

[*Shared Experiences*
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TOWARD A MEANING-CENTERED PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION¹

A philosophy of training is essential in determining the aim, fixing the boundaries and evaluating the methods of any field. Yet formulating such a philosophy is an uncommon, formidable and sensitive venture. Uncommon, because in the daily round of classes, research projects, student conferences and faculty meetings, few teachers have the time or the perspective to canvass their purposes. Formidable, because to evolve such a philosophy is an immense undertaking requiring one to question the nature of our discipline, the legitimate boundaries of our scholarship and the character of our actions as teachers. Sensitive, because at every point one is forced to expose assumptions and motives that are only vaguely known or admitted even in the most mature human being. Each step in such an evaluation touches a raw nerve ending somewhere in that complex called the human ego. Yet this sort of periodic re-evaluation is absolutely essential. Loyalty to a discipline does not lie in an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo; it requires a continuous and vigorous testing of the postulates and practices of any field.

In attempting to phrase a more acceptable philosophy of communication training, I have been guided by a simple, but germinal, idea that can be succinctly stated. It is that a sound philosophy of training is implicit in a sound philosophy of communication. Whatever pedagogical decisions must be made—concerning the proper scope of the curriculum, the legitimacy of certain kinds of research, or the spirit and temper of student-teacher relations—they turn ultimately, if sometimes obscurely, on the nature and goals of successful communication. One cannot have a superficial, or narrow, or opportunistic concept of communication and be a thorough and responsible teacher of that same subject.

The question, therefore, of our role as scholar-teacher (and both the ordering and linking of those terms is deliberate) involves us in a circuitous, but essential, return to the communication process itself. Like the modern architect, one begins by discovering the "nature of his material." To be acceptable, a philosophy of communication should fulfill the following criteria:

- (1) It should provide a satisfactory explanation of the aim of communication

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Fundamental Concepts of Human Communication

- (2) It should provide a technically adequate description of the process of communication
- (3) It should provide a moral standard that will protect and promote the healthiest communicative behavior. Once this process is defined on its nature exposed, the way should be clear for facing the practical decisions involved in giving effective instruction.

AIM OF COMMUNICATION

We begin by asking why men communicate? What human need do it, or should it, satisfy? While there is almost universal agreement that communication is tied to the manipulation of symbols, there is widespread disagreement as to what constitutes effectiveness in this endeavor. A brief review of some abortive explanations of communication is essential because, in spite of repeated criticism, these conceptions continue to influence current training in speech.

One of these theories is that the aim of communication is to transmit information. Success hinges on mastery of the facts, effective arrangement of materials and strength of expression. It is a message-centered philosophy of communication. And it is largely amoral. Critical standards for determining the effectiveness of communication, as in the critical evaluation of literature, are internal; they are found within the message itself. When a writer or speaker or critic asks, "Was it well said?" he is usually viewing communication as a mode of expression. The training in communication that follows from this premise and perspective is destined to be truncated and unrealistic. Talk is not a guarantee of communication. Facts and ideas are not shared because they are articulated loudly or even well. Messages do not influence automatically because of being broadcast on the mass media. The inadequacy of this approach lies in its neglect of the listener as terminus of the communicative act, in its failure to provide an explanation of how meaning arises through communication and in its disregard for all but public and continuous discourse.

A second theory is that the aim of communication is to transfer ideas from one person to another. Here the listener is admitted as part of the communicative situation. The focus, however, in research and training, is upon the message formulator. Effectiveness in communication is thought to turn not only on the content and phrasing of the message, but on the intelligence and credibility of the source. Relatively little attention is paid to the listener other than to note that messages should be adapted to his interests. It ends by becoming a speaker-centered philosophy. Communicative events are explained largely in terms of the experiential milieu that shaped the mind of the speaker and find expression in his messages.

As an explanation of communication it, too, fails in several important respects. First, the listener tends to be regarded as a passive object, rather than an active force in communication. Unfortunately, it is not that simple to deposit ideas in another mind. Teachers of great intelligence and high purpose often find their lessons disregarded or misapplied. Messages flowing through an industrial complex are not received undistorted like images in a hall of mirrors. Second, this approach also fails to provide a satisfactory theory of meaning, and of how messages from highly credible sources can provoke so many and such contradictory meanings. Finally, it is too parochial. It neglects man's communication with himself—an area that is fast becoming one of the

most vital in communication research—and it fails to account for the fact that communication is as often a matter of hiding or protecting what is in men's minds as it is a matter of revealing their thoughts and intentions.

