Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance

Arie W. Kruglanski, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark Dechesne, Shira Fishman and Edward Orehek

University of Maryland, College Park

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Abstract

A motivational analysis of suicidal terrorism is outlined, anchored in the notion of *significance quest*. It is suggested that heterogeneous factors identified as personal causes of suicidal terrorism (e.g. trauma, humiliation, social exclusion) as well as the various ideological reasons assumed to justify it (e.g. liberation from foreign occupation, defense of one’s nation or religion) may be profitably subsumed within an integrative framework that explains diverse instances of suicidal terrorism as attempts at *significance restoration*, *significance gain*, and *prevention of significance loss*. Research and policy implications of the present analysis are considered.
“Mankind's common instinct for reality has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism. In heroism, we feel, life's supreme mystery is hidden. We tolerate no one who has no capacity whatever for it in any direction. On the other hand, no matter what a man's frailties otherwise may be, if he be willing to risk death, and still more if he suffer it heroically, in the service he has chosen, the fact consecrates him forever”
(William James, 1902/1969, p. 330)

Introduction

The motivations underlying suicide terrorism are of major interest to terrorism researchers, possibly for two underlying reasons. One reason is epistemic, and it stems from curiosity about a bizarre phenomenon: The readiness of seemingly unexceptional human beings not only to massively murder innocents, but also to sacrifice their life in the process, contrary to the basic human instinct of physical survival. The second reason is pragmatic. Understanding terrorists’ motivation may be a pre-condition for altering it, hence it offers a potentially important tool for counterterrorism.

Major recent analyses (e.g. by Bloom, 2005, Pedahzur, 2004, Sageman (2004), or Stern, 2005) devoted considerable attention to terrorists’ motivations. They differed, however, in the kind and variety of motives identified as relevant to suicide terrorism. Some authors emphasized a singular motivation (Sageman, 2004, Pape, 2005), others listed a potpourri of motives (Bloom, 2005; Stern, 2005).

For instance, Sageman’s (2004) work on terrorist networks emphasized the quest for emotional and social support by Muslims in European Diasporas who feel rejected by, and alienated from the local societies. Pape (2005) highlighted resistance to foreign occupation as a main motivating force. Spekhard & Akhmedova (2005) assigned this role to personal loss and trauma. And Nasra Hassan’s (2001) concluded that Hamas
terrorists’ main motivation concerned entering “Paradise.. being in the presence of Allah… meeting the prophet Muhammad” and reaping the rewards of participating in a Holy war.

In contrast to an emphasis on a single crucial motivation (quest for social support, coping with trauma, martyrdom), Bloom (2005), listed diverse motivations for suicide terrorism, including honor (pp. 87, 145), dedication to the leader (pp. 64), social status (pp. 65), personal significance (pp. 88), pain and personal loss (pp. 35, 86-87, 145), group pressure (pp. 85), humiliation and injustice (pp. 35, 86), vengeance (pp. 63-64, 86-87), or feminism (pp. 143, 145-147) (i.e., convincing society of women’s contribution).

Similarly, Stern (2005) mentioned as possible motives humiliation (pp. 32, 62, 281, 285), exposure to violence (pp. 53), occupation (pp. 57, 59, 136), lack of alternative prospects (pp. 69), modernization (pp. 69), displacement (pp. 132, 284), restoration of the glory of Islam (pp. 135), poverty (pp. 284), moral obligation (pp. 148, 281), need to belong (pp. 9), heaven (pp. 125), simplification of life (pp. 69), inspirational leadership (pp. 171), friendship (pp. 47), status (pp. 51, 22, 54, 282), glamour (pp. 51), and money and support for one’s family (pp. 51, 62). In a similar vein, Ricolfi (2005, p. 106) suggested that “the motivational drive to engage in suicide missions is likely to be found in a cocktail of feelings, which include desire for revenge, resentment, and a sense of obligation towards the victims, as revealed in the…video recorded pronouncements”

A reasonable step in dealing with such a heterogeneity might be to reduce it by classifying the varied motives identified so far into fewer, more general, motivational categories. Several authors have hinted at such a classification typically based on a
partition between *ideological reasons*, and *personal causes* for becoming a suicide terrorist (Pedahzur (2005, Taarnby, 2005).

In these terms, alienated individuals’ quest for social and emotional support may be assumed to stem from their *personal* experience. So do the pain, trauma, and redemption of lost honor, often listed as motives. In contrast, liberation of one’s land, or carrying out God’s will pertain to *ideological factors* (Atran, 2004; 2006) that transcend individual actors’ life circumstances. By ideology one usually means a belief system centered around some social or collective *ideal* (e.g., based on the values of justice, fairness, or inalienable rights). Ideology’s motivating power resides in identifying a *discrepancy* from an ideal state, and offering a means of removing the discrepancy through action. A *terrorism justifying ideology* identifies a *culprit* (the enemy) presumed responsible for the discrepancy and portrays violence against that culprit (e.g., jihad) as an effective *method* for moving toward the ideal state.  

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1 In a recent paper on the Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq, Hafez (2006, p. 96) identified three themes that constitute the gist of the ideological belief system to which volunteers to suicidal missions were expected to subscribe and that were presented in insurgent videos, audio recordings, and biographies of prior suicide bombers, content analyzed by the author. The ideological narratives contained in these communications are “often presented in a sequence as …a play in three acts. Act one depicts the unmerciful humiliation [of the] Muslims in Iraq.. The second act shows the impotence of existing Muslim regimes and their collusion with the West.. The final act insists on the inevitability of Muslim victory because pious and heroic cadres have stepped forward to redeem the suffering and humiliation of their fellow Muslims through faith in God, sacrifice on the battlefield, and righteousness in their cause..”

2 Whereas the notion of ideology as traditionally conceived has been taken to imply a relatively intricate belief system that requires an extensive background knowledge to enable the extraction of its action implications, recent sociological analyses (following up on Goffman, 1974) have suggested that ideological gist can be effectively contained in relative simple frames or schemata (Gamson, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000; Entman, 2004; Johnston & Noakes, 2005)
Beside ideological reasons and personal causes, a third motivational category likely involved in suicidal attacks involves a sense of social *duty and obligation* whether internalized or induced by peer pressure. This is apparent in data on the Japanese Kamikaze pilots (e.g., Ohnuki-Tierney, 2006) but it is also relevant to present day suicidal terrorism (Bloom, 2005; Gambetta, 2005; Merari, 2002; Stern, 2005).

Classification of terrorist motives into *ideological, personal, and social* is helpful, yet insufficient. It is descriptive rather than analytic and it stops short of explicating the underlying dynamics of suicide terrorism. Several questions remain. For instance, is either of these motive categories unique to terrorism, or could they foster alternative activities in alternative circumstances? The answer seems obvious. Alienation, pain and trauma could foster numerous nonviolent activities. The same holds for ideological objectives and social pressures. As concerns ideological objectives, Mahatma Ghandi’s ideological commitments identified non-violence as supreme means for the pursuit of freedom from foreign rule (Bondurant, 1988) and were adopted by Martin Luther King in reference to the civil rights movement in the U.S. Similarly, social pressures and a sense of duty and obligation, represent psychological mechanisms of influence capable of inducing any kind of commitment not necessarily a commitment to violence. So, the question is what precise role do these motives play in terrorism, and under what circumstances might they instigate it.

