In the first chapter I discussed the aims and trajectory of development ethics and my own participation in this new field. In the last chapter I charted the commitments, areas of consensus, controversies, and challenges facing development ethicists in the early 21st century. In the present chapter I clarify further the tasks and methods of development ethics by situating them in the context of what I call “development theory-practice.”

Before clarifying what I mean by this term and its various ethical and non-ethical components, it will be helpful to provide two examples of moral critique, ethical analysis of policy goals, and ethical norms or principles as they emerge in actual moral dialogue about development. How do development scholars and practitioners—as well as academic ethicists—appeal to ethical norms in evaluating the present, resolving ethical controversies, and envisaging a better future? Sometimes the norms are left unanalyzed; sometimes they are consciously scrutinized. Almost always they are linked to other components, to be analyzed in later sections of this chapter, of a specific development theory-practice. In the examples of ethical assessment and debate that follow, I also take

up some of these substantive issues, especially as they apply to Costa Rica, and try to make headway in resolving them.

**Development Ethics in Action**

As the first example of the practice of development ethics, consider the following 1987 interview in which a Costa Rican journalist questions the Brazilian development scholar Theotonio Dos Santos: “In accordance with the social, political, and economic conditions of Latin America, what would be the ideal development model in order to be able to surpass this stage of underdevelopment and dependency?”

Not satisfied with a negative critique of Latin American underdevelopment and its dependency on rich nations or the international market, Dos Santos set forth the following vision of positive development:

We would have to develop ourselves [*desarrollarnos*] resolutely toward the satisfaction of the necessities of the population in addition to production for the internal and regional market. We also must increase investments in education, nutrition, health, transportation, that is, those things that attend to the basic needs of the population and that generate employment. Moreover, we should increase investment capability linked to a planned economic process. In the same way, we should disassociate ourselves from the maxim of the world market and the international economy—not totally, but as much as we can. . . . An economy turned topsy-turvy [*volcada*] towards
exports is, in the conditions in which we live, an economy of debt, the exporting of surpluses, and the accentuation of dependency.3

An important aspect of my own work in the late 1980s on Costa Rica had been to evaluate the theoretical assumptions—both normative and non-normative—and practical consequences of a development perspective that stresses, as does that of Dos Santos, basic human needs or basic capabilities.4 I argued that securing for each Costa Rican the internal ability and external opportunity for a good human life should be “the moral minimum” of Costa Rican development. I adopted US philosopher Henry Shue’s account of “moral minimum” as: “The lower limits on tolerable conduct, individual and institutional . . . the least every person can demand and the least that every person, every government, and every corporation must be made to do.”5

In Chapter 4, I evaluate Amartya Sen’s argument that a basic-needs approach in development for the 1990’s should be updated, reformulated, and deepened by an emphasis on “capabilities.” I argue that Sen overstated the differences between the languages of basic needs and basic capabilities and that the idea of basic needs is needed to supplement the idea of basic capabilities.

Regardless of the outcome of this debate, Costa Rica, I argued at the close of the 1980s, should design and implement its development policies and institutions in order to satisfy people's basic needs and capabilities for physical well-being, social well-being, and political participation. I argued, however, that this principle ought to be supplemented and balanced by at least two other principles: respect for nature and democratic self-determination. In the present volume, I return to the norm of democratic
self-determination and Dos Santos’s notion of “self-development” and—particularly in Chapters 6 and 9—explain it in relation to my interpretation of Sen’s ideal of agency.

Today, we also see development ethics in action in the debate about different ways to clarify the relation between good development and the conserving or preserving natural resources, biodiversity, and wilderness. Compare the rival long-range visions offered by philosopher J. Baird Callicott in 1986 and journalist Nicholas D. Kristof in 2004. Callicott’s vision of a development-conservation balance calls for more bears and fewer people:

Surely we can envision an eminently livable, modern, systemic, civilized technological society well adapted to and at peace and in harmony with its organic environment. . . . Is our current mechanical technological civilization the only one imaginable? . . . Isn’t it possible to envision, for example, a human civilization based upon nonpolluting solar energy for domestic use, manufacturing and transportation and small-scale, soil-conserving organic agriculture? There would be fewer things and more services, information, and opportunities for aesthetic and recreational activities; fewer people and more bears; fewer parking lots and more wilderness.6

In a lengthy but fascinating passage, Kristof offers an alternative to both Callicott’s vision (less “development” and more preservation) and George W. Bush’s
outlook (more “development” and less conservation) and urges policies for non-wealthy people to enjoy bears in their (the bears’, not the people’s) own habitat:

A focus on the American environmental movement has been conservation, and that’s why there is such rage at the Bush administration’s efforts to log, mine or drill patches of wilderness from the Arctic to Florida. President Bush has done more than any other recent president to shift our environmental balance away from conservation and toward development. . . .

Yet the environmental movement is wrong to emphasize preservation for the sake of the wolves and the moose alone. We should preserve wilderness for our sake—to remind us of our scale on this planet, to humble us, to soothe us. Nothing so civilizes humans as the wild.

That means that we not only have to preserve wilderness, but we also must get more people into it. It’s great that we have managed to save the Artic National Wildlife Refuge. But virtually the only visitors who get to enjoy it are super-wealthy tourists who charter airplanes to fly into remote airstrips.

So how about a hiking trail from Artic Village going north to the Brooks Range, allowing many more people to enjoy the refuge? How about polar bear ecotourism in Kaktovik? Why not democratize the chance to hear wolves howl or be menaced by grizzlies?
It is possible to combine the insights but reject certain aspects of both Callicott’s and Kristof’s visions. Instead of identifying “development,” as does Kristof, with unregulated economic growth (“logging, mining, and drilling”), there is good reason to reconceive it as economic and political processes that expand important human capabilities and freedoms. Like Callicott, one can envisage human institutions in peaceful and mutually beneficial interaction with the natural world. Unlike Callicott, however, one can emphasize not only that civilized institutions leave a reduced footprint on the natural world but also that these institutions provide opportunities for all to enjoy substantive freedoms. And among those freedoms, which Kristof affirms but Callicott ignores, is that of having real access to wilderness and benefiting from it. Ecotourism is a proven way to provide urban dwellers and other visitors this opportunity while at the same time expanding the capabilities of indigenous forest dwellers themselves. Appropriate ecotourism would exclude enterprises that outsiders own and control and whose profits flow out of the region. The best ecotourist companies are locally owned and operated. Their profits stay local. They emphasize environmental education and sustainable development. They are sensitive to the land’s “carrying capacity” and recognize that too many visitors will harm local ecosystems and endanger future ecotourism. Good development means the expansion of valuable opportunities for all, which arguably include income-generating work as well as the enjoyment of wild areas.

I also argued in the late 1980s (and continue to argue now) for a principle of self-determination or agency, a principle absent in the both the Callicott and Kristof passages quoted above. Democratic institutions and citizen participation are crucially important when a society seeks to balance—when they clash—ethical commitments to reduce
poverty as well as to protect the environment. More generally, I argue in Part Four, democratic institutions provide a society with a method of weighing, balancing, and prioritizing clashing goods and incommensurable demands.

A conception of Costa Rican development informed by this principle of self-determination requires, I argued in the late 1980s, a network of grass-roots communities that practice democratic self-management and scale-up to deepen Costa Rica’s representative democracy. Costa Rica, justly famous for its tradition of representative democracy, has been described as a test case for democracy in a developing society where “demands tend to outrun resources, achievements to lag behind expectations and promises, and class conflicts to increase.” I defended the view, however, that Costa Rica, if it is to pass this test, must evolve toward a more participative as well as representative democracy. This democratic vision that seemed right for tiny Costa Rica in the late 1980s is one that I now believe has global reach. The conception of democracy and deliberative participation, which I work out in more detail in later chapters, is also the basis for my view that a society’s democratic bodies should decide on the nature and balance of society’s development principles and goals.

The Very Idea of a Development Theory-Practice

These two examples of development ethics in action illustrate how development ethics, as moral assessment of the ends and means of societal change, has connection with science, policy formation, and institution building. In the last chapter, I identified the questions that this ethical inquiry seeks to answer, some agreed upon answers, and some
remaining controversies as well as obstacles. My aim now is to show that one should morally evaluate development as an integral aspect of what I call a “development theory-practice.”