Neither of these schools of thought, of course, omits the constituent elements in communication altogether. It is, rather, a question of emphasis. Questions of emphasis, however, are not irrelevant or inconsequential in establishing a productive orientation for a discipline. The pedagogical consequences of both of these approaches is to place a disproportionate emphasis (in research, courses and textbooks) on the source and message elements in communication. Both schools of thought tend, also, to minimize or overlook completely, the interactive and dynamic nature of the communicative process. Communication, as I conceive it, is a word that describes the process of creating a meaning. Two words in this sentence are critical. They are "create" and "meaning." Messages may be generated from the outside—by a speaker, a television screen, a scolding parent—but meanings are generated from within. This position parallels that of Berlo when he writes, "Communication does not consist of the transmission of meaning. Meanings are not transmitted, nor transferable. Only messages are transmittable, and meanings are not in the message, they are in the message-user."² Communication is man's attempt to cope with his experience, his current mood, his emerging needs. For every person it is a unique act of creation involving dissimilar materials. But it is, within broad limits, assumed to be predictable or there could be no theory of communication.

The second, and more troublesome word, is "meaning." Meaning is not apparent in the ordinary flow of sensation. We are born into and inhabit a world without "meaning." That life becomes intelligible to us—full of beauty or ugliness, hope or despair—is because it is assigned that significance by the experiencing being. As Karl Britton put it, "A world without minds is a world without structure, without relations, without facts."³ Sensations do not come to us, sorted and labeled, as if we were visitors in a vast, but ordered, museum. Each of us, instead, is his own curator. We learn to look with a selective eye, to classify, to assign significance.

Communication arises out of the need to reduce uncertainty, to act effectively, to defend or strengthen the ego. On some occasions words are used to ward off anxiety. On other occasions they are means of evolving more deeply satisfying ways of expressing ourselves. *The aim of communication is to increase the number and consistency of our meanings within the limits set by patterns of evaluation that have proven successful in the past, our emerging needs and drives, and the demands of the physical and social setting of the moment.* Communication ceases when meanings are adequate; it is initiated as soon as new meanings are required. However, since man is a homeostatic, rather than static, organism, it is impossible for him to discover any permanently satisfying way of relating all his needs; each temporary adjustment is both relieving and disturbing, leading to successively novel ways of relating himself to his environment.

²David Berlo, *The Process of Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960), p. 175.

³Karl Britton, *Communication: A Philosophical Study of Language* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), p. 206.

To say that communication occurs whenever meaning is assigned to internal or external stimuli is to enlarge greatly the span of our discipline. Communication, in this sense, may occur while a man waits alone outside a hospital operating room, or watches the New York skyline disappear at dusk. It can take place in the privacy of his study as he introspects about some internal doubt, or contemplates the fading images of a frightening dream. When man discovers meaning in nature, or in insight in his own reflections, he is a communication system unto himself. Festinger refers to this as "consummatory communication." The creation of meanings, however, also goes on in countless social situations where men talk with those who share or dispute their purposes. Messages are exchanged in the hope of altering the attitudes or actions of those around us. This can be characterized as "instrumental communication," as long as we remember that these two purposes are not mutually exclusive.

What I am describing is a meaning-centered philosophy of communication. It admits that meaning in the sender, and the words of the messages are important, but regards as most critical the state of mind, the assumptive world and the needs of the listener or observer. The impact of any message from "See me after class" to "What's good for General Motors is good for the country" is determined by the physical, personal and social context, the most critical ingredient of which is the mind of the interpreter. Communication, so defined, does not require a speaker, a message, or a listener, in the restricted sense in which these terms are used in the field of speech. All may be combined in a single person, and often are.