It is also of interest to ask whether all three motivational categories constitute *authentic* terrorism-driving forces and if not which is, and which isn’t. Different authors varied in their position on this issue. Some (Sageman, 2004; Spekhard & Akhmedova, 2005) regarded personal circumstance factors as the *true* explanations of terrorists’
behavior and viewed their ideological statements as post hoc justifications. As Spekhard and Akhmedova (2005, p.) put it “the political statements of the individuals involved in terrorism appear less of a driving force for their participation than as a means of justifying their actions.” Similarly, Sageman (2004, p. 108) agreed with Dambruoso that, “[the jihadists motivation] is not religious, it is psychological and personal.”

Other authors put greater faith in terrorists’ idealism. Pape (2005) in particular noted that “egoistic and anomic motives are insufficient. Altruistic motives, either alone or in conjunction with others, play an important role” (p. 184). Too, Gunaratna argued that “what actually motivates Al Qaeda is not power, wealth or fame but an ideological belief in their struggles” (Gunaratna, 2007, pp. 29). Atran (2004, pp. 68-69) observed that terrorists “are motivated not by personal comfort or immediate gain but rather by religious or ideological conviction and zeal” and that “debriefings with captured Al Qaeda operatives at Guantanamo, and with Jemah Islamiyah prisoners in Singapore suggest that recruitment to these organizations is more ideologically driven than grievance-driven” (ibid). Yet other authors (e.g., Pedahzur, 2005) proposed a differentiation whereby some individuals carry out terrorist acts for ideological reasons (such as commitment to a cause or an ideology), whereas others do so because of personal crises. In short, recent analyses of terrorists’ motivations enumerate a broad variety of possible motives and include a heterogeneity of positions and perspectives on this issue. These differences among scholars require sorting out.

The present paper attempts to “connect the dots” furnished by several recent analyses of motivational factors in suicidal terrorism. By synthesizing a widely dispersed literature, it seeks to uncover a deep motivational structure that may afford a common
understanding of numerous disparate instances of this phenomenon, and suggest how the various motive-categories identified thus far may functionally relate to each other. As a preview of what is to come, we first introduce the concept of “significance quest” as an overarching motive propelling suicidal terrorism. We then explore the implications of this motivational notion, and review empirical evidence relevant to those implications. We finally explore the ramifications of our analysis for counterterrorism, and discuss strategies for minimizing suicidal terrorism at levels of military strategy, foreign policy, immigration programs and educational initiatives.

The Quest for Significance as the Underlying Motivation for Suicidal Terrorism

The quest for personal significance has been hailed by psychological theorists as a major motivational force in human behavior. In this vein, Victor Frankl (2000, p. 138) wrote “that fundamental characteristic of the human reality [which he came to term]..its self transcendent quality [denotes the fact that] being human always relates and points to something other than itself.. [person] is oriented toward the world out there.. [she or he] is actualizing himself to the extent that he is forgetting himself by giving himself ..through serving a cause higher than himself..[According to Frankl then] self-transcendence is the essence of human existence..”

Abraham Maslow’s (1943) influential theory of motivation identifies self-esteem and self actualization concerns as top level human strivings of obvious affinity to Frankl’s “search for meaning” notion. In Maslow’s (1965, p. 78) terms, “the business of self actualization” can best be carried out via commitment to an important job”, that is, to a transcendent cause of recognized societal significance (Frankl, 2000, p. 84).
Recent analyses of human motivation (Becker, 1962; Greenberg, Koole and Pyszczynski, 2004) have implied that in the human species the biological need for physical survival is intimately linked to the quest for personal meaning and significance. The reason is assumed to stem from humans’ awareness of their own mortality, and the implied threat of personal insignificance; the nightmare of ending up as “a speck of insignificant dust in an uncaring universe”. It is this awareness that motivates people to “do well” in culturally prescribed ways, and be “good” members of society. A supreme “goodness” in this sense is the readiness to sacrifice oneself for the group in an hour of need (typically, in case of a severe perceived threat to the group’s survival).

Putting the group first is highly valued and rewarded by the promise of immortality. The group remembers its heroes and martyrs; symbolically then, their lives go on in the group’s collective memory. Also, through the act of sacrifice one’s personal identity is meshed with that of the group (Post et al., 2004); so that the group’s continued existence becomes inseparable from one’s own. As Elster (2005, p. 241) noted “a common denominator [of motivations for suicidal terrorism] is a desire to transcend death by living on in the grateful or admiring memory of others…” From a yet different perspective, personal sacrifice may serve the individual’s gene pool and/or value system shared by one’s kin. Hence, suicidal terrorism may be powered by evolutionary forces (Abed, 1997; Buss, 1996; Trivers, 1985).

Finally, in the jihadist ideology at least Shahadat (martyrdom) does not signify an end of individual existence, but rather immortality in highly pleasurable circumstances. For male shaheeds it entails the promise of paradise, and the allure of wedding numerous (seventy two) virgins of incomparable beauty (Hafez, 2006). Paradise is also promised to
female shaheeds. It is believed to entail removal of the strict restrictions on their sexual relations, the possibility of having liaisons with past Muslim heroes, becoming one of the seventy two virgins, bestowal of great beauty irrespective of one’s worldly physical appearance, the opportunity to meet Allah and the prophet Muhammad, and liberation from the grave’s pains for 70 members of one’s family (Berko & Erez, 2006).

As Crenshaw (2007, p. 153) recently summarized it: “Clearly the act is not just about dying and killing. The expectation of gaining status and respect as a martyr for the cause is important, so that individual action is linked to anticipation of both popular approval and collective political success…Sacrifice for the cause is both personally redemptive and a mark of honor, a way of becoming a hero and part of an exalted elite. ..It [contrasts sharply with] an otherwise insignificant or disappointing life.”

Paradoxically then, whether reflecting symbolic immortality and a place in the group’s collective memory, or concrete immortality as denizens of paradise, the willingness to die in an act of suicidal terrorism may be motivated by the desire to live forever.

Is Significance Quest Unique to Suicidal Terrorism?

Is the significance quest assumed to underlie suicidal terrorism unique to this particular phenomenon? Obviously not. As noted by motivational theorists such as Frankl (2000), Becker (1962), or Maslow (1843, 1967) the quest for significant existence constitutes a fundamental human striving, accounting for a broad preponderance of human activities. We behave in accordance with the dictates of our culture and its norms.

Berko & Erez (2006) based their analysis on in depth interviews with 13 Palestinian female prisoners, between the ages of 16-26 sentenced for terrorist activities (including attempts at suicide bombings) and held in Israeli security prisons.
The adolescent culture tells the teenager what counts as “cool” and what activities are “trendy” and likely to gain the peers’ approval. The norms of aesthetics and morality, suggest to members of a community what is valued and respected in their culture, hence what constitutes a “good life,” that confers significance on one’s existence. At moments of crisis, however, an opportunity may present itself for an enormous significance gain, unimaginable in ordinary circumstances; such opportunity may be often coupled with the potential for considerable significance loss in case one had failed to respond to the challenge. On this analysis, the underlying motivation for suicide terrorism involves the coupling of a quest for significance with a crisis situation, involving a perceived threat to one’s group, and a terrorism justifying ideology whereby a suicide attack is portrayed as an act of heroic sacrifice (martyrdom) lending one’s existence and demise an aura of supreme glory. As Gambetta (2005, p. 270) put it “All suicide missions belong to a family of actions in which people go to the extremes of self-sacrifice in the belief that by doing so they will best further the interests of a group or the cause they care about and identify with”

