Abstract In this paper I aim to improve the theory and practice of participation in local, grassroots, or micro-development initiatives. First, I classify weaker and stronger types of participation and, in relation to these accounts, I propose and explain an ideal of deliberative participation derived from the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. Second, in relation to these types of participation and especially the deliberative ideal, I evaluate Sabina Alkire’s recent efforts, in Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction, to apply Sen’s theory to micro-projects. Although I find much to approve of in her approach to grassroots participation, I argue that it could be strengthened by features of deliberative participation. Third, I analyze and rebut three charges leveled against Sen’s democratic turn, deliberative democracy, and deliberative participation -- namely, that these allied accounts are flawed by too much indeterminacy, too little autonomy, and insufficient realism with respect to asymmetries of power.


In this paper I aim to improve the theory and practice of participation in local, grassroots, or micro-development initiatives. Accomplishing this goal requires three steps. First, in order to clarify the different approaches to ‘participation’ that have emerged in the last 50 years of development theory and practice, I discuss and enrich some classifications of types of participation, including those of Denis Goulet (1989), J. N. Pretty (1994), John Gaventa (1998), Bina Agarwal (2001), and Jay Drydyk (2005). In relation to these accounts of participation, I propose and explain an ideal of deliberative participation derived from the theory and practice of deliberative democracy presented elsewhere (Crocker, 2006 and forthcoming).

Second, in relation to these kinds of participation, and especially the ideal of deliberative participation, I analyze economist Sabina Alkire’s recent efforts, in Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction, to apply Sen’s theory to micro-projects. Although I find much to approve of in her approach to grassroots participation, I argue that it could be strengthened by features of deliberative participation.
Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction (Alkire 2002), to apply Amartya Sen’s theory to micro-projects. Although I find much of which to approve of in her approach to grassroots participation, I argue that it could be strengthened by features of deliberative participation.

Finally, I analyze and evaluate three objections that have been made to (i) Sen’s democratic turn in his version of the capability approach, (ii) the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, and (iii) deliberative participation in local development. Critics find these allied accounts of robust democracy and citizen participation flawed by too much indeterminacy, too little autonomy, and insufficient realism with respect to asymmetries of power.

Participation in Development

Since their inception after World War Two, national and international initiatives to bring about “development” in “less developed” countries periodically have aspired to make development “participatory.” More recently the term “empowerment” sometimes encompasses the idea that the recipients of “development” should participate in some way in the process or results of development. \(^1\) Usually, however, what was meant by “participation”—while usually positive in meaning—was vague (Agarwal, 2001; Alkire, 2002). Somehow the recipients of development aid were to be involved in the decision-making processes related to beneficial change. When concepts of participation were precise, substantial differences have existed over the goals, “point of entry,” agents, processes, causes, effects, value, and limits of “participation” as decision-making (see Goulet, 1989). More problematic is that the banner of “participation” has been waved over projects that were, at best, thinly or weakly participatory or, at worst, smokescreens for elite control. Several writers have recently exposed and excoriated a dark side, the anti-

democratic side, of so-called participatory approaches practices. Jay Drydyk has ably analyzed and assessed these recent criticisms, and argued for a deeply democratic approach to participatory development (Drydyk, 2005).

I draw now on and supplement the classificatory work of Agarwal, Pretty, Gaventa, and Drydyk to distinguish—from thinner (or weaker) to thicker (or stronger)—a spectrum of modes of participation in group decision-making:

(i) **Nominal participation:** The shallowest way in which someone participates in group decision-making is when that person is a member of a group but does not attend its meetings. Some people, of course, are not even members. Some are members but are unable to attend, because of other responsibilities, or unwilling to attend, for instance, because they are harassed or unwelcome.

(ii) **Passive participation:** In passive participation, people are group members and attend the group’s or officials’ decision-making meetings, but passively listen to reports about the decisions that others already have made. The elite tells the nonelite what the elite is going to do or has done, and nonelite persons participate, like the White House press corps, by listening and, at best, asking questions or making comments.

(iii) **Consultative participation:** Nonelites participate by giving information and their opinions (“input,” “preferences,” and even “proposals”) to the elite. The nonelite neither deliberate among themselves nor make decisions. It is the elite who are the “deciders,” and while they may deign to listen to the nonelite, they have no obligation to do so.

(iv) **Petitionary participation:** Nonelites petition authorities to make certain decisions and do certain things, usually to remedy grievances. Although it is the prerogative of the elite to decide, the nonelite have a right to be heard and the elite have the duty receive, listen, and consider if not to heed. This participatory model, like that of consultative participation, is often used in traditional decision-making.

(v) **Participatory implementation:** Elites determine the goals and main means, and nonelites implement the goals and decide, if at all, only tactics. In this mode nonelites do more than listen, comment, and express. Like soccer players they also make and enact decisions, but the overall plan, strategy, and line-up belongs to the coach.

(vi) **Bargaining:** On the basis of whatever individual or collective power they have, nonelites bargain with elites. Those who bargain are more adversaries than
partners. Self-interest largely if not exclusively motivates each side, and nonelite influence on the final “deal” depends on what nonelites are willing to give up and what concessions they are able to extract. The greater the power imbalances between an elite and nonelite, the less influence the nonelite has on the final outcome. The elite may settle for some loss now in order to make likely a larger future gain. Alliances with and support from actors outside and above tend to enhance nonelite bargaining power.⁵

(vii) Deliberative participation: Nonelites (sometimes among themselves and sometimes with elites) deliberate together, engage in practical reasoning, and scrutinize proposals and reasons in order to forge agreements on policies for the common good, ones which at least a majority can accept (Crocker 2006 and forthcoming). Such deliberation includes scrutiny and formation of values, including the relative importance of various processes and opportunities.

The further we go down the list the “thicker” or “deeper” is the participatory mode in the sense of more fully expressing individual or collective agency. It requires more agency to attend a meeting than be a stay-at-home member, and even more agency actively to comment or petition than merely listen, accept others’ decisions, or do what one is told. In both bargaining and deliberative, nonelite individuals and groups manifest even more robust agency because they are part of the decision-making process and not passive recipients of others’ decisions.

It should also be noted that different kinds of participation are likely to differ with respect to their consequences. Of particular importance to the agency-focused capability approach is the extent to which nonelites are likely—through the different kinds of participation—to make a positive difference in the world, for example, promote human development. In a particular context, for example, some sort of nondeliberative participation, such as petitioning or bargaining, may be more efficacious than deliberative participation in promoting development as capability expansion and agency enhancement (see Drydyk 2005, pp. 252-57). Moreover, a nondeliberative mode of participation now may play an important role in bringing about a deliberative participation in the future.