A theory that leaves out man's communication with himself, his communication with the world about him and a large proportion of his interactions with his fellowman, is not a theory of communication at all, but a theory of speechmaking. Indeed, it seems applicable to speechmaking only in the most formal and restricted sense of that word. There is little in the traditional view of speech that is helpful in the analysis of conversation, interviewing, conflict negotiations, or in the diagnosis of the whole span of communicative disorders and breakdowns that are receiving so much attention currently. Upon so limited a view of communication it is unlikely that there can develop theories of sufficient scope and stature to command the respect of other disciplines or of the larger public that ultimately decides our role in the solution of man's problems. The field of speech seems to be fast approaching what the airlines call a "checkpoint" where one loses the freedom to choose between alternative flight plans, between a limited interest in speechmaking and a broad concern with the total communicative behavior of man. By defining communication operationally, by examining a wider range of communicative acts, the way might be prepared for making the startling theoretical advances that have, so far, not characterized our field.

THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

A satisfactory philosophy should also provide a starting point for the technical analysis of communication. One way of accomplishing this is to ask what characteristics would have to be built into a scientific model that would represent, at the same time and equally well, the entire spectrum from intrapersonal to mass communication. It should not be a model that is mechanically or structurally faithful, but one that is symbolically and functionally similar.

Space is too limited here to more than suggest a few of the principles that would have to be reflected in such a model.

Communication is not a thing, it is a process. Sender, message and receiver do not remain constant throughout an act of communication. To treat these as static entities, as they often are in our research, is questionable when applied to the most extreme form of continuous discourse, is misleading when used to analyze the episodic verbal exchanges that characterize face-to-face communication, and is totally useless in probing man's communication with himself. Changes in any of these forces, and few forces remain constant very long, reverberate throughout the entire system. Students of communication are not dissecting a cadaver, but are probing the pulsing evolution of meaning in a living organism.

Communication is not linear, it is circular. There are many situations in life where a simple, linear, causal analysis is useful. One thing leads to another. A, then B, then C. I push over the first domino and the rest, in turn, topple over. But this sort of thinking is not very helpful, though quite appealing in its simplicity, in studying communication. There is not first a sender, then a message and finally an interpreter. There is, instead, what Henderson calls "mutual dependence" or what I have termed "interdependent functionalism." The words "sender" and "receiver" no longer name the elements in a communicative act, but indicate the point of view of the critic at the moment.

Communication is complex. Someone once said that whenever there is communication there are at least six "people" involved: The person you think yourself to be; the man your partner thinks you are; the person you believe your partner thinks you are; plus the three equivalent "persons" at the other end of the circuit. If, with as few as four constants, mathematicians must cope with approximately fifty possible relations, then we, in studying communication, where an even greater number of variables is concerned, ought to expound with considerable humility. In this age of Freudian and non-Freudian analysts, of information theory specialists, of structural linguists, and so on, we are just beginning to unravel the mysteries of this terribly involved, and therefore fascinating, puzzle.

Communication is irreversible and unrepeatable. The distinction being suggested here is between systems that are deterministic and mechanical, and those that are spontaneous and evolutionary. One can start a motor, beat a rug, or return a book. But you cannot start a man thinking, beat your son, or return a compliment with the same consequences. The words of a teacher, even when faithfully repeated, do not produce the same effect, but may lead to new insight, increased tension, or complete boredom. A moment of indifference or interest, a disarming or tangential remark, leave indelible traces.

Communication involves the total personality. Despite all efforts to divide body and mind, reason and emotion, thought and action, meanings continue to be generated by the whole organism. This is not to say that some messages do not produce greater or lesser dissonance, or shallower or deeper effects on the personality; it is only to hold that eventually every fact, conclusion, guilt, or enthusiasm must somehow be accommodated by the entire personality. The deeper the involvement produced by any communication, the sooner and more pervasive its effects upon behavior.

Research or instruction that disregards these characteristics of the communicative act would appear both unsound and of dubious value.

THE MORAL DIMENSION

The perennial and legitimate concern with ethics in the field of speech arises out of the inherent moral aspect of every interpersonal communication. As was noted earlier, the aim of communication is to transform chaotic sense impressions into some sort of coherent, intelligible and useful relationship. When men do this privately, either in confronting nature or in assessing their own impulses, they are free to invent whatever meaning they can. But when men encounter each other, a moral issue invades every exchange because the manipulation of symbols always involves a purpose that is external to, and in some degree manipulative of, the interpreter of the message. The complexity of communication makes it difficult to know in advance, and with certainty, the impact of any bundle of words upon the receiver of them. The irreversibility of communication means that whatever meaning is provoked by a message cannot be annulled: A teacher may erase a blackboard, a colleague apologize, or an employer change his mind, but there is no way of erasing the effect of a threatening ultimatum, a bitter remark, or a crushing personal evaluation.