This raises the question of motivational commonalities and differences between suicidal and non-suicidal brands of terrorism. To start with a commonality, endorsement of a terrorism-justifying ideology may well underlie the activities of non-suicidal participants in the terrorist enterprise, operators of improvised explosive devices (the IEDs), and other personnel carrying out the logistic, financial, supply, or transportation tasks of a terrorist organization. A major difference between suicidal and nonsuicidal terrorists seems to reside in the specific role one assigns oneself within the common ideological context. Thus, whereas many may agree that the goal of the terrorist
organization is worthy, and that terrorism constitutes an effective and morally warranted means to that goal (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006), only some may adopt the act of suicidal terrorism as their personal assignment. Because of the extremity of the act, and its exclusivity (that is, incompatibility with alternative, socially sanctioned, objectives) it will likely require a conjunction of psychological forces of supreme magnitude (particularly intense significance quest, particularly powerful social pressures, and a particularly engulfing presence of a suicide-prompting rhetoric). In this sense then, the motivations involved in suicidal and nonsuicidal types of terrorism may differ in degree rather than in kind. Simply put, suicidal terrorism confers upon one greater prestige and represents a more auspicious opportunity for significance gain. For instance, in the case of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) even though all member of the organization are required to commit suicide when captured, the “Black Tigers, the LTTE suicide unit.. are considered elite” (Stack-O’Connor, 2007, p. 52). As Ricolfi (2005, pp.113-114) put it in reference to Palestinian suicide bombers: “A martyr is not an anonymous militant who carries out a mission, and whose name may remain unknown. A martyr is a volunteer who has been selected, who leaves a last will and testament…, and who will be remembered by his fellow countrymen through photographs, posters, murals, and plaques exhibited in public places…While a militant may die anonymously, and thus sacrifice himself twice, a martyr pays ‘only’ with his life but obtains fame and recognition in return. The symbolic calculation may explain why certain people may prefer to choose martyrdom directly over militancy of a more traditional kind.” In summary, suicidal terrorism represents an extreme case of significance quest, an opportunity to catapult oneself to the pinnacle of cultural veneration by an act of supreme sacrifice for an ideologically touted cause.
Implications

Our analysis has several testable implications. If reminders of one’s own mortality convey one’s potential insignificance then such reminders should augment the quest for significance as defined by one’s cultural norms and accepted ideological frames. In some cases, such norms and ideologies may identify the suicide mission against one’s group enemies as a most honorable act, lending one a sense of immense veneration and significance. In this connection Holmes (2005, p. 145) had the following to say concerning the likely motivational “rationality” of the 9/11 attackers: “The future hijackers…were surely encouraged to draw the logical conclusion that it be better to make their deaths meaningful rather than meaningless, to exit life with flags flying, on a combat mission, for their community’s honor, rather than as insignificant observers sitting on the sidelines.”

If our analysis is valid, adoption of cultural causes that lend one a sense of personal significance should reduce death-anxiety. Furthermore, perceived loss of significance through events other than mortality reminders should fuel efforts at significance restoration. Finally, a threat of potential loss of significance should instigate preventive actions designed to fend it off. Taken as a body, these implications identify a deeper motivational theme, of significance quest, that ties together the categories of personal circumstances, ideological reasons, and social pressures involved in suicidal terrorism. This theme is consistent with empirical data of various kinds. We review them next.

Terror Management Research
Much recent psychological research supports the idea that reminders of one’s own mortality motivate individuals to embrace their group’s culture and ideals. By now this prediction was corroborated in hundreds of psychological experiments carried out in numerous world locations. In one well known study, it was found that when research participants were reminded of their mortality they recommended a more severe sentence for a prostitute, representing a deviant from cultural norms (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Lyon, 1989). Yet other work found that exposing Italians to death reminders increased their bias in favor of Italy (their in-group), and the perception that Italy was cohesive and united. As Castano and Dechesne (2005, p. 233) recently summarized it, “Becoming part of collective entities [allows] individuals to extend their selves in space and time [and hence] to overcome the inherent limitations of their individual identity inextricably linked to a perishable body.”

Recent research by Pyszczynski and colleagues (Pyszczynski, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, & Weise, 2006) looked at the effect of mortality salience on Iranian students and their respective support for martyrdom (terrorism). When Iranian students answered questions about an aversive topic (unrelated to death), they evaluated a fellow student who opposed martyrdom attacks against the United States more favorably than a student who supported martyrdom attacks. However, the reverse was found when Iranian students answered questions about their own death. In this instance, they rated more highly the student who supported martyrdom than one who opposed it.

Mortality reminders can come in the form of personal trauma occasioned by the loss of a loved one. Spekhard & Akhmedova (2005) carried out an extensive study of Chechen suicide terrorists via interviews with their family members and close associates
and with hostages who spoke with the terrorists during the three days siege in Moscow’s Dubrovka theater. The relevant data are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1 here

As can be seen, all of the interviewees mentioned traumatic events that appeared to alter the course of the fallen terrorists’ lives. Indeed, the authors concluded: “when we looked for the primary motivation in our sample of terrorists we would have to say that it was trauma in every case” (Spekhard & Akhmedova, 2005, p.). Of particular interest, Spekhard and Akhmedova (2005, p.) observed that their subjects sought out ideological inspiration in response to their personal trauma. Specifically, “In the interviews concerning the accomplished suicide terrorists eighty-two percent (28/34) were secular Muslims prior to their experiences of trauma. Of these twenty-seven had no prior relationship to fundamental militant groups but sought out the Wahhabists radical groups in direct reaction to the traumas they had endured knowing full well of the groups’ beliefs and terroristic practices.” It appears then that personal trauma, feelings of alienation, and disenfranchisement, etc., may spur a quest for meaning that in cases of a severe intergroup conflict may be afforded by a terrorism-justifying ideology.  

Terror management research demonstrates a link between overcoming death anxiety and commitment to cultural causes. In turn, commitment to cultural causes may attenuate death anxiety. In other words, if death reminders cause anxiety because of the insignificance threat (the “speck of dust” prospect) they convey, and if embracement of

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4 Spekhard & Akhmedova’s (2005) findings do not imply that all cases of suicidal terrorism are motivated by personal trauma. Their sample, after all, is opportunistic and highly specific. Their data do suggest, however, that some cases of suicidal terrorism may reflect a motivating force of personal trauma and encounter with death. According to the present analysis such encounter may well prompt the experience of significance loss and the quest for significance restoration.
cultural causes restores one’s sense of significance then embracement of cultural causes should attenuate death anxiety. In support of this possibility, Durlak (1972) found a significant negative correlation ($r=-.68; p<.001$) between purpose in life defined in terms of commitment to cultural objectives and measured by Crumbaugh (1973) PIL test (Purpose in Life) and fear of death. Illustrating the reverse effect, Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & Malishkevich, 2002) showed that depriving people from a sense of belonging increases death related cognitions. Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Simon (1997) first reminded half of their participants about death and assessed their reactions to pro and anti-US essays. Findings showed increases in death thoughts accessibility after the reminder of death. Importantly, accessibility of death thoughts declined after participants were given the opportunity to derogate the critic by giving a negative evaluation, in this sense defending the cultural norm.

The link between a sense of “oneness” with the group, and the attenuation of death anxiety (possibly instilling the readiness to sacrifice oneself for the collective) appears to have been intuitively understood by leaders whose causes required from their followers acts of supreme self denial. In this vein, Mao Tse Tung asserted “All men must die, but death can vary in its significance… To die for the people is heavier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather..” (quoted in Lifton, 1968, p. 27).