Alkire’s Participatory Approach and Deliberative Participation

Given these sorts of participation in development, let us now analyze and evaluate Alkire’s approach to participatory development. Amartya Sen’s capability approach, I argue elsewhere (Crocker, 2006 and forthcoming), requires democracy conceived as “open public reasoning” (Sen, 2003, p. 33) about matters of social concern. Sen himself urges that this deliberative ideal of democracy be built into our conception of the ends as well as the means of development, whether in “developed” or “developing” countries:

Such processes as participation in political decisions and social choice cannot be seen as being—at best—among the means to development (through, say, their contribution to economic growth), but have to be understood as constitutive parts of the ends of development in themselves (Sen, 1999, p. 291).

I now analyze and evaluate—as one way of promoting participatory development—Sabina Alkire’s Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction (Alkire 2002). In this important book Alkire accurately interprets and skillfully applies Sen’s capability approach to three micro-socioeconomic development projects in Pakistan, each of which involves some sort of aid from above and outside. The three groups that constitute Alkire’s Pakistan case studies—the loan-for-goats project with women from four villages near Senghar, Sindh; the Khoj literacy centers near Lahore; and the rose cultivation project in the village of Arabsolangi, Sindh—are all examples of nonpublic, local, and income-generation projects partially dependent on outside help from both an international development agent (Oxfam) and
Pakistani NGOs. Although this help does come from beyond the local community, Alkire’s focus is on bottom-up and small-scale development. In the three local development groups, local facilitators employed (and later helped assess) the value-laden participatory method, which I will analyze, assess, and strengthen in this chapter’s concluding section.

Alkire supplements Sen’s work with that of philosopher John Finnis (Alkire 2002, pp. 15-18; see Finnis 1980, 1983). The result is a novel approach to an outside development agent’s decision of whether to continue funding an income-generating and community-building activity for which the group had received earlier support. Unique to this approach is the external funder’s use of local facilitator-assessor-reporters to elicit, clarify, and then report on the groups’ evaluations of the impact of the project funded earlier. I conclude that an ideal of deliberative participation, informed by the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, would strengthen Alkire’s approach to local participatory development.

In her study, Alkire draws on and sometimes criticizes not only Sen’s ideas but also the development literature concerning popular participation in development initiatives. Alkire’s focus is on only one sort of development activity, and she is keenly aware that other participatory approaches may be called for in other contexts. Among these, I note, would be community-based natural resource management, where the resource to be managed sustainably are such things as forests, wildlife, and water. What specific sort of development context does she address?

A global development agency, Oxfam, with the assistance of Pakistani nongovernmental organizations, had selected and invested in income-generating and community-building initiatives in three different grassroots groups. The projects had been in operation for some time, and Oxfam wanted to assess how well the projects had done before deciding whether to continue funding them. Oxfam employs several established methodologies to evaluate success and failure.
Among these are cost-benefit analysis Social Impact Assessment (SIA), a form of evaluation that emphasizes a contemplated intervention’s anticipated social consequences, especially its negative impacts on human beings (Alkire 2002, pp. 218-222; Mashinya 2007). None of these methodologies, however, gave the groups themselves or their members much of a role. To remedy this deficiency, Alkire employed educated and local people—who, however, were not members of the communities studied—and provided Oxfam with a more robust participatory approach. The basic idea is that these evaluators elicited from the groups members the latter’s evaluations of the impact of the project on their lives. The results of this evaluation then supplemented the outcomes of the other methodologies. Hence, Oxfam, the ultimate decision maker, was to have richer information with respect to its decision of whether or not to continue funding the projects and what sort of projects to fund in the future.

Alkire does not investigate or evaluate the process by which Oxfam itself decided about what projects to fund. If she had done so, it would be important to know to what extent its decision making was deliberative and to what extent, if any, representatives from the affected groups were involved at this higher level. Her focus rather is on the outsider-facilitated, backward-looking assessment exercise that the groups themselves perform. What role did the outsiders play and did they intentionally or inadvertently communicate Oxfam preferences or interests? What role did the groups themselves and their members play? At what point did they enter the decision making process and how, exactly, did they participate?

The local facilitators (1) elicited the group member’s value judgments about impacts of past projects; (2) facilitated the members’ and group’s clarification, scrutiny, and ranking of those judgments; (3) comparatively assessed and reported to the funding institution the various
groups’ achievements; and (4) reported the funding body’s assessments and funding decision back to the investigated groups.

Before describing briefly each role, it is important to underscore that Alkire is acutely aware of the importance that the outsider-facilitators conducted the exercise in what she calls a “participatory manner”:

To the greatest extent possible the facilitators or ‘assessors’ wore simple clothing, used the local language, adapted the methodology flexibly to the situation, respected traditional and religious customs, organized the meeting at a convenient time and place, came with the attitude of informal learning and openness, encouraged quieter persons to speak more and dominant persons to speak less. They also spent time both prior to and after the meeting talking informally, gathering other information necessary for a full assessment, and addressing immediate problems in the activity (Alkire, 2002, p. 225).

Alkire justifies these attitudes instrumentally insofar as they are likely to elicit “richer” and more accurate information than would arrogant, know-it-all “facilitators” with culturally insensitive attitudes. She could also make it clear that the outsiders—as both fellow human beings and guests—ethically owed this conduct to community members. Although the facilitators and group members did not constitute an ongoing group, something like the deliberative virtues of respect for reciprocity, civic integrity (especially honesty), and civic magnanimity (especially openness) certainly apply (See Crocker, forthcoming, Chap. 9). Alkire rightly mentions one problem in this information-gathering phase, related to our ideal of civic integrity, namely what Robert Chambers calls, “inadvertent ventriloquism” (Chambers, 1994;
In this kind of distorted communication, the person questioned tells the questioner just what the latter would like to hear. Some of the aspects of the “participatory manner,” which Alkire approves, would reduce this danger. Assuming something like this “participatory manner” on the part of the outside facilitators, let us briefly analyze their four roles and assess them in relation to the types of participation, especially deliberative participation, discussed above (see also Crocker 2006 and forthcoming).