Meaning, in my opinion, is a private preserve and trespassers always run a risk. To speak of personal integrity at all is to acknowledge this. Any exchange of words is an invasion of the privacy of the listener which is aimed at preventing, restricting, or stimulating the cultivation of meaning. Briefly, three types of interference may be distinguished. First, there are messages whose intent is to coerce. Meaning is controlled by choosing symbols that so threaten the interpreter that he becomes incapable of, and blind to, alternative meanings; second, there are messages of an exploitative sort in which words are arranged to filter the information, narrow the choices, obscure the consequences, so that only one meaning becomes attractive or appropriate; third, there is facilitative communication in which words are used to inform, to enlarge perspective, to deepen sensitivity, to remove external threat, to encourage independence of meaning. The values of the listener are, in the first case, ignored, in the second, subverted, in the third respected. While some qualification of this principle is needed, it appears that only facilitative communication is entirely consistent with the protection and improvement of man's symbolic experience. Unless a teacher is aware of these possibilities and appreciates the differences in these kinds of communication, it is unlikely that he will communicate responsibly in the classroom.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PREPARATION

The outline of any philosophy must be expressed in abstract terminology. For that reason some will see little in this philosophy that is inconsistent with current practice in the field of speech. If so, my meaning has been less than clear. Once one accepts that communication is a study of meaning, and of all of the symbols and circumstances that give rise to meaning, he assumes new and formidable responsibilities as a scholar. Once he agrees that communication is a complicated, irreversible process, and accepts the moral obligation that inheres in such a conception, he embraces a new role as a teacher. Lest the practical consequences of endorsing such a philosophy go unexamined, let me attempt to translate the foregoing abstractions into more concrete form. What habits of preparation, what research interests, what sort of curriculum and what instructional methods, follow from a commitment to a "meaning-centered philosophy of communication"?

All instruction begins with the discovery of knowledge, in this case with knowledge about communication. And the vast bulk of current information about communication is to be found not in the literature of our field but in the experimental investigations and theoretical systems of men in other disciplines. For this reason it would be difficult to imagine anyone committed to a meaning-centered philosophy of communication who was not already conversant with, or wanted to become conversant with, the men and works listed in the brief "Sampler in Communication" that follows. Each of these works is concerned at a sophisticated level with some aspect of meaning.*

Sampler in Communication

- Allport, F. *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure*. (New York: Wiley, 1955).
 Anshen, R. *Language: An Enquiry into its Meaning and Function*. (New York: Harper, 1957).
 Berlo, D. *The Process of Communication*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960).
 Brown, R. *Words and Things*. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).
 Burke, K. *A Philosophy of Literary Form*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1941).
 Festinger, L. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).
 Fromm, E. *The Forgotten Language*. (New York: Rinehart, 1952).
 Hovland, C., Janis, I., and Kelly, H. *Communication and Persuasion*. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
 Langer, S. *Philosophy in a New Key*. (New York: Mentor Books, New American Library, 1948).
 Osgood, C., Suci, G., and Tannenbaum, P. *The Measurement of Meaning*. (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1957).
 Rogers, C. *Client-Centered Therapy*. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1951).
 Ruesch, J. *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*. (New York: Norton, 1951).
 Ruesch, J. and Kess, W. *Nonverbal Communication*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).
 Wheelwright, P. *The Burning Fountain*. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1956).
 Wiener, N. *The Human Use of Human Beings*. (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1950).

The breadth of this list, stretching from perception theory to symbolic processes, from cybernetics to psychotherapy, from literary criticism to cultural anthropology, matches the breadth of viewpoint intended in the phrase a "meaning-centered philosophy of communication." It is what George Miller seemed to have in mind when he wrote as preface to the first text in communi-