Overcoming death-anxiety through commitment to ideological objectives plays a significant part in the indoctrination of contemporary suicide terrorists. One failed suicide terrorist interviewed by Nasra Hassan (2001) was asked “How did you feel when you heard that you’d been selected for martyrdom?” He answered: “It’s as if a very high,
impenetrable wall separated you from Paradise or Hell,” he said. “by pressing the
detonator, you can immediately open the door to Paradise — it is the shortest path to
Heaven.” Another failed suicide terrorist recounted: “I spent a month in a mosque. I
learned how important it is to be a shaheed. It is is the loftiest objective. It's the biggest
and most holy thing you can do. And then you receive all the rewards in Paradise...”

Explicit statements by failed suicide terrorists, or farewell videos left by
“successful” ones, contain ample evidence for ideological arguments. We examined over
three hundred clips from the MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) TV
database (from late 2004 to the present). The MEMRI’s TV monitoring center that
oversees every major Arab channel focusing on political, cultural, religious, and social
developments and debates in the Arab and Muslim world and in Iran. Its data base
contains a large number of video clips from farewell tapes of suicide terrorists, interviews
with captured terrorists, failed suicide terrorists who were captured and imprisoned and
those who escaped from prison. It additionally includes interviews with the Mothers
(Father in one case) of successful suicide terrorists.

We had four coders independently go through clips in two pertinent categories of
from late 2004 to the present, namely “Jihad and Terrorism” and “Suicide (Martyrdom)
Operation”. All clips taken from interviews with individual terrorists, the family
members of successful suicide terrorists, and those from suicide terrorists’ farewell
videos were selected for analysis. Out of the three hundred clips we examined we
identified 58 such video clips. We then analyzed them in terms of the motives they
implied for carrying our suicide missions and engaging in terrorist attacks. The
researches used a set of keywords to identify and group the motives into the two general
categories: ideological/collectivistic and personal. For the category of ideological/collectivistic motives we used the key words: martyr, Jihad, Allah, heaven, role model, pride, honor, love of country, defense/fight for (one’s people/country/community/homeland), wedding (to the black eyed virgin of the paradise), support of one’s brethren (e.g., Iraqi brethren), fighting infidels (e.g., Americans), occupation (of) homeland, sacred, etc. As can be seen in Table 2, the terrorists’ statements reveal exclusively ideological motivations.

We broadened our search by analyzing several recent tapes featured on the website of the Palestine Media Watch (PMW). The PMW is an organization established in 1996 to gain an understanding of Palestinian society through the monitoring of the Palestinian Arabic language media and schoolbooks. It describes and comments on the Palestinian culture and society from numerous perspectives, including studies carried out on youth summer camps, analyses of poetry, schoolbooks, religious ideology, crossword puzzles etc. In September, 2006 this website featured six farewell tapes of recent suicide terrorists. Of these, five mentioned religion as the reason for their fateful decision, represented in terms such as ‘Allah,’ ‘Qu’ran,’ ‘Prophet,’ ‘purify,’ ‘jihad,’ or ‘martyrdom’. Four mentioned the rewards for martyrdom related to reaching ‘Paradise’ and wedding the ‘Maidens of Paradise’. Two mentioned nationalism, including language about ‘liberating occupied Palestinian land’, and one mentioned collectivistic revenge for ills inflicted on the Palestinians by the Israelis (see Table 3).

The PMW website also featured 9 recent interviews with Mothers of successful suicide attackers. All nine mentioned religion, expressed in language about ‘Allah’,
‘Shahada’, etc. One mentioned nationalism (fighting for the ‘homeland’). Three mentioned ‘pride and honor’ accorded the terrorists and their families by the community, and three out of the nine mentioned Paradise and its Maidens (see Table 4). Again then, the statements by suicide bombers’ and their parents suggest that the motivation underlying their acts was ideologically based.

Oliver & Steinberg (2005) in a recent work discuss the video titled “The Giants of Al Qassam Imlaq” and recorded by three Hamas soldiers prior to a planned suicide mission. Ideological statements pervade their statements as well. For instance, the first of the three Giants Mahir Abu Surur stated that the martyr’s mission was to “present our spirits and make our blood cheap for the sake of Allah and out of love for this homeland and for the sake of the freedom and honor of this people in order that Palestine remain Islamic, and Hamas remain a torch lighting the road of all the perplexed and all the tormented and the oppressed, and Palestine be liberated” (Oliver & Steinberg, 2005, p. 120)

Tables 3 and 4 here

*Authentic or manufactured ideologies?* One might wonder whether the farewell videos left by the would be suicide terrorists or their parents reflected these individuals’ genuine beliefs, or whether their statements were prepackaged, and “put in the speakers’ mouths” by the terrorists’ organizational launchers. But even if the latter were the case (i.e., if the statements were in fact pre-manufactured) it doesn’t mean that the statements’ substance wasn’t authentically embraced by their deliverers. Three psychological arguments militate against such a conclusion: (1) It is unlikely that one would go so far as
to sacrifice one’s own life for something one didn’t actually believe, (2) the sheer act of making such statements, and rehearsing them may well produce the well known “saying is believing effect” (Higgins, McCann and Fondacaro, 1982; Janis and King, 1954) in which the communicator ends up believing a statement he or she was induced to recite, particularly if the communication was addressed to a respected audience, and (3) It is generally conceded that such tapes are typically used as effective recruitment devices; if so, they are likely to be believable to candidates for suicidal missions. Furthermore, their contents, if anything, are likely to be embraced more firmly in temporal nearness to the mission, when social and personal pressures to fully commit to the mission mounted.

*Personal Loss of Meaning and Significance*

To summarize, (1) mortality salience may prompt individuals to strengthen their commitment to collectivistic (cultural) causes embodied in prevalent ideologies, (2) in numerous instances personal losses and traumas (arguably representing real life inductions of “mortality salience”) may lead individuals to embrace ideological causes (Spekhard and Akhmedova, 2005) and (3) in the preponderance of cases suicide terrorists’ stated reasons for their actions were in fact ideological. These data are consistent with the possibility that mortality salience represents a significance loss prompting an attempt at significance restoration via an embarkation on a culturally revered act (self sacrifice for a collective cause) identified as such in a prevalent ideological frame.

It is important to note that reminders of one’s own mortality constitute merely one among several cues to insignificance. Other cues to insignificance may stem from one’s current life circumstances. Feelings of isolation and disenfranchisement by Muslim youth
in European Diasporas (Sageman, 2004) could be of this ilk. So could social shame and ostracism to which one might be subjected by failing to live up to the norms of one’s society.

For instance, Wafa Idris, the first female suicide terrorist in Palestine, was infertile, and wanted to show the community that she still had her pride (Pedahzur, 2004, pp. 138-139). Shifa Adnan Al-Qudsi a twenty-six-year-old from Tulkarm who was arrested before she was able to complete her suicidal mission suffered a social stigma because of her divorce (Pedahzur, 2004, p. 139). Ayat Al Akhras, was socially shunned because she has been rumored to have had extramarital sex (Pedahzur, 2004, p. 140). A sixteen-year-old boy from Nablus who detonated an explosives belt when approached by Israeli police on 16 June 2002 was said to have been infected with the HIV virus etc. (ibid., p. 138). In all these cases, and many others, a sense of personal loss of significance as a consequence of deviating from normative injunctions of a highly traditional society may well have introduced a strong quest for significance restoration believed to be served by sacrificing oneself for a cause.