**Elicitation of Value Judgments.**

The facilitators—informed by an assessment framework of the “dimensions” of human development—came to the communities and interacted in various ways with their respective members. This framework is not a Nussbaum-type list that “select[s] those human capabilities that can be convincingly argued to be of central importance in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or chooses” (Nussbaum 2002, p. 128). Elsewhere (Crocker, forthcoming, Chaps. 5 and 6) I discuss Nussbaum’s list and her argument that it should be enshrined in every nation’s constitution. Although a given polity, Nussbaum concedes, may specify the list according to its own traditions and culture, “the list is supposed to be a focus of political planning.” (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 128; 2005, pp. 178-79). Nussbaum restricts her attention to constitutionally embodied and governmentally guaranteed entitlements. Alkire, like Sen himself and the position that I have taken elsewhere, has serious reservations about outsiders or even insiders using such a list on the local level. Even if freely specified, such a list risks removing from communities on every level the opportunity to decide for themselves what impacts they have reasons to value and disvalue, how to prioritize their various values, and what policies to adopt.

Alkire’s outsiders, however, do not come with nothing, thereby leaving everything—the identification of topics as well as the making of assessments—to the group members. Why?
Alkire answers: “Unsystematic public discussion and participatory exercises to date (at local and national levels) have often failed to consider key categories of valuable ends implicitly or explicitly” (Alkire, 2002, p. 224). On the basis of Alkire’s synthesis of ideas from both Sen and Finnis, the outsiders did come with a conception of the multiple dimensions or categories of human development. It is in terms of this schema that the facilitators elicited value information. The facilitators did not prescribe ways of being and doing; instead they used the Alkire-Finnis dimensions to stimulate answers in relation to certain categories or to sort the multiplicity of elicited value judgments into what they call “basic reasons for acting”:

- Life/health/security
- Knowledge
- Work/play
- Beauty/environment
- Self-integration/inner peace
- Religion
- Empowerment (Alkire 2002, p. 282. See also 118)

What the outsiders elicit and the insiders provide and clarify—in terms of these types of valued functionings and capabilities—are insider valuations of the changes that have occurred during the course of the project and perhaps attributable to it. In the field, the facilitators elicited this information about value judgments in two ways. Initially, the outsiders used the dimensions as an “agenda for conversation” (Alkire 2003) and successively asked for value judgments under each of the above seven rubrics. Following the realization that this approach seemed too mechanical and perhaps stifled a free-flowing interchange, the facilitators used the categories differently. After explaining “the general intent of the exercise (to think about the full range of impacts of an activity, good and bad, anticipated and unanticipated),” the facilitator would ask “a purely open question ‘what valuable and negative impacts have you noticed?’” (Alkire 2002, 225). After discussing the impacts in thematic clusters, whether or not they fit the dimensions,
the facilitator toward the end of a session would question whether the group had any value judgments to make under any of the seven neglected categories. Quoting Finnis, Alkire remarks that this use of the seven-item menu “could catalyze the missing discussions by providing ‘an assemblage of reminders of the range of possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to [a community]’” (Finnis 1980, p. 90; see also Alkire 224).

One advantage of this second variant of the “open menu” approach is that it provided the opportunity for group members to suggest concerns that either did not fit within the 7-item list or could only be made to do so by a kind of “shoe horning” that would distort the concern. For example, the 7-item list has no obvious category for assessing impact of earlier projects on the quality of social interaction between family members, friends, or community members. Did participants mention such issues and, if they did, did the 7 categories adequately reflect the community’s concerns?8

The difference between Nussbaum’s prescriptive list and either version of Alkire’s open menu approach is clear. In Nussbaum’s account, the list constitutionally mandates certain social goals and political planning, although Nussbaum encourages groups to specify the norms in relation to its cultural context.9 In Alkire’s approach, the dimensions “could usefully spark conversation” (Alkire 2002, p. 38) about whether there have been any impacts—good or bad—within a given category.

Alkire’s approach to this point is notably different from the thinner participatory modes discussed above. In nominal participation one participates through merely being a member of the group. In contrast the women in Alkire’s group attend meetings and evaluate their project. In passive participation, elites report their decisions and nonelites

passively listen and at best question; but the Pakistani women assess the strengths and weaknesses of their past projects.

*Value Clarification, Scrutiny, and Ranking.*

Facilitators did not just elicit information on valued or disvalued changes; they encouraged group members to participate in a deeper way, namely to scrutinize their choices, rank them by importance, and clarify and prioritize the underlying values they used in these rankings. Here, as in the first stage, a certain kind of social interaction among the group members took place. In the goat loaning project, one member—valuing the empowerment on other issues that she believed resulted from the project—said: “We sit together . . . and whoever gives the best opinion, we do this.” (Alkire 2002, p. 251).

Given the focus on the past, the absence of much disagreement within relatively homogenous groups, and the absence of an emphasis on what ought to be done collectively, it might appear that there was no attempt on the part of either the insiders or facilitators to convert the individual judgments and rankings into a social assessment of the past or a choice for future action. In fact, although the text could address this question more explicitly, the participants together seem to have ranked—in and through discussion—the various impacts of past projects as well as the basic values expressed (Alkire 2003).

Moreover, the facilitators themselves assessed the groups’ assessments. Although I would like to find out more about these facilitator-assessments, Alkire provides one crucial detail: “[One aim of the facilitator is] to assess impacts in such a way that the concerned community could (and did) reflect critically on the relative value or desirability of different impacts and formulate ongoing objectives (and on the basis of these select monitoring indicators)” (Alkire,
Group members had made their own assessments of their past projects and decided upon future income-generating activities. Subsequently, then, the group had the opportunity to react to and shape the report that the facilitators gave to the funding institution. Again, Alkire gives us few details of the extent to which the group’s internal process involved the give and take of reasons. It is clear and praiseworthy, however, that the group was provided the opportunity to have its voice heard. All too often outside development actors study and report on a project to their superiors but rarely give the report to the community for assessment and revision. To do so is to deepen the participation of group members.

**Reports to the Funder**

Following this second step, the facilitators reported the value information and rankings, which the women’s groups had generated, to the external funding institution (Oxfam). Hence, the funders knew how the communities judged and weighed the impacts of the projects on their lives and something of what the communities viewed as their most important values. In addition, the facilitators—also called “assessors”—were responsible for comparing (employing common categories) the various projects that they investigated and, as noted above, performing their own (group-mediated) assessment of each project in relation to the others. The external funders took the insiders’ information and assessments as well as the facilitators’ comparative assessments, combined them with standard assessments such as cost-benefit analysis and social assessment techniques, and decided whether or not to continue funding a particular project. The final decision—to continue or discontinue funding—resided exclusively with the funding agency and not with the communities themselves. It would be interesting to know whether this decision was
made in and through democratic discussion or in some other way. And were there not ways in which the communities could have bargained or deliberated directly with the funders?