A development theory-practice is a more or less integrated totality composed of the following components: (A) ethical and other normative assumptions; (B) scientific and philosophical assumptions, (C) development goals, (D) scientific or empirical understanding, (E) policy options and recommendations, (F) critique, and (G) development activities and institutions. As Hegel said, “first distinguish and then unite.”10 The present essay successively analyzes and shows the (ideal) relations among each of these “moments” of “development theory-practice.” Figure 1 schematizes the components from the most abstract (A and B) at the top of the figure to the most concrete (G) at the bottom. The double horizontal lines indicate the distinction between theory (whether normative or empirical) and practice. The activity of critique is rooted in both theory and practice. The boxes on the left side of the figure express predominately normative considerations, the boxes on the right side indicate largely non-normative or empirical considerations, and the boxes located in the middle embody both normative and the empirical. The activity of critique, rooted in both theory and practice, is on the figures left side for critique evaluates the past and present and prescribes what ought to be.
It must be emphasized that neither Figure 1's spatial order nor the sequence of my presentation indicates a temporal or one-way justificatory relation among the elements as they actually occur. Sometimes we think first and then act on the basis of our ideas.
Sometimes we revise and correct our abstract ideas on the basis of concrete judgments that are part of or follow from our concrete actions. The more abstract elements are often appealed to in order to justify the more concrete ones. But abstractions can, and I would argue should, also be generated from, tested by, and revised in the light of concrete experiences, exemplars and practices. Consequently, the solid vertical lines in Figure 1 have arrowheads at both ends. Moreover, because I reject sharp and permanent “fact/value” and “empirical/normative” distinctions, the horizontal broken lines signify a reciprocal influence between the normative, on the left side, and the non-normative, on the right. To say that facts and values, or empirical and ethical claims, are not completely separate is neither to say that they are identical nor that it is never worth trying to distinguish them. However, making this distinction is important because it helps us, on the one hand, uncover value assumptions that masquerade as facts or, on the other hand, justify beliefs about what actions we should take.

The spatial separation of the boxes in Figure 1 not only reflects analytic distinctions but also permits or makes concessions to some professional division of labor. Perhaps Mario Bunge is right when he assumes that many people largely work in only one “box.” But, in contrast to Bunge, I would argue that many people live and work in various roles or activities at the same time or change—quickly or gradually—from one to the other.

Figure 1's components, then, are distinguishable aspects of a more fundamental reality: the theory-practice of development. When we engage in this activity or field, we do different but related things. When we analyze and assess our own or another
development theory-practice, we should expect to find the following components—although some may be implicit, implied, or incomplete and all will be interconnected in a complex but not seamless web. In this chapter, although I sometimes exemplify the general analysis with reference to my own work, I take no stand on which is the best development theory-practice. But neither is my analysis of the generic structure of such complexes ethically neutral. My general model will imply that some specific development theory-practices are better than others insofar as they explicitly include and successfully integrate the various components. Let us now consider the nature and relations of each element.

**Scientific Understanding**

Development researchers and investigative reporters seek to understand (in box D) development and underdevelopment as both processes and outcomes. They describe happenings and structures, interpret what these phenomena mean, and try to explain them. Investigators want to understand why nations are “developed,” “undeveloped,” or “developing.” For example, which of the following are (always, sometimes) preconditions for or obstacles to (good) development: capital savings and investment, capitalist (or socialist) ownership of the means of production, class struggle, unions, cooperatives, the (democratic) state, transnational corporations, international lending agencies, and the global economic order?

Scientific understanding is pursued on various levels of generality. There are development studies of economic development as such as well as of developing countries, Latin America, Central America, Costa Rica, and the Talamanca region of
Costa Rica. Some investigate the causal mechanisms that led to the failure to realize models popular in the past: for example, the 18th century political model of constitutional democracy or the 19-20th century economic model of export-led growth and comparative advantage. Some try to explain why the import substitution model of the 1960's and 1970's resulted in a “new dependency.” Others identify obstacles that block the realization of new, alternative visions of development. The conservative columnist and Cuban exile Carlos Montaner, repeating what W.W. Rostow had argued twenty six years earlier, provides a good example of the latter:

The poorest countries of the world are those that trade least and have fewest ties to the economic and financial network of the planet's leading nations. In Haiti, in Bolivia, in Bangladesh or in Ethiopia there is hardly any foreign capital that exploits the citizens of these countries. In the developed world, in contrast, every nation energetically fights to be exploited by foreign investors. We in Latin America cannot give ourselves the luxury of continuing to insist on the intimidating revolutionary language that blames entrepreneurs, industrialists, or financiers for the poverty of a country. It is just the opposite: if our countries are not richer, it is because there are not enough entrepreneurs, industrialists, agriculturists or financiers. What we ought to promote is not reproach but applause for those capable of accumulating wealth; for development is impossible without savings that can be converted into investments.
To decide whether Montaner is right about his claims that savings are a necessary condition for development, one has not only to understand events in the world but also how Montaner is using the term “development.” Hence, investigations of the causes of and obstacles to development are conceptual as well as empirical. It is often important to define and justify—or at least indicate how one is using—the concepts of development and underdevelopment as well as gather and interpret phenomena and find their causes.

What we find in development research is not just differences in data sets but also a profusion of perspectives with “development” defined in purely economic terms, for example, the rate of economic growth—per capita gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP), or gross national income (GNI)—or in terms that include a variety of political and social factors, such as “redistribution with growth,”18 “material well-being with cultural autonomy,”19 or “the removal of substantive unfreedoms.”20

To describe (in box D) a region as developed, undeveloped, or underdeveloped often implies an evaluation (in box F) that development is good and underdevelopment bad. The choice of the concepts for understanding development in D (or B) can be linked to normative commitments in C (and A). Hence, the broken lines connecting the empirical (right) and valuational (left) side of Figure 1. For example, the use of the concept of class struggle, social conflict, or “ancient tribal animosities” can be informed by a commitment to a society with more social harmony or a more egalitarian distribution of power. The concept of gender is usually used by those who believe that unfortunately it is men who have benefited from development while women—in spite of or because of the relative “invisibility” in “development theory-practice”—have borne its burdens.21 Of
course, someone who wanted to accentuate conflict could use the concepts of class conflict, and gender distinction could be employed by someone neutral or conservative on gender matters. The point is that often ethical or other normative commitments influence one's choice of descriptive, interpretative, and explanatory categories. Such a “practical intention” is not, as German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argues, part of the *a priori* structure of certain social sciences; for, contrary to Habermas, one *can* pursue scientific knowledge exclusively for its own sake. But such a practical intention is part of one’s moral responsibility in the “theory-practice” of social change in general and development in particular.

Ethical as well as scientific values can also motivate inquirers to understand development as objectively and correctly as possible. Development and underdevelopment are phenomena that we should understand, especially if we want to achieve the first and avoid or overcome the second. It is hard to overcome underdevelopment if—as Peter Berger observed in 1974—we let our hopes or fears distort our understanding of it. And many investigators want to understand the world precisely in order to change it. It is important and itself a moral obligation to grasp the facts and their probable causes. Investigators then have the responsibility to use their knowledge to help change for the better the world that they now (more or less) understand.

**Scientific and Philosophical Assumptions**

The choices of descriptive and explanatory concepts in D often reflect and presuppose not only normative commitments (in C and A) but also philosophical or meta-scientific assumptions (in B) about reality, nature, human nature, society, social change, and the
nature and methods of knowledge and a (good) science of development. For example, various development perspectives can be differentiated on the basis of at least eight sorts of assumptions.