* This is not intended to be a definitive bibliography, only a suggestive sampling of sources. Substitutes could easily be made in every division of this bibliography. For example, in psychotherapy one could as easily recommend Ruesch's *Disturbed Communication* or Hoch and Zubin's *Psychopathology of Communication*; in cybernetics there is Walter's *The Living Brain* and Latil's *Machines That Think*; in literary criticism I. A. Richard's *Principles of Literary Criticism* or Burke's *Grammar of Motives*; in perception theory, Blake and Ramsey's *Perception: An Approach to Personality* and Beardslee and Wertheimer's *Readings in Perception*; in nonverbal communication one could recommend Hall's *The Silent Language* or Birdwhistell's *Introduction to Kinesics*; in semantics, Hayakawa's *Language in Thought and Action*, Korzybski's *Science and Sanity*, or Weinberg's *Levels of Knowing and Existence*. The purpose of the "Sampler" is only to indicate the broad scope of germinal studies of communicative behavior.

cation theory, "When one tries to assemble the facts about this important social event . . . the data come from all the fields of science."⁴

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

Preparation for offering training in communication, however, cannot depend upon sponging on the discoveries of others; it must, if our field is to survive, be advanced by empirical studies and theoretical constructs of our own. Tenure in the academic community is rightly contingent upon respect for the original contributions of a discipline. And, in this respect, it would be difficult to deny our theoretical sterility during the past forty years. A large part of the fault seems to lie in the truncated view we hold of human communication. Medicine would scarcely have obtained recognition if it had limited itself to a study of the human arm. Sociology would be unknown today if it had never gone beyond the classification of criminals. Most of us would find unacceptable a psychology of man based on studies of hypnotism. Yet in our exclusive, or nearly exclusive, interest in formal public address we seem to be attempting the impossible—to build an overall theory of communication based upon a significant, but altogether too restricted, sample of human speech.⁵

What is needed is a broadening of perspective as to what constitutes legitimate research in communication, combined with an intensification of our efforts as research workers. There is no reason why the public platform should monopolize our attention. There is a whole universe of communication currently being neglected that could, and should be, studied. Whenever men work out new meanings, or defend old meanings, whether it involves parent and child, worker and boss, or client and therapist, the student of communication should be there. Sound training in communication is dependent upon the availability of respectable theories and objective data and these will be most valid when they are based on the whole span of human communication. The laboratory and library legitimize instruction.

CURRICULAR IMPLICATIONS

The lopsidedness of current work in speech is also evident in the hierarchy of courses offered to students. College catalogues show an almost exclusive concern with the formal aspects of communication. There are courses in public speaking, advanced public speaking, public debate, forms of public address, history of public address and so on. Here and there is a course in propaganda, in semantics, in business communication. But the curricular monolith we have designed adds to the impression that the rostrum is the only setting where communication among men matters.

The acceptance of a broader conception of our responsibilities should lead to a better balance in the curriculum in communication. Much of what

⁴George A. Miller, *Language and Communication* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), p. v.

⁵This is dramatically underscored whenever copies of *Speech Monographs* and the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* arrive in the same mail. Seldom does the former carry more than one title of empirical research in communication broadly conceived. Yet the last four issues of the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, whose contributors are supposedly unqualified and uninterested in speech, carry between eight and ten titles on various aspects of communication in each issue.

exists would remain. But there would be a shift in emphasis in some offerings, and a compensating development of new work in areas currently neglected. There is no reason, if scholarship supports it, why there should not be courses in interpersonal communication, in conflict resolution, in decision-making, in organizational communication, in psycholinguistics, in societal communication, in network theory and so on. These can all be accommodated within a department of speech as long as the unifying focus of the curriculum is the problem of meaning and the control of it through symbols.

While the magnitude of a discipline of communication may seem frightening to envision, it does not seem any more so than the conception of psychology as the study of human behavior, or sociology as the study of social institutions, or anthropology as the study of cultures. Indeed, to build a significant discipline seems hopeless unless it encompasses a sufficiently broad cross-section of human activity to give it substance and scope.

If there is objection to this conception of communication because the lines separating our interests from those of psychology and sociology would be blurred and overlapping, they would appear to be no less blurred and overlapping than those already separating the behavioral sciences from each other. If students of communication will need to know their psychology, political science and history, it should also be true that a substantial discipline of communication will require students in other fields to be equally familiar with our contributions. If a distinguishing and unifying theme is required for the field of speech let it be our interest in language and how the manipulation of symbols alters human behavior, human institutions and cultural patterns.⁶

PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

We come, finally, to the question of instruction. As in any problem of communication, meaning is a response to tensions in the nervous system of the communicant. This tension may be triggered externally for students through lectures, films, demonstrations, or any other directive teaching technique. Or it may be generated from within by providing a facilitative setting which permits subconscious feelings of inadequacy, ineffectiveness, or inconsistency, to be admitted. As long as this tension is productive rather than reductive, that is, as long as it is disturbing without becoming unmanageable, it creates an opportunity for the evolution of new discriminations and meanings.