How does Alkire’s approach to this point stand in relation to consultative, petitionary, bargaining, and deliberative participation? As in consultative participation, the funding agencies consulted—through the mediation of the facilitators—the three groups about each group’s evaluations of their own projects. Unlike engaging in mere consultation, Alkire’s groups reached their evaluative conclusions through a deliberation process. Like consultation, however, the elite funders made the final decision about whether to continue funding. It is not clear, but it seems doubtful, that the Pakistani groups believed they had a right to be heard and petition. It would not be surprising, however, if the funders believed they had an obligation to elicit—through the facilitators—and take account of the groups’ assessments prior to the funders’ final decision. Going well beyond implementation of the funders’ decisions, the groups had a role in influencing those decisions.

Although Alkire’s account is silent on the matter, the communities may have had a deliberative role in initially deciding their needs and the focus—goats, roses, or something else—of their income-generating projects. Hence in this sense they were not treated as “passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs” (Sen 1999, p. 11). Still, in the evaluation of their past project, a fuller deliberative opportunity was missed. The external donors and the various communities (and perhaps the facilitators) could and arguably should have deliberated together about the projects’ continuance.
Reports Back to the Communities

Outside investigators, even participatory ones, often neglect to return to the community to share
with their informants the investigators’ assessments and the donor’s funding decisions. Although Alkire provides scant details, the facilitators did share their and the funders’ assessments with the communities themselves. Not only did this exercise provide the community with an occasion to assess critically the way the outside facilitators and funders evaluated the communities’ achievements and failures, but each community also gained an opportunity “to formulate ongoing objectives” (Alkire 225). Yet, just at this point, when we would like to hear much more, Alkire’s account falls silent. For it is just here in which another possibility emerges for deliberative participation about the future. In this process the group would have forged agreements (about ends and means) in and through the give and take of reasons that most (come to) find acceptable.

There is an understandable—yet avoidable—cause for this apparent failure. The communities responded to the facilitators’ reports and donor decisions in the local language rather than in Urdu, the language of the facilitators (Alkire 2003). Part of the commended “participatory manner” that Alkire extols is that the facilitators communicate in the local language, yet apparently the facilitators were only able to speak in a language (Urdu) that only some of the group members spoke. Because of this deficiency, the ideal of reciprocity was seriously compromised. Of course, the communities also may have resorted to their own language to gain more ownership over the conversation (cf. Dorfman, 1988), but that possibility raises the question of whether facilitators should have been selected that could use the native or more predominant local language and whether the communities might have acquired ownership through deliberative give-and-take.
What is significantly underdeveloped if not altogether missing in Alkire’s capability-based reconstruction of participation is the group’s deliberation on the initial projects, their assessments of past projects, their future objectives, and their response to the funders’ decisions. Of course, in this exercise in grass-roots evaluation and funding decisions, the emphasis was more on evaluating the past, the changes in community-valued capabilities and functioning, than in offering a collective procedure for deciding about the future. With respect to both past and future, however, Alkire says almost nothing about the process prior to deciding, especially if there were disagreements and how the group addressed them. We are eager to know more about the extent to which deliberation did take place within each group as well as between each group and the funders. If deliberative participation did not take place, could and should it have done so? And what role might bargaining play in these deliberative processes?

One reason, perhaps, that Alkire did not address this issue is that social choice in the three groups proved relatively easy given that the groups were composed solely of women and were homogeneous in other ways. Males or group members of different castes surely would have made social choice more difficult and either called for deliberation or, perhaps, made it impossible.

Alkire is aware that work remains to be done on this issue of social choice. She candidly asks whether her facilitator-assessment methodology overcomes Social Impact Assessment’s (SIA) alleged weakness of failing “to provide decision criteria” (Alkire, 2002, p. 289) and admits that her methodology leaves many issues about decision-making “unresolved.” (Alkire, 2002, p. 289). For instance, Alkire concedes, the methodology “did not treat in depth the problem of combining this information [about valuable capability change] to reach a decision” or “what to do when one agent’s choice is
contested” (Alkire, 2002, p. 289). These are among the very issues that deliberative democracy attempts to answer. Finally, although Alkire adumbrates aspects of participation compatible with the ideal of deliberative participation worked out here, she rightly worries that some types of participation could “fracture” a community, require an individual “to act against her conscience” (Alkire 2002, p. 289).

Alkire’s participatory model, I conclude, would be improved by injecting a strong dose of deliberative participation, especially a version thereof that is sensitive to her concerns. In *Valuing Freedoms*, Alkire recognizes the merit of the capability approach addressing the deliberative interpretations of democracy (2002, pp. 127-28) and in a more recent article she takes up this challenge in relation to World Bank participatory methodologies such as PRA (Participation, Reflection, and Action) (2006). One aim of my recent work is to contribute to this task. Just as deliberative democracy theory, I have argued (Crocker, 2006 and forthcoming) can help Sen specify the concept, justification, and procedures of public discussion and democratic decisions, so deliberative aims, ideals, group membership, background conditions, and processes (as well as the ideal deliberator capacities and virtues) yield a theory and practice of deliberative participation relevant inter alia to small scale, externally-funded development projects for the destitute. These communities, as collective agents of their own development, must often make choices about what they ought to do. In addition to clarifying and evaluating what has happened in the past, they together may seek to overcome their differences with respect to ends and means. An ethically defensible way of doing so is by putting into practice—sometimes with the assistance of outsiders—an ideal of deliberative participation informed by deliberative democracy. Then the favored definition of participation will include the italicized addition to Alkire’s definition: “‘Participation’ refers to the process of discussion, information gathering,
conflict, [deliberation,] and eventual decision-making, implementation, and evaluation by the
group(s) directly affected by the activity” (Alkire, 2002, pp. 129, 283).

One way to strengthen Alkire’s approach becomes clear when it is compared with Fung
and Wright’s model of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) (Fung and Wright 2002).
EPG is more or less exemplified in Porto Alegre, Brazil’s “participatory budgeting,” Kerala,
India’s renovated panchayats, and Chicago, Illinois’s neighborhood school and police
associations. In this model, grassroots or neighborhood deliberative sites are both linked together
horizontally and are coordinated, monitored, and improved vertically by district-wide
intermediate bodies:

These central offices can reinforce the quality of local democratic deliberation in a
number of ways: coordinating and distributing resources, solving problems that local
units cannot address by themselves, rectifying pathological or incompetent decision-
making in failing groups, and diffusing innovations and learning across boundaries (Fung
and Wright, 2003, p. 21).

