Making 20th Century Science
How Theories Became Knowledge

by Stephen G. Brush with Ariel Segal

Historically, the scientific method has been said to require proposing a theory, making a prediction of something not already known, testing the prediction, and giving up the theory (or substantially changing it) if it fails the test. A theory that leads to several successful predictions is more likely to be accepted than one that only explains what is already known but not understood. This process is widely treated as the conventional method of achieving scientific progress, and was used throughout the twentieth century as the standard route to discovery and experimentation. But does science really work this way? In Making 20th Century Science, Stephen G. Brush discusses this question, as it relates to the development of science throughout the last century. Answering this question requires both a philosophically and historically scientific approach, and Brush blends the two in order to take a close look at how scientific methodology has developed. Several cases from the history of modern physical and biological science are examined, including Mendeleev's Periodic Law, Kekule's structure for benzene, the light-quantum hypothesis, quantum mechanics, chromosome theory, and natural selection. In general it is found that theories are accepted for a combination of successful predictions and better explanations of old facts. Making 20th Century Science is a large-scale historical look at the implementation of the scientific method, and how scientific theories come to be accepted.

CONTENTS

Table of Contents
Illustrations
Preface
PART ONE: THE RECEPTION AND EVALUATION OF THEORIES IN THE SCIENCES
• Chapter 1. Who Needs "The Scientific Method"?
• 1.1.   The Rings of Uranus
• 1.2.   Maxwell and Popper
• 1.3.   What is a "Prediction"? A Mercurial Definition
• 1.4.   Hierarchy and Demarcation
• 1.5.   What's Wrong with Quantum Mechanics?
• 1.6.   Was Chemistry (1865-1980) more scientific than Physics?
• 1.7.   Scientific Chemists: Benzene and Molecular Orbitals
• 1.8.   The Unscientific (but very successful) method of Dirac and Einstein: Can We Trust Experiments to Test Theories?
• 1.9.   Why was Bibhas De's paper rejected by Icarus?
• 1.10. The Plurality of Scientific Methods
  
  
• Chapter 2. Reception Studies by Historians of Science
• 2.1.   What is "Reception"?
• 2.2.   The Copernican Heliocentric System
• 2.3.   Newton's Universal Gravity
• 2.4.   Darwin's Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection
• 2.5.   Bohr Model of the Atom
• 2.6.   Conclusions and Generalizations
  
  
• Chapter 3. The Role of Prediction-Testing in the Evaluation of Theories: A Controversy in the Philosophy of Science
• 3.1.   Introduction
• 3.2.   Novelty in the Philosophy of Science
• 3.3.   What is a Prediction? (Revisited)
• 3.4.   Does Novelty Make a Difference?
• 3.5.   Evidence from case histories
• 3.6.   Are Theorists less trustworthy than Observers?
• 3.7.   The Fallacy of Falsifiability: Even the Supreme Court was Fooled
• 3.8.   Conclusions
  
  
• Chapter 4. The Rise and Fall of Social Constructionism 1975-2000
• 4.1.   The Problem of defining "Science and Technology Studies"
• 4.2.   The Rise of Social Constructionism
• 4.3.   The Fall of Social Constructionism
• 4.4.   Post Mortem
• 4.5.   Consequences for "Science Studies"
  
  PART TWO: ATOMS, MOLECULES, AND PARTICLES
• Chapter 5. Mendeleev's Periodic Law
• 5.1.   Mendeleev and the Periodic Law
• 5.2.   Novel Predictions
• 5.3.   Mendeleev's Predictions
• 5.4.   Reception by Whom?
• 5.5.   Tests of Mendeleev's Predictions
• 5.6.   Before the Discovery of Gallium
• 5.7.   The Impact of Gallium and Scandium
• 5.8.   The Limited Value of Novel Predictions
• 5.9.   Implications of the Law
• 5.10  Conclusions
  
  
• Chapter 6. The Benzene Problem 1865-1930
• 6.1.   Kekulé's Theory
• 6.2.   The first Tests of Kekulé's Theory
• 6.3.   Alternative Hypotheses
• 6.4.   Reception of Benzene Theories 1866-1880
• 6.5.   New Experiments, New Theories 1881-1900
• 6.6.   The Failure of Aromatic Empiricism 1901-1930
  
  
• Chapter 7. The Light Quantum Hypothesis
• 7.1.   Black-Body Radiation
• 7.2.   Planck's Theory
• 7.3.   Formulation of the Light-Quantum Hypothesis
• 7.4.   The Wave Theory of Light
• 7.5.   Einstein's "Heuristic Viewpoint"
• 7.6.   What did Millikan Prove?
• 7.7.   The Compton Effect
• 7.8.   Reception of Neo-Newtonian Optics before 1923
• 7.9.   The Impact of Compton's Discovery
• 7.10. Rupp's Fraudulent Experiments
• 7.11. Conclusions
  
  
• Chapter 8. Quantum Mechanics
• 8.1.   The Bohr Model
• 8.2.   The Wave Nature of Matter
• 8.3.   Schrödinger's Wave Mechanics
• 8.4.   The Exclusion Principle, Spin, and the Electronic Structure of Atoms
• 8.5.   Bose-Einstein Statistics
• 8.6.   Fermi-Dirac Statistics
• 8.7.   Initial Reception of Quantum Mechanics
• 8.8.   The Community is Converted
• 8.9.   Novel Predictions of Quantum Mechanics
• 8.10. The Helium Atom
• 8.11. Reasons for accepting Quantum Mechanics after 1928
  