The resulting tension may be resolved, and learning accomplished, at a number of different psychological levels. Indexing of these types of learning, or *communication*, may clarify their differences. Learning₁ consists of acquiring new facts, new information, new terms. This is the simplest type of communication and probably involves the least disturbance to the receiver, for considerable information can be accommodated without altering the existing personality structure. When facts are discrepant with the student's world view, they are denied or distorted to protect past meanings. Learning₂ involves changes in outward behavior. The student acquires new skills which are largely the product of conforming to the directives of a coach or teacher. Recent studies suggest that this type of role-taking is likely to alter the personality in some ways, not all of which are desirable. Learning₃ occurs when the student discovers and adopts new attitudes toward communication. He begins to ques-

⁶The broad conception of communication urged here is also the most promising basis for stopping, or even reversing, the continuing fractionalization of departments of speech.

tion his own assumptions and values, develops insight into his own motives and assumes more responsibility for his own behavior. Learning₄ operates at all the preceding levels. The total personality of the student is involved—his knowledge, his attitudes, his actions. Teaching of this type aims at helping the student to become more conscious of his reasons for communicating and how these are linked to larger philosophical issues. It assists him in becoming increasingly aware of the complicated nature of communication, and its variety of uses and settings. It acquaints him with the multitude of technical means consequences. But while it sensitizes and informs him it should, in my opinion, leave the student free to evolve his own style and standards of communicating.

Alfred North Whitehead once said that any discipline deserving a place in the curriculum must have a philosophy, a method and a technique. The statement is undoubtedly true, but somewhat incomplete if philosophy, method and technique exist as isolated units of instruction. Too often what results is that the technical and moral aspects remain separate, lacking any vital connection in the classroom, and more importantly, in the personality of the student. The result is schizophrenic communication. Men learn to blot out all but technical considerations when communicating in a coercive or prejudicial way, but turn around and attack someone else's communication on moral grounds when it proves technically superior to their own. It is this sort of inconsistency that fosters pathological communication and pathological personalities.

Integrative instruction in communication encourages the student to work out better meanings concerning his own communication with himself and his fellowmen. By "better" I refer to meanings that permit more consistency in his personality between what he assumes, what he sees, and what he does. By "better" I refer to meanings that will increase his openness, curiosity and flexibility. By "better" I refer to meanings that will make him more independent, and more confident of his own judgment.

Lest the point of view presented here be interpreted as a paragon of philosophical virtue, the best possible theory in this best of all possible worlds, let me suggest some of the real obstacles and difficulties that stand in opposition to it. First there is the risk, in embracing the whole gamut of human communication, of tackling too much so that it cannot possibly be brought under control. There is a risk, too, of finding so much complexity that we shall have to return to the view that communication is an art that defies scientific analysis. The problems in making such an all-out attack on so broad a field are great; a conscientious teacher of speech already runs the risk of spending so much time in allied literature there is no time for original investigation of his own specialty. The view of training presented here is, also, an exceedingly moralistic one which, of itself, makes an academic discipline suspect these days. But science and morality must be conjoined when evidence indicates that the warping of communication is one of the most important factors in personality distortion.⁷ These, and other objections, must be raised before taking this philosophy seriously.

⁷Others in the behavioral sciences are belatedly reaching the same conclusion. The most penetrating and persuasive statement of the argument for linking psychological science with human values is to be found in Sigmund Koch's article, "Psychological Science versus the Science-Humanism Antinomy: Intimations of a Significant Science of Man," in the *American Psychologist*, October, 1961.

Writing in the final pages of his last book, John Dewey made the remark that "As philosophers, our disagreements with one another as to conclusions are trivial in comparison with our disagreements as to problems; to see the same problem another sees, in the same perspective and at the same angle—that amounts to something. Agreement as to conclusions is in comparison perfunctory."⁸ The hope is not that all will share my conclusions—for few may—but that all will admit the problem facing our discipline, and see it from somewhat the same angle. That, indeed, would be something.

⁸John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, *Knowing and the Known* (Beacon Press, 1949), p. 314.