




Subjects, Predicates, and Systematicity



Paul M. Pietroski
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Dept. of Linguistics, Dept. of Philosophy



Origins of Propositional Thought

- What are Thoughts?
- What a Propositional (or non-Propositional) Thought?
- Origins?
- 35 minutes (Q&A included)?

Strategy

- Focus on two notions of “Sentential” Thoughts
 - (1) thoughts that exhibit Subject-Predicate structure
 - (2) thoughts composed of Systematically Combinable concepts
- Raise an “origin question” about each
- Speculate about a role for the Human Language Faculty



Where does Subject-Predicate structure come from?



$S \rightarrow NP \text{ (aux) } VP$

but 'Subject' is not a notion of Generative Grammar;
and neither is 'Sentence';
even NP-of-S was passé in the 1980s

Where does Subject-Predicate structure come from?







Darcy is easy to please.

It is easy (for us) to please Darcy.

It is raining. There will be few people at the beach.

- 'Subject' is not a notion of Generative Grammar
- But human languages seem to really like predicates
 - every father is mortal
 - some big brown cow which they chased was from Texas
 - compare: which [they chased ____]
 - whonk [they _____ cows]
 - every Chris we know was between a Smith and a Jones
 - every chase is an event in which something is chased
 - some event was a
stabbing of Caesar that was done by Brutus in March

Where does Subject-Predicate structure come from?



Thoughts (Gedanken) have Function-Argument structure

‘Subject’ is not a notion of Serious Logic;
and unary Functions are just special cases

consider the Thought that
Zero precedes every positive number

Zero precedes every positive number

$\forall x:\text{PositiveNumber}(x)\{\text{Precedes}(0, x)\}$


$(x = 0) \vee \text{Precedes}(0, x)$

$\forall F[F(x) \equiv F(0)]$

$\iota y:\text{NumberOf}[y, \{z: \sim(z = z)\}]$


Ancestral:Predecessor(0, x)

the constituents of Fregean Thoughts
are massively relational



Zero precedes every positive number

$\forall x: \text{PositiveNumber}(x) \{ \text{Precedes}(\text{Zero}, x) \}$




- We introduce relational concepts like **NumberOf[x, F]**.
But we can imagine thinkers who use such concepts
to introduce **Number(x)** and **Zero**.
- A good language is not just for expressing concepts;
it lets you use old concepts to introduce new ones,
and thereby re-present contents in a new format.


Frege on
Definitions

A CASE STUDY OF SEMANTIC CONTENT

John Horty



Origins of Propositional Thought



- The notion of a Subject seems to be rooted in pre-linguistic cognition, as opposed to Grammar or Logic (or Meaning)
- But human languages really like predicates, as Aristotle and the Medieval Logicians suggested, even if predicates are not essential to Thought/Logic
- A language can let you use old concepts to introduce new ones, and thereby re-present contents in a new format



Origins of Propositional Thought



- Minds house modules, whose characteristic representations exhibit distinctive formats.
- These “informationally encapsulated” cognitive systems provide inputs to at least one “central” system.
- Minds deploy concepts that are systematically combinable.
- But how did modular minds come to have such concepts?



Where do Systematically Combinable Concepts come from?



- Minds house modules that employ proprietary vocabularies.
- Minds deploy concepts that are systematically combinable.

if you can think that

Al is blue, and Bo is green

Al saw Bo, and Cy heard Di

A dog barked, and every cat ran

Someone fell, and Al saw Bo

Big new ideas emerge rarely

you can also think that

Al is green, and Bo is blue

Di saw Al, and Bo heard Cy

Every cat barked, and a dog ran

Al fell, and Bo saw someone fall

Colorless green ideas sleep furiously

- But how did modular minds come to have concepts (or words) that are as combinable as words?


Putting the
question
crudely:

if modules 21
and 28
employ
their own
vocabularies

...


THE MODULARITY OF MIND

Jerry A. Fodor




how does any
central
system—say,
31—support
both
productive
combination
(within the
system)
and
interfaces
with diverse
modules?

How did there
come to be
a network
of concepts
that
interface with
disparate
modules,
and yet
combine as
freely as
words?



How did there
come to be
a network
of concepts
that
interface with
disparate
modules,
and yet
combine as
freely as
words?



How did there
come to be
lexical items
that are linked
(via concepts)
to disparate
modules,
and yet
combine so
freely?

Maybe a Human Language lets a child use **Prelexical Concepts**
(which may not be systematically combinable)
to introduce **Lexical Concepts**, which exhibit
a new format that supports systematic combinability

<**Prelexical Concept**, Pronunciation>



LEXICALIZER



<{**Prelexical Concept**, **Lexical Concept**}, Pronunciation>

No guarantee that any particular concept is lexicalizable.

But many concepts can be lexicalized.

(And on any plausible view, lexicalization is not merely a process of connecting concepts with pronunciations.)

<Prelexical Concept, Pronunciation>




LEXICALIZER



<{Prelexical Concept, Lexical Concept}, Pronunciation>

Origins of Propositional Thought






Maybe...

Subject-Predicate is an ancient form of mental sentence.

Our natural modes of relational thought are limited;
to combine relational concepts systematically,
Frege had to invent a language for this very purpose.

But humans acquire words that let us build predicates and
thereby use an ancient form of thought more systematically.

Subjects, Predicates, and Systematicity



THANKS