The functions of these municipal intermediate bodies are reiterated by a higher order
body that has “colonize[d] state power and transform[ed] formal governance institutions” (Fung
and Wright, 2003, p. 22). Some functions of Alkire’s donor institutions and facilitators, such as
funding and assessment, indeed have parallels in EPG. But EPG goes further. Funding, with few
strings attached, comes from the state government rather than from international or national
NGOs. Local (neighborhood) groups are not isolated from each other but send democratically
elected representatives to higher levels, and higher-levels in turn coordinate, monitor, and build

deliberative and other capacities in lower levels, including the capacity (and virtue) of accommodating the views of those with whom one disagrees. Resources, ideas, and skills are shared both horizontally and vertically in a comprehensive network of both direct and representative municipal government in which citizens and their elected representatives join nonvoting sector specialists in deliberating to solve common and practical problems. Majorities, the evidence tends to show, do not tyrannize minorities if and when all forge an agreement for effective action that at least partially embodies minority concerns and which almost all can accept.

**Objections**

Many criticisms have been launched against the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in general and against deliberative participation in local, national, and global development. Critics have charged, for example, that deliberative democracy is too rationalistic and orderly for the messy and passionate worlds of democratic politics and participatory development promotion, worlds that do not conform to the alleged tranquility of the philosophy seminar. Others have claimed that, in spite of protests to the contrary, deliberative democrats still think in terms of face-to-face and local group interactions and tend to see national deliberation as “one big meeting.” Still others have claimed that the ideal deliberators are those who ignore their own interests and grievances and ascend to an impossible and ethically undesirable realm of Rawlsian impartiality.

I think these particular criticisms have been or can be met. One way to do so is to defend a version of deliberative democracy designed to overcome problems found in earlier versions (Young, 2002, pp. 37-40, 44-47 and Mansbridge, 2003, 178-195). Another way is to look at

actual experiments in deliberative democracy and consider what the evidence shows. Empirical evidence often reveals that the allegedly bad effects of deliberative democracy in fact do not happen, happen much less than is supposed, or may be eliminated through better institutional designs.

Other criticisms or worries, however, continually surface among those sympathetic to the capability approach, deliberative democracy, or the convergence of the two currents on the ideal of deliberative participation. Let us state and evaluate three of these criticisms.¹³

**Asymmetry of Power and the Indeterminacy Objection**

The first critique assumes, as do Rawls, Sen, and most deliberative democrats, that economic, political, and, more generally, social power is distributed very unequally in the world. This asymmetry of power afflicts groups at all levels—local, national, and global. To ascribe unconstrained agency, autonomy, or self-determination to groups themselves is to guarantee that the asymmetries will be reproduced when the group decides and acts. Rather than mitigate let alone eliminate these power imbalances, deliberative institutions and procedures at best have no effect and at worst accentuate unacceptable inequalities. Unconstrained democratic bodies will perpetuate and even deepen minority suppression or traditional practices that violate human rights. People with elite educations and well-traveled families tend to excel in debate; men are often thought to be better deliberators or are permitted more speaking opportunities than women; and the poor, ill-educated, and newly arrived immigrant will lose out in what is supposed to be a fair interchange of reasons and proposals.

Instead of invoking democratic agency, the objection continues, what is needed is a prescriptive philosophical theory of the good life or human rights to be embodied in every
nation’s constitution. Some freedoms are good—for instance, freedom from rape and for sexual equality—and some are bad, for instance, freedom to exploit and rape. With constitutional mandates that protect human rights or good freedoms, democratic bodies will not reproduce power inequities but rather will ensure that the human capabilities, valuable freedoms, and human rights of all people, especially those with lesser social power, will be protected.

In the following lengthy passage, Martha Nussbaum makes this indeterminacy objection, assuming in her formulation not economic inequalities but gender inequalities:

[Sen and I have differed on the issue of] the importance of endorsing unequivocally a definite list of capabilities for international society.[note omitted] Like the international human rights movement, I am very definite about content, suggesting that a particular list of capabilities ought to be used to define a minimum level of social justice, and ought to be recognized and given something like constitutional protection in all nations. . . . Now of course some human rights instruments, or my capabilities list, might be wrong in detail, and that is why I have continually insisted that the list is a proposal for further debate and argument, not a confident assertion. But is it quite another thing to say that one should not endorse any definite content and should leave it up to democratic debate in each nation to settle content. . . . Sen’s opposition to the cultural defense of practices harmful to women seems to me to be in considerable tension with his all-purpose endorsement of capability as freedom [note omitted], his unwillingness to say that some freedoms are good and some bad, some important and some trivial.

When we think about violence against women, we see that democratic deliberation has done a bad job so far with this problem. . . . I view my work on the
capabilities list as allied to their [the international women’s movement] efforts, and I am puzzled about why definiteness about content in the international arena should be thought to be a pernicious inhibition of democratic deliberation, rather than a radical challenge to the world’s democracies to do their job better (Nussbaum, 2005, pp. 178-79; cf. Gould, 2004, pp. 31-42).14

I have four problems with Nussbaum’s argument. First, in comparing democratic decision making with a democracy constitutionally constrained by her list, she compares failures of “actually existing” democracies with alleged successes of democracies in which her list is not only constitutionally embodied but the constraints actually result in compliance with constitutional norms. This recalls the equally unfair comparison of ideal capitalism with actually-existing socialism (or the reverse). One can compare the ideal competitors with other ideal competitors or the actual social formations with “really existing” rivals but not actual democratic decision making with ideal list-informed constitutional democracies. It is important to observe that fine philosophical theories of justice and splendid constitutions do not—by themselves—guarantee that a society is just or law-abiding. Asymmetries of power can be just as inimical to the rule of philosophers or the rule of law, embodied for example in Supreme Court justices, as it is to rule by the people.