**Relative Deprivation**

Often a perceived loss of significance pertains to a sense of injustice dealt to a group with which one strongly identifies, hence constituting a principal aspect of one’s social identity. Indeed, a major motivational analysis of terrorism and political violence (Gurr, 1970) is based on the concept of relative deprivation. This notion refers to the experience of being denied something to which one feels entitled (Runciman, 1966; Olson, Herman & Zanna, 1986; Walker & Smith, 2001). Political scientists and sociologists invoked the relative deprivation of a social class or sector as an important
underlying factor in social movements, that in extreme cases may inspire violence expressed in rioting, terrorism and civil wars (Gurr, 1970). According to this view, social movements may arise when people feel deprived of what in their eyes constitutes their 'fair share' (Rose, 1982). From the present perspective, “relative deprivation” need not be real or objective, but rather represent a subjective feeling of injustice and a sense of collective grievance.

The emphasis on the experience of relative deprivation and its pertinence to terrorism casts an important light on the findings that poverty, poor education, or political oppression as defined by some absolute standards may not appear to constitute root causes of terrorism (Atran, 2003; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Berreby, 2003) and that well-known perpetrators of suicidal terrorism (e.g., Muhammad Atta and his 9/11 co-conspirators) were neither destitute nor poorly educated. Yet there are good reasons to believe they may have felt that either they themselves or their group had less than they deserved, were denied their national (Pape, 2005) or religious (Hafez, 2007) rights or were discriminated against relative to other denizens of their host countries (Sageman, 2004).

The psychological relevance of relative deprivation to the notion of significance loss is straightforward. A disparity between what one has and what one feels entitled to may readily induce a sense of disrespect and disparagement on part of the actor(s) deemed responsible for such derision. Should it be allowed to stand, such a humiliation may betoken an acceptance of one’s inferiority and hence a profound sense of significance loss relative to what seemed right and just.

Adoption of Collectivistic Goals and Support for Terrorism
Where individuals perceive their group to confront enemies who deprive it of its entitlements—adoption of collectivistic goals, touted in an accessible ideology, may motivate the support for terrorism. Such goals relate to removal of the apparent discrepancy between the group’s current outcomes and what it subjectively deserves. In an electronic survey recently conducted in 12 Arab countries, in Pakistan and Indonesia we found that the endorsement of individualistic objectives such as education, professional success and raising a family was associated with significantly lower support for attacks on Americans (whether military personnel or civilians) than endorsement of transcendental goals such as defending one’s nation or one’s religion (Fishman, Orehek, Chen, Dechesne, & Kruglanski, 2006). Adoption of collectivistic goals may reflect the motivation to remove the group’s state of relative deprivation and in this sense it may represent a significance quest via militancy and terrorism.

Figure 1 here

Socialization into Suicide Justifying Ideology and Significance Gain

The quest for significance doesn’t necessarily require acute reminders of insignificance (mortality salience), or the personal experience of significance loss. The notion of relative deprivation pertains to a subjective experience or a belief that one’s group’s just deserts have been unfairly denied. It thus defines an opportunity for significance gain, inculcated early in the socialization process, or “bred in the bone” (Post, 2005). Recently, the Egyptian daily Ruz al Yusuf (of August 18, 2006) has published a report about the Hezbollah Shi’te youth movement “Imam al-Mahdi Scouts.” These children range in age from 8-16, number in the tens of thousands, and are indoctrinated with the ideology of radical Iranian Islam. According to Ruz al Yusuf the
objective is “to train high caliber Islamic generation of children who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah (awlad istishadiyyun). Psychologically then, the adoption of ideological goals can represent a quest for significance gain anchored in a shared reality (Higgins and Hardin, 1996) deliberately engineered by an organization.

It is also of interest to suggest that as individuals’ baseline level of felt significance increased a “just noticeable” increment in felt significance (marginal utility) would require a successful attack of a correspondingly higher level of importance. For instance, assuming that Osama bin Laden’s baseline level of subjective significance is relatively high, one would expect his selected targets of attacks to be proportionately high in significance as well (as assessed in terms of their symbolic value to the targeted population). In this vein, Sprinzak (2001) discussed the “megalomaniacal hyperterrorists” whose sense of personal grandeur may drive them to undertake particularly spectacular acts of devastation. In his words, “They perceive themselves in historical terms and dream of individually devastating the hated system.” (p. 73) For example, in 1995 “Ramzi Yousef …openly discussed his dream of seeing the World Trade Center towers fall into the other, causing 250,000 casualties. While hiding in the Philippines.. he planned to destroy 12 U.S. air craft in midair. Yousef also entertained ideas about using chemical weapons on a large scale."

Consistent with these notions are recent data reported by Benmelech and Berreby (2007). These investigators find that in the Palestinian context older and better educated individuals are assigned more important missions (indexed by the size of the population centers attacked and the civilian (vs. military) nature of the targets) than younger and less educated individuals. Specifically, age of the suicide bomber is significantly
associated with the attack being carried out in a big city, and education of the suicide bomber is significantly associated with the attack being carried out against a civilian (vs. a military) target.

Whereas Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) interpret these findings in terms of a rational choice model whereby organizations assign abler operatives to more important targets it is also plausible that the abler (older, better educated) operatives are more likely to volunteer for missions commensurate with their ability, promising to bestow upon the actors the appropriate degree of felt and reflected significance. Indeed, as Benmelech and Berrebi (2007, p. 5) note “on the supply side terrorism may offer greater benefits for those with more education”

**Suicidal Attack as the Prevention of Significance Loss**

At times, preventing a significance loss could constitute a powerful motivating force in suicidal terrorism. Relevant here is Ohnuki-Tierney’s (2006) recent analysis of World War II Japanese Kamikaze pilots’ letters and personal diaries. It appears that many of them highly valued life and were reluctant to die, but were actually pressured into “volunteering.” Their sense of shame, had they refused the mission, as well as honor and solidarity with fallen comrades made it psychologically unacceptable for them to avoid their tragic assignment.

Hayashi Ichizo, a tokkotai pilot (Kamikaze) who died on his mission on February 22, 1945, wrote in a letter to his mother two days before his final flight “I find it so hard to leave you behind... I want to be held in your arms and sleep.. [yet] All men born in Japan are destined to die fighting for the country. You have done a splendid job raising me to become a honorable man.” (Ohnuki-Tierney, 2005, p. 173).
The notion of significance-quest affords an integration of seemingly disparate motivational contexts of suicidal terrorism involving: personal traumas, ideological reasons, and social pressures. In different ways these may relate to the constant human yearning for significance (Frankl, 2000) arguably born of awareness of our temporality (Becker, 1962; Greenberg et al., 2004).

Personal traumas, and frustrations, represent a significance loss, motivating the quest for significance restoration. Often, however, it is beyond the power of the individual to restore her or his lost sense of personal significance. It is impossible to bring back to life the loved ones lost to enemy violence. Nor is it easy to undo the deeds that brought one ostracism from one’s community, or to convince members of an indigenous majority to accept a minority immigrant as equal. Where the direct restoration of one’s lost sense of personal significance seems impossible the individual may seek to do so indirectly through alternative means, including an identification with a collective loss (or one’s group’s relative deprivation) that affords a clear path to renewed significance via participation in militancy and terrorism. Thus, through a kind of “collectivistic shift” individual powerlessness may be overcome by an empowering collectivistic ideology in which name terrorist acts are carried out.

