Dan Moller
I’m an
assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland. Below
are some papers I have written. Although the range of topics is
broad, I'm especially interested in ethics (normative and applied), as
well as epistemology.
Michael Zimmerman, Living with Uncertaintiy Forthcoming in Ethics
Book review and a brief critical discussion of whether moral obligations are subjective, objective or evidential. Suppose drug A will cure your patient, drug C will kill him, and B will bring a partial cure. Normally, of course, you should prescribe A. But does this change if you falsely believe C would be best? (Subjectivists say Yes.) What if your evidence is silent on whether A or C is the killer--should you then prescribe B? Zimmerman argues your obligations are a function of your evidence, not your beliefs or what would be objectively best, but what if you have false beliefs about your evidence?
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Meta-reasoning and Practical Deliberation Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Sometimes there is evidence about what we would decide to do from an improved deliberative position—one in which we have better information, say, or are subject to less bias, or are able to consider the relevant facts with greater vividness. I argue that in such situations we should act on that evidence, and that there are some important ethical and prudential applications for this idea. Following through with this suggestion allows us to respond to the fact that we are prone to error by making the appropriate adjustments in our decision-making. A secondary goal is to explore the neglected role of vividness in our decision-making.
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Love and Death The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 301-316.
Empirical evidence indicates that bereaved spouses are surprisingly muted in their responses to their loss, and that after a few months many of the bereaved return to their emotional baseline. Psychologists think this is good news: resilience is adaptive, and we should welcome evidence that there is less suffering in the world. I explore various reasons we might have for regretting our resilience, both because of what resilience tells us about our own significance vis-à-vis loved ones, and because resilience may render us incapable of comprehending how things really stand, value-wise. I also compare our actual dispositions to extreme alternatives (“sub-resilience” and “super-resilience”), and consider whether we might endorse (plain) resilience as a kind of mean.
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Should We Let People Starve—For Now? Analysis 66 (2006), 240-247
It may well be that we could save more people overall by not aiding those in need now and instead giving aid in the future. This would be true, for instance, if either the price of life-saving interventions fell, or if we could increase our wealth in real terms over time. Additionally, saving people later is better for us, since we can invest the money in a way that benefits us. Instead of giving $1,000,000 now, we might use that money to buy a mansion that we could then live in till we sold it at a profit decades later, and give the money away then. This would allow us to save more people and to lessen the costs of giving for us. Together, these two points create a puzzling case for answering the title-question affirmatively.
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Killing and Dying American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006), 235-248
Everyone knows that killing is wrong and dying is bad. But how are the two related? Surprisingly, there’s disagreement on this point, and settling that disagreement is important, since how we explain the wrongness of killing has practical implications for whom it is permissible to kill. The harm-based account of killing that says killing is wrong for the boring reason that dying is bad, and I defend that account against an important objection mounted by proponents of an alternative, respect-based view. Along the way, I discuss why it might be bad to die even at the biological limits of human life, and whether it’s a misfortune not to be an immortal god.
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The Pyrrhonian Skeptic’s Telos Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004), 425-441
Commentators have focused on the epistemology of Sextus Empiricus, but his avowed aim of ataraxia, or tranquility, deserves attention as well. After warding off various lesser criticisms of the Skeptic’s aim, I identify the central problem: the Skeptic is supposed to be dedicated to suspending judgment concerning theoretical matters, yet his aim seems to embody a controversial philosophical view. I discuss various ways of resolving this issue and what might motivate the Skeptic’s continued adherence to a disputed aim.
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An Argument against Marriage Philosophy 78 (2003), 79-91
I develop and examine the “Bachelor's Argument,” which consists of the following dilemma. Assume that marriage involves something like a promise to be in a lifelong relationship with another person. Either that promise has lifelong binding force or it doesn’t. If it does, marriage is crazy, since it commits us to a relationship with someone even after we cease to love or even like them. Alternatively, if the promise loses its force once we cease to love our spouse, then the commitment lacks authority in the only circumstance in which it is needed and is therefore pointless.
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Parfit on Pains, Pleasures and the Time of their Occurrence Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2002), 67-82
A discussion of the so-called bias toward the future (we care about future pleasant and unpleasant experiences, but much less about past ones). I provide reasons for doubting that we would be better off without such a bias, and consider different explanations of why we have it.