Second, I fully endorse Nussbaum’s challenge to democracies to “do a better job.” But one way to do so is that they become more robust democracies, ones that are more inclusive, tackle rather than duck important issues, and both offer opportunities for and promote higher quality of citizen participation. It is not quite right to say that the only solution to a defect in democracy is more and better democracy. Nondeliberative and even nondemocratic methods
sometimes may be used to bring about or protect a democracy as such, and deliberative
democracy in particular. We deliberative democrats, however, have good reason to believe that it is precisely in making democracies more democratic—along the dimensions of participant inclusiveness, range of issues addressed and institutions democratized, depth of citizen participation, and effectiveness (Crocker, forthcoming)—that democracies are most likely to make decisions that provide the very protections, including that of minorities, which Nussbaum rightly deems important. As Sen reminds us, both agency (the process aspect of freedoms) and capability (the opportunity aspect of freedom) are intrinsically important, and each can contribute to the other. The importance of promoting and protecting well-being freedoms should not, however, weaken our commitment to the at least equal importance of fair agency freedom and achievement (Sen, 1999, pp. 17, 285, 290-92; 2004, pp. 230-38).

Third, Nussbaum’s “constitutionalism” gives insufficient weight to the role that
democratic deliberation plays in the formation, interpretation, and change of constitutions. Although constitutional conventions, and the larger public discussion of which they are a part, involve much power politics—interest-based politicking, lobbying, bargaining, and negotiation—such conventions also illustrate the very deliberative features captured in the model of deliberative democracy. Moreover, although more or less difficult to alter, constitutional democracies have procedures for constitutional amendments. Finally, although Nussbaum leaves ample room for a democratic body “specifying” her list, this exercise would not be sufficiently robust. It does not permit, as it should, a democratic body deciding that in its particular situation personal security is more important (right now) than health care (or vice versa). Democratic bodies, at whatever level, must often decide not merely between good and bad but also between good and good in particular situations. And, in contrast to courts, legislators have responsibilities

not only to decide policy priorities but also to fund them. To block all trade-offs within her list, is not only to limit the agency of democratic citizens, but also to prohibit them achieving increments of good in those situations where all good things do not go together.

Nussbaum repeatedly argues that since the items on her list are incommensurable (which I accept), they cannot be traded off (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 81 and 2006, pp. 174-76; cf. Deneulin, 2005, p. 88). The conclusion, however, does not follow from the premise. Just because love of life and love of country are incommensurable, it does not follow that the Moroccan deciding whether or not to escape severe privation in his homeland cannot—when he cannot have both—decide for one good (more opportunity in Spain) rather than the other (being part of his family and country). Given insufficiency of resources, governments must choose among or prioritize various goods, such as health care and lower taxes. It is not that more of one good makes up for or compensates for less of the other, but that we often cannot have two good things at the same time and must choose between them.

As United States Supreme Court justice Stephen Breyer argued in Active Liberty (2005), it is precisely because of the importance of self-determination that the U.S. constitution devolves a certain range of decisions (and resources to implement them) to state or municipal democratic bodies. Similarly, outside funders, such as Oxfam in Alkire’s cases, often provide the resources and then require that local development projects make their own decisions on their ends and means.

A fourth problem with Nussbaum’s statement of the “indeterminacy objection” relates to her assumption about the respective roles of normative theorizing, constitutions, and democratic decision-making. Nussbaum has changed her list over the years, often responding to criticism. And she says about her current list that she puts it forward not as a “confident assertion” but as
“a proposal for further debate and argument.” Yet, she continues to propose that (something like) her list will be enshrined more or less intact in constitutions, which then, should be the new touchstones of normative correctness. It is better, I submit, to resist the impulse to absolutize any of the three—normative theory, political constitutions, and democratic bodies. Rather, we should see them in ongoing dialectical tension and mutual criticism. For each can make serious mistakes, and each can be improved by listening to the other. Nussbaum hit the right note when she self-describes her list as “a proposal for debate.” Such debate should take place among and between constitutional framers, judges, and democratic bodies at all levels. Constitutional advances, like democratic experiments, can in turn correct the one-sidedness of normative theorizing.

It might be argued that neither Nussbaum’s criticism of democracy (without a constitutionally enshrined list) nor my four replies confront a deeper problem with democracy. Democratic bodies—whether or not constitutionally constrained (Nussbaum) and whether or not inclusive, wide-ranging, deep, and effective—can make unjust decisions, ones inimical to the well-being of minorities or even majorities. The notion of agency might be taken to imply that everybody, including slave-owners or white racists, could do whatever they wanted and not be constrained by a commitment to the well-being of others. Democracy is but a tool to effect justice in the world, and when it fails to do so it must be criticized in the light of the intrinsically good end of justice.

It is true that the democrat is not only committed to agency as intrinsically good and as expressed in democratic procedures but also to reduction of injustice. She believes that one good way—but not the only way—to promote and protect everyone’s well being freedom is by an inclusive, deliberative, and effective governance structure based on the equal agency freedom of...
all. Robustly democratic institutions are venues in which both free and equal citizens express their agency through a fair process. This process is not fair if some are excluded from participating or if the minority (or majority) does not accommodate both the agency and concerns of the majority (or minority). The solution is often to improve the democratic body along one or more of the dimensions of breadth, range, depth, or control. For instance, citizen petitioning of officials or nondeliberative protests might be more effective than deliberation in influencing decisions. Better ways may be found to ensure that power asymmetries are more effectively neutralized and that everyone has voice.

Yet democracy, while intrinsically good, is not everything; and sometimes democrats concerned with justice will have to by-pass or suspend it to prevent or remove some great injustice. It does not follow that we need a theory of justice or a philosophical list of capabilities or entitlements to tell us when to choose well-being outcomes over agency-expressing democratic process. And the choice of justice over democracy is or itself should be an expression of agency (rather than someone else’s choice). What follows, rather, is that our commitments to both equal agency freedom and equal well-being freedom for all should lead us to criticize democratic processes both when they fail to be sufficiently democratic and when they fail to deliver on their promise of justice.

The Autonomy Objection

The autonomy criticism criticizes both Sen’s democratic turn and deliberative participation because they allegedly impose on a community a rigid, autonomy-threatening model of democratic and deliberative aims, ideals, processes, and virtues. What if a society would rather keep to its past traditions of hierarchical decision making rather than democratic decision making.
based on an assumption of free and equal citizens? What if a local community decides to reject outside development assistance if and when this assistance is tied to inclusive deliberation? If we genuinely embrace Sen’s ideal of agency and deliberative democracy’s ideal of being in charge of one’s own (collective) life, should we not respect a group’s decision to be nondemocratic and even anti-democratic? Should not we respect what political theorist William A. Galston calls the group’s “expressive liberty” to choose and live a communal life that prizes obedience to top-down authority (Galston, 2002, pp. 28-29).