**The Basic Unit of Analysis.** One finds a number of fundamental units of analysis in theories of development and underdevelopment: utility-maximizing individuals, great personalities, economic classes in conflict (or consensus), the “block in power,” modes of production, ethnic or religious groups, nations, supranational regions, genders, and either an international order (divided into nation-states) or a global order (divided into center and periphery). For example, the dispute that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s between Marxism and dependency theory or world systems, within what Wilber and Jameson call “the political economy development paradigm,” was a debate over which category should be more fundamental: national class struggle or the world economic system.25

**Process or Outcomes?** An even more fundamental presuppositional difference is exhibited conceptions of development that emphasize development as a process of beneficial change and those that focus largely or exclusively on development as an achievement or desired outcome. Of course, some approaches seek to do empirical (and normative) justice to both aspects.

**Methodological Individualism or Atomism Versus Holism?** As is the case throughout the social sciences, empirical studies of development and underdevelopment differ with respect to the way in which the fundamental units of analysis are combined or divided. Methodological individualists start from externally related atomic units and try to explain larger totalities as the sum or aggregate of such units. For example, neo-
classical and neo-Keynesian economics explains economic growth and its absence in relation to individual human beings conceived as utility-maximizing and cost-minimizing agents. Development economics then goes on to explain the unity and diversity of the international economic system in terms of the relative success by which the units—in this case, externally related nation states—pursue their national interest in development. And development is defined, returning to the microeconomic individual, as per capita GNP.

As Geoffrey Hunt explains, methodological atomists view development and underdevelopment as “endogenous,” that is, as an achievement or failure due primarily to the nation state in question: “From the perspective of TDT [traditional development theory] propounded in the West, poverty is ‘their problem’ and wealth is ‘our achievement.’”

In contrast, holists see parts (entities, events, processes, and actions) as internally related to each other and structured by their role in a totality. For instance, Marxists analyze both individual behavior and capitalist underdevelopment as a function of a social formation structured by a “mode of production” that involves both “productive forces” and “productive relations” of unequal power. Uneven development is a function of class exploitation. Dependency and world-system theorists, taking their unit of analysis to be the global economic system rather than a particular social formation, conceive underdevelopment to be the product of unequal international power and economic exchange. Underdevelopment of some nations is the structural result either of the development of other nations or of the international order dominated by the developed nations.
The Dimensions of Analysis. Development can be understood in exclusively economic categories, as is often the case in mainstream development economics, or in social and political categories, for example, modernization theory. Development economics can become the “political economy of development and underdevelopment” when one or more of the following are added to economic concepts: political categories, such as power, the state, property relations, or, most generally, the “rules of the game;” social categories, such as caste, class or stratum; and cultural categories such as ideology, values, religion, or cultural identity. And if an integral or comprehensive concept of development is sought (or presupposed), the various elements can be combined in a variety of ways, for example, as successive stages, reducible variables, or interacting factors.

Synchronic Versus Diachronic. Some development approaches stress geography and spatial structure. For example, J.P. Dickenson and his colleagues preface their A Geography of the Third World by saying:

We feel that there is a need to present a contemporary geography of the Third World, exploring systematic themes in the development process and examining spatial patterns of development and underdevelopment at various scales within the Third World.

Other development theorists give decisive weight to historical, evolutionary, or sequential factors. Keith Griffin exemplifies this “diachronic” perspective:
It was the social and political systems imposed by the colonists, in combination with the demographic changes that followed the Conquest, which were responsible for creating underdevelopment in Spanish America. One cannot explain poverty of the region today without referring to the region's history.31

Inevitability or Openness? Structure or Agency? Development perspectives also differ with respect to whether individuals, societies or other units have freedom of action and, if they do, the nature and extent of that freedom. Is there only one road, predetermined and inevitable, toward development (as outcome)? Or is the future completely open, such that the failure to achieve development is simply a failure of will or the right goals? Do structures determine human action or does individual and collective agency determine structures?32 Alternatively, consider Jorge Graciarena’s attempt to avoid these extreme answers:

The future, far from being prefixed, is open and takes directions that are difficult to predict but are within certain historical limits that frame what is contextually possible. . . . A real, concrete [development] style is always an alternative among various historically possible and potentially viable alternatives. The selection and application of one of these possible alternatives is a political act: the decision of political will formed by a hegemonic coalition of groups that represent social forces with sufficient resources of power to be able to impose the decision in place of other
options. . . . In a historically concrete and conditioned national situation there is always more than one option possible.33

Fundamental suppositions about the nature and reach of freedom are especially prominent when one offers a general theory of development. Notice the variety of assumptions involved in Graciarena’s definition of “development style”:

From a dynamic and integrated perspective, a development style is . . . a dialectical process between relations of power and conflicts, between groups and social classes that derive from dominant forms of capital accumulation, the structure and tendencies of income distribution, and the historical conjuncture and external dependency as well as from values and ideologies. All this occurs in the midst of other structural conditions (technology, natural resources, population) that are present in the analysis as an integrated totality that frames a style's historical possibilities.34

Fatalism and extreme determinism are clearly unreasonable and incompatible with efforts to bring about (improved) development. Development agents always confront some choices or alternatives, however constrained. Development “oughts” presuppose genuine development options or alternatives. Development goals presuppose purposive and (more or less) free agents. Economist Branko Milanovic puts the “conditioned freedom” view exactly right:
We can indeed explain past trends, because the history that underlies them (e.g., the Chinese Civil War, the Bolshevik revolution, colonialism, or the industrial revolution) is known to us, and the link between them and the observed outcomes can reasonably be made. But we cannot make sensible projections because we do not know the future political and social, and hence economic, history of the world. It is not because history is random, but because it is created through the interaction between an ‘objective’ reality (institutions, preferences, the past) and actions of people endowed with free will. History is, as Vico wrote, what people make of it. Deterministic theories are incomplete because they cannot take into account that second element, human freedom of action (le libre arbitre). Moreover, under the false air of inevitability, they sap all effort to effect social change.  

As Milanovic suggests, this view of free will or freedom of choice has relevance for whether the investigator is justified in making (hard and fast) predictions. The anti-determinist assumption also coheres with the view that humans are or should be agents rather than patients and that development is best understood as the removal or reducing of serious unfreedoms. In Part II, I take up the explicitly normative issues when I analyze and strengthen Sen’s agency-oriented view of development as freedom.  

One Road Versus Many? One Science Versus Many? Closely related to the considerations of free will and determinism is the question of whether there
is one development path, whether inevitable or desirable, or several, whether determined or chosen. Ruccio and Simon argue, for example, that both mainstream capitalist and orthodox Marxist development theory assume that capitalist development is a normal and necessary stage of development and, more generally, that development is a unilinear process that all countries have undergone or will undergo:

For the neoclassical [theory of development], capitalism was the end of development, while for the Marxist, it was a necessary, if regrettable, stage to be transcended by socialism. But both agreed that any (nonsocialist) country that needed to develop had to do so within the framework of capitalism, and moreover, that the operations of the capitalist system (of course, conceived differently by the two positions) would lead to higher levels of development in the normal course of things.36

Furthermore, a unilinear approach assumes that all countries can be arranged on the same (quantitative) scale from least to most developed and that differences merely reflect different starting points and different rates of change.37 In contrast, a multilineal approach assumes that different countries must, can, or should follow a more or less distinctive development path. For example, in Andre Gunder Frank's development theory, contemporary “Third World” countries, of necessity, develop differently than did those now developed countries precisely because the latter have produced adverse
conditions for the former. There has been a “development,” caused by colonialism and dependency, of “underdevelopment.”

Hunt puts the point well in his analysis of "radical" development theories:

For RDT [radical development theory] it is this expansion [“imperialist expansion of capitalism”] that results in, and feeds on, underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is not, then, a universal original condition but an intrinsic dimension of the specifically capitalist mode of production in a late historical phase.

Moreover, many theorists from the South assume that ends and means of their countries can and should be significantly different from Northern precedents. This view is often linked to a methodological historicism or particularism that assumes that general theorizing is either impossible or undesirable because of the important historical and cultural differences among countries (and investigators). Hence, the multilinearists typically differ from the unilinearists on what counts as good (development) science. Unilinearists stress the general and universal and presuppose that science is, in some sense, transhistorical. Multilinearists focus on the local, particular, and indigenous; they charge unilinearists and generalists with (an often unconscious) Western or Northern ethnocentrism, and they advocate such things as a Latin American or African social sciences of development.