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danjmoller
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Michael Zimmerman, Living with Uncertaintiy Forthcoming in Ethics
Book review and a brief critical discussion of whether moral obligations are subjective, objective or evidential. Suppose drug A will cure your patient, drug C will kill him, and B will bring a partial cure. Normally, of course, you should prescribe A. But does this change if you falsely believe C would be best? (Subjectivists say Yes.) What if your evidence is silent on whether A or C is the killer--should you then prescribe B? Zimmerman argues your obligations are a function of your evidence, not your beliefs or what would be objectively best, but what if you have false beliefs about your evidence?
PDF Text
Meta-reasoning and Practical Deliberation Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Sometimes there is evidence about what we would decide to do from an improved deliberative position—one in which we have better information, say, or are subject to less bias, or are able to consider the relevant facts with greater vividness. I argue that in such situations we should act on that evidence, and that there are some important ethical and prudential applications for this idea. Following through with this suggestion allows us to respond to the fact that we are prone to error by making the appropriate adjustments in our decision-making. A secondary goal is to explore the neglected role of vividness in our decision-making.
PDF Text
Love and Death The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 301-316.
Empirical evidence indicates that bereaved spouses are surprisingly muted in their responses to their loss, and that after a few months many of the bereaved return to their emotional baseline. Psychologists think this is good news: resilience is adaptive, and we should welcome evidence that there is less suffering in the world. I explore various reasons we might have for regretting our resilience, both because of what resilience tells us about our own significance vis-à-vis loved ones, and because resilience may render us incapable of comprehending how things really stand, value-wise. I also compare our actual dispositions to extreme alternatives (“sub-resilience” and “super-resilience”), and consider whether we might endorse (plain) resilience as a kind of mean.
PDF Text
Should We Let People Starve—For Now? Analysis 66 (2006), 240-247
It may well be that we could save more people overall by not aiding those in need now and instead giving aid in the future. This would be true, for instance, if either the price of life-saving interventions fell, or if we could increase our wealth in real terms over time. Additionally, saving people later is better for us, since we can invest the money in a way that benefits us. Instead of giving $1,000,000 now, we might use that money to buy a mansion that we could then live in till we sold it at a profit decades later, and give the money away then. This would allow us to save more people and to lessen the costs of giving for us. Together, these two points create a puzzling case for answering the title-question affirmatively.
PDF Text
Killing and Dying American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006), 235-248
Everyone knows that killing is wrong and dying is bad. But how are the two related? Surprisingly, there’s disagreement on this point, and settling that disagreement is important, since how we explain the wrongness of killing has practical implications for whom it is permissible to kill. The harm-based account of killing that says killing is wrong for the boring reason that dying is bad, and I defend that account against an important objection mounted by proponents of an alternative, respect-based view. Along the way, I discuss why it might be bad to die even at the biological limits of human life, and whether it’s a misfortune not to be an immortal god.
PDF Text
The Pyrrhonian Skeptic’s Telos Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004), 425-441
Commentators have focused on the epistemology of Sextus Empiricus, but his avowed aim of ataraxia, or tranquility, deserves attention as well. After warding off various lesser criticisms of the Skeptic’s aim, I identify the central problem: the Skeptic is supposed to be dedicated to suspending judgment concerning theoretical matters, yet his aim seems to embody a controversial philosophical view. I discuss various ways of resolving this issue and what might motivate the Skeptic’s continued adherence to a disputed aim.
PDF Text
An Argument against Marriage Philosophy 78 (2003), 79-91
I develop and examine the “Bachelor's Argument,” which consists of the following dilemma. Assume that marriage involves something like a promise to be in a lifelong relationship with another person. Either that promise has lifelong binding force or it doesn’t. If it does, marriage is crazy, since it commits us to a relationship with someone even after we cease to love or even like them. Alternatively, if the promise loses its force once we cease to love our spouse, then the commitment lacks authority in the only circumstance in which it is needed and is therefore pointless.
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Reply to
Landau Philosophy
80 (2005), 279-284
A response to Iddo Landau’s reply to my paper on marriage. Contains a pretentious quotation from Proust. (See Landau’s “An Argument for Marriage,” Philosophy 79 (2004), 475-481.)
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A response to Iddo Landau’s reply to my paper on marriage. Contains a pretentious quotation from Proust. (See Landau’s “An Argument for Marriage,” Philosophy 79 (2004), 475-481.)
PDF Text
Parfit on Pains, Pleasures and the Time of their Occurrence Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2002), 67-82
A discussion of the so-called bias toward the future (we care about future pleasant and unpleasant experiences, but much less about past ones). I provide reasons for doubting that we would be better off without such a bias, and consider different explanations of why we have it.
PDF Text