and derricks. It is comforting to believe that an enduring photographic image is effective against time and mortality. It is reassuring to believe that our technology is consonant with a woodland fixed in tranquility. And so a telegraphic sentimentality presents us with a stoppage of time and of motion—in one case with a precious moment made eternal, and in the other case with a process arrested in repose.

A second and more elusive answer to the question of what has happened to the sentimental style lies, I think, in the understanding that the sentimental style is a necessarily transitory phenomenon. It is necessarily transitory because it is its own eventual undoing.

Thus far I have dwelt on the negative aspects of the sentimental style, on its evasive and circumventive function. It is appropriate now to redress that partiality and to note that the style's way of evading and circumventing is to focus the attention in an affirmative, indeed an arbitrary manner. And working as it does to consolidate selected perceptions with precisely defined feelings in a series of imperative regulations of sentiment, this style is unusually fecund in the generation of new pieties.

What begins in the sentimental style as the construction of a new sentiment can become after awhile the triggering of a stock response. Thus the melodrama of a hundred years ago, which was in technique and in effect a very exact theatrical counterpart of the sentimental style,[10] can become now the romance or the medical story or detective story of television and film. The modern entertainments are cooler and more implicative in style, but they are able to function only because the amalgams of datum and affect which the older drama made explicit have by now become constituents of our conventional sensibility, and what had to be instructed our forebears may be simply evoked in us.

I am suggesting, then, that the sentimental style is transitory because it is always, when it is effectual, at the threshhold of a sensibility. It is a style that affirmatively answers a deficiency of trust in the appropriateness of certain feeling-states to certain conditions, and it flourishes most in three general circumstances: when a new sensibility is taking form to replace an older one; when a sensibility has been formed, but is competitively marginal to another one; and when an established sensibility is in decline. In any of these three circumstances and because of any of these circumstances some version of the sentimental style may appear. Depending on which of the three circumstances obtains, the style will move either to instruct initiates or to renew the faithful. But absent any of these circumstances, and the sentimental style will be boring and overdone to audiences; it will not flourish because they will not attend it.

What I have been trying to do in my critical remarks is illustrate the relationship between a style and a form of consciousness. When one talks of significant form in rhetorical criticism, the usual referent for that phrase consists of recurrent and abstractable patterns in discourses. That is a necessary, an indispensible construal. But there is , I submit, yet one other locus of form that solicits our attention. It is more elusive and problemmatic than discursive form because it is not directly observable, but its exploration may represent an ultimate humanistic fulfillment of rhetorical criticism. The form to which I refer is the form of consciousness affected by and manifested in the symbolic currency of rhetorical transactions.

Groups of people become distinctive as groups sometimes by their habitual patterns of commitment—not by the beliefs they hold, but by the manner in which they hold them and give them expression. Such people do not necessarily share ideas; they share rather stylistic proclivities and the qualities of mental life of which those proclivities are tokens.

Below the continously mutable dialectic that shapes and reshapes our social actions, there are deeper constancies of consciousness. Their explication is essential to understanding the varieties of rhetorical experience.

NOTES

[1]Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 430-440.

[2]Plato, *Phaedrus,* 265, 266, 270D; *Philebus,* 16-18; *Cratylus,* 424C; *Sophist,* 226C, 235C, 253 ff.; *Politicus,* 285A ff.; *Laws,* 894A, 936D, 965C.

[3]John Humphrey Noyes, *Male Continence* (Oneida, N.Y.: The Oneida Community, 1872; rpt. in *Sexual Indulgence and Denial,* New York: Arno Press, 1974).

[4]Daniel Webster, "The Bunker Hill Monument," in *American*

Speeches, ed. Wayland Maxfield Parish and Marie Hochmuth, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), pp. 106-107.

[5]Collections of orations from the nineteenth century abound in examples of the sentimental style. One such collection is Alexander K. McClure's *Famous American Statemen and Orators* (New York: F.F. Lovell Publishing Company, 1902) in six volumes. Among the nineteenth century speeches in that collection which exhibit, in whole or in part, the sentimental style are: Eliphant Nott, "How Are the Mighty Fallen," II, pp. 308-335; Henry Clay, "On the Expunging Resolutions," II, pp. 350-354; Anson Burlingame, "Massachusetts and Sumner," III, pp. 13-37; Ignatius Donnelly, "Reconstruction," IV, pp. 197-213; William Lloyd Garrison, "Words of Encouragement to the Oppressed," V, pp. 103-115; and a marvelously antic spoof of the sentimental style that was delivered in the U.S. House of Representatives, James Proctor Knott, "Duluth," VI, pp. 308-327.

[6]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* Second Part, Book I, chaps. 18 and 21.

[7]Robert Williams Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross* (Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 86-102, review some of these historians.

[8]Hesketh Pearson, *The Life of Oscar Wilde* (London: Methuen and Co., 1954), pp. 305-307; Frank Harris, *Oscar Wilde. His Life and Confessions* (New York: Horizon Press, 1974), pp. 292-305.

[9]The *discursive* style seems, at least at the present, unfashionable but perhaps its epistemic function has been taken up by other media in our century. One remembers the extravagant artistic activities of Nazism and the pervasive "ignorance" among Germans of what was happening in the concentration camps. In 1936, Walter Benjamin concluded his essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," by noting that "Fascism is rendering [politics] aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art." *Illuminations,* ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 242.

[10]Michael Booth, ed. *Hiss The Villain. Six English and American Melodramas* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964). Booth's introduction to this collection (pp. 9-40) is an exceptionally informative analysis of melodrama. A thorough historical treatment of the genre is Frank Rohill's *The World of Melodrama* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967).

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIME MINISTER WILLIAM PITT AND PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN ON SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS

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The privilege of habeas corpus is a basic tenet of both English and American law. The doctrine was first articulated in Article 29 of the *Magna Carta:*

> No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised [i.e., deprived] of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.[1]

In Great Britain, the monarch held the power to suspend habeas corpus at any time and for any reason until the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of 1679 vested this power in Parliament.[2] When the United States Constitution was being drafted by the Congress of 1789, the framers of that document placed this clause under Article I, which sets forth limitations upon Congress: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."[3]

From time to time throughout history, the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended outright by the legislative assemblies of both Great Britain and the United States. Two such occasions occurred during the French Revolution in England and during the Civil War in the United States. In both instances, the executive administrations, under Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, and President Abraham Lincoln, respectively, had, in effect, suspended habeas corpus through a policy of arbitrary arrests and detention of political dissenters. Pitt and Lincoln faced comparable rhetorical problems, namely, the justification of their administrative policy to withhold the privileges of habeas corpus. The purpose of this