**Essential Versus Historical Human Nature.** Development theorists who posit one (deterministic) development path and one transcultural development science typically
“ground” their development descriptions, explanations, predictions, and prescriptions on a view that their one principle of change is based on an unchanging human essence. As Hunt says, “neo-Keynesians still appeal to supposed features of human nature (diminishing marginal propensity to consume, preference for liquidity, love of prestige) as transhistorical determinants of economic change.” In contrast, other development theorists deny that there is a permanent human nature. Humans can be said to have the "nature" of not having an essential nature or of having the freedom to determine their own nature. What people are is a function of changing relations of specific historical traditions, social production, nature, and—on voluntarist versions—their own choice.

The strategy of the historicist or particularist thinker, says US philosopher Richard Rorty, “has been to insist that socialization, and thus historical circumstance, goes all the way down—that there is nothing ‘beneath’ socialization or prior to history which is definatory of the human.” Historicist development theorists doing development theory in and for their own “social formation,” argue that the question “what is it to be a developed human being and society” should be replaced by questions such as “what is it to be authentic Costa Ricans and have genuine Costa Rican development” and “how can an inhabitant of our poor ‘underdeveloped’ society be more than the enactor of a role in a development script written for another place and time.”

Increasingly, economists such as Sen and social scientists such as Amatai Etzioni argue that economics has been straitjacketed by egoistic assumption about human motivation. However self-interest is defined—as individual welfare, individual goals, or individual choices—Sen argues that (1) people can have good reasons for acting against
their self-interest and that (2) self-interested motivation fails to explain differences in economic productivity among countries.46

As I discussed briefly in Chapter 2 and will explain more fully in later chapters, Sen’s capability approach and the use to which I put it in defending deliberative democracy, assumes that human beings are both shaped by their group affiliations as well as have some freedom to shape and transcend their (multiple) identities. Such a view seeks to finesse the essentialist/historicist dichotomy with respect to human “nature.”47

The above illustrates the way in which development science or development theory in box D can have philosophical or meta-scientific assumptions in box B. The assumptions are not directly part of the scientific investigation of facts, causes, and patterns; rather, they make possible that investigation by supplying its categories. This relationship between B and D is usually non-deductive. B suggests or permits rather than deductively entails D. It is possible that two theory-practices could have the same assumptions in B and yet differ in D (or offer similar descriptions and explanations in D even though their assumptions vary). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, assumptions in B may be modified by anomalies discovered by empirical work in D. Finally, just as the choice of a descriptive vocabulary in D is linked to one's normative commitments in C or A, so scientific and philosophical assumptions include or are related to normative assumptions in A. In both the unilinear and multilinear assumptions discussed above as well as in essentialist and historicist assumptions about human nature, the line is blurred between what is and what ought—or ought not—to happen in development. The components of a development theory-practice interact within the larger totality.48
Critique.

We not only want to understand “developed” and “developing” countries, but we also want to determine what is good and bad about a country’s being developed or remaining underdeveloped. We want to praise, criticize, and sometimes lay blame; for example, in relation to India’s Bhopal disaster in 1983 or Argentina’s economic collapse in 2001-02. Hence, (in box F) we make moral judgments the way a clinician would make judgments about her patient’s health or illness, improvement or decline. We make these assessments either by reference to (a group’s) development goals (in C) or to (its or the evaluator’s) more abstract ethical principles (in A). It is also important to evaluate past and present development policies or plans (in E) and actual projects or practices (in G). All these assessments take place in box F.

Sometimes, of course, our evaluations are nonmoral; we judge how efficient or effective the strategies (in E) have been in realizing the goals (in C). In terms of scientific values, such as simplicity and attention to counter evidence, we evaluate causal explanations. But it is also important explicitly to raise ethical questions about developing societies and other groups and their goals. How important, ethically speaking, is the value of efficiency in relation to other goals? We have achieved our development goals, but are they right, just, or best? Moreover, it is not uncommon to find out in practice that we cannot live with our habitual goals or that we need to revise or improve upon them. Good development ethics does not just apply a preformed, a priori ethics to practice; through critique linked to practice we can improve our development.
goals and ethical principles. Consequently, I have placed box F (critique) on the line that divides theory and practice, for critique looks in both directions. Moreover, in the light of other aspects of development theory-practice, development ethicists engage in a critique of critiques: they assess the strengths and weakness of their and others’ earlier assessments.

It should be underscored that critique is not always negative. It identifies the good as well as the bad. It finds institutional limitations on the good that make it, on balance, bad; but these constraints might be removed so that the good comes to fuller and less compromised realization. The new and better can be conceived and nurtured in the womb of the old and limited.

This conception of “dialectical critique” is meant to include a spectrum of diagnoses and prescriptions—from minor ills to be solved by piecemeal remedies to mortal diseases, such as (bad) development, the latter to be overcome by incremental structural transformation or by revolution. Our speaking of critique, then, leads us to other moments of development theory-practice, namely, conceptions of possible and better futures.

**Delineation of Options.**

It is important not merely to understand and evaluate the past and the present. Development scholars and practitioners are also interested in the future. Unless a theory is fatalistic or deterministic, it identifies a developing society's options for action, its
possibilities for change. I have put such delineation of options in box E because they are policy options, possible course of action. These options, however, are also related to Box D and the scientific understanding of causal mechanisms. More determinist approaches will offer forecasts, projections based on current trends, and even detailed predictions, the latter employed to support or disconfirm causal explanations. Such forecasts of the future are more or less probabilistic, and normally, the longer the range, the less reliable the forecast. Those who call themselves “futurists” explicitly argue that what they offer is more an art of exploring future possibilities than a predictive or even probabilistic science.50 In any case, development delineation of options vary with respect to whether they are based on present trends or on changes in prevalent human action patterns.

British philosopher Onora O’Neill puts the point well in relation to predictions of famine:

These predictions are contingent upon certain assumptions about what people will do in the pre-famine period. Famine is said to be inevitable if people do not curb their fertility, alter their consumption patterns, and avoid pollution and consequent ecological catastrophes. It is the policies of the present that will produce, defer, or avoid famine.51

Another way to put the point is to say that the term “future possibility” is ambiguous. On the one hand, what is possible for a society are those options open to it, given its present structures and patterns of human conduct. On the other hand, what is possible for a society includes, in addition, those options that emerge if and when structures are changed and people act in new ways. A development option that is
impossible now may become “feasible” in the future when people act to remove present impediments or establish requisite preconditions. Innovative social theorists can eliminate intellectual obstacles, and creative social agents can “tear up” calcified meanings and surpass what had seemed to be institutional limits.52 We ought not restrict our analysis of options to what is feasible now or in the short run. In the depths of World War Two, the idea of a United Nations or Marshall Plan seemed preposterous to many. It is important to have medium and long run perspectives that take into account the results of obstacle-removing human action. As US political theorist Charles Beitz says:

One needs to distinguish two classes of reasons for which it may be impossible to implement an ideal. One class includes impediments to change that are themselves capable of modification over time; the other includes impediments that are unalterable and unavoidable.53

Many moral disagreements hinge on conflicting empirical estimates about the possible or probable consequences of various courses of action. For example, the controversy, I briefly discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 (and a topic to which I return in Chapter 8), between two utilitarian ethicists, Peter Singer and Garrett Hardin, over the “ethics of famine relief” largely if not entirely reduces to different forecasts over the impact of aid on famine victims and on the larger societal structures.54 Singer argues that affluent people are morally obligated to send food aid because it prevents the bad consequences of death and suffering. In contrast, Hardin argues not just that we have no such moral duty, but that we have the duty not to send famine relief. His argument is
based on the forecast that such aid causes worse long-term consequences than sending no aid at all. Aid recipients, he predicts, will use their added longevity to produce more mouths to feed and, thereby, further transcend the limits of the environment’s “carrying capacity.” Moreover, for Hardin, a pernicious consequence of aid is that the beneficiary learns to be a passive, dependent recipient of another's charity, rather than an active producer for or prudent investor in the future.