There are two responses to this argument, both of which presuppose the value of agency. The first response challenges the assumption that everyone in the group is in agreement with the “will” or “decision” of the group (Sen, 1999, pp. 241-42). In fact it may be that an elite has decided on hierarchical rule and has imposed that decision through force, fear, manipulation, or custom on the remaining members of the community. It should not be assumed that this elite, which is well-served by hierarchical practices, speaks for everyone. Moreover, the only way that it could be known whether everyone freely agreed with leaders or the culture of obedience, would be for people to have the real chance to decide for themselves and engage with their fellows in public discussion on the merits of different forms of governance. Part of an individual’s having the freedom to decide for or against the nondemocratic way of life would be having information about alternatives and being able, if she chose, to exercise critical scrutiny of claims and counter claims. Some features of democracy, then, would be necessary for a people (and not just their leaders) freely to decide to reject democratic freedom and deliberation.

The second response bites the bullet and accepts that most members of a group knowingly, voluntarily, and freely decide to reject democracy and deliberative participation. Those members who disagree should be aware of --and critically able to assess—alternatives and
have the right and the means to exit from the nondemocratic group (Reich, 2002). And
democratic groups should have a duty to give them refuge and a new life. What about those who
decided to stay and continued in oppose democratic and deliberative modes? I think the only
consistent answer for the defender of agency is to accept this decision (as long as it was not
imposed and takes place in the conditions just sketched). Not only would it be disrespectful of
agency for outsiders to impose (deliberative) democracy on an unwilling people, but it would
also be futile.17 There might be some suspicion, of course, that conditions for a free choice really
had not be satisfied—that people were still being forced or conditioned to accept nonfreedom.
But at some point, reasonable doubt should be satisfied. Then the proponent of autonomy
regretfully respects the group members’ autonomous choice no longer to exercise their agency.
The leaders, presumably, accept the will of the people and agree to stay in charge.

This second response is also the basis for answering the specific objection that
democracy is incompatible with autonomy. More specifically, this version of the autonomy
objection argues that public discussion, which Sen endorses, violates autonomy, and so does—
even more so—deliberative democracy’s package of aims, ideals, four-stage procedure, and
citizen virtues. Freedom is infringed because people are not permitted to exercise their moral and
political freedom in ways that seem best to them. Sen, so the objection goes, is imposing public
discussion on people. Deliberative democrats are forcing people to participate in inclusive, wide-
ranging, deep, and inclusive democracy. The autonomy criticism sounds like the little boy who
plaintively asked his “free school” teacher in 1970: “Do we have to do whatever we want to do
again today?” “Do we,” asked the autonomy critic, “have to engage in public discussion and
democratic deliberation if we choose not to?”

David A. Crocker. “Deliberative Participation in Local Development,” Journal of Human
Again, the answer is: “No, you don’t have to, but this option is open to you.” Similarly, to decide to accept the aims, ideals, procedures and virtues of deliberative democracy is not an abrogation of freedom as long as one has other options, of which one is aware, and one (or the group) makes its own decisions to embrace, modify, or reject deliberative democracy. The point is illustrated by the decision to compose within the musical blues tradition. One is not forced to compose or sing the blues. Other musical genres are available. Once one uses her freedom to be a bluesman or blueswoman, however, there are certain blues conventions that composer-performers from Robert Johnson and Bessie Smith to B. B. King have observed. Freedom goes further, however, for the blues composer, instrumentalist, or vocalist can creatively modify and supplement the blues format. Likewise, deliberative democrats offer their model not as something to impose on groups, but as something they have putative reason freely to accept and modify as they see fit.

It should not be thought, however, that (deliberative) democracy is or should be continually “up for grabs” in a functioning (deliberative) democracy (in contrast to a society aspiring to such a democracy). Just as a blues ensemble may perform more or less habitually within the contours of its musical idiom, so a democratic group’s commitments can crystallize as “habits of the heart.” Yet blues musicians and democratic citizens also should be ready to renew their practices when they are threatened and enrich them when they grow stale.

Deliberative democrats may sometimes have good reasons to reject or postpone rather than employ deliberative and other democratic methods. Employing deliberation may sometimes be too costly with respect to other values, such as non-domination or group solidarity. The women in Alkire’s micro-development projects may decide collectively to defer to one of their leaders. To decide autonomously not to express group agency in deliberation is itself a
manifestation of agency or autonomy. The problem for both Sen and the deliberative democrats comes when someone, a tyrant or jefe máximo, or something else, an unscrutinized tradition or the “force of circumstance,” makes the decision for the group. Then the group is not in charge of its own life, and individual and group agency has been sacrificed.

**The Realism Objection**

Many people respond initially to the ideals of robust democracy in general and deliberative participation in particular. They end up rejecting the latter, however, because it is too utopian or “idealistic,” too much concerned with “what ought to be” and too far removed from “actual world conditions” (Deneulin, 2005, p. 81). Deliberative democrats must take this objection very seriously, but I believe it can be answered. Let us initially make a distinction between two versions of the realist objection, both of which appeal—as did the indeterminacy critique—to the premise of asymmetry of economic, political or social power. One criticism says that due to power asymmetries, it will be impossible to advance from our present unjust world of thin democracies to the symmetric conditions presupposed by robust democracy. The other version says that even if deliberative democracy or participation were somehow established it would soon reinforce and even deepen power imbalances.

The most effective refutation of the impossibility version of the realist objection is to point to actually existing deliberative institutions. It is surprising how rarely self-described realists examine the actual world that they hold up as a touchstone for normative truth. If they did, they would find that there are hosts of deliberative institutions around the world. It is true that many of these are at the neighborhood or city level, although Kerala’s renovated Panchayat system functions in an Indian state of 40 million people. It is also the case that many of these
institutions are fairly recent, and should be termed experiments rather than sustained institutions. Moreover, much more research is needed about what sorts of impact these institutions have had on people’s lives and their surrounding societies (Levine, Fung, and Gastil, 2005, pp. 271---86, especially 280---81). Finally, the efforts to democratize existing democracies and development practices vary with respect to how well they realize the goals of an inclusive, wide-ranging, and deep, and effective democracy.

We do know enough, however, to challenge both versions of the realist objection. Some democratic innovation, especially those in Kerala and Brazil, are redistributing both power and opportunities. Moreover, we are learning ways to improve democratic practice so that new institutions more fully approximate the ideal. The ideal is something to guide action and remedy shortcomings not an impossible dream.