Commenting on Palestinian suicide bombers, Hafez (Manufacturing Human Bombs, p. 152) noted in this vein that “Hamas deliberately framed suicide attacks in terms of a culture of martyrdom that was previously unfamiliar to Palestinian society. [Consequently] Palestinians came to venerate martyrdom because of a ‘confluence of perceived threats and a sense of victimization.”
In more general terms, adoption of ideologically based means (terrorism in this instance) may constitute a substitute vehicle for significance restoration, if individual means for doing so were thwarted (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun & Sleeth-Kepper, 2002). The ideologies elucidate what a significance gain according to one’s group, consists of, and afford a way of preventing a significance loss involving adherence to these ideological dictates.

At times of a severe danger to one’s group, an ideology may call for the ultimate sacrifice from its members, to be repaid by the group’s veneration. Promoting one’s sense of significance or preventing its loss thus seems to constitute the common motivational denominator in numerous instances of suicidal terrorism. This analysis is supported by a variety of data referred to earlier including the prevalence of ideological narratives in suicide bombers’ farewell video-clips, audio recordings, interviews and other materials (Hafez, 2007), by findings that personal traumas seemed to prompt an embrace of such narratives (Spekhard & Akhmedova, 2006), and by a psychological analysis and supportive data identifying the quest for personal meaning and significance as a major motivating force in human affairs ((Becker, 1962; Frankl, 2000; Greenberg, Koole and Pyszczynski, 2004).

Beyond the “fatal cocktail” model. Our analysis goes beyond what “journalist Barbara Victor) called the ‘fatal cocktail’: religious doctrine that promises eternal life, deprivation that offers no hope, nationalism, and the hardships of living under a military occupation” (Crenshaw, 2007, p. 155). Though personal hardships, humiliation and hopelessness may well instill a sense of significance loss and prompt the quest for significance restoration, they are neither sufficient nor necessary for motivating suicidal
terrorism. Instead, such terrorism may arise from a perceived opportunity for an immense *significance gain* that offers a rare opportunity for “stardom” to individuals (e.g. Mohammad Atta and the 9/11/01 attackers, or the perpetrators of the 7/7/05 attack on the London transit system were neither particularly hopeless, destitute, or oppressed).

Finally, suicidal attacks may arise from the desire to avert a *future significance loss*, as amply illustrated by the Kamikaze case of World War II.

The mainstay of our conception is the *significance bestowing ideology* that portrays suicidal terrorism as a way of acquiring immense personal importance. It is embrace of such an ideology, and adoption of the personal goals that it implies (i.e. the commission of a suicidal attacks) that seem crucial in explaining suicidal terrorism.

From a psychological perspective, such ideology need not be of any particular kind. It could be religious, ethno-nationalist (as the LTTE case clearly demonstrates), or socialist as long as it portrayed given activities as means to the end of significance.

In turn, the adoption of a terrorism justifying ideology, as the adoption of any belief system may be facilitated *either* by *motivational* factors such as (a) dire personal circumstances, (b) great personal ambition (Sprinzak’s (2001) notion of megalomania), *or* by *cognitive* factors comprising (c) compelling arguments by revered “epistemic authorities” (d) community consensus and a shared reality in support of given ends and means (such as suicidal terrorism), *or* by both. Thus, rather than explaining suicidal terrorism by a “fatal mix” of factors our analysis distinguishes between the crucial motivational nucleus of the phenomenon, *the suicide advocating ideology*, and motivational and cognitive variables that may drive individuals to subscribe to it, and enact its exhortations.
The Process of Motivational Induction

Though our main concern in this paper is with motivational substance, concerning the kind of goals which may prompt individuals to embark on suicidal terrorism, it may be well to briefly comment on the process whereby such goals are formed in the first place (for general discussion of goal formation see Kruglanski (1996 a, b). As already noted, the goal that inspires an act of suicidal (or other types of) terrorism may be part and parcel of an ideological framing that portray it as a worthy objective carrying an aura of immense significance (of martyrdom or heroism). To be adopted by individuals as a basis for self sacrifice such framing needs to be (1) accessible in individuals’ environment, (2) persuadable in light of their prior values and assumptions.

The role of exposure to terrorism-justifying ideologies as a contributing factor in terrorism, is implied by numerous analyses of terrorists’ life-trajectories. For instance, Weinberg & Eubank (1987, p. 255) in commenting on the role of women in Italian terrorist organizations of the 1970s and 1980s point out that 27 percent “of the female terrorists were related by family to other terrorists,” and that “the process which brought about …participation of women was more likely to have been mediated through family ties than through prior experiences in …political organizations.” (ibid., p. 259). Thus, family connections (to siblings, or husbands) and other close relationships (e.g. with boyfriends) may have rendered terrorism justifying ideologies accessible to those individuals.
Sageman’s (2004) analysis of terrorist networks similarly implies the critical importance of *exposure* to jihadist ideology through social ties to individuals’ who espouse it (referred to as “hubs” of the network). Exposure to terrorism justifying ideologies may take place in radical madrassas (Bergen & Pandey (2005) and mosques (Post et al., 2003) and to be facilitated via messages and blogs on the internet (Weinman, 2004) promoting self recruitment into terrorism (Coolsaet, 2005).

Accessibility of terrorist ideology is a mere necessary condition for serving as a basis for individuals’ actions. In addition, the ideological framing that advocates terrorism needs to be credible to the individual. In turn, credibility may depend on the degree to which such framing is consistent with individuals’ prior premises and assumptions, on the degree to which it is endorsed by charismatic leaders (like Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, or Al Zarqawi) and on the degree to which it constitutes part and parcel of the group’s shared world view and its lore. In this vein, Sageman (2004, p. 154) observed that “Cliques... define a certain social reality for the ever more intimate friends”), presumably a shared reality wherein the right goal to adopt is that of launching a terrorist operation.

In summary then, the quest for significance (its restoration, gain, or the prevention of its loss) may lead to terrorism via the adoption of a terrorism touting ideology that identifies the performance of terrorist attacks as a noble goal for the individual to pursue. Adoption, in turn, requires that the ideology be accessible in the individuals’ environment and be rendered persuasive through its consistency with the individuals’ values and perspectives, its endorsement by credible “epistemic authorities” and charismatic leaders
(Kruglanski et al., 2005), and it being widely shared (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) within one’s referent community.

Research Implications

Though generally consistent with prior data, the present analysis poses a number of questions for further, more specific, research. Thus, it would seem important to ascertain whether the presently postulated “collectivistic shift” occurs automatically in response to individualistic frustrations, or is particularly likely where one’s group membership is made salient. It would also seem of interest to inquire whether the type of group to which one belongs moderates the tendency to shift to collectivistic goals in response to one’s sense of significance loss. For instance, it might be the case that groups characterized by considerable cohesion, and hence considerable potential for collective action might be more likely to prompt a collectivistic shift than groups characterized by a heterogeneity of opinions and torn by internal strife. One could inquire whether the “collectivistic shift” may be more likely for individuals under a heightened need for cognitive closure known for their proclivity for group centrism (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & DeGrada, 2006). It would also seem of interest to investigate whether the propensity for a “collectivistic shift” is particularly likely where the group’s degree of perceived relative deprivation is particularly striking or where the actions geared toward deprivation removal (e.g. militancy, terrorism) are particularly clear cut and well defined. The evolutionary versus acquired nature of the “collectivistic shift” could be also profitably explored in further psychological research.