It might seem that this debate between Singer and Hardin easily could be resolved by empirical investigations about the actual short and long-term consequences of aid. It should be noted, however, that this is not always so simple. For one thing, the data are complex and resist facile generalizations that aid is always or never beneficial. For another, forecasts sometimes express (and conceal) what prognosticators hope to see rather than what they expect to see (the same thing frequently occurs when someone “predicts” that his or her favorite team will win the World Cup). Sometimes the real difference between two forecasts is due to different moral evaluations of the same phenomena, such as the moral weight given to undoubted present suffering compared to probable future misery. However, since many investigators cling to value or moral neutrality, they bury their moral judgments in what should be a (relatively) value-free part of their inquiry. They let their hopes or fears distort their estimate as to what is possible and likely. Although development theory-practice should make an important place for moral judgment and ethical reflection, it should not confuse judgments about what is possible or likely with judgment about what is good or obligatory. The rejection of the dogma of value-neutrality would encourage analysts to make their moral
commitments explicit and open to rational scrutiny rather than permit these assumptions to function in a subterranean manner. ⁵⁶

Identification of options and likelihoods should avoid both utopian dreaming and “crack-pot” realism. Objective forecasts of feasible options for social change are important for development theory-practice, for they enable us to avoid quixotic goals. The feasible or practically possible is not the same as what is only logically or remotely possible. It is also true, however, that the probable is not the inevitable. We should reject a “hardheaded” realism that baptizes an often-unjust status quo when better possibilities are in fact available.

Unfortunately, the future is often hazy, and social projections can be as unreliable as weather forecasting. Moral reflection includes consideration of our moral obligations and ethical principles in situations where we often have only imprecise estimates of probabilities. ⁵⁶

Moreover, that I treated forecast before I considered ethical norms should not be taken to imply an invariable sequence. Sometimes what is possible and feasible only becomes apparent from the perspective of a transformative ideal. After committing ourselves to a new and ethically inspiring goal, what had been neutral or even an obstacle with respect to other aims now becomes an opportunity. Furthermore, it is not the case that we always first discover what is possible and then select what is desirable. Sometimes we start with our ends, and then cast about for means. It is to a consideration of the explicitly normative or ethical dimensions of development theory-practice that we now turn.
Development Goals and Ethical Principles.

Frequently, moral principles and judgments come into play directly and explicitly when, after analyzing the feasible futures, people choose (in box C) the best of these futures, the basic development goals they intend to pursue. One engages in relevant or realistic utopianism by selecting a future—from among the available options—that is on balance morally best as well as realizable. One method of doing so is to (1) identify the fragmentary and embryonic advances made in present thought and action and (2) affirm the progressive elements while criticizing the aspects that block further flourishing of what is promising. We can improve the good by (partially) liberating it—both theoretically and practically—from its historical limitations.57

Sometimes the appropriate critique (in F) of the present and the identification (in C) of the best feasible option for the future are obvious, and immediately we go on to decide (in E) what strategy would be most efficient to reach the desired goal. Sometimes it is not important to appeal to goals or principles. Sometimes we are surer of our concrete judgments than we are of any abstract norms. Sometimes, however, we are justifiably hesitant about our concrete judgments. We worry about biases in our commitments and our past policies or principles, especially when carrying them out has had unintended but negative consequences. We sense an inconsistency among our concrete moral judgments, between them and our development goals, or among our development goals. In these cases, it is appropriate to engage in ethical reflection and dialogue with others. And this reflection includes a consideration of general norms.
These norms can be either basic conceptions of (good) development (in C) or, on a more abstract level, ethical principles (in A).\footnote{58}

Development ethics consists, then, not only of concrete critique and judgments of moral responsibility, but also reflection on both the general direction in which a society should develop and the abstract ethical principles that can guide the choice of these goals. A reasonable development ethic, in the context of development theory-practice, explicitly clarifies, defends, applies, and revises development goals and ethical norms that are realizable locally, regionally, nationally, and globally.

Before looking at some examples of such substantive ethical proposals, let us pause to consider some “metaethical” issues concerning the nature of development ethics. The first is the question of whether development ethics should engage in reflection on general abstract ethical principles (in A) or rather should restrict itself to critical reflection on development goals (in C) and critique (in F). In “Tasks and Methods in Development Ethics,” Denis Goulet distinguishes four levels of ethical discourse:

> Ethical discourse is conducted at four distinct levels: general ends, specific criteria which determine when these ends exist in concrete situations, clusters of interrelated means or systems which constitute strategies congenial or uncongenial to the ends sought, and individual means taken separately.\footnote{59}

After discriminating these levels, Goulet argues as follows:
In questions of social change the sharpest ethical disagreements arise in the two middle realms . . . . Discussion over general ends rarely engenders debate because such ends are deemed to be universal and are easily disguised behind verbal smokescreens. Even tyrants profess to cherish freedom and warmongers to seek peace. Hence many apparent debates over general ends—ideal conceptions of justice, freedom, reciprocity, equity—are, in truth, controversies over the concrete marks or institutions by which the presence of these ideals can be detected. . . . One's ethical stance on ends is dramatically revealed in the means one adopts to pursue them. Consequently, development ethics as “means of the means” requires not that moralists pose ideal goals and pass judgment on the means used by others to pursue these or other goals, but rather that decision-makers, versed in the constraints surrounding vital choices, promote the values for which oppressed and underdeveloped groups struggle: greater justice, a decent sufficiency of goods for all, and equitable access to collective human gains realized in technology, organizations, and research.60

Although I agree with much of Goulet’s approach, I think this argument is problematic at several points. First, as a matter of fact, there is much evidence to challenge his contention that debate over general ends is rare. It is true that ideals such as liberty, equality, justice, have been and continue to be widely affirmed and that tyrants and many others use noble ideals as camouflage or rationalizations for ignoble acts. But
we also find widespread and intense debate about what we should mean or how we should understand these principles. Not just philosophers but also politicians, policymakers, columnists, citizens, and “oppressed and underdeveloped groups” argue about how ideals should be understood and prioritized if we are to think clearly, live with ethical sensitivity, be true to our communities' traditions and hopes, and promote a better world.61

Second, not only do people deliberate about these norms, they should do so both individually and collectively. Such deliberations are often worthwhile for several reasons. They enable critics to unmask the very perversion of moral ideals that Goulet correctly worries about. Debates about fundamental norms are one way of getting clear about alternative social projects and superior social possibilities. Dialogue on abstract themes is one way of “hammering out” new and better conceptions of who a people should be and what they should be committed to. Democratic deliberation about ends as well as means, I shall argue in Chapters 9 and 10, is both a fair way for a group to make collective choices and contributes to individual agency and group empowerment.

Such abstract norms certainly need not and, arguably, should not be viewed as philosophical “foundations” that have to be settled first and from which we deductively deduce specific moral judgments and courses of action. For, as I argued earlier, we often do and should revise our more abstract ethical norms on the basis of our concrete experience and judgments about existing practices. Goulet is correct in affirming that one's abstract ethical principles are often revealed through the means one adopts to realize them. But from that point it does not follow that there is no independent role for such principles. Sometimes we are clearer about more abstract principles than we are
about more concrete norms or practical judgments; consequently the former sometimes
guide us when we decide on the latter. Abstract principles can enable us to perceive in a
new way and direct us to challenge accepted practices, especially those constraints that
policy-makers dogmatically view as given.