  
• Chapter 9. New Particles
• 9.1.   Dirac's Prediction and Anderson's Discovery of the Positron
• 9.2.   The Reception of Dirac's Theory
• 9.3.   The Transformation of Dirac's Theory
• 9.4.   Yukawa's Theory of Nuclear Forces
• 9.5.   Discovery of the Muon and Reception of Yukawa's Theory
• 9.6.   The Transformation of the Yukon
• 9.7.   Conclusions
  
  
• Chapter 10. Benzene and Molecular Orbitals 1931-1980
• 10.1.   Resonance, Mesomerism, and the Mule 1931-1945
• 10.2.   Reception of Quantum Theories of Benzene 1932-1940
• 10.3.   Chemical Proof of Kekulé's Theory
• 10.4.   Anti-Resonance and the Rhinoceros
• 10.5.   The Shift to Molecular Orbitals after 1950
• 10.6.   Aromaticity
• 10.7.   The Revival of Predictive Chemistry
• 10.8.   Reception of Molecular Orbital Theory by Organic Chemists
• 10.9.   Adoption of MO in Textbooks
• 10.10. A 1996 Survey
• 10.11. Conclusions
  
  PART THREE: SPACE AND TIME
• Chapter 11. Relativity
• 11.1.   The Special Theory of Relativity
• 11.2.   General Theory of Relativity
• 11.3.   Empirical Predictions and Explanations
• 11.4.   Social-Psychological Factors
• 11.5.   Aesthetic-Mathematical Factors
• 11.6.   Early Reception of Relativity
• 11.7.   Do Scientists Give Extra Credit for Novelty? The Case of Gravitational Light Bending
• 11.8.   Are Theorists less Trustworthy than Observers?
• 11.9.   Mathematical/Aesthertic Reasons for Accepting Relativity
• 11.10. Social-Psychological Reasons for Accepting Relativity
• 11.11. A Statistical Summary of Comparative Reception
• 11.12. Conclusions
  
  
• Chapter 12. Big Bang Cosmology
• 12.1.   The Expanding Universe is Proposed
• 12.2.   The Age of the Earth
• 12.3.   The Context for the Debate: Four "New Sciences" and One Shared Memory
• 12.4.   Cosmology Constrained by Terrestrial Time
• 12.5.   Hubble Doubts the Expanding Universe
• 12.6.   A Radical Solution: Steady-State Cosmology
• 12.7.   Astronomy Blinks: Slowing the Expansion
• 12.8.   Lemaître's Primeval Atom and Gamow's Big Bang
• 12.9.   Arguments for Steady State Weaken
• 12.10. The Temperature of Space
• 12.11. Discovery of the Cosmic Microwave Background
• 12.12. Impact of the Discovery on Cosmologists
• 12.13. Credit for the Prediction
• 12.14. Conclusions
  
  PART FOUR: HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION
• Chapter 13. Morgan's Chromosome Theory
• 13.1.   Introduction
• 13.2.   Is Biology like (Hypothetico-Deductive) Physics?
• 13.3.   Precursors
• 13.4.   Morgan's Theory
• 13.5.   The Problem of Universality
• 13.6.   Morgan's Theory in Research Journals
• 13.7.   Important Early Supporters
• 13.8.   Bateson and the Morgan Theory in Britain
• 13.9.   The Problem of Universality Revisited
• 13.10. Books and Review Articles on Genetics, Evolution and Cytology
• 13.11. Biology Textbooks
• 13.12. Age Distribution of Supporters and Opponents
• 13.13. Conclusions
  
  
• Chapter 14. The Revival of Natural Selection 1930-1970
• 14.1.   Introduction
• 14.2.   Fisher: A new Language for Evolutionary Research
• 14.3.   Wright: Random Genetic Drift, A Concept Out of Control
• 14.4.   Haldane: A Mathematical-Philosophical Biologist Weighs in
• 14.5.   Early Reception of the Theory
• 14.6.   Dobzhansky: The Faraday of Biology?
• 14.7.   Evidence for Natural Selection, before 1941
• 14.8.   Huxley: A New Synthesis is Proclaimed
• 14.9.   Mayr: Systematics and the Founder Principle
• 14.10. Simpson: No Straight and Narrow Path for Paleontology
• 14.11. Stebbins: Plants are also Selected
• 14.12. Chromosome Inversions in Drosophila
• 14.13. Ford: Unlucky Blood Groups
• 14.14. Resistance to Antibiotics
• 14.15. Two "Great Debates": Snails and Tiger Moths
• 14.16. Selection and/or Drift? The Changing Views of Dobzhansky and Wright
• 14.17. The Views of other Founders and Leaders
• 14.18. The Peppered Moth
• 14.20. Results of a Survey of Biological Publications
• 14.19. The Triumph of Natural Selection?
• 14.21. Is Evolutionary Theory Scientific?
• 14.22. Context and Conclusions
  
  PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
• Chapter 5. Which Works Faster: Prediction or Explanation?
• 5.1.  Comparison of Cases Presented in this Book
• 5.2.   From Princip to Principe
• 5.3.   Can Explanation be Better than Prediction?
• 5.4.   Special Theory of Relativity: Explaining "Nothing"
• 5.5.   The Old Quantum theory: Many Things are Predicted, but Few are Explained
• 5.6.   Quantum Mechanics: Many Things are Explained, Predictions are Confirmed too late
• 5.7.   Millikan's Walk
  
  
• Notes for Part One
• Notes for Part Two
• Notes for Part Three
• Notes for Part Four
• Notes for Part Five
• Selected Bibliography: Includes works cited more than once in a chapter
  
• Index