A different direction of research could address the kind of circumstances that induce a sense of significance loss and how these vary across different dimensions. For
instance, individuals whose social reality represents a “culture of honor” (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) might experience a greater degree of significance loss upon a humiliating experience than ones who have been socialized in a different culture. In this connection, research by Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle and Schwarz (1996) showed that southern White males (vs. their Northern counterparts) exhibited significantly stronger reactions to an insult by a confederate. They were more likely to think that their masculine reputation was challenged, they showed a greater rise in cortisol levels attesting to stress, and they were more primed for aggression on physiological, cognitive, and behavioral levels.

More generally speaking, cultures differ in the importance they assign to honor. So called shame cultures (e.g., the Arab, or the Japanese cultures) assign to it considerably greater importance than do so called guilt cultures (the Jewish or the Protestant cultures) (Benedict, 1967; Dodds, 1951) hence it seems plausible that members of the former cultures would experience a more profound significance loss upon humiliation than members of the latter cultures.

Differences in the value assigned to honor are likely to obtain for individuals within cultures as well. In this vein, Fischer, Rodriguez, van Vlanen, & Manstead (2004) find gender differences within cultures, the men being more likely to subscribe to a “culture of honor” than the women. More generally, it seems plausible that the experience of significance loss will be partially determined by individuals’ hierarchy of values and the degree to which a given occurrence threatened a value at placed high in that hierarchy (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). For instance, cultures or individuals for whom human life represents a supreme value, might experience a more profound sense of significance loss upon an encounter with death, than cultures or
individuals for whom human life represents less of a moral concern, or for whom death is less negatively valenced. These possibilities could be profitably probed in further research.

**Implications for Counterterrorism**

As implied above, we regard suicidal terrorism as merely one (albeit an extreme) form of terrorist-violence employed in the service of an ideological cause. In this sense, implications of our motivational analysis for counterterrorism are meant to apply broadly to both suicidal and non suicidal terrorist tactics. But what might such implications consist of? First off, dealing with terrorists’ *motivation* appears of key importance. Without undermining motivation, reducing terrorists *ability* to launch a given terrorist tactic may often have a temporary effect, lasting until the terrorists discovered a way to restore their constrained ability, or found a new terrorist tactic free from prior limitations. For instance, building a fence to prevent infiltrations of a territory by terrorist operatives may prompt them to opt for the use of rockets circumventing that particular obstacle (as in the example of Hezbollah, and Hamas recent missile attacks on Israeli targets). In empirical work relevant to these notions Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare (1994) used quarterly data on terrorist attacks on Israel during the period January 1968 to December 1989 (selected from the data bases ITERATE 2 and ITERATE 3) to look at the effects of Israeli retaliations policy on the incidence of subsequent terrorist attacks. Based on a time-series intervention model, the authors concluded that a retaliation of an unexpectedly large magnitude, disrupting and hence reducing the terrorists’ ability to operate, may cause a temporary dip in terrorist activity. Yet, the terrorists’ may adjust their expectations and prepare for the retaliatory actions, so if the terrorists’ motivation
for attacks persists, “Retaliation has no long term deterrent... effect” (Brophy-Baerman & Conybeare, 1994, p. 196).

Granting its pivotal importance, how may the terrorists’ motivation be addressed in counterterrorism campaigns? The centrality of ideological warrants for suicidal terrorism, suggest the possibility of undermining them through credible communication efforts. As Post (2006, p. 15) put it in reference to Islamist terrorism “This will require active leadership by moderate Muslim clerics and ..political leaders countering the extremists in their midst.” Recently, Rohan Gunaratna has launched just such an effort aimed at members of the Jamaah Islamiyah and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front detained in Singapore prisons. So did the Saudi Interior Ministry in the past two years. The Saudi effort has included two large-scale projects, one involving an outreach to Saudi security prisoners (carried out by a team of Muslim clerics and jurists [ulama and fuqaha] as well as psychiatrists and psychologists, the second involving an online dialogue with extremists, supported by the Saudi Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. This effort too relied on assistance from psychological and sociological experts. Though the success of the Saudi, and other similar efforts needs careful evaluation, they represent a potentially important first step in an attempt to counter the extremist ideology through the use of “epistemic authorities” credible to the relevant

5 In the past six months, the Saudi Interior Ministry released more than 400 security prisoners .. after becoming convinced that they had renounced their extremist views.. January 23, 2006, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies.
6 Some 40 ulama and propagators of Islam who have internet skills enter extremist websites and forums and converse with the participants in order to bring them to renounce their extremist ideas. ..As of recently, such conversations have been conducted with 972 individuals with extremist views, for a total of 53, 760 hours. According to the campaigns information director Khaled Al-Mushawwah, this initiative has caused “decline of the takfir ideology on the websites that disseminate it”
audiences (Kruglanski, Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Sharvit, Ellis, Bar, Pierro & Mannetti, 2005).

But communicative attempts may fall on deaf ears if not accompanied by a reduction in potential recruits’ readiness to buy into terrorism-justifying ideologies. This may require an alleviation of significance loss prompting circumstances that instill the motivation to accept suicide (and other) missions as means to desirable ends. Some such circumstances may be highly idiosyncratic and personal (e.g. infractions by an individual with respect to norms of her or his community). Yet other circumstances may be widespread and amenable to general policy initiatives. On the military level, this may mean the minimization of violent responses to terrorist attacks, especially as regards the use of excessive (disproportionate) force likely to cause massive “collateral” damage, likely to and push over the brink those who may have suffered or witnessed the consequences of such violence. In a recent monograph on lessons of the Israel-Hezbollah war Anthony Cordesman (2006, p. 15) stated that the “US ..needs to give avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage the same priority as directly destroying the enemy.”

On the political level, it may require foreign policy undertakings, immigration programs, and educational campaigns aimed to reduce the alienation and embitterment of Diaspora youths and enhance their sense of acceptance by their host societies. Creation of positive intergroup contact (e.g. in the European Diasporas) (Victoroff, in press), effective anti-discrimination policies (arguably including affirmative action programs), and strong anti-discrimination norms may reduce intergroup tensions and the readiness of disaffected youth to regain their lost sense of significance by making the leap to
terrorism. As Kepel (2004, p. 9) recently remarked “The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities on the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West.”

*Tradeoffs and Paradoxes*

The present analysis highlights the considerable complexities that coherent counterterrorism policies must confront. Many counterterrorist moves are of a “double edged” variety involving trade offs that need to be carefully considered in reference to a specific set of circumstances. Take the notion that a terrorism-justifying ideology portrays terrorism as an effective tool advancing the perpetrators’ group to the ideal state that constitutes its goal. A seemingly straightforward counter move designed to disabuse the group members of these beliefs is a resolute military campaign targeting the terrorists and their leaders. Yet such campaign is also risking to humiliate the terrorists and their sympathizers, and inflict “collateral damage” claiming the lives of uninvolved bystanders. These may inflame the anger of terrorist supporters and potentially boost recruitment to the terrorist stock. A recent empirical analysis suggests that ‘targeted hits’ by the Israeli forces actually did just that, presumably due to the Palestinians’ motivation to revenge the fallen comrades (Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal & Samban, 2005). Whereas ‘targeted hits’ do hurt (a repeated demand by Palestinian negotiators was that the Israelis desist from employing this tactic) and may arguably undermine the belief that terrorism is effective (due to the organizational disruptions that the elimination of leaders may create), they concomitantly increase the appeal of terrorism by inflating the intensity of the emotional goal it may serve.
Tough counterterrorism policies including a capital punishment for terrorist activities may on the one hand deter some individuals, yet also create the conditions for martyrdom representing a particularly auspicious opportunity for significance gain. One of the leaders of the Narodnaya Volya, a 19th century terrorist organization in Tsarist Russia actually implied as much in stating “..for me that contrast between a radiant future for the people and our own sad fate was extremely influential… If not for the persecution, I’m not at all certain that I would have become a socialist at that time” (Alpern-Engel & Rosenthal, 1992, pp. 19-20).