This is not to say that development ethics should be done only by “outsiders,” let
alone by those philosophers who adopt a “God’s-eye view.” One must concede to Goulet
that much social-political philosophy—and not just the Anglo-American varieties—is
little more than academic dreaming or intellectual gymnastics with little connection to
economic, social, and political realities and even less relevance for public policy dialogue
and formation. And certainly I do not advocate moralistic finger-wagging. However, if
development ethics uncritically accepts what policy-makers and citizens perceive as fixed
norms and constraints, it most definitely will lose the very opportunity for “creating new
possibilities” that Goulet stresses so well. Just as the development ethicists engaged in
critique (Figure 1’s box F) may assess development goals “from below” in the light of
concrete experiences and judgments, so she may assess development practices “from
above” in the light of innovative but still general versions of abstract ideals.62

It is interesting that Rorty, like Goulet, also questions the relevance to actual
policy and political debates of “analytic philosophers who specialize in applied ethics.”63
For Rorty, these philosophers err because they claim “that there are special skills
associated with analytic philosophy which are useful in resolving policy dilemmas.”
Similarly, Rorty criticizes “non-analytic” leftist philosophers who try to “relate
philosophical doctrines and vocabularies. . . to politics.”64 They fail, says Rorty, because
they have “gotten over-theoretical, over-philosophical” and, especially since the late
1960’s in the US have “taken less and less interest in what the rest of the country is worrying about.” Rorty does mention one exception to this general indictment:

Habermas, almost alone among the eminent philosophers of the present day, manages to work as Dewey did, on two tracks. He produces both a stream of philosophical treatises and a stream of comment on current events. I doubt that any philosophy professor since Dewey has done more concrete day-to-day work in the political arena, or done more for the goals of US social democrats. Habermas’s connection with the German SPD is exactly the sort of eminently useful connection that leftist academics influenced by Dewey used to have with the Democratic Party in the United States.

Unfortunately, Rorty’s own highly abstract and meta-theoretical reflections largely fail to put into practice what I would argue is entailed by his own approach—not two separate “tracks” but engaged, revisable, critical assessments of live policy options and of proposals for promising alternatives. Regrettably, Rorty ignores non-analytic thinkers, such as Adela Cortina and Denis Goulet and “post-analytic” philosophers, such as Robert K. Fullinwider, William A. Galston, Judith Lichtenberg, Jonathan Moreno, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, Peter Singer, who do ethically-oriented public policy but do not believe they have unsharable “analytic skills.” Although Rorty might not consider these thinkers to be “eminent philosophers of the present day,” they are making contributions to a variety of “theory-practices.” And one way they are making this
contribution is in arguing for and promoting—in their teaching, writing, lecturing, and consulting—the shareable skills of ethical critique and reflection. Ethical reflection will come to grips with “the day-to-day” debates about international development only if applied philosophers as well as other ethicists do development ethics—however abstractly or concretely—in the context of the scientific and practical components of development theory-practice.

**Development Plans and Strategies**

Much philosophical ethics hitherto has failed to attend to questions of *achieving* or *institutionalizing* moral norms—as if correct moral thinking were all that was needed and then the world would automatically “right itself.” Once again I reject both sharp fact/value as well as conceptual/empirical distinctions. Challenging the notion of philosophy and ethics as exclusively expert knowledge, I advocate a culture in which conceptual, ethical, and political questions are debated by many citizens, whether or not they are professional philosophers or ethicists. Indeed, just as it is important for those who call themselves philosophers to be more knowledgeable about empirical and political matters, so social scientists, politicians, development practitioners, and citizens should be more capable of applying moral intelligence to development matters. In my experience it is interdisciplinary people who can be expected to do the best interdisciplinary work.

Taking into consideration—but also contributing to—science, ethics, and evaluation of past practice, development planners formulate policies, design projects, and
recommend actions. The questions now are: What ought to be done? Who ought to do it? When and how ought they to do it? Who should make these social decisions and how? What are the social mechanisms or institutional designs and devices available to realize and maintain the chosen model of authentic development?

Practical, nontheoretical questions now dominate attention because development agents plan and recommend in order to transform the world and achieve (their concept of) development as beneficial change. Ethics is not forgotten, for we must still consider various strategies from an ethical as well as an economic or political point of view. We want an ethics of means as well as an ethics of principle and vision. We want an ethics of social change in an unjust world, where we want to avoid being either moral fools or amoral operators. We want good outcomes but we want to achieve them by just and fair means. We need to ask not only which means efficiently and effectively will obtain our ends, but also which means are ethically intolerable, acceptable, or obligatory. Moreover, we should question the relative importance of standard notions of economic efficiency when they collide with other goals or constraints such as cultural identity or human rights. We should clarify and evaluate the implicit ethical assumptions, content, and consequences of various development strategies and tactics.

Collective agency, an important theme throughout this book, means that citizens acting in concert with and through their elected representatives are responsible for the development of their own community, region, and country. If countries are to progress towards the goal of authentic development, it will be largely because of critical discussion among and collective participation by citizens themselves, especially those least well off. More generally, in ethically-justified development, a people—sometimes
with assistance from outsiders—defines and develops *itself* and is not coerced or developed *by* someone else. The implication for national or international development professionals is clear. The help they give to others should enhance autonomy rather than produce dependency.

More than 90 years before Sen’s concern to rehabilitate the notion of agency and its implications for outside assistance and democracy promotion, John Dewey and James H. Tufts criticized what Robert B. Westbrook calls the “paternalistic benevolence” of social leaders or reformers:

> The vice of the social leader, of the reformer, of the philanthropist and the specialist in every worthy cause of science, or art, or politics, is to seek ends which promote the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the active interest and cooperation of others. The conception of conferring the good upon others, or a least attaining it for them, which is our inheritance from the aristocratic civilization of the past, is so deeply embodied in religious, political, and charitable institutions and in moral teachings, that it dies hard. Many a man, feeling himself justified by the social character of his ultimate aim (it may be economic, or educational, or political), is genuinely confused or exasperated by the increasing antagonism and resentment which he evokes, because he has not enlisted in his pursuit of the “common” end the freely cooperative activities of others. This cooperation must be the root principle of the morals of democracy.⁶⁹
Concrete and detailed recommendations, of course, are appropriate in development planning. These practical proposals may range from large-scale, regional, or national hydroelectric projects, to small, neighborhood credit unions for single mothers. Like the clinician, the development planner is intent on improving these particular people or, better, enabling them to improve themselves. It is important that general theories be supplemented and corrected by the idiosyncrasies of a unique country or supra- or sub-national region in a particular phase of its history.

A further—sometimes neglected—point is that moral principles and goals can enter into development policy-making in two different ways. As norms (in either boxes A and C of figure 1) for what is good or right, development planners themselves make planning decisions inspired, guided, or constrained by ethical principles and development goals. However, the planner may also recommend that certain values be promoted, scrutinized, or weakened in a population as a means to achieve some other development goal such as economic growth or democratic decision-making. The presence (or absence) of certain operative values explains the presence (or absence) of development success or failure (variously conceived). Then, on the basis of this alleged causal link, the development theorist recommends, on the basis of what she considers to be the most reasonable principles, the promotion, strengthening, or weakening of certain (perhaps different) values that function in the society being investigated. For example, some mainstream economists assume and/or recommend “rationality,” conceived as self-interested behavior, as the explanatory and causal key to development. Mitchell A. Seligson describes a version of this approach to explaining and removing the widening international and domestic gaps between rich and poor:
The widening gap between rich and poor nations is viewed as being principally a cultural problem. Specifically, the cultural values associated with industrialization are seen as foreign to many developing nations, which are deeply attached to more traditional values. Yet the values of punctuality, hard work, achievement, and other “industrial” values are keys to unlocking the economic potential of poor countries, according to these scholars. Most adherents of this perspective believe that such values can be ‘inculcated’ in a population through deliberate effort. Others argue that the values will emerge naturally as the result of a worldwide process of diffusion of values functional for development. This perspective has been incorporated into a more general school of thought focusing on the process called “modernization.” Development occurs and the international gap is narrowed when a broad set of modern values and institutions are present.70

On this first account, development scholars treat values scientifically and instrumentally rather than normatively or critically. Development social scientists, such as anthropologists, describe values or moral norms operative in the lives of people and ask whether these moral commitments help explain and forecast development and underdevelopment. Policy makers often want to know what moral commitments, if any, are aids or obstacles for bringing about development.
Critical or reflective ethics, on the other hand, does not only moral commitments instrumentally, it also asks what principles (ends and constraints) would be intrinsically good or reasonable to have, and how they should be promoted (consistent with human agency and other values). Development ethics asks what should be the ends and morally acceptable means of development rather than merely how societies mobilize values to reach some given conception of development. Planners and other development agents do ethics when they reflect ethically on development ends and means. They use moral values instrumentally when trying to instill them as factors to bring about some model of development. Even if it is scientifically correct that “industrial” values explain and are causal factors in (some view of) development, it follows neither that these values are justified, nor that it is ethically permissible to “inculcate” them, nor that the development model in question is ethically justified.

