A Third Exemplar

Carlos Eloy Viteri Gualinga is an exemplary insider-outsider in several ways. A Kichwa born in a small community in the Ecuadorian Amazon, he is the first person from Latin America’s numerous indigenous communities to hold a position in a multilateral institution. In his current post in the unit on Social Development of the Indigenous People in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in Washington, DC, Viteri is able both to represent indigenous concerns to his Washington, DC colleagues and identify IDB opportunities for indigenous communities. To earn a degree in anthropology, he wrote a thesis, "Sumak Kausai: A Practical Answer Development," which interpreted—for the Ecuadorian academic and policy community—the relevance of the Kichwa view of development. Mediating between the Ladino y indigenous communities, Viteri has been a columnist in a national Ecuadorian newspaper and director of a radio program that transmits from the town of Puyo to villages throughout the Amazon region. Initially an outsider in both Quito and Washington, DC, he has had the unique opportunity to contribute to better Ecuadorian and IDB policy and to help his indigenous compañeros take advantage of development opportunities and improve their own lives.
Global Ethics, Global Community, and Global Citizenship

Insider-outsiders in development ethics have responsibilities beyond doing moral reflection in and for their own and other groups. Without abandoning their own cultural substance, international development ethicists need to help further a global community and a global ethic. Such ethicists should extend their national, ethnic, class, and gender identities to a global “we.” Insofar as such a world community does not exist, it needs to be built. Insofar as it does exist, it needs to be strengthened. To guide in these tasks, as well as to help in the crossing of cultural boundaries and engaging in cross-cultural dialogue, a global ethic is required.

This global ethic would not be a total ethic for a Gemeinschaft but rather a “moral minimum,” a basic moral charter, with which most people of good will could agree, for a global Gesellschaft. It would be what Rawls calls an “overlapping consensus,” a public and publicly-forged moral vision to which persons and groups with a variety of moral, metaphysical, and religious views could have allegiance. It would draw on and partially be embodied in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. It would provide protection for the vulnerable wherever they exist. It would respect each group’s prima facie right to hammer out its own ethics and yet respect each individual’s right to run her own life. In the words of Ghanian-American philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, “a tenable global ethics [in Appiah’s words] has to temper a respect for difference with a respect for the freedom of actual human beings to make their own
A global ethics would give all people a common vocabulary for coping with global problems that refuse to respect national or other boundaries, as well as for resolving problems among and within nations and regions. It would guide people from around the world as they wrestle with the issue of what sort of global institutions would be good to have. These global norms and institutions are important because not only do they contribute to and partially constitute global progress, but they also can promote useful regional, national, and local development.

Although to develop the idea here is beyond the scope of this chapter, I suspect that this global ethic will converge on some general cross-cultural ethical categories related in some way to certain general cross-cultural human traits and experiences that take specific forms in particular cultures. And development ethicists are clearer today than they were twenty years ago that this ethical convergence must include a vision of basic human needs, capabilities, agency, and rights, a nuanced, multi-level concept of moral obligations, an ethical conception of national development, and a model of a just global order.

Like most good things, such a global community and global ethic could go bad; for rich and powerful states and transnational corporations could (self-deceptively) extend their domination precisely by packaging a merely rhetorical global ethic that celebrates national differences and self-determination; rejects misery, oppression, and environmental degradation; and yet behind the protection of such an ethic carries on business as usual. In contrast, we need to go beyond rhetoric to what Dewey called institutional and habitual “reconstruction.”
need to modify existing national and international institutions and create new ones that would exemplify and effectively support such an ethic. If we are to save ourselves from global economic, ecological, and cultural disasters, our answers will need to be a good deal more robust than Rorty’s model of a global Kuwaiti bazaar surrounded by exclusive national private clubs.

Such a global ethic neither eliminates nor always trumps the ethics of our narrower groups, any more than our emerging global community extinguishes or overrides groups of narrower scope. Rather, a transnational ethic both requires and is required by the ethics of local, national, and regional groups. Each can and should be a seedbed for, and corrective, of the others. The international moral minimum can both be inspired by and nurtured from good and exportable ideas invented by particular groups. In turn, the global ethic can be a basis for criticizing and improving the outlooks and practices of particular traditions. Slavery as institution and ideal is almost a thing of the past; gender inequality is under attack throughout the world; respect for basic needs or rights and the environment are rapidly emerging as part of a global vision. Calls increase for global agencies and policies that would redistribute income and wealth from the global rich (individuals and nations) to the global poor. Social movements and global institutions are seeking governance processes that are fairer and more democratic. National development models, informed by a societal ethic, must be forged in relation to regional and global development models informed by a global ethic. Regardless of where good ideals originate, they can move us as world citizens; and we can apply them as members of particular groups.
This is not to say that there will not be clashes between global and narrower loyalties. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, we have no algorithm to adjudicate these conflicts. One of our hopes rests in the increasing number of insiders-outsiders (in relation to groups of various scope) and global citizens engaged in ongoing moral dialogue about good local, national, regional, and global development.

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i. Ferdinand Tönnies, in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887) distinguished a *Gemeinschaft*, an organic “community in which individuals are bound in mutually supportive solidarity,” from a *Gesellschaft*, a “society,” understood as a collection of self-interested individuals bound by social contract or the rule of law. See Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, ed., Jose Harris, trans., Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Tecnos, 1986); Thomas Donaldson, “Moral Minimums for Multinationals,”

*Ethics & International Affairs* 3 (1989), 163---82.

iii. Appiah, “Toward a New Cosmopolitanism,” 52.