The lessons learned through the hundreds of innovative democratic practices around the world also provide lessons for how to get from a thinly democratic and unjust world to a more deliberative and just world. Here Archon Fung’s recent (2005) work is particularly instructive. Fung distinguishes between deliberative and nondeliberative methods for advancing the goals of deliberative democracy. And he distinguishes two very different sorts of obstacles, each of which comes in degrees, to the realization of these goals, (i) unwillingness to deliberate, and (ii) inequality.

Where members of a group are more or less willing to deliberate, they often find institutional designs for improving the quality of deliberation. These devices are most successful when group members are similar and relatively equal, as was the case with Alkire’s three communities. The arrangements, however, are also effective—if there is willingness to deliberate—in overcoming inequality of various sorts. For example, participants in a deliberative
exercise may be randomly selected or invited from underrepresented groups. Seats for women or historically discriminated groups are set aside in assemblies. Skilled facilitators fairly distribute chances to participate in deliberative give and take. Agreed upon rules give women, junior members, or those who have not yet spoken, the right to participate first or next. Higher level structures “capacitate” members of lower level groups, monitoring and improving their deliberative skills. Deliberative exercises provide information on the issues to less informed or less educated participants. These arrangements, whether employed in setting up or improving a democratic body and whether used in groups with unequal or equal members, all presuppose that group members are of good will and willing to deliberate.

To meet the realist objection more adequately, however, Fung considers cases where there is both significant unwillingness (and even hostility) to deliberate and inequality among group members. Under these circumstances he wisely rejects two options. Deliberative democrats should not foolishly use deliberative methods when they have no chance of working any more than a proponent of reasoned persuasion should try to reason with a crazed and knife-wielding killer. Neither should deliberative democrats go to the other extreme and indiscriminately use any and all nondeliberative method to work for a more deliberative society. Those methods not only include the legal staples of power politics – logrolling, lobbying, clientalism, public shaming—but also illegal methods such as “dirty tricks,” vote stealing, bribes, and worse.

The deliberative democrat seeking to advance the prospects of deliberative democracy in an unjust world may choose nondeliberative methods but only when he (i) initially acts on the rebuttable presumption that those opposing deliberation are sincere, (ii) reasonably exhausts deliberative methods, (iii) limits nondeliberative or nondemocratic means by a principle of
proportionality, analogous to a proportionality principle in justification of civil disobedience. The more extreme the hostility to deliberative democracy and the more entrenched are power asymmetries, the more justified are political agitation, mobilization, and even coercive means, such as political pressure and public shaming. Just as the person engaging in an act of civil disobedience is willing to be arrested and tried, rather than flee the law (because he is protesting one law or policy and not the rule of law), so the deliberative democrat in an unjust world limits how far he goes in pursuing his goal. What Fung has given deliberative democrats is not only a model of deliberative democracy that indicates how unjust and undemocratic structures can be transformed. He has also provided a compelling “political ethic” that clarifies “how it is possible to work for deliberative democracy in the face of inequality and hostility without being a political fool” (Fung, 2005, p. 416).

Acknowledgements

This article is an adaptation of (Crocker, forthcoming, Ch. 10). I first articulated these ideas in my contribution to a World Bank project, which I co-directed with Sabina Alkire, entitled “Responding to the Values of the Poor: Participation and Aspiration.” I gave versions of the paper at the World Bank, St. Joseph’s University; Fundación Nueva Generación Argentina, Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Argentina; Michigan State University; the University of Maryland, and at the 2006 HDCA conference at the University of Groningen. I received valuable comments from Sabina Alkire, Jay Drydyk, Verna Gehring, Douglas Grob, Laura Antkowiak Hussey, Judith Lichtenberg, Christopher Morris, Joe Oppenheimer, Henry Richardson, and two anonymous referees.
Notes

1. For the purposes of this paper I shall assume that different sorts of participation in decision making are among the ways in which members of a group are empowered but that there are also nonparticipatory modes of empowerment, such as access to credit or market information.


3. In (Nickel, 2005, p. 211), James W. Nickel briefly discusses the nature and importance the right of citizens to petition governments and the related “duty of governments to receive and consider petitions.”

4. Agarwal calls this mode “activity-specific participation” (2001), but I believe my term better captures the idea that the elites decide on the plan and strategy and the nonelite make only tactical decisions.

5. For a defense of bargaining with the state, with the community, and within the family, see Agarwal (2001, pp.18-22). For a fairly sharp distinction between bargaining and deliberation based on the former’s prudent motivation and latter’s desire to justify one views to others, see Gutmann and Thompson (1996, pp.52-63, 349-50; 2004, pp. 113-15, 148-49). There are, of course, various models of both bargaining and negotiation, some of which include a deliberative component rather than exclude it altogether. Moreover, a group may deliberately decide to bargain, and its bargaining then may be a means to achieve eventual deliberation. In future work I intend to clarify the relations between and assess the respective merits of different models of bargaining, negotiating, and deliberating.


7. Citing Nicholas Van de Walle (2005, p.67), Easterly identifies a less inadvertent kind of ventriloquism: Although the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund no longer impose certain conditions on loans to poor countries and listen to what the poor country plans to do with the loan, the effect is the same: “So the poor-country governments, instead of being told what to do, are now trying to guess what the international agencies will approve their doing” (Easterly, 2006, p. 146).

8. I own this important point to an anonymous reviewer.

9. Nussbaum does allow that a community may contest and remake items on the list, but her list is meant to have a prescriptive and peremptory force.

10. Italics in Alkire’s text.

11. Deepa Narayan and colleagues note that the investigations, which issued in the three volumes, Voices of the Poor, often failed in their moral obligations to share the results of their studies with the people whom they investigated (Narayan, Chambers, Shah, and Petesch, 2000, pp. 16-18).

12. Iris Marion Young helpfully analyzes and evaluates these and other objections (Young, 2000, pp. 36-51).

13. In Crocker (forthcoming, Ch.10), I also try to answer what I call the “inequality objection,” a critique that challenges the agency-focused capability approach and deliberative democracy on the basis that its strong egalitarian and democratic commitments are unlikely to be shared by most people.

14. The quotation omits two of Nussbaum’s footnotes that refer, respectively, to Nussbaum (2003) and Sen (1999).

15. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

16. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution defines health as both a right of all citizens and the responsibility of the state to provide it through its Unified Health System (SUS), and in turn the SUS “introduced the notion of accountability (controle social) and popular participation” and “stated that the health system had to be democratically governed and that the participation of civil society in policymaking was fundamental for attaining its democratization” (Schattan, Coelho, Pozzoni, and Montoyo, 2005, 176).

17. An anonymous reviewer reminded me of this important point.
References