For another example, consider the question whether state actors should be negotiating with terrorists. Though it is generally conceded that negotiating with terrorists may have the ill effect of reinforcing terrorism, it may have other consequences as well that are important to consider, and that may compensate in part for negotiations’ deleterious effects (Fisher & Ury, 1983). Thus, by negotiating with terrorists one may be able to offer alternative means to their stated goals, potentially more effective and less costly to the perpetrators than terrorism. Furthermore, paradoxically, negotiating with terrorists may restore their sense of significance and assuage their feelings of humiliation, hence reducing the psychological force behind the adoption of a terrorism justifying ideology.

A final paradox has to do with the broad base of community support that terrorist activity typically requires (Gur, 1999). A strong base in community support defines a shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) wherein the terrorism justifying ideology is embedded. The broader the support base, the more coherent the social contract endorsing a given strategy of action such as terrorism, hence the more powerful the injunction to
pursue that strategy (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006). But a broad
consensus might be difficult to sustain for an extreme activity that requires the sacrifice
of other objectives (of economic, political and social nature) likely to exist in any large
community. Again then, effective counterterrorism policies may need to consider the
broader context and steer a careful course wherein the “stick” administered to the
terrorists is appropriately balanced by a “carrot” offered the larger community in form of
supporting their alternative strivings with which terrorism may be incompatible.

Recapitulation and Conclusions

Recent analyses of the motivations for suicidal terrorism have identified a broad
variety of motives having to do with potential perpetrators’ (1) personal traumas and
frustrations, (2) ideological reasons, and (3) social pressures to which they may be
subjected. In the present paper we introduced the notion of significance-quest as an
integrative concept tying these motivational categories together: Personal traumas and
frustrations, could encourage a “collectivistic switch” to a terrorism justifying ideologies
because the latter may afford a means for restoring the lost significance occasioned by
various unsettling events. Besides, terrorism justifying ideologies may afford a relatively
simple means of substantial significance gain, and attainment of a hero or a martyr status
in the eyes of one’s community. Thus, whereas prior authors juxtaposed personal traumas
and frustrations to ideological motivations, and/or viewed suicidal violence due to social
pressures (e.g. as in the Kamikaze case) as distinct from both, we offer a general model
grounded in the psychology of human needs (Becker, 1962; Frenkl, 2000; Greenberg et
al., 2004; Maslow, 1943, 1965) that views all three motivational categories as
functionally fitting within an overarching framework of human quest for personal
significance. Our analysis is consistent with prior data and it offers implications for
discouraging terrorism via communication initiatives designed to undermine its
significance-lending warrants, as well as via policies designed to reduce potential
recruits’ sense of significance-loss, affecting their readiness to embrace such warrants.

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Table 1

*Frequency of Traumatic Events in the Lives of Suicide Bomber*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traumatic Event</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than one family member killed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father or mother killed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother killed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband killed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member disappeared after arrest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member tortured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

*Motivations for Suicide Terrorism (Farewell Tapes on MEMRI)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shehzad Tanwee</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>religion, nationalism, revenge</td>
<td>oppress (our people), massacre (of our people), crusade, love Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and martyrdom for the sake of Allah, avenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(the blood of our children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Muhammad Al-San'ani</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>religion, nationalism, revenge</td>
<td>vengeance (upon the American pigs and their apostate collaborator dogs), assault on the home of..., Paradise, heaven, Allah accepts me, sacrifice, martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Mu'awiya Al-Shimali</td>
<td></td>
<td>religion, nationalism</td>
<td>Paradise, religion, honor, martyr, we have been attacked, for the sake of Allah, peace, sacrifice, redeem honor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dahham</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>religion</td>
<td>Allah, Lord of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Sadiq</td>
<td></td>
<td>religion, nationalism</td>
<td>in Allah's cause, religion, obedience, one true God, Allah, ethical stances, my people, protect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and avenge my Muslim brothers and sisters, martyrs, heroes, Paradise

Paradise

Allah, martyr, Zionist colonialist, my country

people of the west, it's time for us to be equals -- as you kill us, you will be killed, honorable sons and daughters of Islam, our land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Keyword</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hanadi Jaradat</td>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>religion, nationalism</td>
<td>Allah, martyr, Zionist colonialist, my country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>nationalistic revenge</td>
<td>people of the west, it's time for us to be equals -- as you kill us, you will be killed, honorable sons and daughters of Islam, our land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adham Ahmad Hujyla</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>religion, nationalism</td>
<td>no God but Allah, leave the Muslim countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Jandal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mu'min Rajab Rajab</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>religion, 72 virgins,</td>
<td>in the name of Allah, take revenge, wedding with the maidens of Paradise, Quran, Jihad, impurity, Judgment day heaven, fulfill duty, maidens of Paradise, martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Hafs</td>
<td></td>
<td>nationalistic revenge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassem Al-Takrouri</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>religion, 72 virgins</td>
<td>Jihad and martyrdom-seeking, Quran, the life (afterlife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahid Al-Jabari</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reem Riyashi
Hamas
religion
heaven, enemies of my
religion, with Allah's
grace

Al-Moayed
Hamas
nationalism
we will destroy you

Bihokmillah Al-Agha

Table 4

Motivations for Suicide Terrorism (from Mothers’ interviews on MEMRI & PMW)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion, nationalism, wedding (with 72 virgins)</td>
<td>Shahada for the homeland, for Allah, the wedding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion</td>
<td>Shahid, Praise Allah, Day of Judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion</td>
<td>Jihad for Allah, religious obligation, afterlife, eternal bliss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion, marry (72 virgins)</td>
<td>Shahada, marry the Dark Eyed (the 72 virgin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion, 72 virgins</td>
<td>praise Allah, Shahada, 72 dark-eyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion, pride and honor of the family</td>
<td>Shahada, for Allah Almighty, pride for us, honor for us, pride for the whole family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Religion, pride and honor</td>
<td>Praise to Allah, honor, pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion, honor</td>
<td>praise Allah, granted me honor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion</td>
<td>Shahids for Allah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>religion, nationalism</td>
<td>martyrdom, go on Jihad and to heaven, role model for all the countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Palestine religion, pride praise Allah, to heaven, pride of martyrdom
Palestine religion, nationalism, 72 virgins love of Palestine, the black-eyed virgins, martyred for Allah, lovesick for his homeland, wage Jihad for the sake of Allah
Hizbullah religion, nationalism, martyrdom, resistance, paradise, marry 72 virgins the black-eyed virgins
Palestine religion sacrifice, Jihad for the sake of Allah, duties of Islam

Figure 1

Support for Attacks Against Americans by Arab Respondents Subscribing to Collectivistic versus Individualistic Goals