These remarks can be summarized in relation to Figure 1. What one development theory-practice proposes (in A) as an ethical principle, or (in C) as a development goal, a contending theory-practice may advocate (in E) as a means, based on scientific understanding (in D) of the value or moral belief as a causal factor. Moreover, it is also possible that the same value can be viewed as both a reasonable end and an efficient (and morally acceptable) means. Basic-need satisfaction or capacity building, for instance, can be viewed as ends of development, the means to economic growth, or both ends and a means. Economic growth can be viewed as the goal of development or as the means to basic-need satisfaction or capability expansion, or both. In Sen’s capability approach, “expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development.”
This view that the same variable can be both an end and a means provides a basis for a criticism of some positions taken on so-called “social capital” or “human capital.” These approaches are flawed when they view human beings, their education, skills and trusting relationships, as only “means of production” and not also as “the end of the exercise.”

While economic prosperity helps people to have wider options and to lead more fulfilling lives, so do more education, better health care, finer medical attention, and other factors that causally influence the effective freedoms that people actually enjoy. These “social developments” must directly count as “developmental,” since they help us to lead longer, freer and more fruitful lives; in addition to the role they have in promoting productivity or economic growth or individual incomes.

Three additional related points are relevant to the relations of different levels of Figure 1. First, boxes C and D together rarely deductively entail E. Practical reasoning is an art, which the Greeks termed phronesis, wherein more abstract beliefs can help one arrive at practical diagnoses, prognoses, or recommendations but do not logically entail them. One implication, which I spell out in my analysis of deliberative democracy, is that two individuals (or sub-groups of a group) may reach the same policy from different normative and empirical starting points. Even people at odds over ultimate goals and basic beliefs may agree on courses of action. Second, two individuals (or sub-groups) can have the same development commitments and beliefs and derive (without inferential
error) diverse proposals for practice. Third, although the idea of a development-theory practice implies that the integration (without fusing) of a theory-practice’s components is a good thing, a certain looseness among the components is also desirable. If a development theory-practice were a seamless web or a prison, deliberation among proponents of different theory-practices would be extremely difficult. When theory-practices share some components and when a theory-practice’s components do not all stand or fall together, deliberation among persons representing rival perspectives may yield innovative agreements and solve practical problems.

**Practice**

Norms and policies are more or less realized in many sorts of development actions and practices. Practice, both good and bad kinds, occasions theorizing. Theory generally guides agents who act to bring about (their conception of) development. People theorize, normally, with the intention of changing as well as understanding the world. As Aristotle realized, people engage in reflective ethics not just better to understand the good, but ultimately to do good, “to act on our knowledge.” Likewise, theorists and practitioners engage in development theory-practice not just to understand good and better development, but to bring it about.

The practice and the theory of development are, ideally, dialectically related within a development theory-practice. Neither has permanent priority. It is important to revise our policy and institutions on the basis of theoretical successes and failures. Likewise, we should revise our normative and non-normative theories on the basis of our
practical achievements and failures. An unsettling gap frequently exists between the ideal and the real, between Figure 1’s boxes A, C, and E, on the one hand, and box G, on the other. Critique in Box F can be unflinchingly honest about this gap between theory and practice. Critique helps us tailor ethical principles and development goals to real world challenges. Critique also enables us to learn the lessons of cases of failure as well as success. As Sen remarks in words with Deweyan echoes:

While . . . success stories have to be supplemented by accounts of failures and deflections, lessons can be leaned from what went wrong, in order to do things better next time. Learning by doing is a great ally of the rationalist reformer.76

The closing of the gap between theory and practice, however, is more than a discursive cliché or a theory. It also depends on individual and collective development agents putting their ethical commitments into practice to improve basic institutions—be they local, national, or global. Australian Anna Malavisi, the Field Director in Bolivia for International Service, puts it exactly right:

There is a risk that ethics becomes just another “buzzword” in the development debate, being understood in a superficial way, diluting its true significance. Including an ethical dimension in development should allow for a more profound analysis and reflection on the failings of development and guide policymakers, practitioners, activists and other
members of the civil society in ways to tackle the moral questions faced in
development and provide effective solutions to decrease human suffering,
inequalities and enhance freedom.77

Elaborating Sen’s point about the role of successful (and unsuccessful) cases, I
add one final ingredient to a development theory-practice. Each development theory-
practice partially defines itself by taking actual projects, societies, or regions as
“exemplars”78 of good and bad development. People often judge Norway or Costa Rica,
for instance, as concrete examples of a social democratic model of good development.
Others offer Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (“The Gang of Four”) as
paradigm cases—now somewhat tarnished—of the so-called “East Asian development
model.” Porto Alegre, Brazil and Kerala, India have become iconic of deliberative and
democratic development. South Africa exemplifies a transition from racist and conflictual
authoritarianism to a rights-respecting and pacific democracy. Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela
exemplifies what one analyst calls “competitive autocracy”79

If we tried to add a “theory-practice’s” exemplar to our Figure 1, it would be most
accurate to depict it within box G but with waves radiating out to all other boxes. For a
concrete development exemplar tends to function as a dominant image that informs and
integrates all aspects of the “theory-practice.” Yet, exemplars are not bedrock; they can
be changed, or more likely, redescribed on the basis of other elements of the theory-
practice. When theory and practice fail to fit together, there is no algorithm to tell us
which element or elements should be altered. Our final appeal is ongoing, critical
dialogue about the ends and means of development.
Concluding Remarks

It is best, at least in our present age of disciplinary and practical divisions, that development theory-practice in general and any specific theory-practice include the work of many hands so that its various components, discussed in this chapter, can make their appropriate contribution. The ongoing dialogue should include many voices. It ought to be at least multidisciplinary and perhaps a new integrated field to ensure the presence of various theoretical elements—economics, but also sociology, political science, history, ecology, agronomy, law, theology, and philosophy. It ought to transcend the distinction between the pure and applied sciences and therefore include such fields as agricultural economics, education, engineering, health, nutrition, and social work. The moral dialogue ought to include theological ethics, so as not to neglect the resources of the religious communities, as well as secular ethics, in order to forge an improved global and public moral consensus.

Development ethics ought to go beyond theoreticians and include development policy makers, politicians, activists, journalists, and citizens. It ought to involve rural as well as urban participants if urban bias—for instance, preference for low food prices—is to be corrected without neglecting either rural needs—for example, good prices for agricultural products—or crucial rural/urban linkages, such as good roads. Public discussion should involve both women and men in order to eliminate sexism. Members of various groups should participate in order to weaken if not altogether extinguish racism, classism, and an academic bias against traditional practices and popular wisdom.
The participants should come from the South as well as the North to avoid ethnocentric imperialism. It is crucial to have participants from the Middle East as well as the West and the East so that the issues of anti-terrorism, development, tolerance, and peace can be intimately linked. What has been called “hubristic imperialism” must be challenged and transformed into ethically-based global leadership. Deliberative dialogue and democratic decision-making, as I argue in detail in Part Four, should be institutionalized on various levels and in diverse venues. It must involve citizens as well as governmental experts and private consultants if citizens are to have a real opportunity to participate effectively.

In sum, when done well, international development ethics requires global dialogue and democratic deliberation in a variety of venues—from small villages, through development-planning ministries, to the World Bank. Perhaps what is most important for this dialogue is that it occurs in a context in which the big, strong, and rich do not coerce the small, weak, and poor. Our notion of good development itself should include as well as contribute to unrestricted and unforced moral dialogue and democratic deliberation. As Sen observes, “political participation and dissent are constitutive parts of development itself.” If these persons and groups are integrated in public discussion and democratic deliberation, we will be moving toward the right kind of development ethics and, we hope, toward genuine development and a better world.
NOTES

1. I first employed the concept of a “development theory-practice” in “Toward Development Ethics,” World Development, 19, 5 (1991): 457---83. Sources for this idea were William Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education (Chicago: Scott Foresman, 1965) and Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1965); Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld; Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983); Orlando Fals-Borda, “The Challenge of Action Research,” in The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, 3rd ed., ed. Charles K. Wilber (New York: Random House, 1983), 65---73; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); and Catherine Z. Elgin (see below, n. 15). MacIntyre defines a practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of ends and good involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre, After Virtue, 18). My view of a development theory-practice enlarges MacIntyre’s definition to include both theory and conduct as elements. Moreover, each development theory-practice has its own conception of the “human powers to achieve excellence” and of the “ends and the goods involved.” Clearer to me now than in the 1980’s—when I first employed the notion of “development
theory-practice”—is the Deweyan character of the idea of a development theory-practice. For Dewey’s conception of the dialectical relation of theory and (political) practice, see below, n. 46.

2. Theotonio Dos Santos, “El modelo de desarrollo de Costa Rica está agotado,”

3. Ibid.


10. In graduate seminars in the early sixties at Yale University, US philosopher John E. Smith often cited this Hegelian maxim, but I have been unable to find it in Hegel’s works.


14. Catherine Z. Elgin’s general characterization of “a system of thought” comes very close to my concept of a “theory-practice,” which I apply to the “domain” of international development. I would only make more explicit, than Elgin does in the following passage, the dialectical links between thought and action:

> A category scheme provides the resources for stating various truths and falsehoods, for exhibiting particular patterns and discrepancies, for drawing specific distinctions, for demarcating conceptual boundaries.

> Purposes, values, and priorities are integral to the design. They constitute
the basis for organizing the domain in one way rather than another. And the acceptability of any particular scheme depends on the truths it enables us to state, the methods it permits to employ, the projects it furthers, and the values it promotes. Together these constitute a system of thought. A failure of the components to mesh undermines the system, preventing it from doing what it ought to do.” Catherine Z. Elgin, “The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value,” *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation*, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 89.


26. Geoffrey Hunt, “Two Methodological Paradigms in Development Economics,” *Philosophical Forum*, 18 (1986): 55. For a brief but clear discussion of the differences between (i) an explanatory individualism that *explains* events by reference to (human) individual motivation or action (“motivational” or “ontological individualism”) and (ii) a “justificatory or moral individualism” in which “it is only individuals ultimately that matter morally speaking and hence justifications for moral principles, actions, and policies must ultimately refer to the well-being and freedom of individuals,” see Alan Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 158.

27. For a fuller consideration of the individualism/holism distinction in development economics, see Hunt, “Two Methodological Paradigms.”


29. For an example of the latter sort of integrative theory, see Bunge, 19--24.


33. Ibid., 184.


37. Ibid., 125---26.


41. Although they cast themselves as opponents of all “development” theories, policies, and practices, the essayists in Wolfgang Sachs, ed. The Development Dictionary (London: Zed, 1992) arguably are anti-essentialists in the sense that they reject a fixed human nature.


43. The text is an application to development theory of a point that Rorty make with respect to the “Western Democracies” in ibid.


47. Some development theory-practices have the ambition of deductively deriving ethical principles and goals (in A and C) as well as development goals and strategies (in D) from metaphysical assumptions in B. In contrast, some Marxists and Richard Rorty contend that metaphysical assumptions provide no “back up” or justification for practice but merely rationalize or articulate it. My own approach, which I can only suggest here, would be to emphasize the way in which metaphysical assumptions can both influence and be influenced by other elements of a development theory-practice. We both tailor development practice to (metaphysical) theory and tailor theory to practice. See Westbrook, *John Dewey*, 366–67, n. 37. For Rorty’s sympathetic critique of Dewey, see Richard Rorty, *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 74; and “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in *The Virginia Statute*
48. See Gasper, *The Ethics of Development*, chap. 3 for a helpful discussion of diverse conceptions of the values of both efficiency and effectiveness.


51. Rorty argues that it is innovative political action in the “Third World” that is likely to open up new institutional possibilities in the rigidified, worn-out, and apathetic (“Alexandrian”) First and Second Worlds: “To say, as I have been saying here, that if there is hope it lies in the imagination of the Third World, is to say that the best any of us here in Alexandria can hope for is that somebody out there will do something to tear up the present system of imaginary significations within which politics in (and between) the First and Second Worlds is conducted. It need not be equalization of incomes, but it has to be something *like* that--something so preposterously romantic as to be no longer discussed by us Alexandrians. Only some actual event (rather than some hopeful book),
the actual success of some political move made in some actual country, is likely to help.” Richard Rorty, “Unger, Castoriadis, and the Romance of a National Future,” Northwestern University Law Review, 82, 2 (1987-1988), 351. Arguably Brazil in the early 21st century can lay claim to two such “preposterously romantic” events, both of which seem to be bearing normative fruit – the election to the Brazilian presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the city of Porto Alegre’s fifteen years of experience with a participatory budgeting process. For the latter, see Gianpaolo Biaocchi, “Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment,” Deepening Democracy, eds. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 45--76.


54. In the mid-eighties Roger C. Riddell helpfully (1) examined the mixed record of foreign aid and (2) criticized the hasty generalizations of those who find aid always good or always bad. See Roger C. Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). For more recent assessments, see World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why (New York: Oxford University

55. See Des Gasper, *The Ethics of Development*, especially chaps. 3 and 4, for helpful unmasking of value assumptions lurking in apparently value-neutral economics.

56. Onora O’Neill argues against utilitarianism as a moral theory precisely because it requires an impossible predictive “science of society.” O’Neill tries to make a virtue of the necessary absence of a social-science crystal ball by working out a version of Kantian ethics that is “less sensitive . . . to gaps on causal knowledge” and does not require “impossible calculations” of the future. O’Neill, “Moral Perplexities,” 315---16, 328.

57. For this notion of the positive dimension of critique, see Crocker, *Praxis and Democratic Socialism*, especially 23---32. For a similar view of the way in which “thought” reflects upon and seeks to improve practice, see Jane Mansbridge, “Practice-Thought-Practice,” *Deepening Democracy*, eds. Fung and Wright, 175---99.


60. Ibid., 11-12. I analyze and evaluate Goulet’s own rather abstract principles in

61. In a review of James M. McPherson's history of the U.S. Civil War, The Battle Cry for Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Jean Baker comments on the appropriateness of the volume’s title: “According to McPherson, the Civil War was a revolution, on both sides. Both the North and South were fighting for alternative views of freedom, an ideal inherited from their shared revolutionary past.” For the South, but not for the North, continues Baker, freedom included “the right to own slaves and to take them anywhere as private property, including the territories such as Kansas, and the right to be free from the interfering North,” Jean Baker, “Our Other Revolution,” New Republic (5 September 1988), 39.

62. For a conception of a social, cross-cultural version of John Rawls’s method of “reflective equilibrium,” see David A. Crocker, Praxis and Democratic Socialism, ch. 6. One-sided positions emphasize abstract principles at the expense of concrete judgments or vice-versa. For the latter, see Richard J. Bernstein, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy,” Political Theory, 15, 4 (1987), 538---63, especially 549. For the former, see Richard Rorty, “Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein,” Political Theory 15, 4 (1987), 564---80, especially 577, n. 20. David Alexander Clark, impatient with abstract normative theorizing, goes to the other extreme of uncritically appealing to the values of the poor: “a new approach, which draws on the perceptions of development among the poor, is required to provide potentially sterile debates about the nature of human well-being and development with
new impetus” (*Visions of Development*, 6). In Chapters 9 and 10, I offer an ideal of deliberative and democratic participation as a way of avoiding the dangers of both top-down theorizing and unscrutinized popular preferences.


64. Ibid. Thugs and Theorists,” 569---70.


66. Ibid., 580, n. 31. See Also Rorty, “Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics,” 33, n. 38.


As Dewey perceived, the language of middle-class
benevolence often betrayed a view of the masses as inert material on which reformers might work their will, and he called instead for a reconstructed conception of helping others which enlisted their full and willing participation in the provision of social welfare (Westbrook, *John Dewey*, 185; see also Westbrook, *John Dewey*, 40---42).


72. Ibid., 296.

73. Ibid., 295.


75. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett,


80. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 36; see also 291.